













# THE GREAT WORLD WAR









FROM A PHOTOGRAPH

BY BASSANO.

*H. M. King George V.*

# THE GREAT WORLD WAR

## A HISTORY

*Editor:*

FRANK A. MUMBY

*Contributors:*

ERNEST A. VIZETELLY · DAVID · HANNAY  
C. GRAHAME-WHITE · HARRY · HARPER  
· EDWIN · SHARPE · GREW · & · OTHERS ·



VOLUME · I

THE GRESHAM PUBLISHING COMPANY  
34 · SOUTHAMPTON · STREET · STRAND · LONDON

1915

## NOTE

The chapters or sections are initialled by the several contributors, namely:—

- |          |                       |
|----------|-----------------------|
| F. A. M. | Frank A. Mumby.       |
| E. A. V. | Ernest A. Vizetelly.  |
| D. H.    | David Hannay.         |
| C. G.-W. | Claude Grahame-White. |
| H. H.    | Harry Harper.         |
| A. W.    | Arthur Waugh.         |
| E. S. G. | Edwin Sharpe Grew.    |
| G. T.    | George Turnbull.      |



## PREFACE

---

In the present work the editor's aim has been to present a comprehensive account of the Great World War, embracing the facts, ideas, and motives that led up to it, and the chief events in the different fields of operation. He has been fortunate in securing collaborators having exceptional qualifications for dealing with the subject in its various aspects. Among them, Mr. Ernest A. Vize-telly, who follows the course of the land operations, is familiar with most of the battlefields of Europe, and was himself an eye-witness of many of the dramatic incidents in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, his experiences being vividly recorded in his reminiscences, *My Days of Adventures*, and other works. He has personal knowledge of Germany and Austria, and has been in close touch with most of the recent military developments at home and abroad. The naval operations are described by Mr. David Hannay, who has made a life-long study of Britain's naval position and policy, and is well known for his various works on the navy.

"The War in the Air", which has played such a new and effective part in the operations, both by land and sea, is dealt with by Mr. Claude Grahame-White—famous among flyers—in collaboration with Mr. Harry Harper.

Of the remaining contributors whose work will be found in this and subsequent volumes, it need only be said that each has specialized in his particular subject, and has gone to the best available sources for his facts.

That no mistake has crept in is more than can be hoped, but the claim may be made for the work that no effort has been spared, on the part alike of editor, authors, and publishers, to produce a worthy record of the greatest war in the history of mankind.

FRANK A. MUMBY.

15th January, 1915.



# CONTENTS

## VOLUME I

	Page
INTRODUCTION: EVENTS THAT LED UP TO THE WAR - - - - -	I
CHAPTER	
I. THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR: THE WAR IN THE WEST (August, 1914) -	15
II. MOVEMENT OF THE FLEETS (August, 1914) - - - - -	53
III. THE WORK OF THE AIR-CRAFT (August-September, 1914)- - - -	75
IV. THE DEVASTATION OF BELGIUM (August-September, 1914) - - -	92
V. THE COLONIES AND INDIA (August-September, 1914) - - - -	98
VI. JAPAN'S SHARE IN THE WAR (August-October, 1914) - - - -	109
VII. THE GERMAN DASH FOR PARIS (August-September, 1914) - - -	113
VIII. THE BATTLES OF THE MARNE AND THE AISNE (September-October, 1914)	130
IX. AIR-CRAFT IN THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN (September-October, 1914) -	148
X. SUBMARINES AND COMMERCE-DESTROYERS (September, 1914) - - -	165
XI. THE ATTACK ON GERMAN COLONIES (August-October, 1914) - - -	190
XII. THE FAR EAST AND NEAR EAST (August-November, 1914) - - -	206
XIII. THE WAR IN EASTERN EUROPE (August-September, 1914) - - -	225
XIV. THE COMMAND OF THE NORTH SEA (October-November, 1914)- - -	234
XV. THE FALL OF ANTWERP (September-October, 1914) - - - -	252
XVI. FROM THE AISNE TO THE LYS (October, 1914) - - - - -	263
XVII. FIGHTING FOR THE CHANNEL COAST (October, 1914) - - - -	273
XVIII. THE NAVAL AIR RAID ON FRIEDRICHSHAFEN (November 21, 1914) -	288
XIX. THE CRUISER WAR IN DISTANT SEAS (November, 1914) - - -	299
XX. THE REVOLT IN SOUTH AFRICA (August-December, 1914)- - -	310
XXI. THE TURKISH CAMPAIGN (November-December, 1914) - - - -	324
ARMIES AND NAVIES AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR - - - - -	52
CONSPECTUS OF ARMY ORGANIZATION - - - - -	223





# LIST OF PLATES

---

## VOLUME I

---

### PHOTOGRAVURES

H.M. KING GEORGE V - - - - -	<i>Frontispiece</i>
ALBERT, KING OF THE BELGIANS - - - - -	<i>Facing p. 120</i>
IMPERIAL COUSINS: THE TSAR NICHOLAS II AND H.M. KING GEORGE V   ,,	232

---

### COLOURED MAPS AND PLANS

	Page
CENTRAL EUROPE - - - - -	8
BELGIUM AND NORTHERN FRANCE - - - - -	24
SKETCH OF THE CHIEF OPERATIONS NEAR MONS AND CHARLEROI - - -	48
PLAN OF THE GREAT RETREAT FROM MONS - - - - -	126
NORTHERN FRANCE, ILLUSTRATING THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN - - - -	148
POLITICAL MAP OF AFRICA - - - - -	192
EAST EUROPEAN THEATRE OF WAR - - - - -	228
SOUTH AFRICA - - - - -	314
BLACK SEA, BOSPHORUS, AND DARDANELLES - - - - -	328





# THE GREAT WORLD WAR

## VOLUME I

---

### INTRODUCTION

#### EVENTS THAT LED UP TO THE WAR

Germany's Lust for World Power—Teaching of Bernhardt, Nietzsche, and Treitschke—Germany's Aims at World Domination—France and Russia to be crushed, then Britain—Doubt as to Germany's Allies—The Assassination that Led up to the War—Austria's Demands on Serbia—Germany backs up Austria-Hungary—Sir Edward Grey's Efforts—Germany's Bid for Britain's Neutrality—Germany's Offer rejected—Efforts of Tsar in Behalf of Peace—Germany plunges into War—Sir Edward Grey's Final Efforts—Neutrality of Belgium—German Ultimatum to Belgium—Great British Interests Involved—Question of Britain's Neutrality—Britain's Honour Pledged on Behalf of Belgium—Britain's Ultimatum to Germany—Germany's Envenomed Feeling towards Britain.

NOW that the diplomatic documents have been published, and the clouds dispersed from the first grim battlefields of the Great War, it is possible to treat historically the antecedents of the struggle, and to view the critical days of August, 1914, in their true perspective. We knew from the first that Great Britain embarked upon this war thrice armed through having her quarrel just; that she strove for peace to the very last, risking precious hours when every minute was vital to the success of her contingent co-operation with France; but not until the publication of the White Papers by the British Foreign Office, and the Orange Book by the Russian Government, together with

Germany's open contempt for her pledged word and all the laws of honourable warfare, could we fully realize that Great Britain had never drawn the sword in a more righteous conflict. There is still much on the diplomatic side of the struggle which can only be seen as through a glass darkly, but the facts regarding Britain's attitude throughout are incontrovertible, in spite of Germany's clumsy attempts to condemn us on the charges of double-dealing and insincerity. To anyone not blinded by prejudice, the chain of evidence issued since the outbreak of hostilities fixes upon Germany and Austria-Hungary—and especially upon Germany—the full responsibility of shattering the

peace of the world. All this evidence, however, bears only upon the ostensible cause of the war—Austria's quarrel with Serbia, which might easily have been settled by arbitration—and its inevitable consequences. The real springs lie elsewhere. They are to be traced in the deeper fountains of Germany's history since the war of 1870; in the new Imperialism of the Hohenzollern dynasty; and in the arrogant lust for world-power of the German War Party.

In this ungovernable ambition Germany stands condemned out of the mouths of her own dictators. War, according to General von Bernhardi, who revealed the thoughts and faith of his race with amazing frankness in his several books on the subject, had become for Germany a biological necessity of the first importance. "War is the father of all things", he quoted, and since Germany had to expand or perish, and could only expand at the cost of other nations, she must hack out her destiny by force of arms. Germany's historical mission, according to the same teaching, was nothing less than the ultimate conquest of the globe. It was to be world-power or downfall, and no German brought up on this doctrine had the least doubt as to the issue.

Bernhardi, whose books, though generally ignored before, have opened the eyes of so many thousands of Britons since the war began, writes partly under the influence of Nietzsche, but more particularly under that of the historian and publicist Heinrich von Treitschke. These two are the chief apostles—the one with his materialistic

philosophy and gospel of unbridled freedom, and the other with his implacable hatred of Britain—who have moulded the mind of modern Germany. Treitschke held that a nation without colonies was destined no longer to count among the Great Powers of Europe, however powerful it might otherwise be; and it maddened him to compare Britain's world-wide Empire with Germany's barren wastes abroad. Treitschke's teaching fell on fruitful soil. Britain was regarded as for ever standing in the course of Germany's rightful "place in the sun".

It is essential to distinguish broadly between Prussia and Germany in this connection. We had no particular quarrel before the war with the German nation as a whole, which had won conquests in the realms of science, scholarship, and commerce of which it had every reason to be proud, and was regarded as a quiet, domestic race that would have been wholly admirable if left to itself. It was not against this Germany that we drew the sword; it was against the mail-fisted, military caste of Prussia. Treitschke's definition of the German ideal was to the effect that since the greatness of Germany had been attained by the governance of Germany by Prussia, so the greatness and glory of the world were to be attained only by the supremacy of the German mind. This policy of aggression and of domination, as Lord Rosebery has said, is entirely, in its inception and in its history, Prussian and nothing else. Hence flowed the bitter animosity against Great Britain, and the whole British Empire, an Empire, it was alleged, built on the

shifting sands of pretence and hypocrisy, and doomed to destruction. First, however, it was necessary for Germany to dispose of the enemies at her gates. France—in the brutally candid words of Bernhardt's *Germany and the Next War*—since she declined to be won by cajolery, “must be so completely crushed that she can never again come across our path”. Russia, not only as the ally of France, but also as the champion of the Slav peoples, ready if need be to test the vital question whether South-Eastern Europe should be lost to Russian influence, was to be kept at bay until the swift death-blow had been dealt to France; and when in due course Russia, beaten to her knees, had been taught that her rightful place was not in Europe, but in Asia, then, and not till then, would “The Day” arrive to which German fire-eaters had been drinking for years—the day on which Germany was to settle her long account with the enemy of enemies, Great Britain.

The gravest danger to Germany

was that, notwithstanding the Triple Alliance, she might be forced to stand alone against all her enemies at once. Bernhardt admitted that possibility in *How Germany Makes War*, when he pointed out that neither Italy nor Austria was bound to support Germany in her dream of world-power; that the Triple Alliance was purely defensive. Hence the eagerness with which Germany supported Austria's quarrel with little Serbia over the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife. Italy might be lost to the alliance, but Germany was at least sure of Austria in such a cause, and would thus be in a position, according to Bernhardt, to win the day against any opposing forces.

It is only when we come to grips with these fundamental facts that we can hope to follow the tortuous paths of diplomacy in the dramatic events which led finally to the throwing down of the gauntlet by Germany at the very moment when the peace of Europe was still hanging in the balance. The



Britain's Bulwarks at Torbay before the War: Firing the Royal Salute

Archduke and his morganatic wife, it will be remembered, were assassinated on 28th June at Serajevo, the capital of the Balkan province of Bosnia, once part of the ancient kingdom of Serbia. Bosnia, with Herzegovina, after remaining for centuries in the hands of the Turks, had been placed under the administration of Austria by the Berlin Treaty of 1878, and Austria, taking advantage of the revolution in Turkey, and the fact that Russia had not yet recovered from her disastrous war with Japan, formally annexed the provinces in 1908. Herein lay the origin of "the crime of Serajevo". Serbia naturally resented the appropriation of territory which she had hoped, at long last, to restore to its original sovereignty, but no legal proof has been produced in support of Austria's charge against her of complicity in the crime of 28th June. That assassination was a dastardly act which no nation, least of all Great Britain, could seek to defend. As Sir Edward Grey has said, "the murder of the Archduke, and some of the circumstances quoted in the Austro-Hungarian Note respecting Serbia, roused sympathy with Austria". But that Note, or rather ultimatum, was couched in such terms as to leave little room for doubt that more was intended by it than the mere humiliation of Serbia. It is needless to mention all the demands made by the Austro-Hungarian Government, but they included a declaration to the Serbian army condemning Serbian propaganda against Austria-Hungary; and an undertaking to suppress any publication which ventured to print anything tending to the same end; to

remove from the army and administrative departments all officers and officials whose names and misdeeds in this connection the Austro-Hungarian Government would itself communicate to Serbia; and to admit the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian officials in the proceedings to be taken against those suspected of supporting the anti-Austrian movement. "I have never before", again to quote Sir Edward Grey, "seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character"; yet the Serbian Government, acting on the pacific advice of Russia, who also admitted frankly that "the demands were reasonable enough in some cases", conceded every stipulation made by the Austrians, save certain points which threatened her very maintenance as an independent sovereignty, offering to submit these last to the judgment of the Hague Tribunal. It was a reply which, in the words of our Foreign Secretary, "involved the greatest humiliation that he had ever seen a country undergo"; but even this humiliation was not enough to satisfy the Austrians, backed as they were by their German allies. Austria accordingly declared war against Serbia on 28th July.

All the facts since disclosed point to the conclusion that Russia was right in declaring that Austria's ultimatum was not directed against Serbia alone, and that she must have received encouragement from Germany before taking so grave a step. The German Foreign Secretary admitted to Sir Horace Rumbold, in Berlin, on 25th July, that the Serbian Government





"The Crime of Serajevo"—the ostensible Cause of the War: the Arrest after the Assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his Wife

"could not swallow certain of the Austro-Hungarian demands"; but Germany made no serious effort to suggest a compromise. The key to the situation in those momentous days of July may be found in the Orange Book published by the Russian Foreign Office, in a telegram from the Russian Ambassador at the Austrian Court, stating that "Austria, influenced by the assurances of the German Ambassador at Vienna, who, throughout the crisis, has played the rôle of an instigator, counted on the probability of the localization of her conflict with Serbia, and on the possibility of striking her a severe blow with impunity".

"Germany", as this same German Ambassador in Vienna told the British representative, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, "knew very well what she was about in backing up Austria-Hungary in this matter". Sir Edward Grey, having

applied without avail for an extension of the time-limit for Serbia, now appealed for a joint conference of the Powers not directly interested, to discuss the possibility of mediation and the best means of averting a situation so fraught with disaster. France and Italy were both favourable to this idea. Russia declared herself "quite ready to stand aside and leave the question in the hands of England, France, Germany, and Italy"—the four Powers chosen by Sir Edward Grey as having no direct interests in the Balkans. Germany alone refused to co-operate. "The question at issue was one for settlement between Serbia and Austria alone" declared the German Government, though as well aware as anyone that the whole peace of Europe was at stake.

That was on 27th July, and events now rushed to the inevitable end.

Once the Tsar partially mobilized his army in defence, if necessary, of Serbia—a nation for which Russians had shed their blood many times before—the tension between Russia and Germany became much greater than between Russia and Austria. In vain Sir Edward Grey strove to prevent the strain from reaching breaking-point. On behalf of the British Government he had declined from the first to bind Great Britain to Russia and her ally France on the Serbian question, as “not one in which we felt called to take a hand. It would then”, as he told M. Cambon, the French Ambassador, on 29th July, “be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav—a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans—and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question. If Germany became involved, and France became involved, we had not made up our minds what we should do; it was a case that we should have to consider. France would then have been drawn into a quarrel which was not hers, but in which, owing to her alliance, her honour and interest obliged her to engage. We were free from engagements, and we should have to decide what British interests required us to do.” For, as the Foreign Minister disclosed to the world in his historic speech in the House of Commons on 3rd August, Great Britain was not only free from all binding agreements of the kind, but did not even know the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance. The Triple Entente, indeed, was merely a diplomatic group, with a definite understanding that the naval



The Right Hon. Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Minister  
(From a photograph by Campbell Gray)

and military “conversations”—which admittedly had taken place between Great Britain and France—did not bind either Government, or restrict their freedom of action in any way.

Whether Germany expected our neutrality or not on this occasion remains a disputed point, just as it is impossible at present to say to what extent Germany counted on the Irish crisis to tie Great Britain's hands; but Sir Edward Grey himself made it clear to the German Ambassador, on 29th July, that if the issue became such “that we thought British interests required us to intervene, we must intervene at once, and the decision would have to be very rapid”. Nevertheless, on the same day, he continued his ceaseless efforts for peace by an appeal to the German Chancellor in

the following terms: "If he can induce Austria to satisfy Russia, and to abstain from going so far as to come into collision with her, we shall all join in deep gratitude to His Excellency for having saved the peace of Europe".

It was on this very day (29th July) that the German Government—deceived, perhaps, by these strenuous, whole-hearted efforts into a belief that Great Britain was ready to bargain away her honour—that the German Chancellor, just returned to Berlin from Potsdam, made that bid for British neutrality which Mr. Asquith has justly described as "infamous". This offer must be preserved in the words of the British Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, to whom it was made:—

"The Chancellor said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main

principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain could never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain was certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue. I questioned His Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar understanding in that respect. As regards Holland, however, His Excellency said that, so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany."

The offer was as stupendously stupid as "infamous". It pre-supposed that Great Britain was capable of running away from all her obligations of honour and interest while Germany was doing her best to crush France for ever. It also proved the measure of Germany's own unscrupulousness, and the standard of morality attained by the German doctrine that "war is a necessity, and necessity knows no law". What, too, were promises worth from a Power prepared at that very moment to violate its own treaty obligations? The offer was of course repudiated.

"His Majesty's Government", replied our Foreign Secretary on 30th July, "cannot for one moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind



The Right Hon. H. H. Asquith, Prime Minister  
(From a photograph by Thomson)



themselves to neutrality on such terms. What he asks us in effect is to engage and stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten, so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies. From the material point of view the proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy. Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace to us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover. The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either."

Even then Sir Edward Grey did not abandon his rôle as peacemaker. In the same carefully-guarded letter he held out a promise that if the peace of Europe could be preserved, and the present crisis passed, he would do his utmost to promote some new scheme—hitherto too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals—by which Germany could be assured that no aggressive policy would be pursued against her or her allies by the Triple Entente, severally or collectively. The Foreign Secretary went further than this on the following day, when he promised the German Ambassador that if Germany would only put forward some reasonable proposal for settling the existing differences, he would not only support it both at Petrograd—as St. Petersburg has since been re-named—and Paris, but go the length of saying that if Russia and France declined to accept it,

Great Britain would have nothing more to do with the consequences.

Instead of formulating any plan of the kind, Germany sent an ultimatum to Russia that very day, threatening instant mobilization unless notified within twelve hours that Russia had stopped every measure of war; and an ultimatum to France demanding a statement of her attitude in the event of a Russo-German conflict. Messages—since printed in the German White Book—had meantime passed between the Kaiser and the Tsar upon the German Emperor's return to Potsdam on 27th July from his cruise in Northern Waters. On 29th July the Tsar urged him "in the name of our old friendship to do all in your power to restrain your ally from going too far". The Kaiser replied on the same day to the effect that he held Austria-Hungary justified in attacking Serbia, "Austria-Hungary knowing from experience that the promises of Serbia, as long as they are merely on paper, are entirely unreliable"—words which recoil with sledge-hammer blows when we remember that Germany must already have planned that base betrayal of Belgium which has stained her name for ever in the eyes of the civilized world.

On 1st August came the personal appeal of King George to the Tsar to "remove the apprehension" which had occurred in Germany regarding the Russian mobilization, and offering to do "everything in His Majesty's power to re-open the interrupted negotiations between the Powers concerned". "I would gladly have accepted your proposals", replied the Tsar, "had not



# CENTRAL EUROPE







the German Ambassador this afternoon presented a note to my Government declaring War." Thus, in little more than a week from the time that Austria presented her ultimatum to Serbia, and just when new hopes were rising of a peaceful understanding between Austria and Russia, Germany, taking the whole matter into her hand, plunged into war. Only the day previously, at the suggestion of Sir Edward Grey, Russia had modified the terms on which she was prepared to stop her military preparations. The Russian Foreign Minister, as revealed in the Orange Book, then acknowledged the firm and friendly tone of Sir Edward's language in negotiating with Germany and Austria on the subject, "thanks to which the hope of finding a pacific solution is still not lost". At midnight, however, on this momentous day, the German Ambassador presented the Russian Foreign Minister with Germany's ultimatum, following this up the next day, since Russia declined to assent to that peremptory summons, with her formal declaration of war. Between Austria and Russia, as Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British Ambassador, testifies in his most important dispatch, an arrangement had seemed almost in sight. The Austrian Ambassador at Petrograd had at length conceded the main points at issue by announcing to the Russian Foreign Secretary that Austria was willing to submit to mediation the points in the note to Serbia which seemed incompatible with the maintenance of Serbian independence. It only needed patience, tact, and a sincere desire for peace to clinch matters.

"Austria, in fact," writes Sir Maurice de Bunsen, "had finally yielded, and that she herself had at this point good hopes of a peaceful issue is shown by the communication made on 1st August by Count Mensdorff, to the effect that Austria had neither 'banged the door' on compromise, nor cut off the conversations. . . . Unfortunately these conversations at St. Petersburg and Vienna were cut short by the transfer of the dispute to the more dangerous ground of a direct conflict between Germany and Russia. Germany intervened on 31st July by means of her double ultimatums to St. Petersburg and Paris. The ultimatums were of a kind to which only one answer is possible. A few days' delay might in all probability have saved Europe from one of the greatest calamities in history."

Even then Sir Edward Grey did not abandon hope of preventing the outbreak from spreading, working for peace, as he confided to the Commons, up to the last moment, and beyond the last moment. As a sort of forlorn hope, it has since been stated, he sounded the German Ambassador on the telephone as to whether Germany would agree not to attack France if France remained neutral—a proposal which the German Government appears erroneously to have accepted as a promise that Great Britain was prepared to force France into neutrality. This, of course, was never Sir Edward Grey's intention, and the idea was dropped without reaching a stage at which it was worth discussing the matter with France herself. The French reply on 1st August to Germany's ultimatum demanding knowledge of her intentions in the event of a Russo-German War was brief but to the point: "France would do that which her interests dictated".

## The Great World War

So far as Britain was concerned, the crucial point now centred in the fate of Belgium, the neutrality and independence of which had been guaranteed by the Treaty of 1839, signed by Prussia as well as by Great Britain, France, Russia, and Austria, and confirmed in writing by Bismarck in 1870. The sanctity of this treaty remained

Three or four days after that document of thanks, as Mr. Lloyd George recalled in the speech delivered at the Queen's Hall, London, on September 19, the French army, wedged up against the Belgian frontier by a ring of flame from the Prussian troops, preferred overwhelming disaster to the breaking of their pledge. Had



Britain's Call to Arms: City of London Recruits for Kitchener's Army cheering Lord Roberts at the Tower

as binding as in the crisis of the Franco-Prussian War, when Great Britain's firm stand for the strict observance of the bond by both belligerents was gratefully acknowledged by the whole Belgian people. That acknowledgment found expression at the time in the message to Queen Victoria, declaring that "next to the unalterable attachment of the Belgian people to their independence, the strongest sentiment which fills their hearts is that of an imperishable gratitude to the people of Great Britain".

they violated Belgian neutrality, the whole course of that humiliating war might have been changed. France preferred to keep her word.

As soon as the new and greater crisis came to a head in the summer of 1914, Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Paris and Berlin for assurances that these treaty rights regarding Belgium would be respected in the event of war. That was on 31st July. France returned the required assurance at once. Germany declined, on the ambiguous plea that any reply it might

give "could not fail, in the event of war, to have the undesirable effect of disclosing, to a certain extent, part of their plan of campaign". The truth was, of course, that Germany had all along arranged to pour her troops into France by the quick cut through Belgium. The necessity for this was admitted by Herr von Jagow, the German Foreign Secretary, to Sir Edward Goschen, on 4th August. On that day Germany sent her ultimatum to Belgium, demanding a promise for the safe passage of her troops through Belgian territory, and threatening, in case of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy. This demand was categorically refused as a flagrant violation of the law of nations, the King of the Belgians himself making at the same time a supreme appeal to the British Government for diplomatic intervention. Since diplomacy had already failed hopelessly to move the German Government in the matter, it remained for Great Britain either to maintain her proud traditions as the champion of little nations, and of Right against Might, or to hide her head in unutterable shame while Germany rode rough-shod over her innocent neighbour. That championship alone was justification enough for what Great Britain did. But Britain's own interests were also involved, no less than those of Belgium and France. Sir Edward Grey put the case in a nutshell when he asked the House of Commons, on 3rd August, to consider what the country had at stake. If France were beaten in a struggle for life and death, and if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence,

and then Holland, and then Denmark (for it could only be a question of time with all these smaller nations), then we should have to consider what Gladstone called "the common interests against the unmeasured aggrandizement of any Power whatever"—and that power would be just opposite to us. Unconditional neutrality on Britain's part was therefore out of the question. As in 1870, we could not think it right—again to quote the words of Gladstone—"even if it were safe, to announce that we would in any case stand by with folded arms and see actions done which would amount to a total extinction of public right in Europe". We were under obligations of honour both to France and Belgium in the present case. The sudden crisis found the northern and western coasts of France absolutely at the mercy of the German fleet. France, through the strengthening of her friendship with Britain, knowing that she had nothing to fear from us, had concentrated her fleet in the Mediterranean, where Britain, on her part, no longer kept a fleet equal alone to deal with a possible combination of hostile naval forces. Had we declared for neutrality, and had France then withdrawn her Mediterranean fleet, our trade routes and vital interests there might at any moment have been exposed to the gravest danger. On 3rd August, therefore, Sir Edward Grey gave to the French ambassador the following historic statement:—

"I am authorized to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into the Channel, or through the North Sea, to



undertake hostile operations against the French coast or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power."

Sir Edward Grey was careful to explain that this was not a declaration of war, but as binding us to take action should that particular contingency arise. It was the German invasion of Belgium which clinched matters.

Germany must have known that war with Britain was inevitable once she broke her written pledge not to violate Belgian neutrality. It is true that the French ambassador in Berlin had telegraphed to Paris on 31st July, saying that it was the uncertainty with regard to Britain's attitude which was the encouraging element in Berlin, and that if only we would declare definitely on the Franco-Russian side it would decide Germany in favour of peace. But Sir Edward Grey disputes this as being altogether wrong. "I had not only definitely declined to remain neutral," he wrote to the British ambassador to Paris on the same day on being informed of that telegram, "I had even gone so far this morning as to say to the German ambassador that, if France and Germany become involved in war we should be drawn into it"; and he was convinced, as he said in another message of the same date, that "the German Government did not expect our neutrality". In the face of this it is difficult to account for the German Chancellor's agitation in his farewell interview with the British ambassador on 4th August, except either as a piece of clumsy, melodramatic acting or as an example of prodigious,

miscalculated folly. Sir Edward Goschen, during that fateful afternoon—the German troops having crossed into Belgium that morning—had delivered Great Britain's ultimatum to the effect that unless the Kaiser's Government could give the assurance by twelve o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier, and stop their advance, his Majesty's Government would take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves. The ambassador found the Imperial Chancellor very agitated, and was harangued by him for about twenty minutes. Dr. Von Bethmann-Hollweg



The Emperor Franz Josef of Austria-Hungary  
(From a photograph by Pietzner)





The War of the Franco-Prussian War: Decorated Battery of French Artillery leaving Versailles for the Front

declared that Britain's action was terrible to a degree:

"Just for a word—'neutrality', a word which in war-time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper, Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her . . . what we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man down from behind whilst he was fighting for life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen."

Sir Edward Goschen naturally protested against this, declaring that just as His Excellency wished him to believe that it was a matter of life and death to Germany to violate Belgian territory, so it was life and death for Britain's honour that she should keep her solemn obligations, and do her utmost to defend Belgian neutrality. It is true that Luxemburg, whose neutrality had been guaranteed in the same way as that of Belgium, had been invaded by the German troops on 2nd August, in spite of Luxemburg's protest; but since that

little State, unlike Belgium, made no appeal to the other Powers, and was regarded as falling within the French sphere of protection, Great Britain was justified in awaiting further developments before declaring war. These developments came with the invasion of Belgium on 4th August, resulting, as already stated, in Britain's ultimatum to Germany, demanding a reply by midnight. Midnight sounded, and with it, as all the world knows, came no reply. Desperate efforts have since been made by Germany to throw the blame for the invasion upon France. French troops, it has been alleged, had already entered Belgium when the Germans crossed the frontier. This statement, however, is unfounded. We are nearer the truth in the Chancellor's speech in the Reichstag on this 4th of August, quoted in *The Times*, to the following effect: "We are now in a state of necessity, and necessity knows no law. Our troops have occupied Luxemburg, and perhaps are already on Belgian soil. Gentlemen, that is contrary to the dictates of international law. . . .



The German Ambassador's Last Call  
Prince Lichnowsky knocking at the door of the Foreign  
Office, London, on the eve of the Declaration of War.

The wrong—I speak openly—that we are committing we will endeavour to make good as soon as our military goal has been reached. Anybody who is threatened as we are threatened, and is fighting for his highest possessions, can only have one thought—how he is to hack his way through.”

That Bernhardt's books represent the views of the dominating party in Germany has been abundantly demonstrated not only by the strategy of the war, but also by the venomous threats published by the Junker leaders

since the outbreak of hostilities. “Any suggestion of an understanding with England,” wrote Count Reventlow on 3rd September in the *Deutsche Tages Zeitung*, “until the British Empire lies at the feet of Germany, is a danger to the future of the German Empire”; and on the following day Vice-Admiral Kirchoff, in the *Hamburger Fremdenblatt*, similarly avowed that Germany's main task was to crush “the perfidious Albion, the most pernicious of all political enemies. . . . The task,” it was admitted—to quote from the translation printed in *The Times* on 17th September—“is not an easy one, but it is a task worth all the sacrifices it will demand. . . . German military and maritime forces are now ready in the North Sea, and on the coast of the Channel, to throw themselves on England, and to destroy it by all means at their disposal by water, in the air, and on land, as well as by the forces of gold and economics. And Germany, whether after a short or a long struggle, is going to accomplish this, and we shall not rest until we have gained our object.” These typical extracts, inspired doubtless by the Kaiser's reputed order to his troops on 19th August, “to exterminate first the treacherous English, and walk over General French's contemptible little Army”, should serve to shatter any lingering doubts—if doubts on the subject can still exist in British minds—as to the life-and-death nature of the struggle.

F. A. M.

## CHAPTER I

THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR: THE WAR  
IN THE WEST

(August, 1914)

Brialmont, the Belgian Military Engineer—The Strength of the Respective Armies—The French Army of the Present Day—Liège—The Surrender of Liège—Germans make Rapid Progress in Belgium—The King and People of Belgium—Early Operations in France—General Joffre—Other Prominent French Officers—Fighting in Alsace-Lorraine—The Germans at Dinant—Lord Kitchener—Other British Commanders—Royal Flying Corps—Despatch of Expeditionary Force—Germans Occupy Brussels—The British Expeditionary Force.

SEVERAL years ago, during one of those anxious moments when everybody feared that ill-feeling between France and Germany might lead to the outbreak of a great war such as that which is now convulsing most of Europe, it was the writer's good fortune to have a conversation with the great Belgian military engineer, General Louis Alexis Henri Brialmont, who, when only a captain, had prepared the scheme for the defence of Antwerp, and in later days had devised the forts of Liège and Namur in order to guard the passage of the Meuse. For many years Brialmont and other leading Belgian officers and politicians were at variance respecting the steps which ought to be taken for the defence of their country; and, although Brialmont had the support of King Leopold II, he would never have been able to carry out even some of his plans if Prince Bismarck, while speaking in the German Reichstag at the time when General Boulanger's ascendancy in France seemed to threaten the continuancy of peace, had not hinted at the possible position of Bel-

gium if another Franco-German war should occur. That hint led to the fortification of the Meuse, the forts of Liège and Namur being constructed between 1888 and 1891.

General Brialmont also stated that he had long been doubtful whether France or Germany would be the first to enter Belgium, but, said he, "I am convinced that the 'neutrality' of our territory is nowadays a mere figure of speech employed by diplomatists, and that it will not be respected in the event of another Franco-German war. My long disputes with our ministers and others were due to our different views on that subject. Because our neutrality was respected in 1870-71, it was held that it would be respected if another war should begin, and that we should act foolishly in saddling ourselves with heavy expenses in order to meet a contingency which would never arise. I wrote and spoke on the subject frequently during many years, but without convincing the majority of my compatriots. I pleaded for an increase in our effective as well as for certain fortifications. Our army is still very imperfectly organized, and



if war should come we may have to pay a very heavy price for our neglect."

At the time of this conversation with General Brialmont, everything already indicated that the violation of Belgian territory would come from Germany, France having strengthened her eastern frontier to such a degree that an invasion on that side had become difficult. "The north-eastern frontier is more vulnerable," said Brialmont, "particularly between Mézières and Dun-sur-Meuse, a distance of some 40 miles. The weakest part of that line is between Stenay and Consenvoye, a distance of about 20 miles, and this weak point would probably be the objective of any German army coming by way of the Grand-Duchy of Luxemburg. But," added the old general, "the Germans would not merely violate the neutrality of Luxemburg in order to fall on Longwy, Montmédy, and Verdun, and then strike westward, they would also enter our territory, descend the valley of the Meuse, and, on reaching France—probably near Chimay—follow, in part, the valley of the Oise, in order to advance on Paris as rapidly as possible." With a map before him, the general, who although a septuagenarian was still full of fire and shrewdness, pointed out the configuration of the ground, the roads most favourable for rapid marching, and the railway lines which would be helpful in pressing forward to the French capital. He directed my attention to certain localities—Soissons, Compiègne, Creil, Senlis, and Chantilly—and added: "The next march on Paris will lie that way."

Recent occurrences have fully demonstrated the accuracy of his forecast in its broad lines. The causes of the present gigantic conflict having been fully explained elsewhere, it need only be said here that hostilities were at first limited to the Austrians and the Serbians, the former declaring war on the latter on 28th July, and on the morrow beginning to bombard Belgrade, which city the Serbian Government had quitted for Nish a few days previously. Every endeavour to stop the conflict failed. With the exception of Great Britain and Italy, all the Great Powers at once began to mobilize their forces, and war in the west as well as in the east of Europe became inevitable. Italy remaining neutral, Germany and Austria, the other members of the Triple Alliance, found themselves confronted in the east by Russia and Serbia, while on the west Germany was opposed by France and Belgium, who were soon reinforced by Great Britain.

Ever since 1870-71 the German army had been regarded as the most powerful and perfect military machine in Europe. In 1913, owing chiefly to Franco-German rivalry, its peace effective was increased by a special law from 544,000 to over 660,000 men, irrespective of first reserves, which were expected to bring the total to about 850,000 men, with more than 35,000 officers. The peace forces were divided into 25 army corps, 19 being supplied by Prussia and the small States under her absolute military control, 3 by Bavaria, 2 by Saxony, and 1 by Würtemberg. The peace establishment in 1913 included

106 brigades of infantry (a few of them being of 3, but most of them of 2 regiments each), 55 brigades of cavalry, 50 brigades of field-artillery, and 235 machine-gun companies. Additions to all of the foregoing followed the law of 1913. It was then estimated, moreover, that, inclusive of various reserves, such as the Land-

immediate war-forces foreseen by Germany and Austria amounted to about 7,800,000 troops.

With respect to mere numbers, Russia alone could put into the field a far more formidable army, her resources in men being almost without limit; but unless she received assistance it might be difficult for her to



The French Call to Arms: Reservists joining the Colours in Paris

wehr and the Landsturm, Germany would, in the event of war, easily be able to bring into the field some 4,300,000 men.

On a peace footing the army of Germany's ally, Austria, comprised only 396,000 men, distributed among 16 army corps, 4 of these belonging to Hungary, 2 to Bohemia, and 2 to Galicia. On a war footing the effective was expected to reach 2,500,000, an additional million being represented by the Landsturm and various untrained men. It follows that the total

provide adequate armament and equipment for all the millions of fighters whom her vast empire should enable her to raise. From 1911 onward her annual contingent was about 450,000 men, irrespective of 16,500 Cossacks, her total peace effective amounting to 1,200,000 men, of whom, however, not more than 850,000 were garrisoned in her European territory. In October, 1913, she had, altogether, 37 army corps, with 24 cavalry divisions, under arms; these representing 353 different regiments. Mobilization



was then officially estimated to yield a total of four millions of men, including two millions of the first line, with 5000 guns. The Cossacks (some 60,000 in time of peace) were expected to number 177,000, with over 4000 officers, when mobilized. It is a mistake to think that the Cossacks are exclusively a cavalry force. The various contingents from the Don, the Amur, the Caucasus, and Turkestan include, when mobilized, 816 squadrons or sotnias, each of 125 horsemen, giving a total of 92,000; but the remaining men are divided into infantry and artillery, the artillery being provided with 250 guns.

There is little reliable information respecting the strength of the Serbian army, but it might be taken, perhaps, at 300,000 men, apart from territorials or others liable to a *levée en masse*. Small, however, though the actual Serbian effective might be, the first important incidents in her conflict with

Austria demonstrated the superiority of men having an actual experience of warfare over others who, although subjected to military training, had never previously been under fire. It seems unquestionable that Serbia owed her early successes over Austria to the lessons which her men learnt in the field during the Balkan wars.

We come now to the French army, whose numerical inferiority to the German forces led, in 1913, to a law by which the term of service, formerly reduced to two years, was again extended to three, in order that the number of men actually with the colours might be largely augmented. The measure was not adopted without violent opposition, but patriotic considerations fortunately prevailed, and France was able to raise her peace footing from 450,000 to about 650,000 men. Her chief trouble was due to the small increase in her population compared with that of Germany.



Mobilizing the Russian Army: the Tsar reviewing his Troops for the Front

In 1870-71 both countries had, approximately, the same number of people. At the last census, however, that of March, 1911, the French only numbered 39,600,000, whereas the Germans, in the previous year, amounted to 64,926,000. Only 3,500,000 people had been added to the French population in thirty-nine years. Under normal circumstances France might well have counted as many inhabitants, and have been able to provide in all lines as many combatants as Germany, but "racial suicide" had caused her to fall, numerically, to an inferior position.

It must be said, however, that the French army of to-day, taken in its totality, is, from a physical standpoint, infinitely superior to that of the time of Napoleon III and the National Defence Government. This is undoubtedly due, very largely, to the increasing popularity of outdoor games and sports among young French people. For military purposes France is divided in peace-time into nineteen regions, to each of which an army corps is assigned. Another corps is usually stationed in Algeria and Tunisia. At the end of 1913 there were 31,611 officers and 613,717 men with the colours, apart from the *gendarmérie* and the colonial forces. An additional colonial army of 26,000 men, mainly Senegalese with French officers, was also being raised for service, if necessary, in Algeria. The official estimate was that, at fully mobilized war strength, France would have about four million men, these including all her reserves. Following the mobilization in August, 1914, the number of French army corps was

increased. In war-time each army corps should consist of 2 divisions of infantry—each of 2 brigades, and each brigade including 2 regiments—together with a regiment of cavalry composed of from 4 to 6 squadrons, and 3 regiments of artillery, having between them about 120 guns. Attached to each army corps there should be 3 companies of engineers, a pontoon corps, a telegraph corps, and 3 companies of ambulance men; as well as ammunition and provision trains, with field-bakeries, droves of cattle, and spare horses to replace those killed in action. All those services, it was understood, were well organized when the Great World War began.

Belgium, which first had to bear the brunt of hostilities in the west of Europe, was then divided into four military circumscriptions. On a peace footing her army consisted of 3542 officers and 44,060 men, with 10,500 horses; but on a war footing she claimed to be able to dispose of about 100,000 men, with 22,000 horses and 2000 guns of all categories. In addition, she counted 2500 gendarmes, about a third of them being mounted, and over 46,000 civic guards, who, in war-time, would be increased to nearly 158,000. By a law passed in 1913 it was estimated that in a few years the total strength of the Belgian army, including garrison and auxiliary services, would be raised to about 350,000 men, but this and other measures of reorganization had been only partially effective in August, 1914.

As regards the British Expeditionary Force and its composition, its

effective at the outset may be taken at 100,000 men (two army corps with auxiliary services), and then glance at the total strength of the various belligerents. On one side we find Germany and Austria mustering in all some 7,800,000 men. On the other hand were Russia with a first estimated total of 4,000,000; Serbia with, perhaps, 400,000 all told; France with an army of 4,000,000; and Belgium with 100,000, irrespective of the civic guard. The whole force of Belgium and Serbia was before long actually brought into the field; but with the other countries engaged in the struggle this was certainly not the case. Russia did not at first put forth anything like her whole strength; we ourselves supplied but a tithe of the men whom we could produce with the help of our Overseas Dominions; and even France had many men in training to replace the losses at the front. Whatever additional levies might be at the disposal of Germany and Austria, it seemed certain that the advantage in numbers must ultimately rest with the Allies. Doubtless, Germany realized that such would be the case, particularly should Belgium resist and Great Britain hasten to her support. The Kaiser and his military advisers therefore resolved to act with the greatest rapidity, and to fall upon France and

crush her before dealing seriously with Russia, whom Austria would, for a time, be able to restrain.

The preliminaries of the conflict were ended in a few days. On 1st August Germany declared war on Russia, and on that same Saturday the first detachments of her western forces, which had been secretly mobilizing since 25th July—that is three



Heroes in Felt Hats: Belgian Civic Guards who helped to stay the German Advance

days before any such action on Russia's part—invaded the neutral Grand-Duchy of Luxemburg, with the intention of passing thence into north-eastern France. From that moment nothing could prevent the Great World War.

It was impossible for Luxemburg to offer the slightest resistance to the Germans. Extending over an area of a thousand square miles, the duchy had but 260,000 inhabitants, some 20,000 of whom dwelt in Luxemburg city, the fortifications of which were



demolished after the London Treaty of May, 1867, when the duchy's neutrality was solemnly guaranteed by Prussia, Austria, France, Great Britain, Russia, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands. At the outset of the war the entire armed force of Luxemburg was limited to one company of gendarmes, 155 strong, and one company of 240 volunteers, including 39 bandsmen—the whole having nine officers whose chief was a major bearing the celebrated name of Vandyck. The last Grand-Duke—William, son of Adolphe of Nassau, whose dominions, castles, and famous vineyards along the Rhine were filched from him by the present German Kaiser's "illustrious grandfather" after the Austro-Prussian War of 1866—left by his still-surviving consort, a Braganza princess, a family of six daughters, the eldest of whom, Marie Adelaide, a beautiful girl of twenty, became Grand-Duchess of Luxemburg in February, 1912. The youngest of her five sisters was born ten years previously.

Over the Moselle by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and into the remaining inheritance of those fatherless girls, who, with their cousin, Queen Wilhelmina of the Netherlands, are the last descendants of a renowned race, came the German troops, all spick and span in their new campaigning uniforms of a greenish-grey, and having with them an abundance of war supplies in armoured trains. Young Marie Adelaide could not withstand the irruption. Her ministers protested, but were told that Germany had no hostile intentions, merely being

solicitous respecting the working of the Luxemburg railway lines, which were connected with the German system, and were said to be threatened by a massing of French troops near Givet. Moreover, Germany promised an indemnity for any inconvenience to which Luxemburg might be put by an occupation of her territory. A part of that indemnity, it seems, was afterwards paid out of the many large sums extorted by the German soldiery from Belgian and French towns.

The talk of large French forces being massed at Givet was the first of many lies disseminated by German commanders during the earlier period of the war. Until the very last moment France strove to avoid all provocation. She actually withdrew her frontier forces to a distance of several miles within her territory, in order to prevent a conflict while any hope of peace remained. The Germans, however, profited by the withdrawal of the French to make several raids across the frontier. Already, on 31st July, they tore up the permanent way at Pagny-sur-Moselle and Moncel-sur-Seille. On 2nd and 3rd August they entered France at several points, some in the vicinity of Belfort and others near Lunéville and Longwy. The French at last retaliated by sallying into Alsace by the Schlucht pass through the Vosges, and a few shots were then exchanged. On the other hand, the Germans charged the French with dropping bombs on Nuremberg. An aviator appears to have flown over that city, but the bombs were a flight of German imagination. As yet neither country had declared war on



## The Great World War

the other. Germany only did so on 4th August, her ambassador, Baron von Schoen, having quitted Paris the previous night. At seven o'clock on the evening of 2nd August, however, Germany made her first demand on Belgium to allow her armies to pass through that country for the purpose of invading France. The demand being rejected, she proceeded to act by force of arms, having already assembled a large body of troops near Moresnet, on the frontier.

The two chief German bases were Cologne and Coblenz. The forces which entered Luxemburg came from the latter city via Trèves, and crossed the Grand-Duchy towards Arlôn in Belgium. At the same time troops

advanced from Metz and Strasburg to threaten the French eastern frontier. The army which entered Belgium from Moresnet and its vicinity—having reached that locality via Cologne—was composed of the 7th, 9th, and 10th army corps, commanded by General von Emmich, a veteran officer, sixty-six years old, who had seen service in the former Franco-German War. The 10th Corps belonged nominally to Hanover and Brunswick, but it does not follow that it was composed exclusively of Hanoverians and Brunswickers, for in certain instances the Germans draft men from many regions into the same regiment, in order to keep local feeling, and possibly disaffection, in check. Thus



The Germans' First Attempt to Strike Terror into Belgian Hearts: the invaders at Visé, with the civilian population (shown in the hollow) under arrest, after the town had been committed to the flames



How the German Advance on Liège was Checked: the Bridge across the Meuse at Visé, blown up by the Belgians

Poles, Silesians, Alsatians, Prussians, and Hessians may be found in one and the same company. The practice may be prejudicial to *esprit de corps*, but for the General Staff at Berlin it suffices that there should be *esprit de caste* among the officers.

General von Emmich's army—numbered the Third—took its way towards Liège, but met with unexpected resistance. The Belgians had blown up some of the bridges over the Meuse, and the invaders were long prevented from throwing pontoons across the river. Ultimately some flanking movements succeeded, and the Belgian forces in front of Visé and Argenteau then fell back. The invaders, infuriated by the earlier resistance, avenged themselves upon Visé, a pretty little place of 4000 souls and as celebrated in Belgium for its geese as Aylesbury is in England for its ducks. Some of the civilian inhabitants having assisted the Belgian soldiers, the unfortunate town was

committed to the flames. Argenteau suffered a similar fate. In both localities, also, several civilians were shot. These were the first attempts to strike terror into Belgian hearts.

The Germans went on towards Liège, the possession of which city and its defences was indispensable to them, for without such possession their communications would have been in danger. Inhabited by 170,000 people, Liège is situated at the confluence of the Meuse with its tributaries the Ourthe and the Vesdre. On the east it extends into a wide valley; on the west it climbs to a steep plateau whence many a height is seen, many a sooty village, and many a tall chimney belching forth dark smoke; while clouds of black dust are carried hither and thither by the wind. There are many factories, mines, steel- and ironworks in the vicinity. Liège is a great centre for the manufacture of fire-arms, notably sporting-guns and revolvers. It has cutlery works also,

and at Seraing, its immediate neighbour, is the famous engineering establishment which John Cockerill founded in 1817, where he built the first gas-engine ever made on the Continent, and where since his time many other engines, together with Bessemer and electric steel, the latter so essential for armaments, have been constantly turned out. Soon after the siege of Liège the Germans took possession of those great works, placed an officer at the head of them, and then ran them on their own account, warning the operatives that they would be immediately shot if they should turn out anything defective or tamper with the machinery.


There are two approaches to Liège from Germany. One is across broken country with rocky hills, which at certain places are crowned by woods, and at others parted by rapid rivers, notably the Ourthe and the Vesdre. An easier route, and one which cannot be so well defended, is from Visé, where the valley of the Meuse expands. Taking both those roads, the Germans pressed forward, hoping to seize Liège by a rush. But the Belgians again met them, inflicted considerable losses on them, and held them in check for some days before they could attempt any organized siege of the forts built by General Brialmont.

Thirteen in number, generally triangular, but occasionally of trapezoidal shape, these forts were planted in admirable positions. Each of them was on the cupola system, armoured in parts, and with masonry of concrete. Within a first rampart, whence

machine-guns could be worked in order to repulse any storming-party, were towers containing the large ascending, descending, and revolving guns. The ammunition was stored in deep concrete vaults, where also the guns were loaded, being afterwards raised to the firing-stage by means of lifts. Overhead was a steel roofing, designed to shelter the guns and their pointsmen from bombardment. On an average, each fort had eight heavy guns and mortars and four quick-firing guns. According to one account, each garrison amounted to several hundred men; but Dr. Hamelius, Professor of English Literature at Liège University, states in a little volume on the recent siege that the average garrisons amounted merely to eighty men, including gunners and infantry.


Situated at about 4 miles from the city, the forts were intended to protect a perimeter of 33 miles. The distance from fort to fort varied from 2 to 3 miles, and though on Sunday, 2nd August, several thousand men were set to dig trenches and erect obstacles along the intervening lines, their work was still incomplete when the Germans appeared. Further, the available field-force was inadequate. Judging by a statement of Lord Sydenham's, Liège needed about 40,000 men for its defence, but not more than half that number could be provided to contend against some 80,000 Germans. In front of the city there was desperate fighting, marked by repeated deeds of Belgian bravery, notably magnificent cavalry charges over difficult ground, and the forts





**BELGIUM AND  
NORTHERN FRANCE**

English Miles  
0 10 20 30 40  
Fortified Towns  
Railways







also played their part in checking the invaders' onset.

The first attempts which the Germans made to get between the forts were frustrated, but on 7th August the city had to surrender, though the forts still held out. Dr. Hamelius says that the commander, General Léman, had nothing to do with the

at first taking a hundred of them as hostages, to be shot if the citizens should prove fractious. The surrender appears to have been caused by threats to reduce Liège to ashes if the forts would not capitulate. On two occasions a bombardment of the town was actually begun.

Although in most "diaries of the



In the Trenches at Liège: Belgians resting during a lull in the German Attack

surrender, as he was shut up in Fort Loncin, and out of touch with Liège itself. The same authority complains that the civic guards, though armed with Mauser rifles, were merely employed as sentries, and that no bridges were blown up when the covering field-force retreated. At the railway station the enemy found twenty engines, an ambulance train, and large military supplies. They also seized all the cattle and pigs which had been driven into Liège from surrounding villages, and they turned the unfortunate civic guards into herdsmen, after

war", published by the British press, the presence of the Germans in Liège was not chronicled until 9th or 10th August, there is no reason to doubt the statement of Dr. Hamelius that the town capitulated on the 7th; and it follows that the rejoicings which took place in Berlin on the morrow were in a measure justified. But there is excellent authority for stating that the resistance of the last of the Brialmont forts was not overcome until 17th August, or two days later than the date which has usually been given. As long as any number of these forts

held out, the main German advance was kept in check; and this became important, for it gave Belgium time to muster her resources, and enabled France and Great Britain to complete their preparations for dealing with the situation which the irruption into Belgian territory had created. Thus consequences of no little magnitude attached to the resistance of the Liège forts.

These were taken gradually, and in several instances were shattered to pieces before the enemy seized them. German 8- and 11-inch guns were set up in positions which the occupation of the town rendered available, and incessant bombardment at last drove the garrisons into the small chambers within the central concrete blocks of the forts. According to a Belgian electrical engineer, who was inside Loncin, that fort was bombarded for twenty-six hours at the rate of six

shells a minute. Storming could no longer be resisted by the defenders after they had been compelled to withdraw to the little chambers previously mentioned. There, for a while, they kept themselves alive by inhaling oxygen, but many were at last asphyxiated. It appears that General Léman, the gallant commander of the defences, was insensible when the Germans took him prisoner. According to the electrician who has been quoted, the smaller German guns proved the more effective during the bombardment, the heavier ones doing but little damage. Although the forts' magazines were remote and well sheltered, they exploded in some cases, and this, of course, proved fatal. As already indicated, the last fort fell on 17th August.

Elsewhere Belgium was still gallantly resisting, and, as Dr. Hamelius tells us, the good people shut up in Liège



After the Fall of Liège: Germans examining the effects of their Shells on one of the Captured Forts

were for ever repeating: "The French are coming to deliver us. The British have landed and are already at Ans." Active preparations for assisting Belgium were certainly in progress. Before dealing, however, with the French and British armies, it is as well to fill in some gaps in the story of the Germans in Belgium. Although the resistance at Liège kept their main army in check, they were able to send forces towards Namur and Dinant on the south-west, and to dispatch a mass of cavalry, preceded by the usual small detachments of venturesome Uhlans, to scour the more northern Hesbaye and Limburg regions.

After crossing the Meuse, a portion of this cavalry made its way to Tongres, noted for its spas, and thence to St. Trond; while another portion, taking a more southern route, pressed on to Hannut, and thence to the ancient little town of Landen, the cradle of that Carolingian race which gave to the world both Charles Martel and Charlemagne. This advance of the German cavalry was virtually an exploration, with the object of ascertaining the exact position of the chief Belgian forces, which, it happened, were stationed before Louvain, under King Albert.

The smaller parties of German cavalry were repulsed again and again, but when more considerable bodies appeared, the Belgians had to give ground in various directions. For instance, although some smart actions, fought near the old walled town of Tirlemont—only five-and-twenty miles from Brussels—went against the Germans, the latter's discomfiture was

but momentary. On 12th and 13th August some really severe fighting took place between Diest, Haelen, and Cortenacker, to the north-east of Louvain, and the Belgian cavalry and artillery then distinguished themselves by repelling several thousand Germans, who retreated in disorder along the Gethe and Velp Rivers. On 13th August, also, a German column was thrown back at Eghezee, on the railway line between Namur and Tirlemont; and on the 14th an engagement at Geet Betz, south of Haelen, again resulted in a Belgian success.

But the enemy was not to be denied, and it became evident that his northern turning movement seriously threatened the Belgian left. This circumstance, and the fact that in the rear of the German advance guard (now that some of the Liège forts had fallen) two or three army corps were assembled between Hasselt, Tongres, and Waremmé—resolved to break through at any cost—led to the withdrawal of the Belgian army from its positions near Louvain and to the transference of the Belgian Government from Brussels to Antwerp. Nevertheless, the enemy's advance did not remain unchecked. Although Diest was only defended by some antiquated forts and a water-moat, it held out for a time against a heavy cannonade; and although, about the same date, the ancient university-city of Louvain—the centre of culture in the Netherlands since the fifteenth century—had to be evacuated, the Belgian forces which were withdrawing towards Brussels took up position in some wooded country overlooking



farmland and marshes, and again resisted the enemy's advance upon the capital. Going southward from Louvain, past Wavre and the famous battlefield of Ramillies, towards Gembloux, the Belgians had at this time the support of French cavalry, which had entered their country at their own invitation.

In his thirty-ninth year, vigorous, and said to be the tallest sovereign in Europe, Albert, King of the Belgians, nephew of Leopold II, and a scion of that same Saxe-Coburg stock from which our own Royal House proceeds, was bent on utilizing every possible means to defend his dominions. Belgium has an area of only 11,400 square miles, and counts, or counted, seven and a half millions of inhabitants. One and all rallied round their sovereign. A hundred years after the first fall of Napoleon, these Flemings and Walloons realized that they were threatened with a tyranny akin to that against which their ancestors had contended in the days of oppressive Spanish and Austrian rule. Subjugated in the past, how could they now hope, by their own sole efforts, to escape subjugation on the part of the Hohenzollern Cæsar whose legions had burst in upon them? Whatever valour the Belgian army might display, however ready all the inhabitants might be to make sacrifices for the national independence, the armies of the German War Lord were so numerous, and the organized Belgian forces were so small that, if the country were left to her own resources, she could but submit or perish.

Thus it befell that Belgium, in her



Albert, King of the Belgians  
(From a photograph by Boute, Brussels)

hour of stress, turned to two of the Powers which had guaranteed her existence—Great Britain and France. From the very outset Great Britain had been mindful of her bond and covenant. France, as explained elsewhere, in reply to the enquiries of Sir Edward Grey, had declared her intention to respect the neutrality of Belgian territory even as she had respected it in 1870, when she might have saved her army from disaster at Sedan had she chosen to throw it, merely for a day or two, across the Belgian frontier. That was past history, and now, the Germans having fallen upon Belgium the better to attack France, King Albert and his Government did not hesitate to seek French co-operation against the

common enemy. Some French forces were immediately available, and crossed the frontier on two or three points, the cavalry going chiefly by way of Charleroi.

It is now as well to quit the Belgian battlefields in order to glance at the French position generally since the beginning of the war. Mobilization had been effected with great rapidity throughout the Republic. French and native troops had been brought from northern Africa, and the advantage of the three-years' service law was at once demonstrated by the number of men ready to meet the enemy. Perfect union prevailed. There were no such political dissensions as those of 1870; and before long the ministry was reorganized on a broad basis, so as to include some of the most con-

servative Republicans and some of the most extreme Socialists in France. Directly a state of war arose, the chief of the army's general staff became, in accordance with regulations prevailing for many years past, Generalissimo of all the land forces. The officer who thus took the supreme post counted among his three Christian names that of Césaire—a circumstance, perhaps, of happy augury. Joseph Jacques Césaire Joffre was born in the little town of Rivesaltes, famous for its muscat wine, and as near to the Pyrenees as to the Mediterranean shore. In 1869, when he was seventeen years old, Joffre entered the École Polytechnique with the intention of becoming an officer of engineers. The war of the following year found him in Paris, where he served throughout the German siege. In 1876, when he had become a captain, he co-operated in fortifying the Jura frontier of France, and a few years later he built some of the forts surrounding the entrenched camp of Paris. Subsequently he went to the Far East and erected the forts in Tonquin. Next, he was to be found in Africa, constructing a railway line from Kayes on the Senegal to the Niger. Then, a French column having been destroyed while advancing on Timbuctoo, Joffre gathered some troops together and forced his way into that famous and long mysterious city. But advancement did not come rapidly, and he was still only a colonel of engineers when, in 1897, he went out to fortify Diego Suarez in Madagascar.

Five years later he became a brigade-general and director of the engineering



Césaire Joffre, the French Commander-in-Chief  
(From a photograph by Henri Manuel)

department at the Ministry of War, and in 1905 he reached divisional rank, and was placed in command of some infantry in Paris. On the whole, his career had hitherto been more useful than brilliant, and nothing in the experience which he had gained in uncivilized countries, far from France, seemed to designate him for the post of chief of the army's general staff, which would imply supreme command in the event of a great European war. But (let credit be given where it is due) a French Prime Minister, more notorious than popular—M. Joseph Caillaux, the trial of whose wife for murder was the last Parisian scandal before the outbreak of war—recognized in Joffre a man of great abilities, and in 1911 submitted his name for the post of chief of the staff, a suggestion which was approved by the entire cabinet. Some political considerations may have influenced the appointment—for Joffre was known to be a stanch Republican—but it was certainly a fortunate selection.

Heavily built, somewhat thick-set, blunt, and sparing of words, Joffre was already noted for a characteristic which was wanting in some distinguished French commanders of former days. He laid no claim to the dash, the *bravura*, of a MacMahon, a Canrobert, or a Galliffet. He was dogged, determined. His very look showed him to be of the bull-dog breed, and in a great, a supreme struggle, it was necessary that the forces of France should be commanded by a man of that stamp. The average French soldier is easily elated, easily depressed, and needs the steadying influence of officers who

do not lose their heads whatever may be the fortune of war. Such an officer, such a leader, the French army secured in Joffre, who, although he was born in the Midi, was always the very antithesis of the excitable, impulsive folk of that region.

Among the other French officers brought into prominence by the war may be mentioned another southerner, the Marquis de Curières de Castelnau, who, prior to hostilities, was assistant chief of the staff at the War Ministry. At an early stage in the fighting both his son Xavier and his nephew Gérald were killed. He avenged them by inflicting a notable reverse



General Pau, the veteran one-armed French Commander





To Check the German Advance: How the Railway was destroyed from Landen to St. Cloud

on the enemy in Lorraine. Note should also be taken of General d'Amade, commanding the 6th Corps, garrisoned in the Aisne, Marne, and Oise regions, and also a southerner, a native of Toulouse. He was at the head of some of the French forces in Morocco during the Casablanca affair, and was previously known to British officers, for he was with Lord Roberts's staff during the Boer war, and afterwards became French military attaché in London. Again, one finds a southerner—this time a native of Montélimar—in the veteran General Paul Marie César Gérard Pau, who was born in 1848, and lost his right arm in action several years ago. That misfortune did not prevent him from becoming a brigade-general before he was fifty years old, though another sixteen years elapsed before he rose to divisional rank. When war broke out, General Pau commanded the 16th Army Corps at

Montpellier, but, after certain reverses on the eastern frontier, as it was well known that he retained no little dash and vigour, he was placed at the head of all the forces operating in Upper Alsace, along the Vosges, and on the Meurthe. In this post he soon achieved several successes. His somewhat exuberant southern nature was exemplified when he conferred on Captain Langlois, of the French Flying Corps, the decoration of the Legion of Honour. "I do so", he exclaimed, "in presence of these trophies (several

guns and a biplane) captured from the enemy, and I give you the accolade of knighthood with this sword taken from a German officer!"

In General Gallieni, commander in Paris, and a year younger than Pau, one finds a Gascon from the banks of the Garonne. It was he who organized the French administration of Madagascar. Among other French commanders of southern origin may be mentioned Espéray (1st Army Corps), Valabrègue (3rd Corps), Lanrezac (11th Corps), Taverna (16th Corps), Mas-Latrie (18th Corps), and Azibert, appointed to watch over Belfort and the defences guarding its "gap" on the eastern frontier. One must not, however, attribute to the generals belonging to the south of France a monopoly of the country's military talent. Many able men from other regions might be named. For instance, General Sordet (a cavalry leader, mentioned in Sir John French's



dispatches) was born in Burgundy, and Coutanceau, the defender of Verdun, on the Norman coast. Other prominent French officers will be mentioned in the course of this narrative.

The first engagements of the war fought between the French and the Germans occurred on the Alsace-Lorraine frontier, and partook of the character of "feelers", designed on either side to ascertain the strength and the positions of the enemy. The French finally decided to advance into Upper Alsace, and, judging by a proclamation which General Joffre issued to the Alsatians, operations of some magnitude were intended in this direction. But in the first instance (7th August) only a division of troops crossed the frontier, and on encountering the Germans before the little town of Altkirch, where some strong field-works had been prepared, drove them from those positions at the point of the bayonet. Cavalry afterwards pursued them, but they escaped under cover of the night. At daybreak on the morrow the French resumed their advance, and at five o'clock reached the outskirts of the old town of Mülhausen (Mulhouse), famous for its woollen and cotton manufactures. The defences there had been abandoned by the Germans, who had withdrawn towards the stronghold of Neu Breisach, and the French occupied Mülhausen, whose inhabitants gave them an enthusiastic welcome. Three days later, however, General Berthold von Deimling, a Badener, commanding the 15th German Army Corps at Strasbourg, moved down from Thann with

superior forces, and the French fell back from Mülhausen, fighting various rear-guard engagements on their way. The War Ministry afterwards explained that the expedition had been little more than a reconnaissance, designed to locate the chief German positions, but it is probable that it would have been followed by more serious operations in the same direction if the Belgian problem had not become more and more acute.

There was further fighting along the frontiers of Alsace and Lorraine. The French seized several of the passes through the Vosges mountains, and occupied both Ste Marie-aux-Mines and Château-Salins. The Germans bombarded—with little effect, it is true—the town of Pont-à-Mousson on the Moselle, and became very active on the north, where, while suffering a severe repulse at Spincourt, not far from Verdun, they achieved some successes near Longwy and Montmédy. They were descending on France in those directions from the positions which they occupied in Luxemburg. On the west there was difficult country, the real Ardennes, wild and rugged, with ravines and defiles, hills sometimes thickly wooded, and at others overgrown with low shrubs, a region through which the Prussians certainly succeeded in invading France in 1792, but with the result that they were crushed at Valmy. Nowadays there is a railway line between Arlon and Dinant, and of this and other facilities the Germans appear to have availed themselves in order to reach the last-named town, which stands on

the Meuse, some 18 miles south of Namur, whither they were also advancing.

They secured possession of a part of Dinant, and planted their flag on the old citadel, which surmounts a rocky cliff-like height rising above the town and the river. This occurred early on the morning of 15th August. On the previous day it had been officially notified that the Belgians and the French forces which had entered the country were in contact. There had been also an encounter between some French cavalry and the Germans in Belgian Luxemburg, earlier in the week. No sooner were the

enemy at Dinant than French infantry, cavalry, and artillery advanced upon that part of the town which stands on the western bank of the Meuse. The river separated the antagonists. Prolonged skirmishing was followed by an artillery duel, for which the French installed their batteries in neighbouring woods and wheatfields. The citadel and that side of Dinant where the Germans had lodged themselves were then bombarded, as was the vicinity east of the Meuse, and a great part of the enemy's force was at last compelled to retire, pursued in the direction of Rochefort by ten squadrons of French cavalry. The citadel,



"Finger-prints" of the Kaiser's Army: A snap-shot of the invaders passing through a village after setting fire to it

however, was still strongly held by other Germans, whose machine-guns fired incessantly from the ramparts, until, as evening fell, the French infantry were summoned to storm the fortress, which rose, on its great rocky crag, some 300 feet above them. The bugles sounded, and the French, with their bayonets fixed, swarmed up the steep ascent in spite of the deadly fire which rained upon them. Once they wavered, but soon rallied and climbed aloft, regardless of their losses; whereupon the Germans rushed from the heights on the other side, endeavouring to escape. Many of them were shot, and many of them drowned in the Meuse. The French feat was a very gallant one, and recalled to memory the famous storming of the Malakoff by MacMahon and his Zouaves; but, unfortunately, the recapture of Dinant did not have the same result as the fall of Sebastopol.

Some days later, when the French had withdrawn to other positions, in order to co-operate with Sir John French's army, the Germans wreaked vengeance on Dinant for the losses they had incurred there. They set fire to many of the houses in the most methodical manner, and while a number of the inhabitants perished in the flames, others were cut down in the streets or marched to the Place d'Armes, where they were deliberately dispatched with sword or rifle. A certain Lieutenant-Colonel Beeger was responsible for those horrors.

During the days which followed the action at Dinant there was some sharp fighting in the west of Belgium, and also on the French eastern frontier. In South Alsace, Thann and Mülhausen were again reoccupied by the troops of the Republic, who, after driving the Germans out of Blamont and Cirey, advanced to Lorquin, on



The German Occupation of Brussels, August 20, 1914



the line to Saarburg and Zabern, while more to the north they made their way into Lorraine along the Seille, and secured possession of Dieuze, Delme, and Château-Salins. These operations had a certain utility, for they at least constrained the Germans to keep considerable forces in the region with the view of preventing the French from carrying any really important position by surprise. But the eyes of the world remained fixed on Belgium, for there a great battle seemed to be more and more imminent.

Some steps had been taken to barricade the approaches to Brussels, but the Belgian Government decided to retire within the entrenched camp of Antwerp, and to offer no resistance to the German occupation of the capital. Brussels had no fortifications, and any serious attempt to defend it might have involved its destruction. Germany was prosecuting the war in the most ruthless fashion. Organized incendiarism, unscrupulous pillage, gross acts of cruelty, abominable outrages on women, were conspicuous features of the invasion. In accordance with the Bismarckian doctrine of striking terror into the hearts of the inhabitants of an invaded country, in order that they might turn and implore their Government to sue for peace, several Belgian villages and smaller towns had already been fired and sacked by the brutish Teuton hosts. The horrors of Dinant, Louvain, Termonde, and Aerschot were not yet; but nobody could tell what might happen, and it was deemed best to let the capital remain undefended. On 18th August the Germans bombarded and

wrecked Tirlemont, and two days later, Thursday, 20th August, they were at the gates of Brussels. The brave burgomaster, M. Adolphe Max, went to parley with them. They demanded a tribute of £8,000,000, but promised that no harm should be done to the city, provided that the inhabitants would offer no resistance. Thus Brussels surrendered, and at 2 o'clock in the afternoon that day the German troops, with bands playing and colours flying, began to make their triumphal entry.

On the evening of the 21st August the concentration of the British Expeditionary Force, sent to co-operate with the French in the task of driving the Germans out of Belgium, was completed. This force, whatever its numbers may subsequently have been, consisted originally of two army corps with a division of cavalry, in addition to the troopers belonging to the two corps. Great Britain began to mobilize her army on 4th August—the day when she declared war on Germany. On the morrow, Lord Kitchener was appointed Secretary of State for War, and started vigorously on the great task before him. He was known to be an expert organizer, and it may well be held that his bent in that respect originated when he was serving, in 1870–71, as a mere “Garde Mobile” in that same 2nd Army of the Loire which the writer accompanied as a newspaper correspondent. With the French he saw none of war's pageantry, only its grimness and suffering, none of its triumphs, only the awful effects of incompetency and mismanagement. For instance, a rail-



Earl Kitchener, Secretary of State for War  
(From a photograph by Bassano)

way line blocked for 40 miles with rolling-stock, high roads crowded with all the broken-down impedimenta of a vanquished army; horses perishing in scores by the wayside, exhausted soldiers falling on the snow and dying there; others also succumbing to starvation. Further, he saw the fatal effects of indiscipline, and learned how hopeless were the chances of men who would not submit to proper control. By practical demonstration, the greatest of teachers, he learned, on one hand, what lack of organization really meant, and on the other, the necessity of exacting full obedience. It must all have tended to make him in later years firm, even stringent and inflexible, as a commander. Yet one cannot believe that there has ever been any undue sternness and harshness about Lord

Kitchener. He can unbend when duty allows it. Having served with a defeated army, he can even sympathize with the vanquished. It will be remembered how he greeted Commandant Marchand at Fashoda, and how he received the Boer leaders when they surrendered. His appointment to the supreme control of our military affairs in the greatest crisis of contemporary times was undoubtedly a most fortunate one for the nation.

The command of our Expeditionary Force was assigned to Field-Marshal Sir John French, who, at the outset of his career, served for four years in the Navy, but then joined the 8th Hussars, of which regiment he was colonel when he went out to South Africa. Later, he commanded



Field-Marshal Sir John French, Commander-in-Chief  
of the British Expeditionary Force  
(From a photograph by Reginald Haines)



Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, Commanding the Second  
British Army Corps at the Front  
(From a photograph by Russell & Son)

at Aldershot, and afterwards was appointed to the War Office, first as Inspector-General of the Forces, and secondly as Chief of the General Staff.

The first of the two army corps of the Expeditionary Force was allotted to Lieutenant-General Sir Douglas Haig, younger son of Mr. John Haig, of Cameron Bridge, Fife, and an officer of wide experience. After joining the 7th Hussars, he served in the Sudan under Lord Kitchener when the latter took Khartoum, and he was afterwards in South Africa, partly with Sir John French. Then, after commanding the 17th Lancers, he went to India as Inspector-General of Cavalry. Next, he became in turn Director of Military Training, Director of Staff Duties

at Army Head-quarters, and Chief of the Staff in India. After rising to the rank of Lieutenant-General, he was appointed to the Aldershot command in 1912. Sir Douglas was born in 1861.

The command of our Second Army Corps on the Continent was originally given to another Scotsman, Sir James Grierson, an officer of distinguished attainments, with an extensive knowledge of German organization and methods of warfare. Unfortunately, although Sir James Grierson was by no means an old man, and still appeared to be quite vigorous, he succumbed to heart-failure during a railway journey in France, while we were preparing for hostilities. His command was thereupon given to Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, one of our most experienced soldiers, with a career embracing virtually all our wars from that with the Zulus in 1879. He was originally a "Sherwood Forester", and became Colonel of that regiment. He served repeatedly in Egypt and India, and in 1900 commanded a division in South Africa. He attained the full rank of General in 1912, in which same year he was appointed to the Southern Command.

Major-General Sir E. H. H. Allenby, in command of the Cavalry Division attached to the Expeditionary Force, first belonged to the Inniskilling Dragoons, and later to the 5th (Royal Irish) Lancers. With the former he saw a good deal of service in South Africa, from 1884 onward. Another cavalry commander prominent in our first operations was Briga-



dier-General Henry de Beauvoir de Lisle, a native of Guernsey, who first served with the Durham Light Infantry, then with the Mounted Infantry in the Sudan in Lord Wolseley's time, and again with a similar force in South Africa. He passed to the command of the Royal Dragoons in 1906, and afterwards to that of our Second Cavalry Brigade. Brigadier-General Sir Philip Chetwode, commanding the Fifth Brigade, should also be mentioned. He formerly served with the 19th Hussars, and became military secretary to Sir John French when Sir John commanded at Aldershot. The Chetwodes are one of the oldest English families; they were in this country before the Norman Conquest.

There will be occasion to mention other distinguished officers in these pages. For the present one need only refer to the composition of the general

staff. The post of Chief of the Staff was assigned to Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Murray, and that of Sub-Chief to Major-General H. H. Wilson, formerly of the Royal Irish and the Rifle Brigade. He was Director of Military Operations at Head-quarters before he received his appointment with the Expeditionary Force. The office of Quartermaster-General devolved on Major- later Lieut.-General Sir William R. Robertson, who was previously Director of Military Training, and whose active service had covered both India and South Africa. As Adjutant-General Sir John French chose Major- later Lieut.-General Sir Nevil Macready, who was with the Gordons both in the Egyptian war of 1882 and in the later war in South Africa. Further, Brigadier-General the Hon. W. Lambton, of the Earl of Durham's family, became military secretary to Sir John French,



Grenadier Guards for the Front passing Buckingham Palace: The King's "Good-bye"



Drawn by F. Matasia: copyright of the *Sphere*

The Landing of the British Expeditionary Force in France, August, 1914

A thrilling incident in the disembarkation of the British troops in France was the first landing of the Highlanders. The historic connections between France and Scotland were not forgotten, and the enthusiasm of the French public for the "Écossais" was unbounded.

and Lord Dalmeny, the Earl of Rosebery's son, likewise received a staff appointment, frequently carrying dispatches from the Commander-in-Chief to London. Finally, the Royal Flying Corps in the field was placed under the control of Brigadier-General Sir David Henderson, a Glaswegian, formerly of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, with whom he saw service in the Sudan and South Africa.

No little official mystery surrounded both the exact composition of the Expeditionary Force and the circum-

stances under which it was conveyed to France. It has been held that nothing respecting these matters was known, until the very last moment, to the German General Staff. In support of this view we have been referred to an order to the Tenth German Reserve Army Corps, dated 21st August, and reporting that an English army had landed at Calais and Boulogne *en route* for Brussels. That the secret was well kept by the British Press is certain; but even during the earlier days of our mobilization French newspapers which were on sale in London contained references to the troops that had already crossed the Channel.

The troops and all their requisites were conveyed at night to various

French ports. Some were landed at Calais, some at Boulogne, some at Havre, some as far south as St. Nazaire, which, during the retreat to cover Paris, became Sir John French's base. More than one vessel, carrying horses requisitioned in London, went to Nantes from Tilbury, and the writer was told that on reaching the Nore they found French gunboats waiting to escort them. Everything was certainly well organized, and not only were troops, horses, guns, ammunition, and food-stuffs, conveyed across the

Channel, but we also sent motor cars, lorries, and 'buses, traction engines, and even water-carts, requisitioned from the London boroughs, in order to provide for the wants of thirsty men in the field. Sir John French ultimately reported that the transport both by sea and by rail had been effected in the best order and without a check, and that each unit of troops reached its destination well within the scheduled time.

Concentration was practically complete on the evening of Friday, August 21, and in accordance with arrangements made at a conference between the British and the French commanders—a conference held, perhaps, in Paris, to which city Sir John French paid a flying visit—the Expeditionary Force took up certain assigned positions, which will be presently explained, and at once went into action. The state of affairs was serious. Not only were the Germans now threatening several more Belgian towns—Ghent, Ostend, and Malines—but they had partially invested Namur, and had begun to bombard its forts. They had also just repulsed the French in Lorraine, and one of their columns seemed to be moving stealthily towards the important city of Lille, near the French north-western frontier. French forces were assembled at Charleroi, on the River Sambre, for the purpose of advancing towards Namur; but on August 21 the Germans assailed Charleroi, and secured various passages across the Sambre.

Namur did not actually fall until the afternoon of August 24, when the battles of Charleroi and Mons were


over, but it may be convenient to say something here respecting the resistance of this fortress. According to M. Mellot, the representative of Namur in the Belgian Parliament, the German bombardment began as early as August 14. The railway line was then cut, and German cavalry gathered all round. One judges from soldiers' stories that, after a part of the British force had occupied Mons, an attempt was made to open up communications with Namur, but that it came to nothing. Some French troops also advanced, but were thrown back, and a more and more terrific bombardment from fifty or sixty heavy howitzers ensued. By August 23 three of the north-eastern forts had been practically destroyed, and the town itself was then shelled. At five o'clock that day the defending force—between 3000 and 4000 men, all told—evacuated Namur under a rain of projectiles. They were able to retreat towards the French frontier, by way first of Dave, where they crossed the Meuse on a pontoon-bridge, and then by Marienburg, whence they proceeded to Liart in the Ardennes. There they entrained for Havre, and were conveyed by ship to Ostend, afterwards marching to Antwerp in order to participate in its defence. The fall of Namur was certainly a blow for the Allies; but after the fate of Liège it was not unexpected by military men. Namur, be it said, was always an unfortunate fortress. It had been obliged to surrender more than once before the famous siege with which we associate the names of Dutch William, Uncle Toby, and Corporal Trim. Further,



the French took the town not only in the time of Louis XIV and Louis XV, but on two subsequent occasions during the wars of the great Revolution. The fall of Namur in August, 1914, was the seventh or the eighth in its history.

Before that surrender three French armies had been dispatched to Belgium. While one of them advanced

and the Meuse, with Namur as its apex. Though the district is hilly and wooded, it is of a much less rugged character than the Ardennes proper. Further, the valley of the Sambre is better adapted than that of the Meuse for rapid marching. A great coal-field stretches around Charleroi, which is the chief Belgian town on the Sambre; and between Char-



How Namur Fell: One of the German 100-ton Siege Guns used in the Bombardment

The guns have to be divided into sections for transport, as shown in the photograph. In the centre is the gun-carriage used in action, with its powerful recoil apparatus. In rear—to the left—is the gun itself, short and squat, but of immense calibre. The Krupp sliding-breech, it will be seen, opens sideways.

from the so-called Woëvre region towards Neufchâteau, with the object of intercepting the German communications with the Grand-Duchy of Luxembourg, a second crossed the Ardennes in order to attack the enemy between the Meuse and the Lesse, and it may have been this army which, for a time, dislodged the Germans from Dinant. The third French force entered Belgium by the gap of Chimay, and afterwards fought at Charleroi. Considerable numbers of the enemy already occupied the triangular stretch of territory which is formed by the Sambre

leroi and Mons, a distance of some 34 miles, is the region known as the Borinage, a kind of black country, all pit-shafts and factory-chimneys. Mons—a town of 30,000 inhabitants, and said to occupy the site of one of Julius Cæsar's military stations, abandoned in the sixth century—is another coal centre, standing near a couple of hundred pits, whence an average of 12 million tons of coal is derived every year. The town was formerly fortified, but was successfully besieged by the Duke of Marlborough and Prince Eugène in 1709. In addition to the

River Trouille, quite a network of canals spreads from Mons in every direction, excepting the south, which is a somewhat wooded region.

It was arranged between General Joffre and Sir John French that the British troops should take up positions on the left of the French army operating at Charleroi. Mons became the centre of the Field-Marshal's line. On the east—in which direction were the French—it extended as far as a little place called Brag (spelt Bray in Sir John's report as printed), and between that point and Mons was stationed our First Army Corps, under Sir Douglas Haig. West of Mons the line selected was that of the canal extending to Condé, formerly a fortress, and now a coal town, standing on the Scheldt, just across the French frontier. The canal line and Mons itself were assigned to our Second Corps, under Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien. On or about August 19 some of our men were already stationed at Mons, but the bulk were not yet in position. Some of the canal bridges had already been blown up, however, and others were commanded by machine-guns and barricades.

The French had previously reached and occupied Charleroi, and some German "Death's Head" Hussars, who rode into that town on August 20, were amazed to find them there. Early on the morrow the enemy approached in force, and while many of the civilian inhabitants fled along the western and southern roads, the German artillery applied itself to a distant bombardment of Charleroi. A bomb was also dropped on one of the railway

stations from a German aeroplane. The French held the canal bridges with machine-guns, and their cavalry was posted near the various railway lines on the north. Early on Saturday, the 22nd, after some cavalry skirmishing, the Germans advanced from the direction of Genappe and Fleurus, one of their columns being preceded by some captive Belgian pitmen. The French sallied forth to meet them, and the Turcos, who were in the first line, gallantly charged a German battery and bayoneted the gunners. A part of the Prussian Guard then delivered a counter-attack, and after incurring very severe losses the Algerians had to retire.

The Germans were too numerous to be resisted victoriously. Deter-



To Confuse the Enemy: Belgians obliterating Sign-post Directions



Back to the Firing Line: Belgian Artilleryman returning to the Front after having his Wounds Dressed

mined to force the passage of the Sambre, they came on, slowly but surely, through the outskirts of Charleroi, pressing forward by way of Montigny until they reached the turning canal bridges near the southern railway station. At this point and in several streets desperate fighting occurred, but when, after a great struggle of some hours' duration, the Germans carried the bridges, they steadily gained further ground, and the French evacuated the town, chiefly by way of Châtelet. Later in the day, even as the Germans had shelled the northern part of Charleroi, the French bombarded the southern part, in the hope of dislodging the enemy. The bulk of the French had retired to a line some 7 miles south of the town, and extending from Thuin to Mettet, a distance of 16 or 17 miles. On Sunday, the 23rd, the French recaptured a number of villages and even forced their way to Charleroi once more. But they were unable to hold the position,

and at five o'clock that evening the British commander received a telegram from General Joffre stating that the French army and its reserves were retiring.

It afterwards came to light that this was the more necessary as the forces which had entered Belgium between the Meuse and the Lesse had likewise suffered a decided reverse in the difficult, hilly, and wooded Ardennes region. An army commanded by Duke Albrecht, heir presumptive to the throne of

Württemberg, had come down on them from the direction of Neufchâteau, and, after a lively engagement on the outskirts of the Ardennes Forest, had compelled them to retreat beyond the Semoy in the vicinity of the Franco-Belgian frontier.

The withdrawal of the French from the neighbourhood of Charleroi placed the British in a dangerous position. In completing his arrangements, the Commander-in-Chief had stationed the 5th Cavalry Brigade, under Sir Philip Chetwode, at Binche, a couple of miles or so south of Brag, our extreme right, which was in contact with the French extreme left at Anderlues. Our First Cavalry Division, under General Allenby, was at first at or near Givry, several miles in the rear. For information respecting the enemy's movements and strength Sir John French was chiefly dependent on General Joffre's Intelligence Department, by which he was given to understand that "little more than one, or at most



two, of the enemy's army corps, with, perhaps, one cavalry division" were in front of his positions. Nevertheless, he determined to send out a strong reconnoitring cavalry party, and selected Sir Philip Chetwode's brigade, reinforced by some squadrons from General Allenby's command, for this duty. On Saturday, August 22, and early on the morning of the following day, some of these troopers advanced northward as far as Soignies, and although there were various minor encounters, in which our men showed to advantage, no serious opposition was offered. Further, the observations taken by our aeroplanes tended to confirm the view that no overwhelming force of the enemy was near. As yet, too, there was no sign of any attempt at an out-flanking movement.

The situation changed between noon and one o'clock on Sunday. Some of our troops had just had their midday meal, and others were waiting for theirs, when news arrived that the Germans were at hand. Fear then came upon the townsfolk, who had been cheered by the arrival of the British soldiers. Cafés were hastily deserted, shops were closed, doors barred, and windows shuttered. Charleroi having been virtually taken on the previous day, the enemy was bringing much of his strength to bear upon our forces. The Kaiser, so it was said, had just issued the truculent order to his forces "to exterminate first the treacherous English and walk over General French's contemptible little army". One of the first operations of the Germans now was to threaten our right as though



General von Kluck, one of the ablest  
German Generals

they wished to drive a wedge between us and the French. The French were for a while able to check the German advance from Jumet, on the north-west of Charleroi, to Anderlues, on the west; but Sir Douglas Haig found it expedient to withdraw his flank to some high ground south of its original position at Brag; and Chetwode's cavalry brigade thereupon retired slightly to the south of Binche, which the enemy thereupon occupied.

The British line, at first almost a straight one from Condé to Brag, was somewhat deflected by these movements, and, as Sir John French mentioned in his subsequent report, Mons now formed a rather dangerous salient. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was therefore instructed not to keep his troops —mainly the 3rd Division under Major-

General Hubert Ion Hamilton—too long in the threatened town. It has been mentioned that the enemy's attack began about dinner-time. The Germans have a fondness for disturbing their antagonists at their meals; many instances of the kind occurred during the war of 1870-71. Various men of the 2nd Worcesters and some of the 1st Royal West Kents have recorded that they were just about to sit down to their Sunday provender when a German aeroplane was seen, and almost immediately afterwards shrapnel began to burst. The predicament of the West Kents was very critical, for they were not armed and had their shirts and socks out to wash. Nevertheless, they speedily advanced across one of the canals to a point where some of our troops were already resisting the German advance. The 2nd Worcesters also went forward, with the Scottish Borderers on their left. Some of these

men state afterwards that they suffered most from the German shells and the machine-gun fire, the marksmanship of the enemy's infantry being regarded as very bad. Many of the wounds which our men suffered from rifle-fire were in the legs or the feet, and possibly that may now be a part of the German system, as those who incur such wounds are less able to retreat and more liable to be taken prisoners.

A number of statements were afterwards made by British soldiers to the effect that at Mons (as at Charleroi) some of the German columns drove Belgian prisoners, in certain instances even women and children, before them on advancing to the attack. The brunt of the first onslaught at Mons appears to have been borne by the Middlesex men, who were on the right of the troops defending the town, and to whose bravery and severe losses soldiers of several other regiments have since testified. The men of the 2nd



With the Invaders: German Lancers approaching the Village of Moulant, in Belgium

Shots having been fired from the farmhouse shown on the right, four peasants were taken out and shot without trial.

Manchester Regiment, which was one of the first sent out of the town to repel the attack, barely had time to dig "a bit of a trench" when the enemy's shells began to fall about them. Some of the 2nd Worcestershires, who also entrenched themselves after a fashion, likewise suffered from a deadly artillery fire. In order to deliver their attacks the enemy had to cross a bridge over the river and another spanning one of the canals. An officer of the Royal Engineers therefore instructed one of his "non-coms" to swim both streams and set fuses under both bridges. Having safely reached the canal, the gallant emissary set a fuse under the bridge there, and on his way back was equally successful with the river bridge. Almost immediately afterwards, however, one of his arms was blown away at the shoulder by the German artillery fire, and a comrade had to rescue him from the water. Scarcely had the Germans crossed the first bridge when it was blown up, their ammunition carts remaining on the other side of it, and immediately afterwards the second bridge was likewise destroyed. The British then poured lead into the massed enemy, who vainly strove to construct a temporary bridge, which on each occasion was shattered by our artillery-fire, so that the Germans had to seek a more circuitous means of advancing. In accordance, however, with Sir John French's instructions, our men were ordered to retire. In doing so some of the 4th Royal Fusiliers, under Captain Attwood, had to cross a canal by a swing-bridge, which was sent up directly every man

had passed over it, the captain being the last to do so.

There were so many gallant actions during the fighting in and around the town, and also during the withdrawal, that it seems invidious to single out any particular regiment for praise. They all vied with one another in upholding the British army's reputation for valour and steadiness, and in doing their duty to the utmost. Reference has been made, however, to the Middlesex men, otherwise the "Die Hards", and it may be mentioned that they were brigaded with the Royal Scots, the Gordons, and the Royal Irish. The two Scottish regiments were in the centre of the brigade's line, with the Royal Irish on their left and the Middlesex on their right. The Royal Scots escaped lightly on this occasion, but the losses of the Irish, like those of the "Die Hards", were very heavy. To guard the retiring line, the Gordons—1100 strong—were placed on the extreme flank of our force, that is, on the Mons - Paris road. Both before and behind them were some woods, one in the rear being held by a battery of Royal Field Artillery. Amid a tornado of German shells the Highlanders cleared away all bushes and standing crops which might have been utilized by the enemy as head-cover, and when, excepting for a few buildings, they had a clear range of a couple of thousand yards, they dug trenches and awaited the Germans, who eventually appeared on their right and endeavoured to reach a wood which would have enabled them to effect an outflanking movement. One of the Gordons, a private named Smiley, has related that the





Drawn by F. Marais; copyright of the *Sphere*

"Ten several times the Germans succeeded in throwing pontoons over the water, and ten times the British artillery destroyed them"; Extract from an Eye-witness's Account of an Incident in the Crossing of the Mons-Condé Canal by the German Pontoon Companies

Germans were in companies of about 150 men, marching in file five deep, and were provided with machine-guns, with which they immediately opened fire. The Gordons, however, steady-ing their rifles in their trenches, aimed at them deliberately, shot them by the score, and effectually held them back until their retreat at about five o'clock in the evening.

One company of the Gordons was ordered to relieve the Royal Irish, who were being hard pressed near a village about a mile and a half away, and after creeping from their trenches the Highlanders stole cautiously towards the designated spot. All went well until they were near an isolated white house standing at about 150 yards from the village. A most violent fire was then opened on the little force, but luckily it got past without mishap—excepting that Private Smiley was hit in the right knee by a ricocheting shrapnel bullet, which he afterwards extracted with a knife. The Gordons found the Royal Irish in a bad plight. They had been under fire since dinner-time, and dead and wounded were lying round their position. At the time when the Gordons came up, however, the German fire slackened, and until darkness set in little occurred apart from a skirmish with some of the enemy's cavalry.

The Royal Scots, who have already been mentioned, had reached Mons the previous evening after a severe march. Although they appear to have escaped lightly, they were subjected to severe fighting on the Sunday night from 8.30 to 12.30, when both German infantry and cavalry advanced in their

direction. At one moment the enemy were only 300 yards from the position, and the Scots thereupon received orders to fix bayonets; but there was no charge, rapid rifle-firing and the play of the Maxim guns sufficing to keep the enemy back.

The losses of the Scottish Borderers at Mons were more severe than those of the Royal Scots. The Borderers suffered, it seems, chiefly from shell-fire. The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders put up a good fight during the engagement and the withdrawal, and so did the Black Watch, who found that the enemy was by no means partial to cold steel. Some companies of the 1st Northumberland Fusiliers—the "Fighting Fifth"—(who, by the way, brought down a German aeroplane on the afternoon of August 22) were very badly cut up indeed. In one instance a shell blew part of a trench away, with the result that a few minutes later one company had no fewer than 47 men killed or wounded. Some of the Coldstreams suffered even more severely, one company losing 12 killed and 72 wounded out of a total of 120 officers and men. On the other hand, the losses of the Germans were infinitely greater, owing to their close formation.

It has already been mentioned that at five o'clock on Sunday Sir John French received news that our allies were retreating. In the same tele-graphic message General Joffre stated that at least three German army corps—the 4th, the 9th, and a reserve corps—were moving on the front of the British line, in addition to the troops by which we were already assailed; and







that yet another corps was trying to effect a turning movement from the direction of Tournai. This last column was the one which, according to earlier surmises, had Lille as its objective. The British commander was naturally surprised by his colleague's intimation, but he had previously decided to take up a position across the French frontier if he should be compelled to evacuate Mons. This position extended from the fortress of Maubeuge on the east to Bavai on the west, and thence to Jenlain, south-east of Valenciennes. It was reported, however, to be difficult to hold, as standing crops and buildings interfered with the siting of trenches and limited the field of fire on many important points. At the same time there were a few good artillery positions.

After testing General Joffre's information by an aeroplane reconnaissance, Sir John French decided to fall back to the new position at day-break on the morrow, August 24. The experiences of some of our regiments show that there was considerable fighting during the night, when Mons was seen to be burning in several places. We ourselves had set fire to some canal barges, lest the enemy should use them for bridge purposes, but the German bombardment had fired a number of houses in the town. At day-break on the 24th our 2nd Division, belonging to Sir Douglas Haig's command, made a demonstration from Harmignies as though we desired to recapture our earlier position at Binche. The artillery of the 1st and 2nd Divisions supported this demonstration, which was also assisted by a move-

ment of the 1st Division on Peissant, south-east of Mons. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's Army Corps then retired by way of Dour, Frameries, and Quaroubles, the last-named a little place between Quevrain and Valenciennes. Although the 3rd Division of the Corps again suffered in this withdrawal, Smith-Dorrien's men partially entrenched themselves on the new line.

General Allenby's cavalry was in the meantime acting vigorously on our left front in order to remove the German pressure in that direction; but when, at about 7.30 a.m. (Monday, August 24) this officer received information that the 5th Division, under Sir Charles Fergusson, urgently needed support, he drew in his troopers in order to give assistance. General De Lisle, of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, considered that the further advance of the German infantry might be prevented by a mounted flank attack. The 9th Lancers and the 18th (Queen Mary's) Hussars thereupon went forward, and charged into the enemy's lines. This gave our infantry an opportunity to retreat in spite of very galling artillery- and rifle-fire; but while the operation was proceeding a considerable body of German Uhlans secured some of our guns, whose teams were intact but whose gunners had been killed by shrapnel.

According to a vivacious account given by Corporal J. O'Brien, of the Lancers, Captain Grenfell said to his squadron: "Men of the 9th Lancers, you must prepare to do what I don't suppose many of you have ever done before. Give a good charge, drive the



To Save the Guns at Mons: the Gallant Charge of the 9th Lancers

Drawn by Archibald Webb



enemy from their positions, and, if possible, take the guns from them. Get through and back again, and you will win immortal glory." In a moment, says the corporal, every man had thrown off his coat and cap, rolled up his shirt sleeves, and bared his chest. Then, as soon as a little trumpeter had sounded the charge, they dashed away, yelling. Many of their lances getting broken, they drew their swords, cut through one body of Uhlans, and swung round upon others who were in possession of the guns, which they secured, and carried off to the 119th Battery, taking cover in its wagon lines. Many of the Lancers were either killed or wounded in performing that gallant exploit, for they not only had to deal with the Uhlans but were subjected to a severe cross-fire from a wood. Their riderless and sometimes wounded horses galloped back along a railway line, screaming the while with fright or suffering. For repeated acts of gallantry on this eventful day Captain Francis O. Grenfell was awarded the Victoria Cross, heading the first list of recipients of that decoration in the Great World War. At a later stage in the withdrawal Captain Grenfell was wounded, but soon recovered. The 18th Hussars also suffered severely in their charges on the German infantry; and the 4th Dragoons, under Sir Philip Chetwode, likewise had some heavy losses.

The Lancers, by the way, were not the only men who saved guns during the retirement. The Royal Munster Fusiliers, who distinguished themselves by a bayonet charge, and who were one

of the regiments which lost the most heavily in the fighting, rescued three guns, all of whose horses had been killed, while only four men were left to work them. After driving off the enemy, some of the Munsters harnessed themselves to the artillery and dragged it along until they at last secured several German horses, whose riders they either shot dead or wounded.

Our First Corps, under Sir Douglas Haig, retired steadily, without incurring any considerable loss, the enemy's efforts being chiefly directed against Smith-Dorrien, who had two hostile corps on his front and one threatening his flank. Though there were many losses among his men, the assistance of the cavalry enabled him gradually to withdraw. He was supported, moreover, on one side by the 19th Infantry Brigade, which, on August 22 and 23, had been brought by rail from the line of communications to Valenciennes. On the morning of the following day these men moved to a position near Quaroubles. The Royal Sussex and the King's Royal Rifles appear to have been among them and rendered very useful service. By ten o'clock at night the whole of our forces were assembled to the east and west of Bavai, where Sir John French had his post of command. On the east, as far as Maubeuge, stretched our First Army Corps, on the west, towards Jenlain, was the Second. The 19th Brigade was stationed between Jenlain and Bry, and the outer flank in that direction was guarded by the cavalry.

After such severe fighting, after contending with so much valour and devotion against overwhelming odds,

# The Great World War

our men were assuredly deserving of a respite. But Sir John French was not satisfied with his position. The enemy was still advancing, intent upon driving our force into the lines of Maubeuge, bottling it up there, and, after the reduction of the fortress, compelling us to surrender. Thus our Commander-in-Chief decided on a further and immediate retreat, the story of which must be reserved for subsequent treatment.

While the events which have here been recorded were occurring in Belgium and France, hostilities were also

in progress in eastern Europe, where Russia was preparing to invade both German and Austrian territory, Serbia meantime holding an attempted Austrian invasion in check. But at the date which has been reached—August 24—the war in the east had scarcely taken shape, there being, as yet, little or nothing beyond some frontier fighting. In order to supply a more connected narrative it is necessary to defer to a future chapter of this work an account of the operations of Russia and Serbia against the two central empires.

E. A. V.

## ARMIES AND NAVIES AT THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

### ARMIES

		Peace Footing.	War Footing.
France	... ..	790,000	3,800,000
Russia	... ..	1,500,000	5,000,000
Britain	... ..	720,000	850,000
Belgium	... ..	50,000	350,000
Serbia	... ..	40,000	350,000
Japan	... ..	230,000	2,000,000
<i>The Allies,</i>	... ..	<u>3,330,000</u>	<u>12,350,000</u>
Germany	... ..	800,000	5,000,000
Austria-Hungary	... ..	430,000	2,500,000
Turkey	... ..	380,000	1,600,000
<i>Germanic Group</i>	... ..	<u>1,610,000</u>	<u>9,100,000</u>

### NAVIES

In the following list vessels building at the beginning of 1914 are counted, but all vessels more than twenty years old are omitted. The figures in parentheses, under "Battleships and Battle Cruisers", denote the number of ships of Dreadnought and super-Dreadnought class.

	Battleships and Battle Cruisers.	Cruisers and Light Cruisers.	Destroyers.	Torpedo Boats.	Sub- marines.
Britain	... .. 82 (41)	... .. 132	... .. 237	... .. 106	... .. 98
France	... .. 31 (12)	... .. 32	... .. 87	... .. 153	... .. 76
Russia	... .. 19 (11)	... .. 22	... .. 140	... .. 25	... .. 43
Japan	... .. 23 (7)	... .. 34	... .. 53	... .. 33	... .. 15
<i>The Allies</i>	... .. <u>155 (71)</u>	... .. <u>220</u>	... .. <u>517</u>	... .. <u>317</u>	... .. <u>232</u>
Germany	... .. 48 (28)	... .. 58	... .. 144	... .. 80	... .. 40
Austria-Hungary	... .. 16 (4)	... .. 14	... .. 18	... .. 85	... .. 11
Turkey	... .. 2 (2)	... .. 2	... .. 8	... .. 9	... .. 0
<i>Germanic Group</i>	... .. <u>66 (34)</u>	... .. <u>74</u>	... .. <u>170</u>	... .. <u>174</u>	... .. <u>51</u>

## CHAPTER II

## MOVEMENT OF THE FLEETS

(August, 1914)

The British Navy Ready—Organization of the British Home Fleets—The German Fleet—The Personnel of the British and German Navies—Britain and the North Sea—German Naval Bases—The Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal—Heligoland—Sir John Jellicoe—Rear-Admiral Madden—Other British Naval Commanders—German Naval Strategy—German Sea-borne Commerce stopped—The Sinking of the Mine-layer, *Königin Luise*, by the *Amphion*—Method of Mine-sweeping—The *Amphion* sunk by a Mine—The Use of Mines in Warfare—Mines and Trade—Torpedoes and Submarines—The U 15 Sunk by the *Birmingham*—French and Austrian Fleets in the Mediterranean—The *Goeben* and *Breslau*—German Ships in the Pacific and Atlantic—The *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* as Commerce-destroyer—The Sinking of the *Kaipara*—The *Kaiser Wilhelm* sunk by H.M.S. *Highflyer*—The Battle of Heligoland.

THE outbreak of the World War found the British navy in a state of preparation for which there is no precedent in the long course of our naval history. The Spithead review had served as preliminary mobilization. It had been held not only as a parade and display of ships, but as a voluntary test of the mobilizing capacity of the Fleet Reserve. The trial had been thoroughly successful, and the virtues of the organization designed by Lord Fisher had been amply proved. The navy was therefore absolutely ready, not only in spirit, as it always was, but in every other respect, to a degree which would have appeared incredible to our ancestors, who were accustomed in those earlier ages to methods of a more easy-going or even more hand-to-mouth kind. So fully was all prepared that, though the decision to mobilize was taken on Sunday, 2nd August, and publicly announced on the Monday morning, the reservists were at their posts by the evening of that day, 3rd August.

Two questions have to be answered on the threshold of the history of all wars. The first is, what were the forces opposed? The second is, on what field were they called upon to operate? A complete answer to the first of these enquiries would entail an account of the three navies of the Triple Entente—the British, the French, and the Russian—and the two of the hostile alliance, the German and Austrian. But, for reasons which will be stated in their proper place, we may for the moment put aside all except the British and the German. In describing them we will not dwell on those minute divisions and classifications which are elaborated in official lists, and have their value for certain purposes, but are apt to be confusing to the general reader, and to escape even a tenacious memory.

The British navy, as organized by Lord Fisher and his colleagues and successors at the Admiralty, was in the first place divided into the great majority of vessels in home waters and a minority in distant seas. In



former times the rule had been that the bulk of the fleet was always on service on foreign stations. Since the rise of the German navy it had become the practice to draw the main force of the navy into home waters, where it would be instantly available against an enemy whose strength was concentrated in the northern seas. This main force of the British navy was subdivided into fleets and squadrons of battleships and cruisers. Without dwelling on classifications, which have often a mainly formal value, it is enough to say that the navy contained 57 battleships divided into three fleets, of which the First, divided into four squadrons of 8 ships each, contained the most powerful and newest ships; the Second, of two squadrons of 8 each, was formed of vessels of less strength; and the Third contained all such battleships as were becoming antiquated, though still capable of rendering some service. These last would be called into action only as a reserve. Five squadrons, of 4 ships each, were attached as cruisers to the First Fleet. Two cruiser squadrons were attached to the Second Fleet, and were of varying strength. The oldest cruisers, divided into five squadrons, were attached to the Third Fleet. Torpedo-boat destroyers, commonly known as "destroyers", to the number of 82, and 24 torpedo-boats, together with 57 submarines, were available for service at home. Two battleships were abroad, one on the China and one on the India station. But the details as to strength in foreign waters are of little consequence till we have to deal with such

operations as have taken place there. The decisive field is the North Sea, since a defeat on it would ruin the naval power of Great Britain at its very foundations.

The German navy was, at the beginning of the war, composed of 21 battleships of the newer types, and 12 old ships—33 in all, as against 55 British. It included about 25 cruisers, of which some were absent on foreign stations, and not a few were old and weak. To these were to be added 21 submarines and nearly 100 torpedo craft, larger or smaller. It would be well within the truth to say that the British fleet was at least twice as strong as its opponent. In regard to what rank as the most powerful of battleships—the Dreadnoughts—the proportion was 19 in the British to 13 in the German fleet. The essential difference between a pre-Dreadnought and a Dreadnought is that the first carry a few very heavy guns, and larger numbers of medium and light ones; while the second carry a large number of very heavy guns—which in the best of them are so placed that they can be all fired on one side—and a comparatively small proportion of light guns.

When we pass from the vessels to their crews, the superiority of our navy is still more marked. The establishment—that is, the total number of all ranks provided for—is 150,000 and odd. We all know that they enlist freely, and can serve for twenty years to earn a pension. All do not, but many do. Behind the establishment stand the Fleet Reserve of men who have served with or without

earning a pension; the Coast-guard, the Royal Naval Reserve of merchant seamen, the Volunteer Reserve for local service, and men who engage to serve in the "trawlers", that is, vessels employed to search for and remove mines. They amounted in round figures to 55,000 men of all classes. The German navy employs long-service men for skilled work, but its crews are in the main drawn from the conscription, and serve but a short time, as the soldiers do. Their strength amounted in round numbers to 73,000. When the reserves are included, the conditions of their service do not allow them to reach the same level of skill as the British crews.

The field of operations for a fleet is all the navigable seas of the world. But though ships can go wherever

they can float, various considerations, of which the geographical are the most important, have usually confined naval wars to definite regions. In this case the main—the vital—scene of hostilities is the North Sea. The German war-ships can reach the outer ocean only across its waters. Now Great Britain possesses the very signal advantage that it lies across the road of the Germans. They cannot venture to try to force the Straits of Dover, and their one road out is between the Shetlands and Norway. Since the rise of the German fleet the British Government has formed a naval post at Rosyth, and the fleet has been familiarized in practice with the anchorages on the north-east of Scotland, with Scapa Flow between Orkney and the Pentland Firth, and



Photo Critch, Southsea

The British Armada, 1914, led by Admiral Sir John Jellicoe's Flagship, the *Iron Duke*

Lamlash in Arran. From these bases it can watch, and can start to attack.

The geographical position of Germany is unfavourable as against Great Britain, but it has a peculiar advantage. The bases of its fleet lie in the eastern and western angles formed by the peninsula of which the northern part is Jutland and belongs to Denmark, and the southern in Schleswig-Holstein, which, since the wars of 1864 and 1866, has belonged to Germany. On the east is the fine harbour of Kiel; on the west are the mouths of the Elbe, the Weser, and the Jahde, on which stand important ports. The two bases are connected by the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal, of which one end opens on Kiel harbour or fiord, and the other on the Elbe. So long as a superior naval force is not stationed at both ends of the canal, the German navy will always be able to act with its whole strength either in the Baltic or in the North Sea. The British fleet is not strong enough to be able to provide a blockading force on both sides. As the North Sea is of vital importance to Great Britain, our fleet must neglect the Baltic. The Germans are therefore free to make use of it either to operate against the Russians—whose fleet has not yet recovered from the disasters of the Japanese war—or for the purpose of completing the training of their crews. The western German coast is shallow and fringed by low islands. The passages through the sand-banks to the rivers and harbours are intricate, and the depths are constantly shifting. Opposite the river mouths, and at a distance of about

20 miles from them, are the two islands which form Heligoland. One of these is rocky and precipitous, with a single small landing-place; the other is a sand-bank. They were formerly connected, but in 1720 a great storm divided them. The water between is an anchorage for small vessels, but a ridge of sand, on which there is only 2 fathoms of water at low tide, still connects the two islands, and renders the anchorage bad for large vessels. It is open to the dangerous northerly gales. The rocky island is heavily fortified, and the whole serves as a barrier to the coast, as well as a look-out place and cover for the fleet. On this coast the head-quarters of the German navy are Wilhelmshaven, on the Jahde, where they are amply covered against an attack from the sea.

The chief command of the British Home Fleets is held by Sir John Jellicoe. Sir John, who was fifty-four when he was appointed, had forty-two years of service behind him. He had served in the Egyptian War, had survived the wreck of the *Victoria*, and had been Chief of the Staff to Sir Edward Seymour during the operations in China in 1900. He had a wide experience of administrative work at the Admiralty as Controller, and also as Director of Ordnance; and had hoisted his flag as Commander-in-Chief of the Red Fleet during the manœuvres of 1913. Rear-Admiral Madden was appointed as Chief of the Staff (a title which has replaced the old name of "Captain of the Fleet") to Sir John. He also had served in the Egyptian War, and had experience at the





The Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir John Jellicoe  
(From a photograph by Russell, Southsea)

Admiralty and in manœuvres. Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, who has had similar service, and who was in command on the Montenegrin coast and at Scutari during the recent troubles in Albania, was at the head of the Second and Third Fleets. The four battle squadrons of the First Fleet were under Vice-Admiral Sir Lewis Bayly, Vice-Admiral Sir George

Warrender, Vice-Admiral G. E. Bradford, and Vice-Admiral Sir Douglas Gamble, officers whose experience had been similar to that of the chief commanders. The First, Second, and Third Cruiser Squadrons were led by Rear-Admiral Sir David Beatty, Rear-Admiral the Hon. G. A. Gough Calthorpe, and Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham. The last-named of these officers had been present as British naval attaché on Admiral Togo's flagship at the battle of Tsushima. He had thus the peculiar distinction of being one of the very few members of the British navy who had taken part in a naval battle.

What has been said above of the respective strengths of the fleets will show how very improbable it was that this experience of a decisive battle would fall to the British navy in the present war, at least for some time. It was not to be supposed that the German admirals would commit the mistake proverbially known as trying to kill the cat by choking it with cream. They would not rush out with the certainty that they would at once find themselves in the presence of an overwhelmingly superior force. When war was seen to be at hand, the German ships in commission were carrying out their summer manœuvres on the coast of Norway. They were at once called home and concentrated at Kiel. Apart altogether from the question of their safety, there was another reason why they should be collected in the Baltic. We have seen that the British fleet could not divide itself without incurring risks which the Admiralty was obviously resolved to avoid. The

entries to the Baltic are, moreover, dangerous—by the narrow sound between the Danish island Zeeland and the coast of Sweden, or by the Belts on the other side. They are narrow and full of shoals. It would be easy for the Germans to place mines in them, and fleets which did come through would be subject to the risk of being crushed in detail as the ships came through successively in face of a united enemy waiting for them at the ends. The Germans stood to gain by keeping to the Baltic for the present. In the first place, their navy was free to co-operate in the defence of the eastern frontier of the Empire against a Russian invasion, and, in the second place, their freedom to move in the Baltic saved them from the debilitating influence of a close blockade, which they must have felt if they remained in their western ports.

If the visible superiority of the British fleet deprived it of the prospect of enjoying the excitement of battle, there was another and a very vital duty which it was all the better able to perform. The mere fact that the whole of our navy was mobilized for war and ready to act had as its immediate consequence the total disappearance of the German merchant ships from the sea. The great bulk of this huge loss was not represented by actual capture. There were in British ports, when the war began, 102 German ships of 200,000 tons, which were of course detained. Against them were to be set off 94 British vessels of 170,000 tons seized in German ports at the same time. About

90 German ships, of an estimated tonnage of 338,000, were swiftly taken at sea, while some of them were on their way to our country with cargoes consigned to British receivers. Taken together they represent but a minor part of the total of 2019 ships of 4,743,046 tons composing the German merchant fleet. Even if we add the 168 vessels of 283,000 tons said to have been detained or speedily taken by our Russian and French allies, the total is still but a comparatively small proportion of the whole, and it is highly probable, if not certain, that these last figures include Austrian craft. The vital injury done to our enemy was that none of his trading vessels could any longer go to sea. They were laid up either at home or in neutral ports. There were in the waters of the United States 15 fine steamers of 247,000 tons. None of them could now hope to reach home, and they were therefore detained in America. This result of a naval war with Great Britain had, of course, been foreseen by a people who calculate so carefully as the Germans. They had always contemplated the possibility that they might be compelled to lose the services of their merchant navy, and to alleviate the loss by selling their ships cut off abroad if they could find a purchaser. They did try to dispose of the steamers detained in America, but the results of their efforts belong to a later stage of the war, and must be left to be dealt with further on. And besides this attempt to minimize loss, the Germans had not forgotten to prepare the means for retaliating on British com-

merce by carrying on a cruiser warfare. But the development of this side of the war could not be immediate.

Until it began to be felt—or at least to be heard of—attention was naturally directed to the North Sea first of all, and then to the Mediterranean. In the North Sea the British fleet had to take effective possession, by such arrangements as would place an impassable barrier in the way of all German naval attacks. When no harm can any longer be done by telling the whole truth, we shall know what those arrangements have been. For the present the movements and stations of our Home Fleet are very properly concealed. We know only as much as by the very nature of it is public—namely, that the field of operations is the North Sea and that the bases of the fleet are those which have been already named, from Harwich to Scapa Flow and Lamlash. What was no less public from the first was that the function of the British fleet was to cover the transport of whatever military forces the Government decided to send abroad.

The first incident in the naval war arose out of this part of the duty of the fleet. At a later period the German Government made the very unfounded boast that it had stopped the passage of a British army to the Continent by scattering mines across the route. With that indication to guide us, we can safely estimate the purpose for which the *Königin Luise* was sent into the south half of the North Sea on the very first day of the war. She was a small steamer of

about 2000 tons, belonging to the Hamburg - America Company, and employed as a mine-layer. The mine is a weapon of war akin to a torpedo, but differently employed. It is not launched at an enemy directly, and has no motive power of its own. It is either turned adrift or anchored. The anchoring is apt to be of a very uncertain order in tides and currents. It is perfectly fair to employ mines either to cover the approach to the ports of the nation using them or to block the harbours of an enemy. It would, by analogy, be quite legitimate to lay them in the path of transports conveying troops. Waters crossed by vessels used for that purpose are part of the field of war. An abuse has been made of mines by the Germans, and there will be more to be said on that subject; but the dash of the *Königin Luise* was not proved to be a case in point.

She had for her mission to scatter these hidden weapons on the water between Harwich and the coast of Belgium, which the Germans, no doubt, assumed would be the course to be taken by British troops sent to the Continent. When she was just beginning her work she was sighted by a trawler, who gave notice to the *Amphion* and the destroyers of her flotilla. The German ship fled, dropping her mines, but was overtaken and speedily sent to the bottom by her pursuers. Such a vessel could offer no effectual resistance, but it was a reason for legitimate satisfaction that the fire of the cruiser and of the destroyers was as accurate as it could be at peace practice. The conclusion



that the *Königin Luise* and her dangerous cargo were both at the bottom of the sea was somewhat hastily reached. Within twenty-four hours it was proved that she had either dropped mines before her flight or that some of them had broken away while she was being sunk.

A mine which is meant to float below the surface, without sinking to the bottom, will of course remain passive in absolutely still water, or drift under the pressure of tides and currents. The waters of the North Sea and Channel are never quite motionless. During the flood-tide they are moved by a current which runs towards London, and on the ebb flows away from it. Obviously the mines floating in the upper waters would be carried to and fro with deviations very difficult to calculate. They can be sought for, and either exploded harmlessly or picked up. The method adopted is to employ small vessels of shallow draught, which will pass over them. They hunt in couples, with a cable stretched from the bow of one to the bow of the other. The bight of the cable gropes below the surface and catches the mine. It is dangerous work, and is entrusted to so-called "trawlers", though they do not use the common trawl.

Some of those brought by the *Königin Luise* did escape, and were the means of inflicting the first loss suffered by the British navy. The mine-layer had been sent to the bottom on the forenoon of 5th August. After picking up the survivors of her crew, the *Amphion* and the third flotilla of destroyers under her care proceeded

on what the official report discreetly calls "the prearranged plan of search" on which they were engaged. The duty was executed, and the *Amphion* returned, taking all care to avoid the area on which the sunken mine-layer might be supposed to have left her dangerous cargo. But tides and currents had been busy. At 6.30 on the morning of 6th August the *Amphion* struck a mine. In the words of the official report:

"A sheet of flame instantly enveloped the bridge and rendered the captain insensible, and he fell on the fore-and-aft bridge. As soon as he recovered consciousness he ran to the engine-room to stop the engines, which were still going at revolutions for 20 knots. As all the fore part was on fire, it proved impossible to reach the bridge or to flood the fore magazine. The ship's back appeared to be broken, and she was already settling down by the bows. All efforts were therefore directed towards placing the wounded in places of safety in case of explosion, and towards getting her in tow by the stern. By the time the destroyers closed it was clearly time to abandon the ship. The men fell in for this purpose with the same composure that had marked their behaviour throughout. All was done without hurry or confusion, and twenty minutes after the mine was struck the men, officers, and captain left the ship. Three minutes after the captain left his ship another explosion occurred, which enveloped and threw up the fore part of the vessel. The effects showed that she must have struck a second mine, which exploded the fore magazine. Debris falling from a great height struck the rescue boats and destroyers, and one of the *Amphion's* shells burst on the deck of one of the latter, killing two of the men and a German prisoner rescued from the cruiser. The after part now began to settle quickly, till the foremost part was on the bottom, and

the whole after part tilted up at an angle of 45 degrees. In another quarter of an hour this, too, had disappeared. Captain Fox speaks in high terms of the behaviour of the officers and men throughout. Every order was promptly obeyed, without confusion or perturbation."

The loss of the *Amphion*, a cruiser of 3500 tons, barely three years old, was a shrewd price to pay for the destruction of the *Königin Luise*, if we look to the relative value of the vessels alone. But Captain Fox and the other officers of the flotilla had averted a great danger. The fact that the cruiser floated so long after receiving the first blow testified to excellence of the workmanship put

into her at Pembroke Dockyard, where she was built. The loss of 150 lives (including several of the German prisoners) was sadder than the loss of the vessel. Yet even in this respect there was ground for a certain feeling of relief. It had commonly been supposed that when a ship was lost in such circumstances as the *Amphion*, few or none of her crew would escape. The survivors were, however, more numerous than those who were lost.

The use and the effect of mines during the period we are now dealing with was a subject much discussed. The question of principle involved was this: granting that it is legitimate

to use mines in order to obstruct the operations of an enemy in such parts of the sea as belong to the field of the war, is it pardonable to lay them far and wide where they constitute a danger to the unarmed and neutral trader? The difficulty is to define the boundary between the two. It is complicated in the North Sea by the fact that the general tendency of tide and current is to carry all floating objects towards the Continental coast and not towards Great Britain. Thus, supposing that a German mine-layer, more fortunate than the *Königin Luise*, had laid mines opposite our north-east coast in order to obstruct our squadrons which have their bases there, the tendency of the currents,



Photo Cribb, Southsea

H.M.S. *Iron Duke*: Admiral Sir John Jellicoe's Flagship

tidal and permanent, would be to carry them into the open waters. To this must be added the other fact that mines had been freely laid in the entrances to the Baltic, the Sound, and the Belts, by the Germans, and, it is said, by the Danish Government, which made use of these weapons to enforce respect for its neutrality. Passages

must be added British trawlers, as, for example, the *Barley Rig* of Buckie. The exact place where these disasters have happened is not generally stated, and for obvious reasons. When we can survey the war with fuller knowledge we shall be able to decide whether the Germans have shown in their operations at sea more or less



Germany's Armada, 1914: the Kaiser's Battle Fleet in the North Sea

known to the Danish pilots were left for the transit of trade. But the immense amount of fresh water poured into the Baltic by the 250 rivers, big and little, which fall into that sea, raises its level above the outside waters. There is, therefore, an overflow. Even anchored mines are liable to drift. It is always a possible danger that they will be carried out into the Kattegat and so to the North Sea, where they become a general peril. Before 28th August nine neutral vessels—two Norwegian, five Danish, and two Dutch—had perished through mines. To them

brutal disregard of the rights of neutrals than they have on land.

When we turn to the question what effect the scattering of these deadly devices has had on the conduct of trade and war the answer is more encouraging than had been expected. It had been supposed that mines and torpedoes would put a complete stop to the navigation of the North Sea. Yet, when the excitement of the first few days was over, trade resumed its course between Great Britain and the neutrals with unexpected rapidity. The loss of neutral traders and



trawlers on mines was deplorable, but an equal or larger number have perished in a single storm. The risk has not been greater than can be covered by a tolerable insurance by the owners, while the sailors, a race of men who pass their lives in facing dangers, have not been deterred from following their trade because the risk of being killed by mines has been added to the perils of the sea.

It is early to judge how far the conduct of the naval war has been influenced by these mines. We must be content with bearing in mind that the most powerful battleship or battle cruiser which floats is very vulnerable below the water-line, and that the more costly she is the less can she be put in hazard of an explosion underneath her. Therefore the movements of the great ships must be to some extent regulated by the obligation not to put them rashly in danger. Now, the region in which the mine is most to be guarded against is the German coast. They lie in a barrier in front of it—not a complete line, of course, for the enemy must leave water-ways free for the exit and entry of his own ships. Yet, as the exact places they occupy cannot be accurately known to us, it would be pure folly to take the larger vessels to where they might be lost for no purpose. That is the sufficient answer to impatient people who wondered why we heard nothing of the doings of Sir John Jellicoe's battleships, forgetting that their time could only come when they could meet their own kind on the open sea, which would be when the German battleships came, or were forced, out.

The mine, being passive, can be dredged out of the way, and it is possible for careful observers to estimate with a reasonable approach to accuracy where it will be likely to be found. These places are known as danger zones, and are indicated by the Admiralty to British and neutral vessels. The torpedo moves by its own machinery and can come to attack. Some of the German torpedoes have a range of 7000 yards—4 miles roughly speaking. It was said that others then being constructed were designed to attain to a range of 10,000 yards. They can be sped from stations on shore, and therefore render the approach to fortified coasts still more perilous. At sea they are the weapon of all kinds of ships, and the sole arm—at least, sole dangerous arm—of the submarine. Vessels of that class can carry guns, but not a heavy armament. The submarine, which shows little above the water and strikes from below, is the most to be dreaded of all craft which use torpedoes. The Germans are sufficiently provided with them, and were known to have a dozen or fourteen in course of construction. That they would try to make effective use of them was to be taken for granted.

The first but unhappily by no means the last instance of their activity was given on 9th August. It was disastrous to them, for the submarine U 15, which made the attack, was sunk by the *Birmingham*, a cruiser of 5530 tons, carrying nine 6-inch guns. The details of this encounter have been described in vivid terms, but the authority of the description is

not beyond dispute. The British cruiser (so much seems certain) did not merely attempt to avoid the submarine, but dashed at her, and succeeded in doing her a hurt which compelled her to come to the surface, where she was instantly destroyed. That the U 15 was sunk we know, as surely as we know that she was a vessel of 321 tons with a speed of 13 knots on the surface and of  $8\frac{1}{2}$  below, and therefore not of the largest and most formidable type. It is good to know that these furtive enemies can be sunk by a quickly-handled cruiser, but we have no full account of a trustworthy order to tell us exactly what did happen on 9th August.

In the outer seas—the Atlantic, the Pacific, and the Mediterranean—the first days of the war were not barren of events of importance. But in so far as the last-named is concerned we are met by the difficulty which prevents a full account of events nearer home, in an aggravated form. It would be easy to say what number of British vessels were there just before the war—some fifty of all classes; but we do not know how many were there a week after 4th August. The numbers of the ships of our ally, the French, and of our enemies, the Austrians, within the Straits of Gibraltar were matters of common knowledge, and were not liable to be altered, except by the casualties of war. The bulk of the French navy was stationed there—20 battleships, of which 10 are Dreadnoughts, 40 armoured cruisers, 80 destroyers, 140 torpedo-boats, and 50 submarines. The torpedo-boats were

not of much value except for harbour service; but the total gave our ally an overwhelming superiority over the Austrians, whose navy consisted of 15 battleships—of which several were of but 6000 tons, and only 3 were Dreadnoughts—2 armoured cruisers, and 9 light cruisers, with 15 destroyers, 58 small torpedo-boats, and 6 submarines. Even if we leave the British ships out of the account, the disparity of force between French and Austrians rendered it almost impossible that actions of any importance should occur. And this was not all. Austria is constrained by her geographical position to operate only in the narrow waters of the Adriatic. One of her cruisers, the *Kaiserin Elizabeth*, was understood to be at Kiao Chau, the German colony in China. It is enough to say, once and for all, that except bald statements of bombardments, and the destruction of one Austrian warship, the light cruiser *Zenta*, little news has come from these seas. And as regards the little that has come, we are met by the obligation to say nothing. The circumstances which led to the escape of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* from the French and British cruisers, their safe arrival in the Dardanelles, and the sale of them to the Turks are the subject of examination by a court of enquiry. Any comment on them would be not only premature but ignorant. It may be added that there is nothing to be said of the operations of the Germans against Russians in the Baltic in the early days of the war.

When we turn to the operations of the cruisers on the ocean routes and

in distant seas we come into the light—comparatively—and the events possess interest. At the beginning of August there were at Apia—the scene of the great hurricane, in which Captain Kane and his ship, the *Calliope*, distinguished themselves, and which was described by Robert Louis Stevenson, an eyewitness—a squadron

a very good chance of winning successes for a time. The policy of concentrating the bulk of the British navy in home waters was justified by strong arguments, but it had its counterpart in the corresponding reduction in the number of vessels stationed abroad. When war was visibly at hand, steps were taken to

protect commerce. Cruisers were sent for the purpose, but in what numbers and to what destinations were details which it was not proper to reveal. Until these reinforcements were on the spot the available British forces were small in proportion to the extent of ocean routes to be guarded and the number of possible assailants. One battleship and 15 torpedo-craft in China, 1 battleship



H.M.S. *Birmingham*, the Cruiser which sank the German Submarine U15 on August 9, 1914

of German cruisers: the *Scharnhorst*, of 11,600 tons, the *Gneisenau*, of the same size, the *Leipzig*, of 3400, the *Nürnberg*, of 3470, and the *Emden*, of 3650. Five small swift vessels were understood to be in the Atlantic and West Indies, and others on the coast of Africa. It was further known that some of the German liners carried an armament, and could be converted into armed cruisers. There were also ships of war on both African coasts. Here were, in appreciable numbers, the instruments of a severe commerce-destroying war. They had apparently

and 2 cruisers in British Indian waters, 4 small cruisers in the Persian Gulf, 3 cruisers at the Cape, 2 gunboats on the west coast of South America, 2 cruisers and a sloop in New Zealand, a few scattered vessels on the east coast of South America and the west of Africa, even when reinforced by the battle cruiser, 3 light cruisers, the torpedo-craft, and submarine of the Australian navy, were but little for the work.

It cannot, however, be said that the German cruisers made a prompt or brilliant use of their opportunity. No-



thing was heard of them for long. Whether because they were in want of coal or because they were acting on some plan not known to us, they seemed strangely torpid for vessels which commonly boasted of 23 or 24 knots of speed, and, moreover, must have been well aware that the longer they delayed the less would be their chance of doing anything to the purpose. In fact, down to the last days of August, only one German cruiser displayed signal activity, and she did not belong to the vessels stationed abroad at the beginning of the war.

The *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* was a Norddeutscher-Lloyd steamer of 13,952 tons and a speed of 22 knots. She had in her day the reputation of being the swiftest ship on the North Atlantic. In the early days of the war she escaped from Bremerhaven. Whether she took her armament with her, which appears to be the most probable story, or whether she was equipped in South American waters seems to be uncertain. If she was the vessel which sank the *Hyades* off Pernambuco she must have gone out armed. The *Hyades* was, by one of those ironies which do occur in war, freighted by a German firm, with a cargo for German use, and was bound to Rotterdam. The *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse* would therefore appear to have damaged her own side by sinking the British steamer; but her captain was no doubt

well aware that, as the *Hyades* would have reached European waters after the declaration of war, she could not well have been allowed to carry an enemy's goods to a neutral port for the enemy's uses. Germany lost nothing when the *Hyades* was sunk. The field of operations on which the German commerce-destroyer was to act is one of very peculiar importance to Great Britain. It was the South Atlantic. The whole of the food supply we draw from New Zealand and the Argentine in the form of chilled and frozen meat, dairy produce, and wheat comes by this route. If an opponent could break and suspend this commerce, even for a comparatively short time, the injury inflicted would be keenly felt. It was no doubt their knowledge of this fact which accounts for the promptitude shown in sending out the commerce-destroyer. The officers and crew of the *Kaiser Wilhelm* displayed no contemptible degree of aptitude for the performance of their task. The speed of their ship made it easy for them to overhaul the average cargo-boat, which is not designed to go at the pace of a North Atlantic "greyhound". Fifteen



The German Battleship *Goeben*, which escaped into the Dardanelles, and was sold to the Turks



Photo. Traampus, Paris

The German Cruiser *Breslau*, which escaped with the *Goeben*, and was sold to the Turks

knots is a good speed even for Royal Mail steamers engaged in the South American trade. It is not nearly enough to enable them to outrun the 22 knots of the German cruiser. She took for the main scene of her operations what had been in former times a favourite cruising-ground of the pirates—that is to say, the north-west coast of Africa, with the Canaries or Cape Verd Islands as a centre. Though her career was short it was not barren. Two of her prizes alone represented more than her own value, the *Kaipara* and the *Nyanza*. The first was a cargo-boat, the property of the New Zealand Shipping Company. She was of 7892 tons, and she carried 72,000 carcasses of mutton, together with dairy produce, and perhaps some wool. Ship and cargo together were worth little short of £300,000. The *Nyanza* belonged to the Elder Dempster line, and was of 3066 tons. She was bound for Hamburg with a general cargo of West African produce, palm-oil, and nuts. Her own value was put at £24,000, and the price of her cargo must have been considerable.

The story of the *Kaipara* supplies a capital leading example of what "commerce-destroying" means for

the victims, and of how the work is done. She left Lyttelton on Saturday, 11th July, when Europe was far from foreseeing the storm which was to break out at the end of the month. On 1st August she was at Montevideo, where she would stop to take in coal. On 16th August, seven days before

she was due home at the end of her long voyage, at 7 a.m., when everybody was looking forward, with a good sea appetite, for breakfast, she was aware of a big four-funnel steamer bearing down on her. The stranger fired a blank discharge, as a signal to stop, and ranged up alongside. A discharge of blank cartridge is the known and universal signal to stop. The *Kaiser Wilhelm* had painted out her name, but the crew of the *Kaipara* soon learned who the stranger was. The German ranged up alongside within hailing distance, and ordered the prize's crew not to make use of their wireless under penalty of being sent to the bottom at once. There was nothing for it but to obey. The captor sent a prize-master and crew to take possession. Two lieutenants, armed to the teeth, as Mr. Bartlett, who tells the story to the *Dover Express*, credibly informs us, came aboard and at once dismantled the wireless apparatus. The next step was to transfer the *Kaipara's* crew to the *Kaiser Wilhelm* and sink her. It required, according to the witness, sixty shots to make an end of her. The work, it would seem, might have been done at a cheaper rate. And

now, after generations of peace on the sea, the *Kaipara's* people had an experience which in former times was very common. They learned the discomforts of being prisoners of war. The German officers and men showed no brutality, but treated their captives in a humane manner. But, be the treatment given as kind as it may be, the position of a prisoner in a cruising commerce-destroyer must be painful. It is not possible for their captor to allow them to range freely about the ship. They must be confined below except during the reasonable interval of exercise on deck which humanity makes it incumbent to allow them. The captain of the *Kaiser Wilhelm* fixed it at two hours—a fair amount. Confinement below in a vessel cruising in the Tropics entailed much misery from heat, and it was a matter of course that food was doled out with a sparing hand. So it was, no doubt, to the officers and crew themselves. The prisoners from the *Kaipara* were soon joined by others from the *Nyanza*. They would all have been landed somewhere if opportunity had been given. The Germans had prepared to get rid of them by calling upon them to sign an agreement not to serve in the war. As the announcement was made in broken English it was perhaps not well understood. But the release of the prisoners was to come in another way.

The commerce-destroyer of old was a weaker ship than a modern steamer, and was tied very largely by wind and current; but it had its advantages. So long as food and water lasted it could keep the sea, and they lasted far longer than the coal supply of such a vessel as the *Kaiser Wilhelm*. Then she could “lie-to” in the trade-winds and drift till she saw a prize coming along the trade route, which was pretty closely fixed for a sailing merchant-ship by wind and current. Her spars would stand continuous use better than machinery. Soon after the capture of the *Nyanza*, the *Kaiser Wilhelm* began to run out of coal. Arrangements of a secret kind had, of course, been made, whereby she was to be met, at points fixed beforehand, by a tender with fuel. Captain Semmes, of the *Alabama*, had made a fine art of these precautions. The German had laid his plans to be met near Agadir, on the north-west coast of Africa, by the supply-ships. The transfer of coal at sea is a difficult and laborious process, and is often not even



H.M.S. *Highflyer*, which sank the *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*



## The "Highflyer" sinks the "Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse" 69



The *Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse*, converted by Germany into a commerce-destroyer, sunk by H.M.S. *Highflyer* on August 27, 1914

crew, nor to the navy at large, nor yet to the public, to treat the brief action which followed as anything "to make a song of"—as Rob Roy would have said. The *Highflyer* is but a light cruiser, fourteen years old, and not at the best of her time very speedy—20 knots was her limit—but she was built for war, carried eleven 6-inch guns,

possible. If that were not the case the *Kaiser Wilhelm* would probably have given some point of longitude and latitude as the rendezvous. But, as this course could not be taken, there was nothing for it but to choose some spot on the coast. And this method had its dangers, for any British naval officer could make an approximately accurate guess where a commerce-destroyer prowling in these waters must needs go to meet her supply-ships.

The *Kaiser Wilhelm* was at her rendezvous ten days after she took the *Kaipara*. She had been met by the Hamburg s.s. *Dalla*, which supplied her with 2000 tons of coal. As this was not enough, she had to wait for others. Two—one of them being a four-master sailing-ship—came in, and on 27th August the German was completing her coaling when H.M.S. *Highflyer* came in sight. And then there was a speedy end to the career of the commerce-destroyer.

It would be no compliment to Captain H. T. Buller, M.V.O., and his

as against the four 10-inch of the *Kaiser Wilhelm*, and her 5600 tons presented a far smaller target than the 13,000 odd tons of the armed passenger-ship, which was built high to make room for cabins. The German had nothing for it but to run if she could. The prisoners were allowed to pass over to the colliers. It is always pleasant to meet instances of humanity in the midst of war. We are glad to learn that Captain Buller gave time for the transfer, and that the released prisoners, feeling that their captors had treated them fairly, cheered the Germans as they went off. The *Kaiser Wilhelm's* only chance was to run, but she was within range, and no time was given her. In a very brief space she was sunk by the *Highflyer's* guns. The loss on the British ship was only 1 killed and 5 slightly wounded. The released prisoners were taken to the Canaries, and thence home. The career of the *Kaiser Wilhelm* illustrates very well the real weakness of the armed merchant-liner as

a commerce-destroyer. It lasted for a very short time, and if the supply-ships which came to bring her coal had been intercepted, as they very well might, she would have been disposed of by her mere inability to keep the sea at all.

On the day after the sinking of the commerce-destroyer on the coast of Africa there occurred the first encounter on a considerable scale in the naval part of the war. The general direction on the spot was in the hands of Sir David Beatty (of course under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief), but, as it was a reconnaissance in force, the first to come into action were the scouts. The scene was the North Sea and the neighbourhood of Heligoland from the beginning of the war, as we learn from the report of Commodore Keyes (which was published on October 23, together with Sir David Beatty's and others). The submarines had been active in the Bight of Heligoland in scouting duty. Though "subjected to skilful and well-executed anti-submarine tactics, hunted for hours at a time by torpedo-craft, and attacked by gun-fire and torpedoes", they had kept the enemy under observation, and had suffered no disaster. It was on their reports that a scheme, which we have to judge by the results, was laid to abate the activity of the German cruisers and destroyers. On the morning of August 28 a force of destroyers—the 1st and 3rd Flotillas with a few exceptions—led by Commodore Tyrwhitt in the *Arethusa*, a light cruiser of a new model and of 3700 tons, carrying 2.6-inch and 8.4-inch guns, was to form



The Right Hon. Winston Spencer Churchill, First Lord  
of the Admiralty  
(From a photograph by Elliot & Fry)

the first line. The *Arethusa* had been joined on the 27th by the *Fearless*, Captain W. J. Blunt, another light cruiser of 3440 tons and 10.4-inch guns. Cruisers of Commodore Goodenough's squadron were at hand to support, and behind them, in case of need, the battle-cruiser squadron of Sir David Beatty. The sea was calm, and there was a haze which made it impossible to see for more than 3 miles. The immediate aim was to cut off a German force of cruisers and destroyers from Heligoland. The alarm was given to the enemy by a scouting destroyer. As the British force pushed on, a very smart engagement ensued, in which the *Arethusa* was severely cut up. Lieutenant Eric Westmacott was killed by Commodore


Tyrwhitt's side, all the *Arethusa's* guns, except one, were disabled, her speed was reduced, and at the close of the action she had to be taken in tow by the *Hogue*. But the enemy was driven away, and the pursuing British ships followed them to within sight of Heligoland. The exact movements of the ships engaged cannot be traced from the dispatches, but we know that the British vessels drew off to the west to avoid the fire of the forts, and it appears that they were pressed by the German ships, who rallied on the support of the batteries. The light cruisers of Commodore Goodenough's squadron came into action, and then Sir David Beatty brought up the battle cruisers. Promptitude and exact movement gave full effect to the su-

periority of the British in heavy ships. The calm sea was unfavourable to the use of torpedoes, for they could be seen coming and could be avoided by Sir David Beatty's vessels, which also maintained a high rate of speed. The Germans lost three cruisers — the *Mainz* and *Köln*, vessels corresponding to the *Fearless*, and a smaller cruiser, the *Aurora*. Many of their destroyers perished, and, to borrow a military phrase, they were driven in badly mauled. The modest list of decorations (including a C.B. for Commodore Tyrwhitt) and of promotions conferred on officers and men was well deserved. The action had distinct phases, as the enemy's ships appeared from or disappeared into the haze. It lasted from early in the morning till the afternoon. Without information which we do not possess it is impossible to follow the movements of individual vessels, which would enable us to understand why so large a proportion of the total loss of about 100 fell to the share of the *Arethusa*. It was, in short, an affair of outposts. But we may observe that if it was no more than this the reason was that the German navy, or its Government, was not prepared to make the encounter more equal. There are German ships, and to spare, quite equal to the task of encountering the battle cruisers of the British fleet; but they were not at hand. We must conclude either that the German Government had no intention of meeting the British fleet on the open sea in that stage of the war or that it had other uses for its big ships in the Baltic, where they served to prevent



Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, in command in the action in the Bight of Heligoland  
(From a photograph by Speight)





The Cruiser *Mainz*, one of the German warships sunk in the Bight of Heligoland on August 28, 1914

a Russian landing on the Pomeranian coast.

Even an "affair of outposts", as this was, has its incidents of gallantry or of honour. Lieutenant Westmacott of the *Arethusa* and Lieutenant-Commander Barttelot of the destroyer *Liberty* fell at their posts with high honour; and Commander Frank Rose, by keeping his place on the bridge, though wounded first in one leg and then in the other, covered himself with honour. So did the captain of the *Defender*, when, after sinking an enemy, he lowered a boat to help her men who were in the water. It is not equally easy to decide what we are to say of the conduct of some of the Germans. It is allowed by the best witnesses that they fought hard. The damage done to the *Arethusa*, the *Laurel*, and the *Liberty* shows that they handled their guns to some purpose. A lieutenant whose letter was published in *The Morning Post* speaks very highly of the fight made by the *Mainz*. He calls it "immensely gallant". Even when "her whole mid-

ships" was "a fuming inferno" her fore and after guns continued to fire. But it is none the less clear that the vein of deliberate ferocity which stains the undeniable courage of the Germans was to be seen at work here as on land. There seems to be no question that German officers were seen to

fire at their own men struggling in the water. Their motive was probably that they thought the sailors had left their posts too soon. At a later date the Admiralty published a strongly-worded vindication of the humanity of the British sailors against the unfounded charges of the Germans. The fact that the *Defender* lowered her boat to pick up her enemies, and was herself attacked immediately afterwards, is proof enough that there was no lack of chivalry in the British squadron. The boat's crew was in danger of being lost, but was rescued by a submarine.

It is to be noted that the first German account of the action which reached this country acknowledged that the British ships had done their utmost to help the men who were struggling in the water. For the rest, that account deals chiefly with the fortunes of the *Ariadne*, and gives no intelligible account of the engagement. We may deduce from a confused whirl of words that, while the *Mainz* and the *Köln* sunk in battle,



Drawn by Norman Wilkinson

"The Battle-cruiser Squadron most opportunely arrived": the Turning-point in the British Naval Victory  
in the Bight of Heligoland on August 28, 1914

the *Ariadne* got away badly damaged. She was no doubt the vessel which was seen by British witnesses to disappear in the fog and to be on fire. She ran for a time, but, being too much battered to reach port, was left by her crew and allowed to sink. The German accounts state that the chief of their flotilla, Corvette Captain

(i.e. Commander) Wallis, was killed. Their total loss can hardly have been less than twelve hundred. Among the prisoners picked up was Lieutenant von Tirpitz, of the *Mainz*, a son of the German Minister of Marine, Grand Admiral von Tirpitz.

D. H.



The Sinking of the German Cruiser *Mainz*: an instantaneous photograph taken on board one of the British Warships during the Naval Engagement off Heligoland, August 28, 1914

‘After an action of approximately twenty-five minutes, the *Mainz* was seen to be sinking by the head, her engines stopped, besides being on fire. At this moment the Light Cruiser Squadron appeared, and they very speedily reduced the *Mainz* to a condition which must have been indescribable. I then recalled *Fearless* and the destroyers, and ordered cease fire.”

—Extract from Commodore Tyrwhitt's Official Dispatch.



## CHAPTER III

## THE WORK OF THE AIR-CRAFT

(August-September, 1914)

The British Air Service—Air-scouting in War—Weather Conditions—Engine Breakdowns—Risks from Guns—Three Types of Machine for Reconnaissance—Machines for Quick Reconnaissance—An Example from the Battle of Mons—Air-craft as an Aid to Artillery—Air-craft as Protectors of Troopships—Sea-planes—Biplanes for Detailed Survey—Air-ships in War—Aeroplane Contests with Air-ships—Top-platform Guns on Air-ships—Air-ships by Night—Zeppelin Attack on Antwerp—Protection from Low-lying Clouds—"Mastery of the Air"—A New Weapon wanted—French and German States of Preparation—Stability of German Aeroplanes—British War-planes—Aeroplanes of Russia, Austria, and Belgium—Importance of Skilled Mechanics—Travelling Workshops—Motor Equipment—Sir David Henderson.

WITH the British Expeditionary Force, when it arrived in France, was a small but very completely equipped service of aeroplanes; and experimental though any air service at the present day must be, this corps of ours was acknowledged, by each expert who had studied it, to be a model of organization; and not an organization that would shine merely on manœuvres, but such an organization as might be relied upon with confidence to withstand the wear and tear of war. Limited in numbers it was certainly; although, if reckoned merely as an adjunct to our small army, it was relatively large—at any rate when compared with the air fleets which had to serve the other huge forces in the field. But our airmen, as General Joffre testified in his message to Sir John French, have not confined their duties solely to the British headquarters. Their information, gleaned in constant scouting flights, has, when necessary, been at the disposal of the French staff.

Before detailing the actual work

which has gained our aviators the admiration of such world pioneers as the French, it is necessary to consider briefly the conditions which govern air-scouting in war. Above all, the machines must be airworthy, and their pilots sufficiently skilled to navigate them even in the highest winds. When news is needed urgently the airmen must be ready to fly; nothing save a gale must be allowed to check them in their work. And it is here, thanks to science in construction and the experience of pilots, that the modern war aeroplane is so vastly improved a craft. Eleven years ago, in the days when Wilbur Wright foresaw that aviation would be "a military proposition", a machine was a prisoner to the ground in the lightest of gusts. Four years ago, even, it was considered an achievement if a craft could weather a 25-mile-an-hour wind. But to-day, with machines that have wings and fins so shaped as to give them an inherent stability, and pilots who profit by an accumulation of knowledge—all of it dearly bought—it is possible to remain aloft, and even fly with safety, in a


wind blowing as high as 60 miles an hour. We read, in the words of Sir John French, that our pilots in France have not hesitated to fly "in every kind of weather". Instead of being available one day, and precluded by weather from flying the next, the air corps has been in constant and unremitting service, braving rain and wind in addition to the enemy's gun-fire; and what such reliability means, in the actual work of war, none can appreciate so well as the Commander-in-Chief himself. It removes, at a stroke, nearly all the doubts that have been entertained as to the use of air-craft on active service. No longer a fair-weather machine, the aeroplane takes its place as a dependable and vitally important instrument of war. In twenty days, up to 10th September, it was stated on authority that the British airmen maintained a daily average of nine flights, each over 100 miles in length; and by 21st September, according to a subsequent official report, the air mileage flown by our pilots,

while on scouting and other work, had reached a total of 87,000 miles.

Granted he can overcome the problem of adverse weather, there are still obstacles which, in time of actual war, stand between the air-scout and a successful reconnaissance. One is represented by the possible break-down of his engine—a risk that lurks always in a pilot's mind when flying, and becomes extremely serious in time of war, when an involuntary descent may bring him down in hostile country. Aviation motors, of course, have been very materially improved; but until duplicate power plants are perfected, and so long as an aviator relies upon a single engine, there will be this risk of failure. No matter how carefully a motor is overhauled on the ground, there is always the possibility of some trivial break-down—a mishap quite unimportant in itself, but which, before it can be repaired, makes it imperative for a pilot to descend. A magneto may give trouble; an ignition wire or valve-spring break; a petrol pipe,



A Fast, Two-seated British Monoplane, as used by a Pilot and Observer for Rapid Scouting  
The cowl over the motor is sloped to reduce wind resistance. The main landing wheels have been blocked in also, the spokes of the wheels being found to cause air friction when at high speeds.



A Military Biplane with the Curved-back, Arrow-shaped Planes, which have been adopted largely by the Germans

Our Royal Air-craft Factory has recently built a highly-successful machine of the automatic stability type.

through vibration, shake free from the soldering that attaches it to a tank. These are potential break-downs which may defy previous inspection.

Other risks which the air-scout runs are from the gun-fire that may be directed against him from the ground, and the attacks that—as he approaches the enemy's lines—may be made upon him by hostile air-craft. War is a science of moves and counter-moves. A new weapon is invented, and another devised immediately which may nullify its effect. So, when it was realized that every effort must be made to check the spying of aeroplanes, artillery was constructed which would throw a shell directly upwards, and tests were made with air-craft fitted with machine-guns. But in this war, luckily for the air-scout, and also for the head-quarters staff he serves, the means of checkmating him are purely experimental. Sometimes, certainly, as has been shown, the land-guns claim a victim; but should one machine

be winged there are others which will return with the news that has been sought. When an aerial reconnaissance is needed, and the area to be traversed is wide, a group of scouts are called for duty. Each machine passes above a given tract of land; and each, its specified distance traversed and no casualty having overtaken it, returns to its head-quarters. If one craft should fail to reappear, or even several, there are still the reports of the others to be sifted and combined; and should it be found that some vital position remains unsurveyed, through the non-return of an individual scout, then a high-speed craft rushes off to repair the omission. The risks which each individual airman runs, from engine failure, gun-fire, or the attack of hostile planes, although these dangers may lead to an appreciable loss, both of men and machines, cannot prevent a well-organized air corps from obtaining the news it seeks.

An ability to provide special air-craft for certain definite tasks adds greatly to the efficiency of a corps; and in this war, although military aviation is still in its infancy, there are three distinct types of machines which may be employed for the work of reconnaissance. First comes the craft for a rapid, general survey. Speed is the aim sought, and everything is made subservient to this end. The machine is either a monoplane or a small biplane, engined, say, with a motor of 100 horse-power, yielding a maximum speed of slightly more than 100 miles an hour. There is accommodation in its hull for only one man;



therefore its pilot must play a dual rôle. He is airman and observer; and a combination of these two tasks presents such difficulties that none but specially skilled men are chosen for the work.

To appreciate the value of this 100-mile-an-hour scout it must be understood how vital, at some critical moment of a campaign, is news of an enemy's movements that may be obtained rapidly. Special cavalry patrols, in the era before aeroplanes, represented the means for a quick reconnaissance; and yet, despite their courage and intelligence, a large percentage of their reports were useless when they reached head-quarters. This was not because the news obtained was incorrect, but simply because it had been anticipated. Impending movements which the cavalry patrols had detected, and the inferences to be drawn from them, were nullified by the fact that, during the slow process of gleaning and transmitting this news, the situation had so developed that the opportunity to profit by the intelligence had—before the Commander-in-Chief received it—been lost completely in the march of events. Modern warfare represents a constant process of speeding up, and the delivery of quicker and more crushing blows. Hence, if the scouting of an army can be made correspondingly swift and sure, this may make all the difference between victory and defeat. If MacMahon had been aided by air-scouts just before Sedan, he would scarcely have been caught as he was in the fatal trap on the Meuse; and Napoleon, with an efficient flying corps, might conceivably have won Waterloo.

A remarkable instance of what air-scouting may achieve, when it is rapid and accurate, we have been shown already in this war in the fighting on the Franco-Belgian frontier. It was at 5 p.m. on the evening of 23rd August that Sir John French, holding his pre-arranged position on the French left, along the line Condé-Mons-Binche, learned by telegraph from General Joffre that the Germans had forced the passage of the Sambre, that the French left was already falling back, and that the British force was menaced by three of the enemy's army corps on its front, with a fourth attempting a turning movement on its left. Such news, unexpected and extremely grave, needed urgent action. But first of all, before he decided what to do, Sir John French needed to confirm the message he had received, and discover if possible the positions of the forces that threatened him. Such information was required without an instant's delay. It was already evening, and before the next dawn some general movement must be planned. The opportunity was an ideal one for aeroplanes, and Sir John French made full use of it. He sent out his air-scouts at once, and they returned promptly with the intelligence sought. The pilot-observers located the enemy in his strength, and verified the flanking movement that was so grave a peril. So much is certain. And as a direct result of this news from the air, which reached him more rapidly than would have been possible by any other means, Sir John French issued an order to his forces that as soon as it was dawn next day a general



Escorting the British Expeditionary Force to France

"While the British troopships were crossing to the continent, airships acted as sentinels above the water . . . watching not only for hostile air-craft, but also for any distant approach of the enemy's warships, and particularly for any sign of their submarines."

retreat should be commenced. This is merely one instance of the utility of air-craft, but it is striking because, apart from the value of the information obtained, there entered into it so forcibly this question of a time factor.

It is the lofty outlook of the airman, carrying his line of vision over hills or woods, that has enabled air-craft to co-operate so successfully with artillery. If gunners have to open fire at trenches they cannot see, or over a hill at some position beyond, an aeroplane can soar above all obstructions and quickly give them the range, signalling back by the use of smoke bombs, the exposure of discs below the machine, or certain prearranged evolutions. The immense field of vision of an aerial observer, when above the sea and in clear atmosphere, was turned to practical account

in the earliest stage of the war, while the British troop-ships were crossing to the Continent. Before their passage, and while it took place, air-ships and aeroplanes acted as sentinels above the water, moving to and fro, or sweeping in wide circles outward, and watching not only for hostile air-craft, but also for any distant approach of the enemy's war-ships, and particularly for any sign of their submarines.

Fortunately for Britain, at the outbreak of the war we found ourselves, as a result of the energetic action on the part of the Admiralty, with an extremely efficient, if limited, service of sea-planes; and these machines, stationed mainly at points on the east and north-east coast, have done valuable work in maintaining an air patrol and in making scouting flights above the North Sea.

Augmenting the work of a single-seated, high-speed aeroplane, there is—as another and a distinct type of military air-craft—the slower-flying, weight-carrying biplane. This machine amplifies the swift survey of the faster craft. The observer in a single-seated machine, having his controls to engage attention, and passing through the air at an extremely rapid pace, cannot hope to effect more than the most general of surveys. And so, when detail in observation becomes necessary, and the time-factor is not so urgent, a pilot and an observer set forth in a biplane—the pilot's duty being to control the machine and steer it in whatever direction, and at whatever altitude, the observer may direct. The latter, who sits well down within the body of the machine, shielded from the rush of wind, has maps, a notebook, and powerful field-glasses. He is a man who has been specially trained

for his task—the making of observations from the air, if they are to be dependable, being extremely difficult. Having nothing to concern himself with but the study of his maps and of the land below, he is able to produce such a detailed report as is only to be improved upon by the use of one other type of craft—the large air-ship.

With the air-ship, apart from the fact that it can remain long periods in the air without alighting—an entire day as a normal flight and several days and nights in time of exceptional need—there is the very great advantage that it affords, when necessary, a stationary view-platform from which the closest of observations can be made. With the aeroplane it is not feasible, of course, to remain poised above a chosen spot, and it is this hovering capacity of the air-ship—added to the fact that its weight-lift-



One of the British Non-rigid Naval Air-ships, used for Patrol Work above the North Sea, flying over Ostend



ing power is so ample that several observers, stationed in its cars, may combine in a leisurely and detailed survey—which renders the machine strategically valuable, and goes to compensate for the drawbacks which its bulk entails.

But war is a science of meeting force by force, and so these 30-ton leviathans of the air, with their huge, fragile hulls, are attacked from the earth with gun-fire and assailed from the air by hostile planes. Thus it is sought to nullify an air-ship's work, and it is in this regard that experts, following each phase of the great campaign, find a keen and peculiar interest. That the air-ship could do valuable work was known; but the question was: "Would she be allowed to do it?" Statistics as to air-ship casualties, so far as the war has gone, give results that are confusing, and cannot be discussed in detail. But a point emerges, none the less, that was anticipated generally. Air-ships have been shown extremely vulnerable. Reckoning the number of machines available, and the flying done, the casualties among air-ships have been heavy. Land-guns have accounted for some; aeroplanes have crippled others by bombs from above.

The air-ship, when attacked by aeroplanes, labours under one great disadvantage: she is far slower-flying than her nimble foe. Her 50 miles an hour may be matched against an adversary which flies at 100 miles an hour. But the air-ship can raise the weight of machine-guns, and has a steady platform from which to fire them. Her opponents, however, offer

elusive, quickly-moving marks, and it is their policy to place themselves in such a position of advantage that the gunners on the air-ship cannot reach them with their fire. This they can do by attempting to ascend higher than the air-ship. In such a contest for altitude, at any rate up to a height of about 10,000 feet, which represents her maximum at the present time, the air-ship should have the advantage. The aeroplane climbs fairly swiftly to an elevation, say, of 6000 feet; but after this, owing to the increased rarity of the air, its ascent is laboured. But the air-ship, if she sacrifices her ballast, can ascend rapidly until she reaches her limit of altitude.

It is the aim of an aeroplane pilot, when attacking an air-ship, to gain, if possible, a high elevation before he is sighted by the enemy, and then close in quickly for the delivery of his blow. With an enemy overhead, the marksmen in the cars of an air-ship are helpless; the huge hull above them blocks out their view. To remedy this defect, which it was seen might prove fatal in warfare, the experiment was tried, on the German rigid-type Zeppelins, of building a platform on the top of the hull, and mounting upon this platform a machine-gun which should sweep the sky above. This was in theory a step of importance, but in practice a serious difficulty arose. From the gas-compartments in an air-ship's hull, a certain percentage of hydrogen escapes. This naturally ascends, and when in contact with the air is highly explosive; and in at least one test, when a top-platform gun was fired,



German Naval Zeppelin flying over Heligoland, where Germany has an important Air-craft Base

the flash from it ignited gas that had filtered from the compartments below and caused a disaster. Whether this drawback can be overcome has not yet transpired. In future craft perhaps it may be; but the risk from firing top-platform guns, upon any existing machines, would appear to be grave, and no report has been received, at any rate so far as the war has gone, that would indicate the use of such weapons. If an attacking aeroplane can obtain its position of mastery, and pass low over the air-ship without resistance, then the huge machine is at the mercy of a well-placed bomb. Theoretically, at all events, when she sets out upon a raid, the air-ship should be accompanied by several aeroplanes; and it should be the duty of these craft, armed and fast-flying, to protect her from the attack of hostile planes.

There is one expedient—a desperate one—by which an aeroplane pilot, even when unsupported by other craft, may practically ensure the destruction of an air-ship. This is by driving pell-mell into it, preferably in a dive from above, and causing by the col-

lision fatal damage to the air-ship's hull. Such ramming tactics should represent a last resort, justified only by the direst need, because the airman must almost inevitably lose his life in the destruction of the air-ship, and his machine would be wrecked as well.

The air-ship has a screen by which she may shield herself, and this is the darkness of night. Ascending, say, at dusk, she may remain aloft until the ensuing dawn, making special observations, with and without the aid of her search-light, or stealing towards some fixed point on a destructive raid. As he nears his objective, the air-ship commander can stop his motors and drift down noiselessly with the wind—unseen and unheard. Even if his motors are running, so well silenced are those in the latest type of air-ships, the movement of the machine is almost inaudible. In this way, profiting by the darkness and its own silence, an air-ship may seek to steal over a city without being seen. But if an aerial attack is anticipated there will be an energetic use of search-lights, fixed upon commanding natural heights, or the roofs of buildings; and if the

defenders can locate a raiding craft, despite its stealthy approach, they will open fire upon it with high-angle guns, and send up armed aeroplanes to fight it in its own element.

Some notion of what may be expected, when an air-ship raids a city by night, although the facts available do not carry us far, has been provided in the war by the case of Antwerp. In this instance one important factor was missing—that of the aeroplanes which might have been protecting the city. Aerial opposition being absent, the attacking Zeppelin had only to reckon with search-lights and the fire from land-guns; and she was sufficiently wary to escape destruction. But her bomb-dropping, represented by the release of only a few missiles, cannot be regarded as serious. It does not, at any rate, give a reasonable indication of what might be accomplished in the future by such a form of attack. In this war, fortunately for the inhabitants of defended cities, there is no likelihood that aerial bombardment will become a really serious factor. The dropping of heavy loads of explosives from air-ships, apart from the matter of accurate aim, introduces technical difficulties that are as yet imperfectly solved.

A stratagem of air-ship attack employed in this war is for a

vessel to seek the shelter of low-lying clouds when a raid is being delivered, and lower a member of the crew from one of the cars, in a steel cage or basket, until he is free of the cloud-bank and can see the earth below. Then, from his view-point perhaps several hundred feet beneath, the observer signals up to the pilot of the air-ship, giving him directions as to the course that should be steered so as to carry the craft directly above its mark. In this way, if atmospheric conditions favour the ruse, an air-ship might be steered successfully by the man in the observation-cage, and steal over a desired position without emerging from its cloud-bank—the tiny cage, suspended at the end of its length of cable, being a very elusive object to distinguish from the earth below. The man in the cage, when he finds himself above the area chosen, can signal the air-ship to hover, while he begins



A British Seaplane armed with a Machine-gun

The type of craft which—in the case of a hostile raid—would be used for the defence of our coast-line. British seaplanes have reached a more practical stage than those of any other nation.



his attack with bombs. This, at least, is the scheme so far as it is reported; but no definite news of its employment has yet come to hand, and so its efficacy must await the test of experience. In any case, though the ruse could be employed with profit when it was cloudy, against search-lights or land-guns, the chances of its success might be minimized when there were armed aeroplanes to reckon with, although the cage containing the bomb-dropper would no doubt be armoured, and he would be provided probably with a rifle or small machine-gun.

In such fighting in the air as has been seen in Belgium and France—and this reference applies particularly to the combats between aeroplanes—victory has gone to the swift rather than to the strong. The German aeroplanes are powerful machines, steel-built to withstand the strains of war, but the craft used by our British aviators, so far as one can generalize, are more lightly constructed than those of the enemy and quicker in control. Two priceless facilities have, in consequence, been shown to be in possession of our airmen. They can fly faster than the majority of the German machines, and rise more rapidly, and in this respect have duplicated for us, though in a new element, the triumphs won on the sea in the old days by our nimbly-handled sailing-ships of war. Naval engagements were won then by dint of handiness, and skill in gaining and holding the weather-gauge against formidable foes. To-day our aeroplanes, fighting in the same spirit of adroitness and resource, have sought out the enemy in this newest form of

combat and secured in aerial tactics what corresponds to the weather-gauge at sea; they have climbed and manœuvred, that is to say, until they have found themselves directly above their foe. It was as a result of this bold spirit of attack that, in a report issued as early as 7th September, our head-quarters staff was able to announce that “something in the direction of the mastery of the air has already been gained”.

If he can only secure the upper hand, and has speed and manœuvring-power to maintain it, the attacking airman finds himself master of the situation. The foe may dive or wheel, twist and turn, but so long as the machine above is the faster craft, and is handled with skill, the positions cannot be reversed. The pilot of the machine thus risen above, if flying alone, finds himself in the direst peril. If he carries bombs, he cannot use them against an enemy above him, and to face directly upwards and use a rifle, apart from the awkwardness of the movement as he sits in his driving seat, means that for the moment he must relinquish the control of his machine. He may compromise, however, by employing a revolver or an automatic pistol, holding this upward in one hand while he retains the other for his controls. Pistol-shooting has played a prominent part in such aerial duels as have already taken place, being used not only by the pilot attacked from overhead, but by the antagonist who, descending with a rush towards his prey, leans out over the side of his hull and empties his weapon downwards at the figure of



Bomb Droppers

A powerfully-engined, weight-carrying biplane, of the type used in bomb-dropping. The pilot is in his driving-seat in the bow, while the bomb thrower is seen behind him, with one missile ready to release, and a second hooked upon the side of the machine.

the man who is so plainly exposed to view.

When two men are in the aeroplane thus attacked, and they have an enemy above them, their position is not so unenviable as that of the single pilot. While one steers, and does his best to elude the foe, the other can devote himself to the use of a rifle. But in any case, as this war has shown us, aerial duelling as at present waged is an unsatisfactory, haphazard business, the weapons of the combatants being ridiculously inadequate in view of the extraordinary manœuvring powers which their machines possess. Not only can they steer to and fro, and from side to side, at a pace greater than is feasible either on earth or sea, but they have two additional move-

ments that are impossible in warfare on land or water, excepting the dive of the submarine; they can if necessary, that is to say, rise or descend steeply. If these high-speed aerial fighters could be provided, say, with some type of torpedo, as effective as that used at sea, this new form of warfare might be rendered conclusive; but, as it is, though the smallness and speed of the machines cry out for some specially effective arm, no weapons are as yet available save the lightest of those which are used on land.

Germany was encouraged to this policy of boldness, no doubt, by her numerical superiority in aeroplanes. She had, for a long time prior to the war, stimulated her aviation industry to its maximum output, and craft were

delivered at the military aerodromes in constantly-growing numbers. As to reliable statistics, Germany has been careful that these should not be available; but it seems a safe assumption that, when war actually came, she had made ready a fleet of quite 1000 machines, all of them excellently built and in first-class condition.

Aviation in France, unfortunately for her splendidly-conceived air corps, had, just before the gathering of the war-cloud, been through a period of grave vicissitude. It was found that her military aeroplane service required complete reorganization, and a large number of machines previously listed as effective were discarded as being useless for the purposes of war. Then, setting to work with typical enthusiasm, France sought to reform her corps. But the war came almost too soon for her—at any rate from this point of view. She had not so many machines ready as had Germany, nor were they, generally speaking, so well suited for withstanding the wear and tear of war. This question of the rough usage which an aeroplane receives when upon active service, apart from the risk of its being struck by the enemy's gun-fire, is highly important. The machine may have to stand out in the open in all weathers, its planes soaked again and again by storms of rain; and such a test is a critical one of its method of construction. Unless the internal structure of its wings has been built up with the utmost care, and without stint of the best materials available, and unless the fabric that covers this framework has been treated painstakingly with

a preparation which resists moisture, the rigidity of the lifting-planes may be affected, and their fabric become slack, with the result that the whole efficiency of the machine will be impaired.

Between 500 and 600 machines is the total with which, at the outbreak of hostilities, France was credited. But immensely to her favour, in the actual work of war, has been the experienced construction and high efficiency of her latest types of craft, and the fact that among her pilots she can number some of the world's most brilliant airmen.

Extremely interesting, because so characteristic, has been the development of the war aeroplane in Germany and France—both nations, in their building, having in mind always the coming of this great war. Germany from the first strove to be independent, in obtaining materials of construction, of any other nation. She bore constantly in mind the need to foster a home industry. Competitions were organized, funds were forthcoming far more freely than in any other country, and always the rule was that machines must be designed in Germany, built in Germany with German materials, and driven by German engines.

In a few years, so great was her energy—anticipating the crisis she herself meant to force—that Germany had created a number of distinct types of war-craft, and had established a strong home industry for the building of aeroplane engines. Aviation experts of other nations, visiting Germany, were amazed at the activity everywhere displayed. What this por-





An Aerial Duel at the Front



A "Flight" of French Military Aeroplanes  
Monoplanes and biplanes are grouped into separate squadrons.

tended many of them guessed; but, even so, they were astonished at the suddenness with which the storm burst.

The German aeroplane, as used in this war, is typically German. The desire was that the machine should be extremely strong, therefore steel was employed in construction—many of the latest-type craft having no wood at all about them, save in the ribs of their wings. And it must not be assumed, argued the German designers, that all aeroplane pilots would be exceptionally skilled men—particularly in view of the hundreds who would be trained for the military service. A machine must be devised, it was agreed, which would, so far as was possible, fly itself—a craft which had a stability largely inherent, and made the least possible demand upon the dexterity of its pilot. Experiments were made, therefore, with wings shaped like those of a bird; and these were uptilted at their ends to afford lateral balance, and also swept backward, in an arrow-head formation, to provide a strong fore-and-aft stability.

In addition to this, fins were placed upon the hulls, by the action of which, when the craft was in flight, the equilibrium was still further improved.

By this study of equilibrium, scientifically pursued, German designers produced a war-craft which, when once it was clear of the ground and in normal flight, required a minimum of control. Beyond steering the machine from right to left with the rudder, as occasion required, the pilot, indeed, had little to do. When struck by side gusts the craft would roll, but the shape of her wings, and their up-raised tips, acting automatically as balancers, brought her back again upon an even keel; and should the wind throw up her bow, or tend to send her on a dive, the arrow-head formation of her wings—resisting deflection from the normal path—would correct the tendency without movement of the controlling planes.

There are, from the war point of view, two advantages of inherent stability, and both are important. In the first place, with large batches of

pilots drafted into a military service, it is unreasonable to assume that all will be specially dexterous men, adapted by nature for the navigation of the air. If any approach to a self-controlling machine can be built, therefore, this is all to the good. Secondly, when long scouting flights are required, in boisterous winds, it is essential that a pilot should be spared, so far as possible, such heavy and constant work at his controls as was necessary with the early-type planes. In many of the first air races, when long distances had to be flown in high winds, it was not the force of the gusts which compelled pilots to descend, but the sheer muscular fatigue which they suffered through ceaseless movement of the levers.

In Britain, thanks to the research work of the National Physical Laboratory, carried out in co-operation with the Royal Air-craft Factory, we have produced an inherently stable war bi-

plane which has flown admirably in peace tests, and, when detailed reports are to hand, should have proved its worth beyond question in the operations abroad. As regards the far larger, heavier, and more powerfully engined war-craft, such as the future must produce, automatic stability will be vital to their use. These machines, apart from the operations of their helmsman when ascending, turning, or alighting, will need to be entirely self-balancing in flight.

Of other combatants, apart from Germany and France, Russia is the most powerful aerially—from a numerical point of view at any rate. With Russia, as with Germany, statistics are intentionally misleading; but it was estimated at the commencement of the war that she had upwards of 300 machines. In her air corps are several enormous biplanes, constructed by the engineer Sykorsky. These machines, more ambitious than

those built in any other country, are fitted with a power plant of four separate motors, each developing 100 horse-power, and capable of flying with a pilot and fifteen passengers. Austria, at the beginning of the war, was credited with an effective fleet of about 100 aeroplanes, and Belgium with a small but energetic corps.


The factor of numbers, in regard to military aeroplanes as they exist to-day, need not be regarded too seriously. The question is one rather of the general efficiency of a



What a Taube looks like

A monoplane with the bird-like wing shape, adopted to secure stability in flight, represents a type used extensively by the Germans. Although there are many different makes this type has become known by the generic term of "Taube", or dove.





The Spiess, a rigid-type French Air-ship


corps, and particularly of the readiness of each human unit, and of each and every piece of mechanism, to withstand the usages of war. That pilots and observers should be experts, and as experienced as peace training can make them, is essential. These are the outward and visible proofs of efficiency—the actors we see on the stage. Behind them, each a vital cog in the wheel, must be a highly-trained band of workers whom the limelight never sees; and these men, labouring with a high sense of duty, must be supported by the very best that can be obtained in the way of mechanical aid. A high-speed scout, ascending on some vital errand, places his life in the hands of the

mechanics who have assembled his machine—men who, although they may be working against time, must never make a mistake or be guilty of a slipshod piece of work. And this same pilot, seeking some news that may turn the fortunes of a battle, relies upon the skill of the engineer, who, toiling perhaps in a hurry amid a storm of dust, has been tuning up the motor of his machine.

An air service requires travelling workshops—large motor-lorries equipped with lathes and tools for every kind of repair. These should be on the spot and ready for work whenever they are required. There are also motor-wagons built to carry aeroplanes, and others to bring up their supplies of petrol and oil. Others, again, bear spare wings for the machines—



A French non-rigid Air-ship, smaller in size than the Zeppelins, such as is used for detailed reconnaissance



Ready for Raiders

This biplane, which has a light machine-gun in its bow, is designed to combat hostile planes or raiding air-ships. The gunner sits right out in front of the machine, so as to have a clear field for fire, while the pilot is placed behind him and between the planes.

large, delicate surfaces, that need to be transported with care. And more vans are necessary to carry the collapsible sheds in which the aeroplanes are housed. Nor does this end the list, because there are lighter, high-speed cars, fitted up to carry, say, a spare propeller, or new wheels and parts for a damaged landing-chassis, which can be rushed to any point where a craft may be lying partially disabled. Run-about cars for officers, and a service of motor-cyclists, complete the motor equipment of an air corps. An army, it has been said, fights on its stomach—an allusion, of course, to the importance, under all conditions, of striving to provide the soldier with a satisfying meal. And an air corps in war, if it is to achieve success, must do so mainly through the excellence of its land organization—engineers, mechanics, motors, each and all of the small details of its

equipment. It is largely owing to the care and forethought with which its organization has been built up that our British Flying Corps has already done such conspicuously fine work at the front. And it is fortunate indeed for our corps that, as its Commander-Colonel, in its first and supreme test in war it should have Major-General Sir David Henderson, K.C.B. He it was who, when Director of Military Training, took such a deep and personal interest in aviation that he learned to fly a biplane in his spare time, and



Major-General Sir David Henderson, K.C.B., commanding the Royal Flying Corps at the Front  
(From a photograph by Elliot and Fry)

then relinquished his former post so that he might become the first Director-General of Military Aeronautics,

and devote his whole energies to building up the service.

C. G.-W.  
H. H.

## CHAPTER IV

### THE DEVASTATION OF BELGIUM

(August—September, 1914)

The Land of Belgium—The German Invader—Visé—Dinant—Louvain—Malines—Irreparable Damage—The Belgian People.

THERE is no country in Europe, it may safely be said, whose sufferings could have gone more keenly home to the hearts of the British people than have the sufferings of Belgium during the early days of the great war; for every British traveller on the Continent, however modest his itinerary, has made some acquaintance with, and carried away some happy memories from, the pleasant land of Flanders. And many people, among whom the present writer is proud to enrol himself as one, have gone back to Belgium again and again, as to a country of infinite resources and fresh variety, a country of grey towers and sweet carillons, whose bells, worn "thin with time", ring in the ears long after the sea between Ostend and Dover has been recrossed; a country of shady cloisters and still water-ways, overgrown with lilies and the wandering weed; a country of rich picture galleries and reverend shrines, with broad spaces of meadowland between, and, farther south, the billowy woods about the Ourthe, the peaceful stretches of the Meuse, and here and there a rock-

bound castle overlooking the winding Lesse among its willow-thickets. There are few tastes of the traveller which Flanders cannot satisfy—architecture, art, the romance of history, the beauty of unspoiled nature—all these consolations of the weary brain are to be found in plenty between the hills of Luxemburg and the sand-dunes of Knocke. Add to this that the Belgians are naturally a hospitable people, and that they understand the business of hotel-keeping as well as any European nation, and it is not difficult to see why the Briton has been found in his thousands every summer, refreshing brain and body, in one of the kindest, cheapest, and most comfortable countries in the world.

There are many British mourners, then, for Belgium, and terrible is the sacrifice for which they have to mourn. The foul "blonde beast" of Nietzsche has ravaged the fields of Flanders with diabolical effect. To follow his track from Visé to Malines is to be reminded of a score of happy summer memories, now never to be revived. Look at the photograph of the little



church at Visé, where the beautiful silver "chasse" of St. Hadelin was never without its silent worshipper amid the flickering candles. This was the beginning of the Hun's journey, and all the road behind him is black with fire and desolation. Dinant again; how many English-speaking

Beeger; but what it lacks in antiquity it more than compensates for in its rural beauties. The river between Dinant and Givet, with the woods of Waulsort and the nestling abbey of Hastière to rest beside, used to present a perfect panorama of rustic peace and simple prosperity. Imagination



Photo. Underwood & Underwood

The First Act in the Drama: the Ruins of the Church at Visé, where the Germans first invaded Belgium

tourists are familiar with the dome-like spire of its Notre-Dame, gleaming like gun-metal under the shadow of the citadel, and looking across the cheery Meuse to the wooded heights upon the other bank. Dinant was one of the most delightful of Belgian resting-places. Its historical associations may be few, although it had been three times taken by storm between the days of Philippe of Burgundy and the foul invasion of Colonel

shudders at the prospect of its condition to-day. For Dinant has paid the price, and its market-place by the bridge is just a heap of stones.

Fury grows by what it feeds upon, and, having gained in virulence by its checks at Liège, the German lust for insensate revenge had become irrational by the time the forces reached Louvain. A bevy of German soldiers, drinking with their customary freedom in a café under the shadow of the

Cathedral of St. Pierre, were suddenly alarmed by the return of the main body of their own troops, whom in their muddled condition they mistook for the enemy. They immediately opened fire upon their friends, and succeeded in hitting some of them. When the mistake was discovered it had to be concealed, and the notorious fiction was published that the civilians of Louvain had attacked the Prussian military, despite the fact that the whole city had been disarmed, and that there was not a single rifle in the possession of any private citizen. The order was then given to the Prussian guns to bombard the city, and the venerable University of Belgium was soon in ruins. It is difficult to imagine a viler act of vandalism. Louvain is the Oxford of Flanders, and for centuries its records have been those of an imperturbable haunt of peace. Its history goes back to the eleventh century, and in its flowering days, 600 years ago, it boasted of a population twice as large as the present. But there were quarrels among the weavers, and many emigrated to England, so that the town's commercial prosperity declined. And then it was that the University arose, in the early years of the fifteenth century, on the very site and in the very buildings of the old market-place. Learning, in fact, was born out of the wreck of trade, and prospered so fortunately that within a few years Louvain had more than 4000 undergraduates upon its books.

Three historic buildings formed the architectural riches of Louvain—the Hotel de Ville, the Cathedral, and the great Library of the University.

The Hotel de Ville still stands, but it is the only unscathed survivor. The Cathedral is desperately damaged. Among the treasures there, of which British visitors will yearn to know the fate, are the famous statue of Christ, which is traditionally believed to have once detained a sacrilegious thief; the noble "Last Supper" of Dierick Bouts, and the Tomb of Matilda, wife of Henry I, Duke of Brabant, and founder of the Cathedral. These would be grievous losses, but of all the wrongs inflicted upon Louvain the worst, beyond question, is the demolition of the Library. This collection, started early in the eighteenth century, was the glory of the town, and contained a finer variety of volumes than any institution of the kind in Belgium. Upon this home of culture the modern Vandals concentrated their attack, and now, even though the University halls should open their doors once more to the encouragement of true learning, they can never point again to the treasures of bibliography in which so many succeeding generations of students have felt a worthy pride. The books are scattered, the exquisite old manuscripts are in shreds, and all the rich wood-carving lies in ragged splinters under an avalanche of stone. "Remember Louvain!" will long be the reply of educated Europe when Prussian "Culture" attempts to press its claims upon an enlightened and a disillusioned world.

From Louvain the horde of desolation swept northward to Malines, and no one who has followed that track will be surprised that the splendid, beaconing tower of St. Rombold

should have proved an irresistible temptation to the all-devouring guns. The country round Malines is flat and unideal, and long before the town is reached its Cathedral looms through the haze, like a landmark to the traveller. It was a landmark indeed

closes in the world—such lingerers in Malines market-place have found themselves well rewarded for their sojourn. For Malines—the old centre of the Mechlin-lace industry, is a bewitchingly communicable spot, and its Grand' Place, set round with mediaeval



"Remember Louvain!" The desolated heart of the ancient Belgian city after the German holocaust  
The famous Hotel de Ville is the tall building in the centre

to the Prussians, and soon the quiet folk of Mechlin were awakened to their baptism of fire. Now, few British travellers stay long at Malines, which can indeed be easily visited from Antwerp within the limits of a day's excursion. But those who have felt more confidence in the place, and have been unwilling to part too quickly from one of the most romantic cathedral-

houses, remains absolutely unspoiled by the vulgarities of commerce. Three-hundred feet and more rises the tower, to which, if the original plans had been carried out, another 200 feet were to have been added; and the Town Hall and official buildings beneath it, worthy and substantial fabrics though they are, look like children's toy houses beside its rich magnificence. Close to the



summit of the tower is the great clock, served by the most melodious carillon in all Belgium; and if you doubt the sacristan's assurance that the clock-face is more than 40 feet in diameter, you can go and "step it out" for yourself on the pavement of the square, for there is a stone replica of the dial let into the cobbles around the charitable-looking statue of Margaret of Austria. It was a treble vile act to shell the tower of Malines, for it was built in the fourteenth century out of the contributions of poor pilgrims and in gratitude for benefits received, while every figure and gargoyle upon the face of it bore witness to the loving imagination of mediaeval craftsmanship. Malines, moreover, is heart-whole in its love for the old buildings around the Grand' Place, and has bestowed infinite pains during the last ten years upon the renovation of its fine Gothic market-hall. It was a busy, harmless, self-respecting country town, threatening nothing to even the most emotional and panic-stricken



Effects of German Shells in Malines Cathedral

invader. Nevertheless, Malines also had to undergo its martyrdom.

But who would pile up horror upon horror in repeating the criminal indictment of the vilest, most barbarian armament that ever breathed defiance and hatred against the homes of simplicity and the sanctuaries of a desecrated faith? A railing accusation seems too pitifully puny a response to deeds that cry aloud to heaven for vengeance; and the vindication of Flanders can only be left in hope to the slow but certain process of the suns. Even now it is uncertain what treasures of art and of fond association have been wrecked and ravaged by the vandal host. Some of the pictures—the masterpieces of Crayer and of Rubens, of Dierick Bouts and of Van Dyck—have happily been saved; but of others it is only possible to hope that they may at least have escaped being ruined irretrievably. Commerce may talk glibly of vast indemnities, of huge material recompenses, to be exacted from the spoilers, when the



In Malines Cathedral after the German Occupation

world's work of punishment is complete; but what money or what new enterprise will restore to the country-towns of Flanders the ruined palaces of romance that have been their glory from generation to generation?

The Belgians, as we have all known them, were a simple, industrious, happy people. As the twilight fell along the canal of Malines, or by the shady *béguinage* of Bruges, they might be seen—daughter, mother, and grandmother—seated at their cottage doors, husbanding the last rays of sunlight, as they bent above their bobbins, weaving lace. Along the quay the men of the family are slowly trudging home, their low trucks drawn by cheery, panting dogs, whose tails wag with gay anticipation as the savour from the hot-pot on the fire is drifted under the plane-trees. A little later there is a stir in the broad, cobbled *Grand' Place*; lights are lit in the bandstand, uniforms and brass instruments flash and glitter; and under the flapping banner of red, black, and yellow, now all one nondescript colour in the darkness, the lovers walk to and fro, arm locked in arm, to the encouragement of good music excellently played. At every café the tables are filled with laughing family parties; no vulgarity, no hoarse jest-

ing, no shadow of drunkenness in all the crowd. The people are just enjoying the summer evening and the festal music; and over all the great belfry tower looks down, as it looked down upon the company of Jan Breidel and Peter de Coninc, while its bells ring out the evening quarters in an everlasting rune of sweet, drowsy contentment. This was the people upon whom the fortune of war brought, with the brutal suddenness of a dog-day thunderstorm, the scattering of dreams, the blank destruction of domesticity, the intolerable horrors of lust, of ravin, and of homeless, hopeless exile. That such things should be at all, in an age of vaunted culture and supersensitive humanity, is a mystery beside which the riddle of the Sphinx pales into inconsequence. That such things, having once been, should be possible again, is a prospect before which the Justice of the World may well shrink back ashamed. But no such prospect is conceivable. If it were—

“The pillared firmament were rottenness,  
And earth's base built on stubble”.

The mills of God may grind slowly, but, with awful and inevitable deliberation, they will grind exceeding small.

A. W.

## CHAPTER V

## THE COLONIES AND INDIA

(August—September, 1914)

German Miscalculations—Professor Cramb quoted—Bernhardi and Colonies—Australia's Declaration—Capture of German Samoa—Australian Victory at Neu Pommern—Wireless Stations captured in the Marshall and Caroline Islands—Occupation of German New Guinea—Canada's Offer and Gifts—German Plots in South Africa—Treachery of Maritz and other Boers—General Botha—General Botha takes Command against German South-West Africa—A Regrettable Incident—Seizure of Lüderitzbucht—Newfoundland—Jamaica—Falkland Islands—Egypt—Indian Loyalty—German Delusions—The King-Emperor's Message—Indian Princes volunteer for Service—An Indian Force of 70,000—The Aga Khan's Declaration—Mr. Malabiya's Speech.

OF all the vain imaginings of Germany before the war, none was more firmly rooted in the minds of her professors and statesmen than the belief that the British Empire would collapse like a house of cards once the "treacherous English" dared to draw the sword against the might and power of Germany. They took it for granted that the self-governing dominions of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were only awaiting such an opportunity to break the last fetters which bound them to Britain. That South Africa would leap at the golden chance of absolute independence was a foregone conclusion, and when the Germans learned that General Botha, of all people, and most of his brother Boers, as well as the Britishers, were remaining loyal, they regarded it almost as a personal insult. As for India, everyone, they argued, knew that the whole of that ancient empire was seething with discontent, and that all the feudatory princes and ruling chiefs were longing for "The Day" with as much impatience as the Ger-

mans themselves. It was a dazzling dream for infatuated minds—minds bent on wresting the sceptre of empire from British hands, and forging new links worthy of a race which believed itself destined to rule the world by the matchless combination of Teutonic culture and sheer brute force.

The late Professor Cramb, who had plumbed the depths of German psychology, and whose warnings passed almost unheeded when first uttered only two months before the declaration of war, crystallized this Prussian idea in his prophetic book on *England and Germany*.

"Largely under the influence of the Prussian School of History, there has been evolved a portrait of England as the great robber State. In one phase or another this conception is gradually permeating all classes, making itself apparent now in a character of fiction, now in a poem, now in a work of history or economics, now in the lecture-hall at Bonn or Heidelberg or Berlin, now in a political speech. And the theme is precise. England's supremacy is an unreality, her political power is as hollow as her moral virtues; the one an arrogance



and pretence, the other hypocrisy. She cannot long maintain that baseless supremacy. On the sea she is rapidly being approached by other Powers; her resources, except by immigration, are almost stationary, and her very immigration debases still further her resources. Her decline is certain. Who is to succeed her? It may not be Germany; some Power it must be. But if Germany *were* to inherit the sceptre which is falling from her nerveless hands . . . ?”

Such was the teaching and such the dream of modern Prussian Junkerdom, and war with Great Britain was merely a question of time. It was Germany's historical mission, according to Bernhardt, the high priest of this new gospel of imperialism, to unsheathe

the sword in her righteous cause with the burning zeal of the old Crusaders. Conscience has ever been a useful cloak for political designs, and Bernhardt's exhortations are merely echoes of the mediaeval days of the German-Roman Empire, when the defence of Christendom against the Infidel was the hollow excuse of Christian princes for all warlike preparations. The fact that Germany in those days sacrificed internal unity for the same shadow of universal dominion, and lapsed into ruinous anarchy, conveys nothing to Bernhardt's truculent mind. “What we now wish to attain”, he writes, “must be *fought* for and won, against a



Photo. Underwood & Underwood

The Gathering of the Clans: a Typical Group of Colonial Troops from Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa

superior force of hostile interests and Powers". What Germany wants, above all things, are our tempting British colonies. "We are already suffering severely from the need of colonies to meet our requirements", confesses Bernhardt, descending to plain, bed-rock facts. "They would not merely guarantee a livelihood to our growing working population, but would supply raw materials and food-stuffs, would buy goods, and open a field of activity to that immense capital of intellectual labour forces which is to-day lying unproductive in Germany, or in the service of foreign interests." The great surprise in store for all these believers in Britain's decadence and Germany's historical mission was that not only were Britain's sturdy sons oversea loyal to a man, but that India, and practically every other part of this world-wide Empire, were ready to rush to the Motherland's assistance in her hour of need, and fight shoulder to shoulder with her against Germany herself as the common foe. "The peoples of my whole Empire at home and overseas", wrote the King in the message to his Dominions, which must have brought bitter disillusionment to those of the enemy who were permitted to read it, "have moved with one mind and one purpose to confront and overthrow an unparalleled assault upon the continuity of civilization and the peace of mankind."

Australia at once declared herself ready to defend the Motherland, as Mr. Fisher, her Prime Minister, declared "to our last man and our last shilling"; or, in the words of

Mr. Millen, her Minister of Defence: "Australia wishes the rest of the Empire to know that in this momentous struggle for liberty and national honour, the vigour of her manhood, the bounty of her soil, resources, her economic organization, all she possesses, to the last ear of corn and drop of blood, is freely offered to help maintain the glory and greatness of the Empire, and to battle in the righteous cause wherein she is engaged". Australia's Labour Ministry has since demonstrated its sympathy with devastated Belgium by contributing £100,000 towards the Belgian Relief Fund. All parties combined in supporting the Motherland, especially as the passing of the first months revealed the desperate nature of the



H.R.H. the Duke of Connaught, Governor-General  
and Commander-in-Chief in Canada  
(From a photograph by R. Ellis, Malta)



Mr. Fisher, Prime Minister of Australia  
(From a photograph by E. H. Mills)

struggle. Increasing need only added to colonial loyalty. Two months after the outbreak of the war Australia's first offer of 20,000 men for Britain's European army had been increased by second and third contingents.

That was the spirit which animated the Empire from one end to the other. The colonies were proud of the Motherland for raising the old battle-cry of Liberty and Right which had so often carried her to victory in her glorious past. The Motherland was proud of her valiant sons for the ennobling way in which they rose to the occasion, not only ready to face any danger which might threaten their own lands, but eager to stand at Britain's side in arms in defence of the Motherland herself. Australia, with a Royal Navy of her own—paid for by herself,

and manned largely by Australians—was able immediately to do splendid work for the Empire at sea by placing her ships under the control of the Admiralty. Leaving Sydney upon the outbreak of war, the fleet, in conjunction with the China Squadron, patrolled the trade routes and covered the New Zealand Expeditionary Force which seized German Samoa—including the island of Upolu, containing, not only the wireless station, which was the primary object of the New Zealanders' visit, but also one of Britain's most famous literary shrines—the tomb of Robert Louis Stevenson. The capture of these Samoan Islands, though unaccompanied by serious fighting, was a smart piece of work, reflecting the highest credit on everyone concerned. At the outbreak of the war New Zealand, like Australia, had offered to the Motherland, if necessary, her all, and had placed her own naval forces under Admiralty control. Her handsome gift of the battle-cruiser *New Zealand* was already attached to the Home Fleet. Like Australia, too, New Zealand offered an Imperial Expeditionary Force, consisting, in her case, of 8000 men as a first instalment; and the response produced a wave of recruiting enthusiasm throughout the Dominion.

Australia's Royal Fleet, in addition to covering New Zealand's expedition to Samoa, also engaged in a highly-successful cruise to the other German possessions in the Pacific, though losing, unhappily, a submarine in circumstances which can probably never be fully explained. Apparently the Germans concentrated their forces at



Herbertshöhe, in the island of Neu Pommern, in the Bismarck Archipelago, where they had another of their wireless stations. Here they put up a stiff fight against the Australians, who annihilated them, though not without suffering some loss themselves. A third wireless station was seized at Naura, the capital of the Marshall Islands, Germany's last wireless installation in the Pacific falling into the same busy hands in the neighbouring Caroline Islands. Then came the crowning capture of the town and harbour of Friedrich Wilhelm, the seat of government of Kaiser Wilhelm's Land, German New Guinea—a colony which, situated as it was at their very backdoor, had been regarded by the Australians as a standing menace ever since its annexation by the Germans in 1884. Having hoisted the British flag at Friedrich Wilhelm, a garrison was established there, and new acts of administration were put in force at once to prove to the German planters that there was no intention of ruling them with any but the highest ideals of British justice.

Canada was not behind her sister States in the rally of the Empire. It was a fortunate chance that made the Duke of Connaught's term as Governor-General coincide with this supreme test of loyalty. With the Duchess and Princess Patricia, his Royal Highness threw himself into the war preparations with a zeal which, combined with his great experience in all military work, proved of inestimable service, and added greatly to his already vast popularity. Canada's first offer



Major-General E. A. H. Alderson, commanding the  
Canadian Contingent  
(From a photograph by Elliot & Fry)

of a fighting contingent of 20,000 men was increased in September to upwards of 30,000, including a regiment of French Canadians, another of Irish Canadians, Princess Patricia's Light Infantry, and Strathcona's Horse. "If the vast millions of armed men of Germany cannot be driven back by our first contingent," said Colonel Hughes, the Canadian Minister of Militia, "I am sure I voice the sentiment of Canada and the whole Empire when I say that ten, yes twenty, more contingents if necessary will be sent in order that the liberties of the British people may be preserved. We are determined that the tyrant's heel shall never grind the people of the Empire."

The dispatch of troops was only part of Canada's answer to Germany's

taunt that Britain's sons, tired of her decadent dominion, would all desert her in her hour of trial, in order to carve out their destinies alone. Montreal started a patriotic fund which reached over £300,000 in the first five days, and contributions in kind were raised for the Mother Country in every one of the nine Canadian provinces, headed by the Dominion Government's first generous gift of 100,000,000 bags of flour. A hospital ship, provided and maintained by Canada, and a couple of submarines, must also be added to the list. So splendid was the response of re-

cruits, too, that on October 7 Sir Robert Borden, the Prime Minister, announced the Canadian Government's intention at once to raise and send to the front a second Expeditionary Force, making, all told, a magnificent contribution of over 60,000 men, fully equipped for the front. Subsequently Sir Robert promised that the Dominion Government would keep 30,000 men continuously in training, to be drawn up in units of 10,000 so long as the war lasted.

It was only in a portion of South Africa that German hopes of revolt were realized. German plots to undermine the loyalty of the Boers were, as usual, thorough and persistent, and they succeeded not only in securing the treachery of Lieutenant-Colonel Maritz, commanding the Union Defence Forces in the north-west of the Cape Province, and those men of his commando who threw in their lot with him, but also—though this was not apparent until a later stage of the war—of Generals Christian de Wet and Beyers. While this revolt was a regrettable blot on the Imperial escutcheon, it served to accentuate the sterling loyalty of the rest of the colony. South Africa, declared General Botha, the Prime Minister, must prove to the British Empire, which was watching them, that they were worthy of trust. They proved this at the very outbreak of the war by the Union Government's offer to the Motherland to undertake the whole military duties of South Africa, so that the Imperial garrison could be withdrawn for the European campaign. Not only this, but when the Motherland asked the Union



Men of Strathcona's Horse

Government if it would carry the war into German South-West Africa, as certain operations there would be of great service to the Empire, South Africa readily accepted the task. That there was a certain amount of opposition from such little South Africans as the Hertzogites was, in the nature of things, to be expected; but the majority of Boers, as well as Britons, declared themselves ready to stand together and fight to the last man. When in due course General Botha announced his intention of personally commanding the forces in the field against German South-West Africa, he became more than ever the most popular man in the Union, save where rebellion was smouldering. No one knew the full extent of Germany's designs in South Africa better than the General who, after fighting against the British as Commander-in-Chief of the Boer forces, was now Prime Minister of the Union Government. "I have information about German ambitions concerning South Africa", he told his constituents at Bank, in the Transvaal, in sounding the call to arms in this new campaign, "that would make your hair stand on end."

It was no light task that was undertaken by the Union in its attack on the neighbouring Germans, whose troops were estimated at 10,000 at least, and particularly strong in artillery. Well-equipped German forces were on the frontier even before the Union mobilization, entrenching themselves in British territory as soon as war was declared. With their elaborate system of communications they were able to bring off a "regrettable

incident" at the beginning of the campaign, when 2000 Germans entrapped two squadrons of the 1st South African Mountain Rifles and a section of the Transvaal Horse Artillery in a narrow defile, and decimated them. British and Afrikaners put up a gallant fight against overwhelming odds, and only surrendered when all their artillery ammunition had been exhausted and hope of rescue abandoned. Of far greater importance to the course of the campaign was the seizure by the South African force on September 18 of the town of Lüderitzbucht, the only natural harbour of much account in German South-West Africa. It was at Lüderitzbucht, in 1884, that the German Government, taking over the trading-station established there by a



General the Right Hon. Louis Botha, Prime Minister  
of South Africa

(From a photograph by E. H. Mills)





A Lancer from Bengal

(From a photograph by F. G. O. Stuart, Southampton)

Bremen merchant called Lüderitz—whence the town derives its name—first embarked on its modern schemes of colonization in Africa. This campaign accounts for the absence of a separate South African contingent in the European War, the Imperial Government suggesting that the patriotic offers made by countless Rhodesians and other Britishers should be utilized first in their own direction. Thereupon they agreed that the privilege of sharing in the European War should be the reward of those who rendered good service in the fighting nearer home.

What the self-governing Dominions have done to prove their loyalty on a large scale has been done with no less eagerness and self-sacrificing devotion by the smaller colonies. Newfound-

land, Britain's oldest colony, though her population was too small to raise an army in its midst, decided at once to equip a force of 500 men for foreign service, and a further 500 for home defence, besides increasing the naval reserve from 600 to 1000. Jamaica, another ancient, but equally loyal little possession, took steps to organize forces for defence in order that the regulars might be set free, while many Jamaicans volunteered for the front. Their Legislature in special session also unanimously voted £50,000 for buying island sugar for the Imperial troops, and war funds were raised and supported not only for the Prince of Wales's and the Sailors' and Seamen's Funds, but also for the Belgian sufferers. The Falkland Islands telegraphed a first instalment of £3000 towards the Prince of Wales's Fund, £2250 of which was voted by the Legislative Council—equivalent to a contribution of £1 per head from every inhabitant—with the promise of a further instalment in due course. Gifts in kind were offered with noble liberality from all the scattered parts of the Empire, ranging from Saskatchewan's handsome present of 15,000 horses for the army—gratefully accepted by His Majesty's Government as of great assistance in mounting cavalry and yeomanry regiments—to St. Vincent's gift of arrowroot, £2000 being voted for this purpose by the Legislative Council, and 250 barrels being given by the planters. Even from Egypt—where German and Turkish official and secret agents left no stone unturned in their propagandist campaign against the British rule—came

such expressions of confidence and loyalty as will not soon be forgotten in this country. The Egyptians insisted upon proving how little the intrigues had affected them by pouring out subscriptions for Great Britain without regard to a particular fund; this, too, in spite of the efforts of the British Agency—while thanking them for such spontaneous generosity—to induce them to reserve their efforts for the approaching serious needs of their own country.

Most convincing proof of all that Britain's Empire, for all its seeming weakness to superficial observers, rests upon a sure foundation, was India's "one-voiced demand to be foremost in the conflict", to quote from the King-Emperor's heartfelt tribute to his Indian subjects. Germany, scorning British principles of liberty and discrimination, and holding the uniform standard of an iron rule as the true ideal of empire, looked for a revolution in India as soon as a great war set in motion what Bernhardt describes as the "centrifugal forces of Britain's loosely-compacted World Empire". It was in India, according to German professors, that Britain had failed most conspicuously. Professor Cramb voices the opinions of these deluded critics when he quotes them as saying that our failure with the Mother of Nations has been ignoble and complete:

"Failing to impress your dominion on India by sovereignty of mind or by the daring of speculative thought, you might still have impressed the imagination of the Hindu by your valour and by your organized strength in war. To the 300,000,000

of Hindus you might have presented yourselves as a great Kshatriya race, a nation of warriors. Instead of this, you attempt to hold India with almost fewer legions than Rome required to govern the original despicable race of Britannia . . . you have lost, if you ever possessed them, the three qualities revered by the Hindu race—creative genius in religion, the valour in arms of a military caste, and the pride of birth of the rajah. But chiefly you have failed because you have ceased to be soldiers; because you dread war; because you present to the whole world the spectacle which the world has not seen since the fall of the Byzantine Empire—a timorous, craven nation trusting to its fleet."

Not even the Kaiser's reported outburst against "General French's contemptible little army" revealed more clearly how much these astounding thinkers and blustering war lords, for all their *Kultur* and military might, had still to learn of this "loosely-compacted" empire before they tried to wrest its sceptre from British hands. The Mother of Nations furnished an object-lesson which must have acted not unlike a bomb-shell in the professorial camp. When war broke out the rulers of the Native States, numbering nearly 700 in all, rallied to the defence of the Empire with one accord, offering their personal services and their resources with a princely loyalty and munificence which sent a thrill of pride and enthusiasm throughout the British Empire, and created an immense impression upon the world outside. "Among the many incidents that have marked the unanimous uprising of the population of my Empire in defence of its unity and integrity," wrote the King-Emperor in the his-



Sir Pertab Singh  
(From a photograph by C. Vandyk.)

toric message already referred to, "nothing has moved me more than the passionate devotion to my Throne expressed both by my Indian subjects and by the feudatory princes and the ruling chiefs of India, and their prodigal offers of their lives and their resources in the cause of the realm". From among the many princes and nobles who volunteered for active service were selected the chiefs of Jodhpur, Bikaner, Kishangarh, Rutlam, Sachin, Patiala, Sir Pertab Singh, Regent of Jodhpur, the heir apparent of Bhopal, and a brother of the Maharajah of Cooch Behar, together with

other cadets of noble families. The veteran Sir Pertab would not be denied his right to serve the King-Emperor, in spite of his seventy years—had he not uttered a vow never to die in his bed?—and his nephew, the Maharajah, who is but sixteen years old, accompanied him. All these, with the Commander-in-Chief's approval, joined the Expeditionary Forces at once. The Maharajah of Gwalior and the chiefs of Jaora and Dholpur, together with the heir apparent of Palanpur, were, to their great regret, prevented from leaving their States. Twenty-seven of the larger States maintain Imperial Service troops, and the services of every corps were immediately placed at the disposal of the Government on the outbreak of war. Powerful contingents were accepted from various States, consisting of native cavalry, infantry, sappers, and transport, together with a camel corps from Bikaner, while large sums of money, thousands of remounts, and offers of all kinds poured in from princes and peoples alike. The Maharajah of Mysore, who alone rules over a population exceeding that of Sweden, offered not only his troops, but also 50 lakhs of rupees for the Expeditionary Force—a sum equivalent to no less than £333,000. "All I possess", was the unconditional offer of the Rajah of Pudukota, who was in Britain at the time, and came forward immediately with an earnest desire to serve in any capacity. Similar offers came from other chiefs then staying in Britain. The Maharajah and the Maharani Maji Sahiba



of Bharatpur volunteered "the whole resources of their State"; the Gaekwar of Baroda, "all his troops and resources", the Rajah of Akalkot and Mir Ghulum Ali Khan of Khairpur, personal service in the field. The Maharajah Jam Sahib of Nawanagar—better known as the famous cricketer "Ranji"—promised to raise and maintain a force of 1000 men to fight for the Empire, to give 200 horses and 15 motors, over and above two squadrons of the Imperial Service Lancers. Even the sacred Lamas of Tibet, high up on the Roof of the World, offered troops, as well as prayers, for the success of the British Army.

The examples mentioned by no means exhaust the unparalleled list of lavish and voluntary contributions made by India in Britain's hour of

trial. She realized her dearest wish in being allowed to take her place on the battlefields of Europe shoulder to shoulder with the troops from the Motherland and from the British Dominions overseas, only asking in return, as the Aga Khan declared, in speaking for India's sixty millions of Mussulmans, "that the Queen's proclamation of 1858 should be kept in the letter and in the spirit".

This splendid army—the first military force of the kind that had ever left the shores of India for service in Europe—was estimated at 70,000 first-class fighting-men—superb Sikhs, of the race which forms the backbone of our Indian army; Punjabi Mussulmans, next in point of numbers in the British service; no fewer than seven battalions of the gallant Gurkhas;



Famous Soldiers for the Front: A Regiment of Indian Lancers preparing to Charge

Pathans and Brahmans, Rajputs and Mahrattas, Madrasis and Dogras—heroes of many a hard-fought battlefield, and all faithful to the core. "If 70,000 soldiers are not enough, and the Empire calls for more", declared the Agha Khan, who with self-sacrificing chivalry applied to the War Office to be allowed to serve as a private with the Indian army at the front, "we shall send 700,000—and we could send seven millions. Whatever the Empire demands we shall supply to the fullest extent of our resources. We intend to stand by the British Empire."

Such is the spirit of the chiefs and peoples upon whose disloyalty Germany counted to paralyse the British Empire in its life-and-death struggle

with the crushing might of the Fatherland. Indian public opinion on the subject was eloquently expressed by Mr. Malabiya in a memorable speech before the Viceroy's Council:

"India recognizes her duty at this present moment, and, God willing, will loyally and manfully discharge that duty, that no sacrifice of men or money will be grudged in order that the British arms should triumph, that the success of the British arms should establish the triumph of right over might, of civilization over the military barbarism of Germany, of ordered freedom over military slavery, and of everything that men have held dear in the last hundred years over all that seems to be ugly and despicable at the present moment in the doings that are going on in Belgium and other countries."

F. A. M.

## CHAPTER VI

### JAPAN'S SHARE IN THE WAR

(August–October, 1914)

Japan agrees to join Britain—German Occupation of Kiao-Chau in 1898—Japanese Resentment—Alliance with Britain—Baron Kato's Statement—Ultimatum to Germany—Japan declares War—Japanese Operations in the Pacific—Marshall Islands occupied—Assurance to Australia.

WAR had no sooner been declared in Europe than grave anxiety was felt for the maintenance of peace in the Far East. German warships were prowling round the seas of Eastern Asia, menacing both British and Japanese trade, and carrying out operations in Kiao-Chau Bay which plainly pointed to the employment of that powerful station as a base for hostilities. Thereupon Great Britain approached Japan, and, after a

full and frank exchange of views, the Japanese Government agreed to co-operate against Germany under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.

Kiao Chau, "the key to Northern China", as it is called, had been an increasing source of anxiety to Japan ever since it was seized by the Germans, on the flimsiest prettexts, in 1898. Two German missionaries had been murdered in Shantung in the previous November—a tragedy all too

common in the remote parts of China, and one for which the Chinese Government was ready to make what reparation was in its power. Germany, however, had hankered after a naval base in the Far East, and nothing would appease her wrath on this occasion but the ninety-nine years' lease by which she became possessed—as she hoped for all time, since the agreement was merely “a scrap of paper”—of the excellent harbour of Kiao-Chau. This was most conveniently situated, facing the Yellow Sea, some 350 miles in a direct line from Peking, and opposite to the southern extremity of Korea, thus threatening the interests of the Japanese Empire. Germany's possession of this formidable base was always regarded by Japan as a serious obstacle to the maintenance of peace in the Far East, and though she expressed some diplomatic reluctance to be drawn into the Great World War, there can be no doubt that the prospect of removing the German peril made a strong appeal to our allies.

Japan had never forgiven Germany her share, with Russia and France, in prohibiting the annexation of the Liao-tung peninsula at the close of her war with China in 1895. The three Powers had intervened on that occasion on the ground that such an annexa-

tion by Japan would be dangerous to the peace of the Far East, and since nothing more than benevolent neutrality from Great Britain could then be expected, Japan was forced to submit. But the recollection of this intervention rankled in Japanese minds, and the Kaiser's sweeping denunciations of the Yellow Peril only added to the account which Japan was keeping for her settlement with Germany. Great Britain, on the other hand, had consistently supported the Japanese. She had taken the lead and initiative over other Powers when Japan, by the revision of her international treaties with the West in the midst of her war with China, received for the first time full recognition in the comity of civilized nations. The British alliance, which followed in 1902, was the ideal in foreign politics



Photo. Underwood & Underwood

Our Allies in the Far East: Japanese Sailors getting Naval Guns into position for shelling a distant Fort





Photo. Underwood & Underwood

Japanese Troops in the Trenches

aimed at by all enlightened Japanese, and time has proved that that alliance had for its basis, and still possesses, the mutual interests of both countries. "Japan", said Baron Kato, the Foreign Minister, in his speech at the opening of the special session of the Japanese Diet on September 5, 1914, "had no desire or inclination to become involved in the present conflict; only she believed she owed it to herself to be faithful to the Alliance, and to strengthen its foundation by insuring permanent peace in the East, and protecting the special interests of the two allied Powers." In her stern ultimatum to Germany on August 15 she had demanded the immediate withdrawal of German war-ships from Japanese and Chinese waters, and

the delivery within a month to the Japanese authorities, "without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiao-Chau, with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China. An answer was demanded by noon on August 23; and, failing unconditional acceptance of the conditions, Japan threatened "to take such action as it may consider necessary to meet the situation". The only reply from Germany was a verbal message to the Japanese diplomatic representative to the effect that, having no answer to make to Japan's demands, she found herself compelled to recall her ambassador from Tokio, and to hand to the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires his passports. The last moment of the time allowed having expired without further word from the German Government, the Imperial Japanese rescript declaring war was issued the next day—August 23, 1914:

"We, by the Grace of Heaven, Emperor of Japan, on the throne occupied by the same dynasty from time immemorial, do hereby make the following proclamation to our loyal and brave subjects. We hereby declare war against Germany, and we command our army and navy to carry on hostilities against that Empire with all their strength. We also command all our competent authorities to make every effort in pursuance of their original duties to attain the national aim within the limits of the law of nations."

The subsequent operations at Kiao-Chau, in which British troops co-operated with their allies, must be reserved for a later chapter. It may be added here, however, that the



Photo, Underwood &amp; Underwood

Our Japanese Allies in the Field: Infantry resting before delivering an Attack

Japanese navy, like the British fleet, helped to pluck the feathers from the German eagle in the Pacific Ocean, as well as in the Yellow Sea. The capture of the Marshall Islands, announced from Tokio on October 6, rounds off the list of German equatorial possessions already seized by the Australian navy. A timely reassurance for the Australian Government was forthcoming on this occa-

sion, in the statement issued by the Japanese Navy Department to the effect that the capture of Jaluit, the capital of the Marshall group, with its fortifications, arms, and ammunition, was intended solely for military purposes, and not for permanent occupation. German warships were thus deprived of their last official refuge in the Pacific.

F. A. M.

---

## CHAPTER VII

## THE GERMAN DASH FOR PARIS

(August–September, 1914)

The Defence of Maubeuge and Longwy—British Retreat to Cambrai, Le Cateau, and Landrecies—Night Fight at Landrecies—Further Retreat of the First Army Corps—The Battle at Le Cateau—Saving the Guns—The Retirement to the Vermand-St. Quentin-Ribemont Line—Charge of the Scots Greys and the Black Watch—Commanders of the German Armies—The British at La Fère, Chauny, and Noyon—New French and British Plans—Fighting at Compiègne and at Villers-Cotterets—German Excesses at Senlis—Paris and its Defences.

SIR JOHN FRENCH undoubtedly took a wise course when he decided that he would not defend the Jenlain-Bavai-Maubeuge line, to which he first retired after the fighting in and round Mons. Many ancient roads of Roman origin—but popularly ascribed to that legendary road-builder Brunhilda, the Visigoth consort of the Merovingian King Sigisbert—converge on Bavai, which in Roman days was, after Reims, the most important city in all Gaul. The modern town, however, only counts 2000 inhabitants, who are chiefly metal-workers and tanners. Easy of access from northerly directions, Bavai could not be well defended, and, if a further retreat had not been decided on, the British army would have had to throw itself into the entrenched camp of Maubeuge.

Judging by what happened either previously or afterwards at Liège, Namur, and Antwerp, such a course might well have proved disastrous. Maubeuge is overlooked on all sides by heights with forts which were supposed to protect it from bombardment. Three of these forts with a redoubt and a couple of permanent batteries

occupied the high ground on the right bank of the Sambre, three others and an additional battery being on the left bank of that river. But the intermediate trenching work seems to have been as imperfect as at Liège and Namur, and thus the Germans reduced Maubeuge after about a week's siege, the surrender taking place on September 7. For some time longer the French authorities refused to believe that this so-called stronghold had been lost; but the first German accounts of its capture were confirmed by a telegram from the Kaiser to the Duke of Saxe-Meiningen, stating that the latter's son, Prince Ernest, had fallen in the fighting, and had been buried with military honours in the town.

A far better resistance was offered to the enemy by the historic little fortress of Longwy, in the extreme north-eastern corner of France, and styled by Louis XIV the Iron Gate of his dominions. In the course of centuries the defences of Longwy have become virtually obsolete, and that circumstance, coupled with the town's exposed position, inclined most military critics to expect from it only a very brief resistance. But although Longwy





Maubeuge and its Defences, captured by the Germans, after a week's siege, on September 7, 1914

was held by merely 800 men under Colonel d'Arche, it did not surrender until four-and-twenty days had elapsed, and half of its heroic garrison had been killed. M. Alfred Mézières, the octogenarian *doyen* of the French Academy, figured among the besieged.

Four days before the fall of Longwy the Germans occupied Lunéville, south of Nancy, an incident which led to General Pau's appointment to the command of all the French forces on the Eastern frontier. The British Commander was at this moment still at Bavai, but intent on retiring southward; for although the Germans generally had suffered heavy losses, and appeared to be somewhat fatigued, a large body of them was persistently endeavouring to turn our left flank. Our rear-guard received orders to be clear of its positions at 5.30 a.m. on August 25. Our west flank was covered by General Allenby with a part of his cavalry and the 19th Brigade. The Second Corps, which was the most exposed to the enemy's attacks, was screened by two other

brigades of Allenby's cavalry and its own divisional cavalry. The line to which Sir John French decided to withdraw was that of Cambrai, Le Cateau-Cambrésis, and Landrecies, and in order to assist the retiring troops the Fourth Division of the Expeditionary Corps was brought to Le Cateau by rail as early as Sunday, August 23, when the British Commander realized that the fighting at Mons was going against us. Thus, on the morning of the 25th, eleven battalions and a brigade of artillery, under Major-General D'Oyly Snow, were available to support the retirement of our other forces. With this object General Snow placed his men on a line extending from a point south of Solesmes to one on the road from Cambrai to Le Cateau, the direction being from north-east to south-west, in such wise that the Fourth Division virtually confronted the left of the German forces which were trying to outflank us.

Cambrai is west of Solesmes on approximately the same line. South of Solesmes is Le Cateau, at a few miles eastward of which town, in a somewhat northerly direction, one finds Landrecies. Cambrai is on the Scheldt or Escaut, Le Cateau on the Selle, and Landrecies on the canalized part of the Sambre. All three localities have notable historical associations to which our men can have paid little if any attention during the hard fighting which was there demanded of them. Cambrai—whence we derive our English word *cambric*—figured prominently in the wars of Francis I, Henri II, and Louis XIV, the last of whom personally besieged and captured the city.

Some of Vauban's fortifications still remain there. On the highest ground is a citadel, and the various gates and the river are protected by advanced works. The famous General Dumouriez, who, during the Revolutionary wars, crushed the Prussian invaders at Valmy and the Austrians at Jemmapes, and afterwards wrested Belgium from their sway, was a native of Cambrai. Fénelon was the most famous of its archbishops.

Le Cateau (a corruption of Château) was one of the archiepiscopal appanages. Its 10,000 people are nowadays largely engaged in sugar-refining and woollen manufactures. Here Henri II signed the treaty which first gave Metz, Toul, and Verdun to France, and here was born one of Napoleon I's

ablest lieutenants, Marshal Mortier, Duke of Treviso. Landrecies, a much smaller town, with old ramparts, the ground beyond which can be flooded with the waters of the Sambre, gave birth to two celebrities—one of English origin, Marshal Clarke, Duke of Feltre, sometime Napoleon's Minister of War, and Joseph, Marquis Dupleix, the adventurous Frenchman who strove to turn us out of India and there establish a great Empire for his own country. Possibly none of the Coldstream Guards who fought so bravely on August 25 in the outskirts and the narrow streets of Landrecies realized that the statue on the town's little square, facing the barracks which they had occupied, was that of one of Great



Longwy after its heroic Defence: Ruins of the historic French town as seen from an aeroplane after the German bombardment

Britain's greatest and at the same time most valiant enemies.

Throughout August 25, until the evening, our First Army Corps, under Sir Douglas Haig, continued its march on Landrecies, skirting as it went the eastern border of the great State forest of Mormal, which has an area of more than 22,000 acres. The forest is intersected by railway lines, but these, apparently, were not available, for our men followed some of the ancient roads ascribed to Queen Brunhilda. Meantime, the Second Corps, under Sir H. Smith-Dorrien, came down on Le Cateau by a more westerly route, its right resting on that town and its left on Caudry, a tulle- and lace-making locality, where the Austrians were badly beaten in 1794. The better to assist the Second Corps, a part of General Snow's division came as far south as Seranvillers, a little place on the right bank of the Scheldt, and in proximity to Cambrai.

The Second Corps was in position at about 6 p.m. on August 25, and the First Corps reached Landrecies that same evening. It had been Sir John French's intention that Sir Douglas Haig's troops should fill up the gap between Landrecies and Le Cateau, but the men were very tired and could get no farther west than the former locality. The 9th German Army Corps had been following them all day by a parallel road through the Mormal Forest, and at about seven o'clock, while some men of the 4th Guards Brigade were preparing for tea at the Landrecies barracks, they were disturbed by a report that thousands of German cavalry were riding



The Feathered Regiment in the French Army: the carrier-pigeon service at the front

The French trooper in charge is about to release a bird with a message to head-quarters.

through the streets. A party of Coldstreams at once turned out with fixed bayonets and machine-guns, but it was discovered that the enemy's troopers—a little detachment of reconnoitring Uhlans—had already ridden off. The incident was significant, however, and indeed, at about half-past eight o'clock the alarm sounded, and the 3rd Coldstreams hurried off to the outposts, while some men of the 2nd Battalion and some Irish Guards took up positions on the right and left flanks, a detachment of the Grenadier Guards forming a reserve. According to Lieutenant the Hon. Aubrey Herbert, of the Irish Guards, the town was barricaded by the troops remaining there, in order to prevent any cavalry



charges, and numerous houses were loop-holed. Several men of the 3rd Coldstreams who had gone out to meet the enemy afterwards related that they took up positions across the roads coming from the north, so as to be in readiness for the German onset. Wire fences were hastily improvised at a distance of some 70 yards in advance of their lines; they had Maxim guns on either side of them, and, as the roads were of no great width, and they desired to direct an effective fire on the enemy, they disposed themselves in three rows, the first lying down, the second kneeling, and the third standing. The first Germans who appeared wore French uniforms, and called to our men in the French language, but the deception was speedily detected, and a hail of

lead at once checked the enemy's advance. The fighting soon became very violent. The Germans were provided with artillery, but their shells passed over the Coldstreams and exploded in the town, where affrighted women and children were fleeing hither and thither. Again and again did the enemy rush upon the British line, and on one occasion they succeeded in capturing a machine-gun, which the Coldstreams, however, soon recovered. At one point the Germans managed to cross a bridge and reach some of the narrow streets, but were driven from them at the bayonet's point, and then subjected to a fierce fire from some machine-guns which the Grenadier Guards trained upon the bridge. During the fighting, moreover, the Germans managed to surround a detachment of our cavalry; but Private D. J. Price, of the 15th Hussars, swam the canalized Sambre in order to warn the commanding officer, Lieutenant G. H. Straker, who was thereupon able to remove his troop to a position of safety. Price's gallantry was rewarded with the Medal for Distinguished Conduct. Eventually, when the enemy had been forced back to their original positions, our men dug fresh trenches, which they defended vigorously



The First List of V.C.'s: Captain Francis Octavus Grenfell, 9th Lancers  
(From a photograph by W. A. Rouch)

Captain Grenfell headed the first list of recipients of the Victoria Cross in the Great War, "for gallantry in action against unbroken infantry at Andregnies, Belgium, on 24th August, 1914, and for gallant conduct in assisting to save the guns of the 119th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, near Doubaon the same day".

attachment of our cavalry; but Private D. J. Price, of the 15th Hussars, swam the canalized Sambre in order to warn the commanding officer, Lieutenant G. H. Straker, who was thereupon able to remove his troop to a position of safety. Price's gallantry was rewarded with the Medal for Distinguished Conduct. Eventually, when the enemy had been forced back to their original positions, our men dug fresh trenches, which they defended vigorously

until about half-past one o'clock in the morning, when the Germans, who had suffered very severe losses, abstained from further attacks of any violence.

While all this was occurring at Landrecies, Sir Douglas Haig's First Division was being heavily engaged near Maroilles, a neighbouring little town, famous for its cheese, which the Parisians wrongly call "Marolles". As there were two French reserve divisions on our right, Sir John French sent urgent messages to their commander to come up to the assistance of our First Corps. This they ultimately did. Meantime, however, as the French generally were still retiring and the enemy's forces were accumulating and seriously threatening our left flank, the Commander-in-Chief felt that a further withdrawal was imperative, and he therefore instructed Sir Douglas Haig and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien to continue the retreat as soon as possible towards a line stretching from Vermand, on the west, past St. Quentin, to Ribemont, with the view of ultimately placing the River Oise between ourselves and the enemy.

Those instructions were to have been carried out by both of our army corps early on Wednesday the 26th, but although during the previous night Sir Douglas Haig skilfully extricated his men from their difficult position, so that they were able at dawn to march on Wassignies, at the edge of the Antigny forest, and thence on Guise (famous for its Dukes), where they crossed the Oise, the hard-pressed troops of Sir H. Smith-Dorrien were constrained to give

battle to the Germans, who were descending on Le Cateau. Our Second Corps and the 4th Division, which was now incorporated with it, were confronted by the guns of four German army corps, and in face of such an attack Smith-Dorrien reported that he judged it impossible to continue the retreat at daybreak as instructed. Sir John French, however, ordered him to break off the action and retire at the earliest possible moment, this being the more urgent as no support could be provided. Three days previously the British commander had earnestly requested the support of three divisions of French cavalry under General Sordet, who were billeted north of Avesnes, at no great distance from Maroilles, where our 1st Division was hard pressed on the night of the 25th. But Sordet's cavalry had been protecting the French retreat since the battle of Charleroi, and although the General promised to obtain the sanction of his army-commander to act on our left flank, his horses, it was urged, had been too severely tried for any immediate action to be taken. It may be pointed out that our own cavalry had been put to great exertions since the battle of Mons, but was not in the same exhausted condition, owing to the unquestionable superiority of our horses. As it happened, General Sordet was unable to assist us until the 27th, that is, some four-and-twenty hours after our most critical moment had passed. That moment occurred on the 26th, when, as already indicated, Sir H. Smith-Dorrien found four German army corps attacking him.

There had not been time to entrench our positions properly. Nevertheless, as Sir John French afterwards reported, our troops showed a magnificent front to the terrible fire directed on them, and our artillery, although outmatched by at least four to one, made a truly splendid fight. The action began very early in the morning, after the British positions had been reconnoitred by German aeroplanes, one of which was brought down by the fire of the Royal Scots. The airman alighted uninjured and attempted to escape, but was overtaken by one of our troopers, who shot him through the head. So terrible, however, became the enemy's fire, and so great the pressure, that at nine o'clock Sir H. Smith-Dorrien ordered every man on his staff—tele-

graphists and escort—to take rifles and go into action.

A company of the Royal Scots suffered severely from shrapnel-fire, and the battalion's transport, comprising numerous ammunition- and provision-wagons, stationed in a farmyard, was completely wrecked, the wagons being blown into the air and many of the horses being killed. The King's Own Royal Lancasters were also great sufferers. Colonel Dykes, their commander, fell mortally wounded when the action had lasted but ten minutes. One company lost nearly all its officers, yet the surviving ones never flinched, but exposed themselves repeatedly in order to encourage their men and ensure them proper protection. Unfortunately this was not always feasible. A battalion of the



Honouring a Highland Hero: The Grave of one of the "Seaforths" killed in action at La Ferté

The soldier's khaki overcoat was placed on the cross, and flowers were placed on the grave every day by the French peasantry.



King's Own Yorkshire Light Infantry lost three-fifths of its effective; but it happened to be the very last body of our men to leave the trenches, and was complimented by the General on its gallantry. Meantime, our artillery kept up a steady fight, although it included sections which had only just arrived in France. Lieutenant C. A. Jardine—a son of Sir John Jardine, M.P. for Roxburghshire—distinguished himself while his battery was retreating across open country by retracing his steps in order to harness fresh horses to one of the guns, whose team had been killed by shell-fire after its position had been located by a German aeroplane. Captain Douglas Reynolds of the 37th battery, Royal Field Artillery, saved a gun in the very teeth of the enemy, who were within a hundred yards of him, and for this and subsequent gallantry was awarded the Victoria Cross.

There were courageous deeds on all parts of the battlefield. When some of the guns of the 27th battery of the Royal Field Artillery lost their horses near Ligny-en-Cambresis, Sergeants M'Ewen and Jenkins, and Gunners Donneghan, Boatwright, Harrison, Whitehouse, and Williams dragged them into safety under a heavy fire, winning by this bravery and devotion the honour of the Distinguished Conduct Medal. There was severe fighting at the Cambrai end of our line, on which side the Germans were striving to outflank us. Our cavalry had become a good deal scattered during the engagements of the 24th and the 25th, and General Allenby had only been able to concentrate two brigades to the south of Cambrai, in order to protect our retreat. The 1st Somerset Light Infantry, who were in a village north of the town, had to put up a hard fight, and incurred



A Check in the Dash for Paris: Remains of a German Motor Convoy completely wrecked by shell-fire



FROM A PHOTOGRAPH

DAVID WHITE & SONS

*Albert King of the Belgians.*







After the Battle: French villager collecting shells and shell cases from one of the trenches abandoned by the Germans

severe losses. Men of the 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers, the Middlesex, Essex, and Suffolk regiments have related how greatly they were outnumbered by the enemy, and what stanch resistance was required of them. The 1st Gordons also had a terrible time in defending their trenches, and one section was unfortunately cut off. At last it became absolutely necessary to retire, and by Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien's orders the first regiments began to withdraw at about 3.30 p.m., after contending since early morning against overwhelming odds. Though the artillery had already suffered severely, it covered the retirement with its customary intrepidity, while

the cavalry, however tired it may have been, put forth renewed exertions. Sir John French subsequently recorded his deep appreciation of the coolness, bravery, and determination which Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien displayed in directing the movements of his men.

The troops now passed from the department of the Nord into that of the Aisne, where they crossed the once-famous county of Vermandois, which Louis XIV bestowed on his son by Louise de la Vallière. Vermandois, which is a broadly undulating region, with bare, chalky slopes surmounted by clusters of houses usually standing among poplar-trees, takes its name from Vermand, a little riverside place of 1200 people, selected by Sir John French as the western limit of our line. The central point was fixed at St. Quentin, a thriving town on the Somme, counting 50,000 inhabitants, and famous for its sieges. The first of these was conducted by the troops of Philip II of Spain, who vowed to St. Lawrence that in return for the capture of the town he would build in his honour a chapel and palace in the form of a gridiron—the emblem of the saint's martyrdom. Philip's wish being fulfilled, he massacred many of the inhabitants, and then built the famous Escorial. The last of St. Quentin's sieges took place in 1870, when the defence against the Germans was conducted by a literary man, Anatole de la Forge. A little later General Faidherbe fought an indecisive battle against the superior forces of the Prussian commander, Von Manteuffel, in St. Quentin's immediate vicinity.

From this point Sir John French proposed to extend our line across the Oise to Ribemont, a small town, the birthplace of Condorcet, and peopled chiefly by tanners and basket-makers. There is railway communication between St. Quentin and Ribemont, and also between the latter place and Guise, to which locality Sir Douglas Haig's men at first retired.

But the enemy was pursuing us closely, there were repeated rear-guard engagements, and it became impossible to hold the line which Sir John French had selected. The retreat was continued until a late hour on the 26th, and again all day on the 27th. A private of the Cameronians afterwards related that on reaching St. Quentin, and preparing for meals, our men were again attacked by the pursuing Germans. But a determined stand was made against them. At one point they were driven off by a charge of our Hussars and Lancers; at another a combined charge of the Scots Greys and the 1st Battalion of the Black Watch—similar to the famous charge at Waterloo, the infantry hanging on to the stirrup-leathers of the troopers—was even more successful in hurling back the enemy. Men and horses flew through a hail of bullets from the enemy's machine-guns, and, when his lines were reached, bayonet and sabre wrought havoc among them.

Gradually the enemy's pressure on our retreating columns relaxed. On the east General Sordet's cavalry was at last able to drive some of the Germans back on Cambrai, while on the west two French reserve divisions moved down from Arras, a distance

of over 30 miles, and, by attacking the enemy's right flank, brought considerable relief to our rear-guard. On August 28 our First Corps was on the Oise near La Fère, and our Second Corps at Chauny, on the same river, and at Noyon, on its tributary, the Verse. At this point the weight of the enemy's pursuit was in a measure thrown off.

The German forces which had been following us, leaving others to engage the French, were more particularly those commanded by General Alexander von Kluck, an officer of undoubted ability, born at Münster as far back as May, 1846. His troops occupied the most westerly position among the German armies advancing from Belgium into France at the date which has now been reached—August 28. Going eastward, one next found the French opposed by the forces of General von Bülow, born, like Kluck, in 1846, and, prior to the war, Inspector at Hanover of the 7th, 9th, and 10th Army Corps. Next in line on the north of France was the army commanded by General Baron Max von Hausen, born at Dresden in the same year as Kluck and Bülow, and previously Minister of State and War in Saxony. Before long, General von Hausen was replaced in his command in France by General von Einem-Rothmaler, his junior by seven years and a native of the Hartz country. Einem first saw active service as an officer of Uhlans in the war of 1870-71, and was at one time Minister of War at Berlin. Next to the forces commanded successively by Hausen and Einem was



Drawn by R. Caton Woodville

As at Waterloo: History repeats itself in the stirrup charge at St. Quentin

The combined charge of the Highland infantry and Scots Greys at St. Quentin—repeating the dramatic incident at Waterloo depicted in Lady Butler's famous picture, "Scotland for ever!"—took the Germans completely by surprise, hurling them back with heavy losses both from sabre and bayonet. One account states that the Highlanders joined with the Scots Greys in several charges of the kind, all racing forward, shouting and cheering.



the army of Duke Albrecht of Würtemberg, who, the King of Würtemberg having only a daughter, Princess Pauline of Wied, ranked as heir presumptive of the little monarchy. Born in July, 1865, Duke Albrecht had received considerable military training prior to the war, having held both cavalry and infantry commands of importance. Finally, the German line on the north of France was completed by the army of the Imperial Crown Prince, born in 1882, and thus the youngest German in high command. On the east, in front of Metz, were the Bavarians, commanded by their Crown Prince Rupert, a man of five-and-forty, with twenty-eight years of military service. Operating on the same front, and more particularly before Nancy and Château-Salins,



General Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of General Staff of the German Army



Duke Albrecht of Würtemberg

were some forces under the command of the elderly and Semitic-looking General von Heeringen, previously Inspector of the Prussian Guard and a former Minister of War.

Of the three towns forming our line on August 28, only La Fère—which the Germans vainly besieged in the time of Napoleon I, but which they took after a gallant resistance during the war of 1870—has any fortifications, and, although there was some fighting between our men and the enemy in the vicinity of the town, we were less pressed in that direction than in the neighbourhood of Chauny and Noyon—the last an ancient little place where Charlemagne is said to have been born, and where he was certainly crowned King of Neustria. Two of

the enemy's cavalry columns came down on us in this direction from St. Quentin. South of the Somme, however, the Uhlans of the Guard, who formed part of the more westerly column, were thrown back with considerable loss by our 3rd Cavalry Brigade, under General Gough; while our 5th Brigade, under Sir Philip Chetwode, attacked the eastern column near Cérizy, and routed it after an extremely sharp fight. These achievements again momentarily relieved the pressure, and on the following day the French Sixth Army, a part of which had come from the south, took up positions on our left, its right resting on Roye, a little town on the Somme. This army was composed of the 7th Corps, previously stationed at Besançon, under General Bruneau, with four divisions of reserve troops, adjoined to which was General Sordet's cavalry corps. General Maunoury was in command of the whole force.

Meantime the 5th French Army, which held positions behind the Oise between Guise and La Fère, was threatened by five or six German corps coming from the direction of the Somme, while at least two corps of the enemy were crossing that river on either side of the ancient stronghold of Ham, in whose historic fortress so many famous people, from Joan of Arc to Napoleon III, were at one or another period imprisoned. The last-named German corps were intent on pursuing the British columns, which they did so vigorously that our rear-guard was still constantly called upon to fight. On the whole, though there had been more than one thunderstorm

since the engagement at Mons, the weather was favourable for marching, and the British troops strode on manfully, frequently covering more than 30 miles a day, and often remaining content with emergency rations, as no prolonged halts were allowed.

It would appear that the one object



Field-Marshal Baron von der Goltz, appointed Military Governor of Belgium after the German occupation of Brussels.

of our retirement had hitherto been to escape the pressure of greatly superior forces, irrespective of all other considerations; but on August 29 General Joffre visited Sir John French and conferred with him with respect to future movements. The plan of drawing the enemy on until the position became favourable for assuming the offensive was then evolved, but owing to repeated changes in the situation several alterations in the

scheme of the allied commanders supervened. To provide for immediate necessities the 5th French Army had received orders to advance from the Oise towards the Somme, and thereby check the German pursuit, and on August 29 the 1st and 3rd Corps, under Generals Franchet d'Espérey and Valabrègue, successfully carried out this movement, and inflicted severe losses on the German Guard, Guard Reserve, and 10th Army Corps. It was not, however, a part of the Allies' plan to profit by this advantage, and the gradual retreat towards the River Marne continued.

On August 29, while the French and the Germans were engaged, the British retired to a line a few miles north of Compiègne and Soissons. Sir John French had previously withdrawn his communications' service from Amiens and Boulogne, substituting Havre for the last-named town, and he now deemed it expedient to transfer his base once more—that is to Saint Nazaire, at the mouth of the Loire, and to install an advance base at the great railway-junction of Le Mans, the ancient capital of Maine. The British Commander had further agreed with General Joffre that he would do his utmost to keep within a day's march of the French forces, which had now been strengthened by the arrival of a new army (the 9th). This army took up position between the 5th and 4th Armies, east of the British lines. These, for the moment, followed the course of the Aisne from the point where that river joins the Oise, near Compiègne, and past Attichy, Vic and Fontenoy to Soissons.


The river, about 170 feet in breadth, flows at this part of its course in a hollow varying from half a mile to a mile in width, and lying between slopes which rise to an altitude of some 400 feet, and are frequently crowned with copses.

As our columns drew near, on the one hand to Compiègne and on the other to Soissons, the German forces continued in contact with our covering and delaying troops, which, therefore, were again repeatedly engaged, while the other men with their great accompaniment of guns, ammunition, and provisions, their huge trains of motor-lorries, vans, and buses, went on unceasingly at the same steady pace. There soon came a fresh page in the history of Compiègne, which teems with so many memories. "King Pippin" and Charles the Bald hunted there in the dim days of the past. There Joan of Arc was taken prisoner, and sold to Jean de Luxembourg. Thither for relaxation and pleasure came Queens of France and royal favourites galore. There Napoleon III wooed the Empress Eugénie.

Every autumn in those days the hundreds of crossways and roads which intersect the great forest of Compiègne—some 35,000 acres in extent—re-echoed to the tooting of French horns, sounding either the full cry or the death of the stag. Now they were to hear very different sounds. On September 1, while our last forces were emerging from the forest, south of the town, some German cavalry came up with our 1st Cavalry Brigade—dragoons and hussars under Brigadier-General Briggs. A sharp








THE FIRST PHASE OF THE GREAT RETREAT: PLAN SHOWING THE BRITISH POSITIONS  
FROM AUGUST 23 TO AUGUST 28, 1914

† Chief engagements during the Retreat    - - - - - Franco-Belgian Frontier.

A. British Positions at Mons, August 23.    B. Retiring Line of 2nd Army Corps, August 24.    C. British Lines, evening, August 24.    D. British Lines, August 25-26.    E. Position of General Sordet's Cavalry, August 23-26.    F. General direction of French Retreat.    G. General d'Amade's movement from Arras to assist the British.    H. British Lines, August 26-27.    J. British Lines, August 28.



THE SECOND PHASE OF THE GREAT RETREAT: PLAN SHOWING THE BRITISH POSITIONS  
FROM AUGUST 28 TO SEPTEMBER 6, 1914

The map also indicates the positions of the Allies and of the German Army under General von Kluck at the beginning of the Battle of the Marne.

- + Engagements on September 1.      - - - - - Approximate British Lines of Retreat, August 28 to September 3.  
 A. British Lines, August 29.    B. British Lines, September 3.    C. British Lines, September 6.    D. Sixth French Army, September 6.  
 E. Von Kluck's Army, September 6.    F. Fifth French Army, September 6.





action ensued, several of our officers and men were killed or wounded, and we all but lost a Horse Artillery battery. All the officers were killed or wounded and all the ammunition was expended, but Sergeant-Major Dorrell and Sergeant Nelson, who were afterwards promoted to be Second

streams, Grenadiers, and Irish) was overtaken by the enemy; but our men turned and beat the Germans back, though not without considerable losses owing to the difficult nature of the ground. There was also some rear-guard fighting in the direction of Soissons.



Louvain after the German Bombardment: one portion of the devastated town


Lieutenants and awarded the Victoria Cross, steadfastly remained with the guns until some detachments of our 3rd Army Corps gave support. In the end, not only was "L" battery saved, but twelve of the enemy's guns were captured. On the same day, in the neighbouring forest of Villers-Cotterets, in whose glades Alexandre Dumas first dreamed of his immortal Musketeers and their gallant achievements, our 4th Guards Brigade (Cold-

The retreat continued, much to the dislike of our men, who would infinitely have preferred to advance; but the plan agreed upon between General Joffre and Sir John French was sound, and orders had to be obeyed. Thus the British troops drew nearer and nearer to Paris, the 2nd Corps following the fine paved road which extends from Compiègne to the capital and passes through Senlis, which with its Gallo-Roman ramparts, its cathedral,

its town-hall, and other buildings of the past, was one of the most picturesque old cities in France before the Germans arrived there. The men who had destroyed Louvain, committing even its splendid library to the flames, and who, in following the Belgian army towards Antwerp, were soon to bombard Termonde, then sack it, burn down three of its churches, three of its convents, and many other buildings, besides shooting a number of townsfolk and violating women, were in no mood to spare Senlis. On the ground that a civilian had fired on them while they were entering the town after we had quitted it, they shot the Mayor and other leading inhabitants and then set fire to the main street.

By that time the British troops had reached Chantilly, the famous racing centre, which scores of British trainers, jockeys, and stable-lads were precipitately leaving in order to take shelter within the entrenched camp of Paris. Nearer and nearer did our troops approach to the French capital, as though it was Sir John French's purpose to contribute to its defence. It certainly seemed to be the objective of General von Kluck's army, which was paying us such close attention, and General Gallieni, the Governor of Paris, was preparing to face the enemy's onset.

On September 3, President Poincaré and his Ministers quitted the city for Bordeaux in order to retain full liberty of action. No greater mistake was made by the Republican Government of 1870 than that of shutting itself up in Paris with twice the number of troops which were then



M. Poincaré, President of the French Republic  
(From a photograph by Henri Manuel, Paris)

necessary for its defence and would have been so useful in the provinces. A repetition of that error might have proved disastrous. It is true that from a military standpoint, as from others, there was a great difference between the Paris of 1914 and that of 1870-71. After the former Franco-German War it was decided to surround the city with a great girdle of forts on points many miles in advance of those which then existed. The perimeter which had to be defended in 1870 was one of about 40 miles, whereas the new one extended to 90, and embraced great tracts of land, including most of the market-gardens supplying the Parisians, and abundant pasturage for live stock. This, it was hoped, would prevent the reduction of Paris by famine, as happened in 1871. The



enlargement of the perimeter also tended to render investment more difficult, and as the new forts were at a much greater distance from the ramparts than the older ones, it was thought that any bombardment of Paris itself would be prevented. But nearly all of the new forts were built before 1880, and, judging by the fate of the defences of Liège, Namur, and

of breastworks, entrenchments, entanglements, and other obstacles, must be regarded as very serious when one remembers what happened during the sieges in Belgium. It seems quite unlikely that the Germans would have attempted a complete investment of Paris if they had descended on the city in September, 1914. As at Liège, they would probably have fol-



Photo. Underwood & Underwood

Back to the Fighting Line: French colonial troops who were slightly wounded in the early operations of the war, ready to return to the front

Antwerp, their ability to withstand an up-to-date bombardment is open to question. Further, if so extensive a perimeter required a large army to invest it, a large defensive force was also needed.

The theory taught at the famous Artillery and Engineering School of Fontainebleau was that the entrenched camp of Paris would require 150,000 men for its defence, and that the investing army must amount to at least 350,000. However that may be, the question of adequately protecting the many open spaces between the forts, not only by men, but also by means

lowed the methods counselled by their authority, Von Sauer, who said: "No more parallels, no more *cheminements*. Let a siege-train of howitzers be attached to every army corps. Bombard the defenders' outposts, drive them back, rush in, storm the breastworks, and then the forts themselves." Such a course necessarily involves a great sacrifice of life, but that is not a consideration of any particular weight with German commanders.

General Gallieni and his assistants certainly did their utmost to strengthen the Paris defences, but the question

whether they could have offered a victorious resistance remained unsolved; for on that very third of September when the French Government departed for Bordeaux, the Germans found it necessary to modify their plans. It was reported a little later that General von Kluck had moved in a south-easterly direction in order to assist the other German forces. Rumour even asserted that he went to the relief of the Crown Prince, who found himself imperilled. But it is far more likely that he diverged to the south-east in order that he might not be cut off from the armies of Bülow and Hausen, and then crushed by the Allies. The strategy of General Joffre and Sir John French most certainly tended to that result.

When the full story of the British

retreat from Mons to the environs of Paris comes to be written, that retreat will probably rank as one of the greatest in military history—such as Xenophon's at the head of the Ten Thousand, Broglie's from Prague, Sir John Moore's to Corunna, and Chanzy's from Orleans to Le Mans in 1870-71. Soldiers do not like to retreat, and laymen do not like to read of their doing so; but it should be remembered that a retreat is the supreme test of generalship, and when it is carried out in the face of overwhelming odds, and results in the saving of an army, it ranks, in the military mind, as an achievement equal to victory. Never was the resourcefulness of Sir John French and his coadjutors better displayed than during our retreat from Mons.

E. A. V.

## CHAPTER VIII

### THE BATTLES OF THE MARNE AND THE AISNE

(September-October, 1914)

The New British Positions near the Marne—German Advance checked by the British and the French—German Excesses at Épernay and Reims—Frontier Operations of the French Forces—Some Gallant Deeds during the Marne Fighting—Pursuit of the Germans to the Aisne—Soissons and its Neighbourhood—The British cross the Aisne—Heavy Fighting North of the River—Bombardment of the British Trenches—Casualties of the British Force—"Turpinite" and its Alleged Effects—Engagements between French and Germans—Bombardment of Reims—The Position in North-western France and in Belgium.

ON September 3 the British forces found themselves to the east of Paris, in positions extending from Lagny, an old town of 5000 people, to Signy and Signets, a couple of villages near the Dhuys aqueduct, which conveys drinking-water to the Parisians. These

localities are just south of the River Marne, which General Joffre had requested Sir John French to defend. The British therefore blew up the bridges behind them, but Joffre subsequently requested them to retire to the line of the Seine. This was done while the Germans threw pontoons

across the Marne and threatened both the British and the French forces. On September 5, however, General Joffre informed the British commander that he intended to assume the offensive, and it was arranged that our troops should occupy positions which would link the 5th and 6th French Armies together. The necessary move-

moved so that its right should rest on the Marne at Meaux, while its left extended towards Betz, not far from the River Ourcq. Our own line was transferred to the village of Dagny, at a bend of the little River Aubertin, extending thence to the pretty and famous cheese-making town of Coulommiers on the Grand Morin, and



Photo. Underwood & Underwood

The Track of the Great Retreat: one of the blown-up bridges on the River Marne

ments began at sunrise on September 6, on which day the Battle of the Marne may be said to have commenced.

At first the front of the Allies extended to many miles north-eastward of the Marne, the extreme left of the French 6th Army under General Maunoury being at Ermenonville, south of Senlis, and thereby covering Paris on its northern side; while the right stretched as far as Lizy, near the confluence of the Ourcq and the Marne. On September 6, however, as Kluck's men no longer threatened Paris from the north, the 6th Army

beyond that locality to the village of Vieilles-Maisons. On our right was a French cavalry corps under General Conneau, followed by the 5th French Army under General Franchet d'Espérey, with whom General Joffre had his head-quarters, while more to the east came the 9th Army under General Foch.

The enemy was near at hand. After crossing the Marne he had advanced near to Dagny and Coulommiers, and several of his columns were converging on the historic battle-field of Montmirail, where in 1814 Napoleon gave the Prussians a bad beating. The



men who confronted the British, and also that part of the 6th French Army which was on the Ourcq, belonged to the 1st German Army under Kluck, comprising five corps and two cavalry divisions. Some of these troops also threatened the left of the 5th French Army, but the main effort against that force and the troops of General Foch was made by the 2nd German Army, commanded by Bülow and composed of three corps and the Prussian Guard.

While moving in a south-easterly direction the enemy realized that his columns were threatened with flank attacks, both by the 6th French Army and the British troops, and he therefore attempted to draw off. That part of Kluck's army which was descending the line of the Ourcq turned, and by a prompt conversion confronted Maunoury's forces; while the Germans facing Franchet d'Espérey's army fell back towards the Grand Morin. Those movements on September 6 were attended by occasional fighting, and matters became much more serious on the following day, when the French troops on both our flanks were heavily engaged. The French 6th Army met with great resistance while attempting to reach the Ourcq, but gained ground and inflicted severe losses on the enemy, who in the meantime was thrown back to the line of the Petit Morin River by the 5th French Army, the positions near Montceaux being carried by a bayonet charge. On the advance of the British against the right of Kluck's forces the Germans began to retreat, covered by strong bodies of cavalry which were vigorously engaged by our troopers, par-

ticularly the 9th Lancers and the 18th Hussars belonging to General De Lisle's command. The efficacy of the Allies' strategy became apparent on that very first day of the new fighting. When the advanced columns of Kluck's army turned back, and confronted Maunoury's troops, while the Germans facing Franchet d'Espérey withdrew to the Grand Morin River, it was possible to execute a second manoeuvre, by which the British army straightened its lines northwards.

On September 8 our troops engaged strong German rear-guards of all arms on the Petit Morin River, thus assisting both of the French armies on our flanks. While D'Espérey's men assumed the offensive, and threw both the left of Kluck's forces and the right of Bülow's back towards the Marne, our 1st Corps, after passing the village of Rebais, north-east of Coulommiers, attacked the enemy from La Trétoire to the south-east of La Ferté-sous-Jouarre. The Germans, who were in a strong position on the northern bank of the Petit Morin, put up a determined defence. But with the help of our cavalry and our 1st Division, which crossed at another point, we forced the passage of the river and captured many prisoners and several machine-guns, the enemy also leaving a couple of hundred dead upon the ground. The operations of our 2nd and 3rd Army Corps proved equally successful. Here it should be mentioned that the 3rd Corps had been completed since the retreat from Mons. At that moment Sir John French had only disposed of one section of it, the 4th Division, under General



The Fate of a Red Cross Train during the Battle of the Marne: Scene of the disaster near Lizy

During the battle of the Marne a Red Cross train fell into the River Ourcq through the blowing up of the bridge, the remains of which are shown in the photograph reproduced above. Forty wounded soldiers were drowned.

Snow, which was attached during the retreat to Sir H. Smith-Dorrien's command. The corps' other division—the 6th (of the Irish command)—and its complementary troops, artillery, engineers, &c., had subsequently joined the Expeditionary Force, the command then being assumed by Lieutenant-General W. P. Pulteney, an officer in his fifty-fourth year, who had originally belonged to the Scots Guards, and who, from 1882 onwards, had seen much service in Egypt and both South and Central Africa.

While the British were engaged on the Petit Morin on September 8, the

9th French Army, under General Foch, which was located to the east of the 5th under D'Espérey, held three German army corps in check eastward of the Napoleonic battle-field of La Fère-Champenoise, and was able to fall upon the enemy's flank, forcing him across the Marne to the vicinity of Reims. The Germans had occupied the so-called "Coronation City" of France on September 5, and had thence spread to Ay, Épernay, Avize, and other localities prominently associated with the renowned sparkling wine which the fair province of Champagne exports all over the world.

There were probably from 80 to 90 million bottles of champagne stored in the cellars of the many shipping houses, and the Germans did not fail to indulge in the same excesses as their fathers in 1870, and their grandfathers or great-grandfathers in 1814-15. While the French and the British commanders were enforcing sobriety among their men, the enemy's generals by their own example encouraged gross indulgence on the part of the troops they led. Nor was that all. Several palatial mansions in the Rue du Commerce, at Épernay, were despoiled of their art treasures, and similar acts of pillage occurred at the homes of the Reims shippers, which as buildings were less ornate, but contained equally fine collections of paintings, statuary, and rare curios—the cult of art having long been conspicuous among the magnates of the sparkling-wine trade.

Even as the French forced the passage of the Marne on September 8, so did we push across that river on a more western point during the following day. Our 1st and 2nd Army Corps even advanced some miles to the north, inflicting great losses on the enemy, and capturing many more prisoners and machine-guns. At La Ferté-sous-Jouarre, however, our 3rd Corps encountered much stouter resistance. The bridge over the Marne had been destroyed, and the enemy was in force in the town which stands on the northern bank. Throughout the day our men strove to throw a bridge across the river, but were repeatedly prevented, and it was only after nightfall that the 3rd Corps succeeded in crossing.

Meantime, the 6th French Army came over the Ourcq, and although it was opposed by greatly superior forces it prosecuted a successful advance. On our right the 5th French Army became heavily engaged with the German troops who were still south of the Marne. There was some desperate fighting at Montmirail, but the enemy eventually had to fall back, and the French reached Château-Thierry. More to the east, beyond the 9th French Army under Foch, was the 4th, commanded by General de Langle, who on September 9 occupied Vitry-le-François, south-east of Châlons, whence an advance was made to the same line as that which General Foch's troops had secured. To the north-east of Châlons, however, the 2nd French Army, which General Sarrail commanded, was now threatened both from the Meuse and from the neighbourhood of Clermont-en-Argonne, the enemy's desire being to throw it upon Verdun. Several days' hard fighting ensued in this direction, but the French resolutely maintained their positions. Thus the eastern lines of the Allies remained secure, while further progress was made on the western side. The British 1st and 2nd Corps resumed their advance at dawn on September 10, reached the line of the Ourcq, and, with the help of the Cavalry Division and the 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades, pursued the enemy to advantage. Thirteen guns, seven machine-guns, 2000 prisoners, and a large quantity of transport fell into the possession of our troops. Little opposition was offered to the French near us, and, the armies of





ARCH WEBB.

"Twixt Steel and Water: how British and French Infantry cut off some of the retreating Germans during the Battle of the Marne

"Some of them flung themselves into the stream and tried to swim to safety, but they were heavily accoutred and worn out, so they didn't go very far."

Extract from a letter from a private of the Rifle Brigade, who took part in the action. (See p. 137.)



On the Track of the Invader: French troops passing through one of their villages—Soizy aux Bois—destroyed by the Germans during their retreat

Kluck and Bülow now being in full retreat, the four days' Battle of the Marne, which south of the river had been waged from Faremoutiers to Vitry-le-François, and on the northern side from the bend of the Ourcq to Châlons-sur-Marne, came to a termination. It was speedily to be followed, however, by the long Battle of the Aisne.

There had been several stirring incidents during the Marne fighting. On the very first day there was a fine bayonet charge by some of the Irish Guards, who received orders to dislodge the Germans from a commanding position south of the river. After reaching a little knoll, which some of our men were left to hold, the others

crept round to the German left, took cover at a distance of about 500 yards, waited there for the men on the knoll to join them, then edged again towards the enemy's trenches, and finally lined up within 200 yards of him. A non-commissioned officer subsequently related that at the last lap of the wild race a fiendish machine-gun fire was concentrated on the battalion; but that it did not stop the Guards, who at last reached their foes with "a wild whoop that must have struck terror to their hearts". In vain did the enemy on their side try to employ the bayonet; the Irishmen stuck to them like leeches, until, the centre of the German line being broken, there came a perfect stampede, the German officers vainly

striving to rally their men, who ran off like hares, throwing away their weapons as they went. Many of them were forced to surrender.

When the enemy began to retreat across the Marne, a mixed force of British and French infantry was at one point told off to prevent them from doing so. A private of the Rifle Brigade related that when he and his comrades saw the French advancing in the same direction as themselves they resolved that they would not be left behind, and that a genuine race ensued between the French and the British, both being anxious to reach the enemy the first. The Rifle Brigade won the "sprint" by "a head", and succeeded in overtaking a mob of Germans who were approaching the

river. While the British went at them with the bayonet, many of them flung themselves into the Marne and tried to swim across it; but they were heavily accoutred and greatly fatigued, so that of about three hundred men not more than half a dozen managed to reach the northern bank, the others being drowned in the stream. French and British artillery were meanwhile shelling some German pontoons a short distance away, and, rather than risk crossing under such a terrible fire, many of the retreating men flung themselves down by the riverside. The Rifle Brigade was sent to capture them, but could only do so by coming under the fire of our own guns, with the result that some casualties occurred. The Camerons, the Black Watch, and the Middlesex Regiment also had some exciting experiences during the Marne battle. Some of the last-named were surprised at Coulommiers while they were washing, not a rifle being at hand. In this predicament they fought right manfully with their fists, but were badly cut up by the enemy. Further, a troop of the Scots Greys, while following a French officer who was in a motor-car, suddenly found themselves in the German lines near Rebais, and had to ride for their lives. Out of thirty-seven men only five succeeded in reaching a position of safety. There is laconic eloquence in the following entries which a quartermaster-sergeant of the 2nd Welsh Regiment made in his diary both during the Marne fighting and the ensuing days:—

"September 8: No time to write. Pushing the enemy hard. September 9: Ditto. September 10: Ditto. September 11: Ditto.



Major-General Sir E. H. H. Allenby, in command of the Cavalry Division

(From a photograph by Maull & Fox)

Vol. 1.





Sketch Map of the Valley of the Aisne above Soissons

September 12: Still hard pushing, and inflicting severe losses."

After crossing the Marne, the British force found itself in the Aisne department. The enemy had to be chased across the Ourcq, and on September 11, when that had been effected, our cavalry approached the Aisne, two brigades being to the direct south of Soissons and three to the south-east, near the villages of Couvrelle and Cerseuil, which stand on high ground sloping down towards the Aisne's tributary, the Vesle. From the opposition offered both to the French and to our 2nd and 3rd Corps on the 12th, it became evident that the Germans had stopped their retreat, and intended to defend the passage of the Aisne. Assisted by the artillery of our 3rd Corps, the 6th French Army, which was operating on the south near Mont

de Paris, drove the enemy across the river to Soissons, where they destroyed the bridges and prepared for a vigorous resistance. On the east, General Allenby's cavalry crossed the Vesle to Braisne, and cleared that town and the neighbourhood of large German detachments. At this point the 2nd Dragoon Guards (Queen's Bays) distinguished themselves, with the support of our 3rd Division (Smith-Dorrien's Corps), which advanced in the direction of the Aisne and bivouacked that night at Brenelle. Meantime, the 5th Division (of the same corps) approached the river near Missy, and Sir Douglas Haig's troops reached the neighbourhood of Vauxcéré without much opposition.

Some mention of the Aisne country was made previously. East of Soissons the river valley is much less narrow than in other parts, being in

some places 3 miles wide. The river itself is about 170 feet in breadth and too deep in the centre to be forded. It is skirted on the south by a canal, and between Soissons and Villers, the district in which we chiefly fought, it is crossed by eleven bridges, all liable to come under direct or high-angle

was formerly classed as a fortified place, but ceased to rank as such after the war of 1870-71, as it is situated in a valley surrounded by high ground, a circumstance which had invariably brought about its capitulation on the dozen or fifteen occasions when it had been besieged, from the Middle



The Turn of the Tide: German prisoners on the march


artillery fire. There are two railway lines, one partly on the north and the other on the south bank. The heights are numerous, and have wooded slopes well suited to purposes of defence.

Soissons, which was in some respects our objective, is an ancient little city associated with memories of many Frankish kings from Clovis onward. It stands south of the Aisne, near its confluence with the little river Crise, but it has a *faubourg*, called St. Vaast, on the northern bank. It

Ages down to our own times. The Germans, however, held most of the high ground around Soissons, and it was there that they elected to make a stand.

On the morning of September 13 our 1st Army Corps and General Allenby's cavalry crossed the Aisne by the Bourg and Pont-Arcy bridges, and advanced on Chamouille, Chavonne, and Braye. There being only little opposition, the 1st Division was able to press forward, supported by the

cavalry and driving the enemy before it. The 2nd Division, however, employed several hours in constructing a pontoon bridge at Pont-Arcy under the fire of the German artillery. The 4th Guards Brigade ferried a number of men across the Aisne, but eventually the bulk of the 2nd Division had to spend the night on the south side of the river. With respect to Sir H. Smith-Dorrien's troops, who advanced



One of Germany's Heavy Siege-guns

nearer to Soissons, they found all the bridges in front of them broken, excepting one at Condé, which the enemy held in force. Lower down the Aisne, the 5th Division, under Sir Charles Fergusson, was in part rafted across the river to the east of Venizel, and succeeded by night-time in establishing its left at Ste. Marguerite. On the morrow some more of our troops crossed at the same point, the road-bridge then having been to some extent repaired, though our artillery had to be man-handled across it. The Royal Engineers were faced by very arduous and dangerous duties, and worked incessantly both by day and by night. A score of pontoon bridges and one foot-bridge were at last thrown across the Aisne under heavy artillery fire, and four road-bridges and a railway bridge were sufficiently repaired to facilitate the passage of our men

and our mechanical transport. September 13 and 14 were occupied in perfecting this work, while Sir Douglas Haig's men, by bold and skilful movements, succeeded in reaching important positions.

On the evening of September 13 the enemy's main forces retired to the high ground about 2 miles north of the Aisne, and along the road known as the Chemin des Dames. Here the Germans strongly entrenched themselves, but they left detachments also entrenched in commanding situations on the slopes and spurs of the heights, and these advanced points of defence were well supported by artillery.

On the morning of the 14th the 1st Division, under Major-General Lomax, advanced in the direction of Vendresse, some 15 miles, as the crow flies, north-east of Soissons, it



having been resolved to reach the Chemin des Dames from that direction. General Bulfin's brigade headed this advance at an early hour and reached the vicinity of Troyon, beyond which village the Germans could be seen in force in and around a large factory. The brigade was unable to make headway, and the Coldstreams, and eventually the whole of the 1st Division, had to support it. The Loyal North Lancashire men then seized the factory, to the north and east of which the enemy occupied entrenchments, whence a heavy shell and machine-gun fire was directed on our troops, thereby preventing any successful advance. It was a wet morning, a heavy mist hung over the hills, and until nine o'clock our artillery

could give no effective support. The 3rd Infantry Brigade was at last sent forward to connect the others and assist them. It repulsed a German advance and thereby relieved the pressure, and a series of attacks and counter-attacks ensued until late in the afternoon, when the enemy was finally driven back with heavy loss.

The 4th Guards Brigade, which crossed the Aisne at about 10 a.m. that same day, and pushed through dense woods where artillery support was difficult, reached the south of the so-called Ostel ridge at one in the afternoon, when, however, the Germans secured a footing between our 1st and 2nd Army Corps, thereby threatening the latter's communications. Sir Douglas Haig now had all his men in action, and Sir John French therefore sent Allenby's cavalry to his assistance. After some more heavy fighting the enemy was forced back with many losses. When at 4 p.m. the German attacks decreased in vigour, Sir Douglas ordered a general advance, and in spite of great resistance his troops held at the end of the day a line extending in a south-westerly direction from the Chemin des Dames on the north to the height of La Cour des Soupires, below which our 1st Cavalry Brigade held the road from Chavonne to Soissons. On our right were the Moroccan troops of the 18th French Army Corps, which, to the east of our positions, had also been driving back the Germans throughout the day. The casualties among our 1st Army Corps were very severe during the fighting which has been mentioned, but several hundred



Sir Douglas Haig, commanding the First British Army Corps at the Front  
(From a photograph by Russell)

prisoners were taken as well as some field-pieces and machine-guns.

The troops of Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien, which were placed nearer to Soissons, also had severe experiences. The 4th Division could only maintain its ground, and although the 3rd advanced towards the plateau of Aizy and nearly reached it, the Germans delivered such a powerful counter-attack, supported by heavy artillery, that our men had to fall back and entrench themselves at about a mile north of the bridge of Vailly. The 5th Division (of General Pulteney's corps) was also in action that day, but fared no better than the 4th.

On the following morning, September 15, it became clear to Sir John French that the enemy was resolved to make an effective stand along a line which, as he learned from the French commanders in his vicinity, extended from the north of Compiègne along all the high ground of the Aisne, and thence in a south-easterly direction beyond Reims. Maubeuge having fallen on the 7th, a quantity of heavy artillery had been brought down to strengthen the German positions in front of our troops, who now had their first experiences of what they jocularly called "Jack Johnsons", "Black Marias", and "coal-boxes". One man, in writing home respecting the great shells hurled from the gigantic German guns upon our positions, likened them to "porridge-pots", whilst another called them "jam-puddings", and, in alluding to the fact that he had been wounded, added, "unluckily some of the jam stuck to me". The German artillery fire undoubtedly caused many casu-

alties among our soldiers, and Sir John French particularly insisted on efficient entrenchment, which, at last, mitigated the effect of the enemy's fire.

Our 5th Division, commanded by Sir Charles Fergusson, found itself in a very exposed position on the southern edge of the plateau of Chivres, to which point it advanced on the 14th September, for the Germans holding the neighbouring village of Vregny directed a deadly flank fire on our trenches. It therefore became necessary for Sir Charles to retire to a line running from Ste Marguerite to Missy, and although the enemy was on higher ground, and approached to a distance of 400 yards, this new position was held by our troops with great tenacity.

On September 16 the 3rd Division, under General Hubert Hamilton, regained the ground which it had lost on the previous day. The 6th Division (the first section of an additional army corps) now joined the Expeditionary Force, but Sir John French decided to hold it in reserve on the south side of the Aisne. On the 17th, the 18th, and the 19th the whole British line was vigorously bombarded, and Sir Douglas Haig's troops were engaged incessantly. On the afternoon of the first-named day the right flank of the 1st Division was seriously threatened, but the Northamptonshire men and the Queen's delivered a strong counter-attack with the support of some reserves.

"Under cover of the mist", said Sir John French in his subsequent report, "the Northamptonshire men crept up to within a hundred yards of the enemy's trenches, and

charged with the bayonet, driving them out of the trenches and up the hill. A very strong force of hostile infantry was then disclosed on the crest line. This was enfiladed in part by the Queen's and the King's Royal Rifles which wheeled on their outer flank, and the enemy's attack was eventually driven back with heavy loss."

There were several similar attacks on our lines on the night of the 18th, but they also were repulsed, and so were two determined onslaughts which occurred in the afternoon and evening of the following day. On the 18th the Commander-in-Chief received news from General Joffre that he proposed to attack and envelop the German right flank, for which purpose the 6th

French Army was being strongly reinforced. As, however, this new plan could only be carried out after some delay, Sir John French decided to establish a system of regular relief in our trenches, and employed the fresh men of the newly arrived 6th Division for that purpose. The relieved brigades were brought back alternately to the south side of the Aisne, where they helped to form a general reserve. The cavalry, it should be added, also rendered good help in the trenches, thereby lightening the arduous duties of our infantrymen. Apart from the dangers which trench duty implied, climatic conditions had become far less favourable than at the outset of the



After the German Bombardment of Reims: part of the havoc caused inside the Cathedral



war, for there were repeated spells of wet weather, which naturally increased the discomfort of the troops.

The Germans were again active on September 19 and 20, when they made repeated attacks upon the lines of our 1st Army Corps. They were invariably repulsed, however, and their killed and wounded vastly exceeded ours. Nevertheless our men were heavily tried by this incessant fighting, and were therefore reinforced by more troops from the reserve and by the 1st Cavalry Division. On the night of the 21st there was a particularly violent attack, which was repulsed like the previous one. Happily, on the 23rd, four 6-inch howitzer batteries arrived from Britain, and, after being apportioned between the 1st and 2nd Army Corps, were brought into action with excellent results. Moreover, the reinforcement of the 6th French Army—the command of which had been assumed by General the Marquis de Curières de Castelnau—had now been accomplished, and as the action of this force developed, the enemy withdrew considerable bodies of troops from the central and eastern sections of his line. A temporary abatement of his efforts against the British army ensued, but on the 26th he again subjected our lines to an unrelenting bombardment, while stealthily endeavouring to “sap” up to them. Those efforts were renewed on the two following days, and upon all points of the allied front. Sir John French afterwards expressed his conviction that “the enemy then made one last great effort to establish ascendancy”. He was, however, repulsed everywhere, and again suffered



The Damage to Reims Cathedral  
Some of the broken masonry and ruined windows  
of priceless mediæval stained glass

heavy losses. Our own were severe. A return shows that from September 12 to October 8 our killed, wounded, and missing amounted to 561 officers and 12,980 men. Our first casualty list had amounted to 5127, our second to 5218, our third to 4796, and our fourth to 3588; the total to the 8th October being therefore 32,270.

In his report on the Aisne fighting, Sir John French particularly commended Sir Douglas Haig and the men under him for their valuable services in holding so steadily an advanced and commanding position, and for repulsing every attack in spite of

the enemy's continuous artillery-fire. Many of the men in writing home gave high praise to their officers, who, on their side, were enthusiastic over the men's exceeding cheerfulness amid the most trying ordeals. In that connection a German officer, in noting some of his experiences in his diary, alluded to the British as those "smiling devils". That many of the troops saw strangely gruesome sights their correspondence testified. Some of them referred to the uncanny spectacle of dead Germans remaining in exactly the same attitudes as at the last moment of life—one man, for instance, taking aim, another raising a Hamburg cigar to his lips, another with his mouth open as though he were speaking. The French generally ascribed this to sudden asphyxia, caused by the gases of a new explosive compound devised by M. Turpin, the inventor of Melinite. Some experiments with this new invention were made at the battle of the Marne, and,

according to French accounts, the effects were deadly. But it could not be reasonably claimed that the fumes of the so-called "Turpinite" were responsible for whole "rows of German dead remaining in their trenches bolt upright, with their rifles in firing attitude"; for only a few experiments were made, and similar phenomena (if that word be permissible) were observed during the Franco-German War of 1870, when the high explosives of the present day were not in use. For instance, several cases of the kind occurred on the battle-field of Sedan, and a German scientist came to the conclusion that the rigid life-like attitudes preserved by the bodies which he examined were purely and simply due to a sudden overpowering, life-destroying shock.

In connection with the many casualties which occurred among our men one must not forget the devotion displayed by the Royal Army Medical Corps. Here is an extract from the first list of Victoria Cross awards:—

"Captain Harry Sherwood Ranken, Royal Army Medical Corps, for tending wounded in the trenches under rifle and shrapnel fire at Haut-vesnes on September 19, and on September 20 continuing to attend to wounded after his thigh and leg had been shattered."

Captain Ranken afterwards died of his wounds.

Having followed the fortunes of the British Expeditionary Force to



The Famous Bells of Reims Cathedral: how they suffered in the German bombardment

the end of September, let us now glance at some intervening features of the war in France and Belgium. On August 25, the day after the Germans occupied Lunéville (referred to previously), there was desperate fighting between the French and the Bavarians in the vicinity of Nancy, the enemy being commanded by the Bavarian Crown Prince. The Kaiser appears to have witnessed the engagement and to have anticipated a complete victory, which was to have been followed by a triumphal entry into the old capital of Lorraine. But the Bavarians were repulsed, and on the following day defeated with heavy losses. It was not, however, until September 11 that the French again possessed themselves of Lunéville.

On August 29 one of the French armies retreating from Belgium fought a brilliant engagement at Guise, on the Aisne, where their  $3\frac{1}{2}$ -inch guns—called by them their “seventy-fives”—effectually retarded the German pursuit. Two days later another French column stopped the Germans between the Meuse and Rethel; but, as General Joffre’s orders were to continue the retreat, the Meuse line was left to the enemy, who afterwards advanced into the forest region of the Argonne. About this time some bombs were dropped by the German aeroplanes of General von Kluck’s army on Paris, where several civilians were killed or injured. Of the French co-operation with our own troops at the Battle of the Marne some account has already been given, but it should be added here that on September 10, when the enemy was

retreating before the British force, he made a last desperate effort against the left of the French 9th Army under General Foch, in the vicinity of Vitry-le-François. A vigorous repulse ensued, and in this direction, as in others, the Germans began to retreat. More to the east, the German Crown Prince’s army, which had penetrated as far south as Ste Menehould, was, on the 14th, constrained to retire northward into the Meuse department, for fear lest it should be outflanked. The Prince’s head-quarters were hurriedly transferred to Montfaucon, more than 10 miles above Verdun. In these last operations the French claimed to have captured 175 guns and 6000 prisoners.

Our allies had withdrawn from Reims on September 2, and before they did so the Germans, descending towards the Marne, had begun to bombard some of the forts on the north and east of the city. These forts did not offer much resistance, because most of their armament had been hurriedly removed in order to strengthen the defences of Paris. On the 5th Reims was occupied by the Germans, but six days later they withdrew, whereupon the French returned and endeavoured to recapture the forts which were still held by the enemy. A German bombardment of Reims then began, and on September 20, and again a few days later, the German artillery-fire was wantonly directed on the city’s historic cathedral, a marvel of architectural beauty and the spot where all the kings of France were crowned from the Middle Ages onward. At the first reports of this



gross act of vandalism there was an outcry of indignation in every part of Christendom except Germany and Austria. Fortunately, although the damage done was grievous and shameful, it was not so great as was at first reported. There were irreparable losses, but the towers, on which the Germans mendaciously asserted the

Soon after the battles of Mons and Charleroi some German forces coming from Belgium seized the wealthy industrial city of Lille and the adjacent flourishing town of Armentières. Heavy tributes were levied on both localities, as on Roubaix, Lens, and Amiens, which were also raided; and at the end of the first week in Septem-



In the Hands of the Wreckers: German troops passing through the ruins of Louvain

French had established posts of observation, and even machine-guns, were not destroyed as rumour asserted. During the bombardment—which was repeated a few days later—the cathedral was used as an ambulance, and many German wounded were tended in the great nave, up which, to the very choir, as Jean Chartier, the old chronicler, tells us, Joan of Arc rode in full armour when, finally accomplishing her pious mission, she brought her “gentle king” to be crowned in the sacred fane.

ber it was estimated that the German exactions in Belgium and northern France already amounted in money alone to thirty millions sterling. It has always been the German system to live on the invaded country. The practice was the same in France in 1870–71, and the two hundred millions which the French afterwards paid as war indemnity represented only about one-third of the total amount filched by the German armies. Our allies were repeatedly engaged with the enemy during the latter part of Sep-

tember. Not only was there incessant fighting of a siege-like character all along the Aisne, but there were numerous actions at either end of the allied lines. The French forces which were operating in the north-west for the purpose of driving the enemy from Lille and Amiens at least succeeded in wresting the town of Péronne from his grasp. On the eastern frontier, as on the Aisne, the fighting was of a somewhat "ding-dong" character, small advantages being gained on either side.

The real importance of the great struggle in the west was undoubtedly now centred in France, but an increasingly painful interest attached to the hostilities in Belgium. King Albert's Government now controlled only a fraction of the country, and the Germans were intent on seizing it.

While a body of British marines occupied Ostend, the Belgian forces, the principal of which had retired to the entrenched camp of Antwerp, gallantly strove to prevent the enemy's further advance. Almost every inch of ground was contested. More than once the Antwerp army sallied forth and repulsed greatly superior forces. Some towns—Aerschot for instance—were momentarily retaken. Termonde, captured by the Germans, was recovered from them, then lost again, and committed by them to the flames. There was also a struggle for Malines, but the enemy installed himself there on September 27, and prosecuted his designs on the great city and port of Antwerp, which he particularly coveted, as "a pistol pointed at the heart of Britain".

E. A. V.

## CHAPTER IX

### AIR-CRAFT IN THE WESTERN CAMPAIGN

(September–October, 1914)

Splendid Work of Aeroplanes in this War—Their Achievements at Mons—Resource and Daring of our Airmen—Duels in the Air—Naval Airmen drop Bombs on Zeppelin Sheds—Military Pilots' Co-operation with the French—The Airman's Vital Work.

WHEN Von Kluck sought, by the sheer weight and violence of his attack, to overwhelm the British at Mons, it was the aerial scouting of our Flying Corps, executed with precision and speed, which, as we have already shown, confirmed the report which Sir John French had received from General Joffre, and made him decide instantly upon his fighting retreat. And

again, when, practically at the very gates of Paris, the German wave spent itself and broke, it was our air corps which rendered distinguished service. Not only when threatened by a frontal or flank attack, but when it has asserted its own supremacy and turned the tide of war, does an army profit by the work of its flying scouts. The tactics of an enemy, either in an advance or a retreat, are in one respect

# NORTHERN ILLUSTRATION THE WESTERN

Fortresses ★ Rail  
Political Boundary

EXPLANATION OF COLOURING

METRES	ENGLISH FEET
600	= 1968
400	= 1312
300	= 984
200	= 656
100	= 328

The heights on the map are in metres







substantially the same. In advancing he throws forward a line of troops, and these must act as a screen, resisting the penetration of hostile scouts and concealing the disposition of the army corps that move behind them. And, when he retires, he throws back rear-guards which keep in constant touch with their pursuers, delaying and harassing their advance, yielding ground obstinately yard by yard, and preventing them from gauging—so far as it is possible to do so—the general extent and rapidity of the retreat. There is a distinct peril for pursuers if, with intelligence as to the enemy's retirement which is no more than vague, they press home too vigorously a success. Should the retreating force be numerically strong, and its order maintained, it can choose its own moment and its own ground, and deliver a counter-attack with crushing force.

When we had assailed, at the psychological moment, the hitherto resistless German right, and it had halted, stood, and begun to give ground, a point that Sir John French wished to establish, and without delay, was the exact extent of this yielding movement, and whether it was only temporary or implied a general retreat. So our aeroplanes flew out over the enemy, as they had done at Mons, fired at furiously by his rear-guards, but adhering steadily to their path; and in due course, and with admirable dispatch, they brought back the news that the Commander-in-Chief required. The German retreat was not the strategy merely of the moment, dictated with a view to a counter-

attack. Behind the shield of its rear-guards, which offered no check to the eye of an observer from above, the German tide was really on the ebb, and receding, not temporarily or slowly, but as swiftly and violently as it had flowed. Knowing this fact—having gained, indeed, just such information as the enemy sought to conceal—our head-quarters staff was, in the planning of its pursuit, freed from one grave preoccupation. With an enemy retreating so precipitately, the factor of an immediate counter-offensive could be ignored, and so the pursuit was pushed hard and at the utmost speed.

Then, with the period of the siege warfare on the Aisne, came other fields of action for the air-craft. The two great hosts, pursuers and pursued, dug themselves into the earth and faced each other with a grim tenacity, while the artillery, embarking on a duel that lasted day and night, roared ceaselessly from carefully hidden positions. To detect these concealed batteries, dotted as they were along an abnormally extended battle-front, and give their own gunners the range, became the task of the aeroplanes—both those of the Allies and of the Germans—and it was an extremely difficult one.

An incident from this game of hide-and-seek, played in its new form for the first time in war, is typical of many. A French battery, neatly hidden, was doing excellent work against a German position. Again and again its shells, perfectly timed, burst in white smoke-balls immediately above their mark. The German gunners who were replying, having failed,

as yet, to locate the French, placed their shells wide, and did little harm. The French fire, sustained and searching, was intolerable to the Germans. Something must be done, and was done, or their position would have grown untenable. Flying at a high altitude, out from behind the German lines, appeared the familiar, bird-like shape of a German monoplane. The drone of its motor rose and fell upon the wind, and near the machine, but chiefly below it, as it circled here and there, exploded the shells from anti-aircraft guns—each forming a small white cloud of smoke which dispersed sluggishly. So for a while, his course marked by a stream of these bursting shells, the airman searched like a bird of prey. "Has he seen us?" This is what the French artillerymen asked themselves, peering upward from their well-screened hollow. But there was no means, as yet, of answering the question. The monoplane turned from side to side with an apparent futility; then suddenly, as swiftly as it came, it hummed away across the German trenches and was lost to view.

Nothing happened for awhile. The artillery duel went on, and the French shells continued to burst with an accuracy that was monotonous and deadly. "He did not see us," decided the officer who was in charge of the French battery. But his self-congratulation was premature; almost as he spoke he had reason to alter his opinion. Above the distant clamour of the German guns there came a deeper and louder and more ominous "boom", like an angry blow upon a drum. Then there followed the

wailing shriek of the projectile as it rushed through the air, and a few seconds later, right above the French battery, burst with devastating force a shell from one of the largest of the German guns. The pause that followed the disappearance of the airman was now explained. He had not braved the shrapnel in vain. Despite his altitude, and the screened position of the French guns, he had located their hiding-place and borne back the intelligence to his own lines. Where-upon—and this manœuvre had accounted for the brief delay—the Germans had brought up to the firing-line a heavy gun. The men handling this weapon, though their target was several miles away and they could see nothing of it, were able, thanks to the aeroplane, to make immediate and deadly practice. The position and range of the French battery was known now with accuracy, and so it became a question merely of laying and handling the gun. Confronted thus by heavier metal, his position at last unmasked, the French artillery officer did not wait for annihilation. His concealment had served him well, and he could afford to view its detection with a philosophic shrug. Limbering up smartly, although with sundry casualties among men and horses, he moved a few hundred yards to the rear, and sought again for a screened position. The Germans meanwhile, wasting costly ammunition, continued to plough up the hollow in which the French guns had stood. But after a time, it being observed that all response had ceased, the airman was ordered again to reconnoitre.





Drawn by Georges Scott

## The Fourth Arm in the Great War: French Air-scouts at work

A powerfully engined French biplane as used for detailed reconnaissance. The pilot is at his control-wheel; one of the two observers is studying the land below through his field-glasses, while the other is throwing earthward, over the French lines, and in a small tube, a written report as to what has been seen. This tube is visible as it falls, bright-coloured ribbons being attached to it; and when it is retrieved by the nearest troops—who are warned to be on the look-out for such messages from the sky—it is borne swiftly to head-quarters.

But this time, perhaps, in addition to the anti-aircraft guns, he is confronted by another and a graver menace. A speck appears in the sky from over towards the French lines, moving swiftly and steadily towards him—a hostile aeroplane, bent upon conflict. It is not easy, in forming a mental impression of such aerial combats—which became almost a daily feature of the siege warfare of the Aisne—to grasp adequately the strange conditions in which the combatants have to fight. So far as any comparison is possible, from either land or sea, one might liken two air-men, when pitted against each other, to a couple of horsemen who, mounted

upon the swiftest of steeds and armed with no weapon more powerful than a revolver, ride out against each other from opposite sides of some wide and empty plain. And this simile, although it gives some notion of the vastness of the air-space, and of the insufficiency of an airman's weapons, is at the same time imperfect. We must, in order to gain an impression of the tactical problems that face the combatants, imagine that these horses, in addition to their movement across the ground, have wings which will take them in a swift rush skyward, and allow them to dart above a slower-flying foe. The early lessons of the war, so far as aerial duelling was con-

cerned, went to show that the man who drove the fastest and most easily handled aeroplane—as would be the case with the rider of the swiftest and most manageable horse—held an essential advantage; and the frequent aerial combats of the Aisne, between craft which were aiding their artillery and machines that were determined to prevent them from doing so, served to confirm and render clear the experience already gained. Airmen who fight, having no laws or precedents to guide them, must solve problems of strategy as they present themselves.

In this regard, it is instructive to note, the confirmation of war has been given, and in a curiously exact way, to such a tactical situation as we have already dealt with. "When two airmen", it was explained, "are in the aeroplane attacked, and they have an enemy above them, their position is not so unenviable as that of a single pilot: while one steers, and does his best to elude the foe, the other can devote himself to the use of a rifle." Following upon this statement, and in summarizing one phase of the prolonged fighting on the Aisne, the British official reports gave us, for the first time, something like a detailed description of an aerial duel. In this it was said:—

"Unfortunately one of our aviators, who has been particularly active in annoying the enemy by dropping bombs, was wounded in a duel in the air. Being alone in a single-seated monoplane, he was not able to use a rifle, and while circling above a German two-seater, in an endeavour to get to within pistol-shot, was hit by the observer of the latter, who was armed with a rifle. He managed to fly back over our lines, and by

great good luck descended close to a motor ambulance, which at once conveyed him to hospital."

Here is a problem, involving tactics and armament, that cannot be solved outright—not, at any rate, until we have more data upon which to build. It may be assumed that the two-seated machine is slower than the single-seater, and will not climb so fast; hence it is at a disadvantage in preliminary manœuvring. But its marksman, with both arms free to use a rifle, has a clear point in his favour in the matter of range, seeing that the man who flies the single-seater, needing one hand always for his controls, is limited to the use of a revolver. But speed is still a governing factor, even when it is set against a longer range of fire. The airman who possesses it can assume a strong offensive, imposing his tactics upon those of his opponent; and at the critical moment, should pace and manœuvring power give him the position for which he plans, he may be able to nullify the effect of the enemy's fire. If, for instance, the opposing craft is a biplane, the attacking airman may sweep over it at such an angle that, just at the instant the two machines are nearest each other, the upper wing of the biplane interferes with its marksman's aim; or if the two-seated craft is a monoplane, with a place for its passenger, say, between the pilot and the engine, the airman who is in the offensive may, by darting across in front of his foe, cause the propeller of the monoplane temporarily to hamper its combatant's fire. Determining all such strategy, of course, is the judg-



War in the Air: Military Aeroplane armed with Quick-firing Gun, and manned by a Marksman as well as a Pilot

ment and dexterity of the man who controls the machine. If he is a pilot of long experience and exceptional skill, and has a craft which is not only fast but quickly handled, he represents a combination that—at any rate in aerial warfare as it exists to-day—should be nearly invincible.

In regard to the aerial duel officially described, the pilot whose misfortune it was to be wounded had, according to the wording of the report—and before he was hit—"been particularly active in annoying the enemy by dropping bombs". Here, as the war develops, and operations allow, have been found chances for the display of daring and a quick resource. The airmen, naturally, in view of their own vulnerability and the weight-limit that

is imposed upon their load of explosives, must wage a guerrilla form of warfare, attacking here and there as a rule, without concerted plan, and merely as opportunity may offer. They cannot expect, with their handful of bombs, to influence in any way the fortunes of a battle; but as they fly to and fro above his lines, or dart out upon some specifically destructive raid, they can certainly "annoy" an enemy, and cause him embarrassment in more ways than one.


Of such instances as have been mentioned officially—and many, of course, pass unrecorded—there is the feat of the British pilot who, flying over a transport park of the enemy at La Fère, dropped an incendiary bomb with accuracy and considerable effect;



while an example of the "annoyance" an airman may cause, quite apart from any question of the actual damage done, is provided by the exploit of another pilot, several of whose bombs fell in a cavalry encampment and stampeded the horses in their lines.

On a more ambitious scale, and attended, of course, by a greater risk, were the raids made by our naval airmen on Düsseldorf. It was on August 27 that a squadron of naval planes, under Wing-Commander Samson, complete in its equipment and transport, flew to Ostend via Dover and Calais, and moved subsequently from the coast, establishing advanced bases some distance inland. The first aerial invasion of the enemy's country,

which had Düsseldorf for its objective, and was made on September 23, would have been more successful had the weather proved clear. It was the work of a detached squadron of naval pilots, and represented merely one phase of their activities. The raiders in this case, after flying across the Rhine, found the air so misty that it was hard to distinguish landmarks. Düsseldorf was reached, none the less, and the big Zeppelin shed located. But Flight-Lieutenant Collet, in order to make reasonably certain of hitting it, had to dive to within 400 feet of the ground, a manœuvre so risky, when over a hostile position, that it is not surprising his machine was hit by the gun-fire from below. No vital



The Scene of Two Daring Attacks by British Naval Airmen

A Zeppelin being drawn out from one of the huge Düsseldorf sheds, which are large enough to house two air-ships, side by side. It was this air-station that our naval aviators attacked twice with bombs—on the first occasion doing considerable damage, and on the second destroying a Zeppelin.



Wing-Commander Charles R. Samson, R.N., D.S.O.  
(From a photograph by Elliot & Fry)

One of the first of our naval officers to identify himself prominently with aviation, and a man of exceptional resource. He went to Belgium, at the outbreak of the war, in charge of the naval air squadron.

part was struck, however, and the airman dropped three bombs on the shed and flew away. He could not see what damage he had done, and in the Admiralty report this was given as unknown; but since then it has been stated, although not officially confirmed, that not only did the shed itself and some adjacent workshops suffer, but that a Zeppelin which was inside the shed was slightly damaged as well. This raid was specially instructive, apart from the boldness with which it was carried out. It illustrated the fact that an air-ship, even when housed in its shed, is not immune from attack. Such sheds are vulnerable, and offer a large target,

and the craft within them are highly vulnerable too. But in war-time, of course, if a raid is expected, these sheds would be guarded from attack. They may be protected in several ways; by high-angle guns, for instance, or by a patrol of armed aeroplanes. But, even so, if an enemy's air raiders are bold and resourceful, and ready to run heavy risks, one or more of them may slip through the patrol, brave the land gun-fire, and place bombs upon their mark.

That such an aerial attack may succeed, even when the enemy is on the alert, was proved conclusively by the second raid which was made on Düsseldorf on October 8. Again the naval airmen who were in Belgium



Flight-Lieutenant R. L. Marix, R.N., D.S.O.  
(From a photograph by Swaine, London)

It was Lieutenant Marix who destroyed a Zeppelin at Düsseldorf with two accurately placed bombs. He was formerly an officer of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.

were responsible for the attack, and there were three of them concerned—Squadron-Commander Spenser Grey, and Lieutenants Marix and Sippe. Their flight, which started from the neighbourhood of Antwerp, was especially daring, and for two reasons: they penetrated, in the first instance, for more than 100 miles into the enemy's country, and, to make their task infinitely more perilous, were robbed by their previous raid of any chance of delivering a surprise attack. The Admiralty report of the adventure, while showing a great economy in words, reveals the fact that it was Lieutenant Marix, flying a high-speed, single-seated biplane, who made the best practice with his bombs. To quote the official wording:—

“Lieutenant Marix's bombs, dropped from 600 feet, hit the shed, went through the roof, which was observed to collapse, and destroyed a Zeppelin. Flames were observed 500 feet high, the result of igniting the gas of an air-ship.”

That the Zeppelin was actually destroyed has, however, been denied. The enemy's version of the attack is that the two bombs dropped, although they damaged the air-ship, did not destroy it; and the statement is also made that, in the most modern of Zeppelin sheds, certain “precautionary

measures” have been taken to safeguard air-craft from attack. That the air-ship was not destroyed is a contention we may take or leave according to our own deductions; but on the evidence of the Admiralty report, which is specific, it would appear that, even if the craft was not totally destroyed, it was very seriously damaged; and the latest reports indeed go to show that the air-ship, which was a brand-new machine, suffered so heavily that it was put completely out of action. But the most interesting part of the German statement is that which refers to the safeguarding of air-ships in their sheds. Hitherto it has been argued that an underground harbour, with an armoured roof flush with the ground, represented the only feasible protection, being difficult to locate from the



Flight-Lieutenant C. H. Collet, R.N., D.S.O.  
(From a photograph by N. Birkett, London)

A skilled biplane pilot, who earned the distinction of being the first airman in the war to drop bombs on a Zeppelin shed.





Flight-Lieutenant Sidney V. Sippe

Lieutenant Sippe's engine failed him in the first air raid on Düsseldorf, but he succeeded recently in dropping bombs on the Zeppelin factory at Friedrichshafen. He was a prominent civilian pilot previous to the war.

air, and harder to damage; but such resting-places, of course, besides being extremely costly, need long periods for their construction. The compromise which the Germans have arrived at, so far as this report may be judged, is to place some protective device between the hulls of their air-ships and the roof of the sheds—something, perhaps, that may correspond roughly with the netting used to guard a ship from torpedo attack. Whatever the plan may be, its aim obviously is to muffle or absorb the shock of a bomb that may penetrate the roof; although, in the case of the missile that Lieutenant Marix dropped at Düsseldorf, the protecting mechanism can have been only partially successful. The bomb went through the roof of the shed, and, from its obvious results,

must have punctured one or more compartments of the Zeppelin inside.

The personal adventures of the pilots, while engaged in this raid, were sufficiently exciting. Lieutenant Sippe's motor gave trouble, and he could not attain his objective. He descended hurriedly, in fact, at a point that he could not locate from his map, and feared a German patrol. But the first person who approached him was a friendly old Belgian woman, who asked solicitously whether he had had his breakfast. Squadron-Commander Grey and Lieutenant Marix both reached Düsseldorf. The former, observing that his companion's bombs had struck their mark, flew on to Cologne with the intention of attacking the Zeppelin shed there. But he encountered a heavy mist as he neared Cologne, and could not locate the shed; so he discharged his bombs at the railway station, and flew back to his starting-point.

Lieutenant Marix, as he attacked the Düsseldorf shed, was subjected to a hot fire from high-angle guns, supplemented by rifle volleys. His machine, it is reported officially, was struck five times; and in another statement it is mentioned that two control wires were cut by bullets. Yet the airman retained command of his craft. Perhaps it was the wires leading to one of the ailerons, or balancing-planes, that were severed. In such a contingency, if the pilot is skilful, and the wind is not high, it is possible to make use of the rudder in place of the aileron, should the machine heel to a gust; but such an action is of course a makeshift, and renders piloting

extremely difficult. Lieutenant Marix, however, managed to fly back within 15 miles of Antwerp, and then descended only through lack of fuel. The machine, so that it should not fall into the hands of the enemy, was destroyed where it landed, and Lieutenant Marix travelled on to Antwerp in an armoured Belgian car.

The chief point in this regard is not the precise damage done to the biplane, but the fact that, when diving low over his mark and exposing himself deliberately to machine-gun and rifle-fire, Lieutenant Marix should have been able to escape without a vital injury either to himself or his machine. What saved him undoubtedly, apart from his own skill in handling his craft, was the high speed at which he flew. The "scout" type of biplane he used, being small, light, and powerfully engined, will attain a pace of more than 100 miles an hour. The statements of eye-witnesses of the raid, as published in German papers, all refer indeed to the surprising speed at which the airman approached the shed. No sooner was the machine observed, it seemed, and its nationality questioned, than it was over its mark and dropping its bombs. Then, of course, the guns flashed out; but the airman, his task quickly done, swerved away and sped out of range. The lesson of these two raids is that an aeroplane, provided it is of the high-speed type and daringly flown, may deliver an attack on a formidably defended position, and even descend low enough to plant its bombs with accuracy, without the enemy being in any way certain of their ability to

bring it to the ground. The risk is great of course—exceptionally so—but the pilot obviously has "a sporting chance", and he asks no more than this.

The airmen most prominent in these two raids—Squadron-Commander S. D. A. Grey, Flight-Lieutenant R. L. G. Marix, and Lieutenant C. H. Collet, R.M.A.—have been appointed to the Distinguished Service Order and awarded the Distinguished Service Cross.

Not only with guns, revolvers, and bombs, but with a new and ingeniously deadly form of missile, is aerial warfare being waged. As to this method of attack, at any rate prior to the war, vague data only were to hand; it was recognized as a possibility and little else. Now, however, and from more than one source, there is evidence of its use. The new method of attack, which is listed with bombs under the heading of "hand-artillery", may be described as follows: A pilot, before he sets out to harass the enemy, provides himself with a number of small steel rods, each about seven inches in length, sharply pointed at one end, and balanced so that they will fall point downward through the air. These miniature arrows, when he is over, say, a bivouac or a body of troops on the march, the airman releases in a shower, and after falling from a height of several thousand feet they reach the earth in the form of very destructive missiles.

Of their precise effect, when they strike men or horses, expert testimony is now procurable. On September 1, while a German regiment was in camp



Drawn by John de G. Bryan

#### The Latest Terror of Modern Warfare: an Arrow Attack from Air-craft at the Front

"A pilot, before he sets out to harass the enemy, provides himself with a number of small steel rods, each about 7 inches in length, sharply pointed at one end, and balanced so that they will fall point downward through the air. These miniature arrows, when he is over, say, a bivouac or a body of troops on the march, the airman releases in a shower; and, after falling from a height of several thousand feet, they reach the earth in the form of very destructive missiles."



at a place not named, two hostile aeroplanes were seen to pass over it at a height of about 4000 feet; and what followed has been described by a German surgeon, a summary of whose statement is appended:—

“Suddenly a soldier felt a pain in his foot, near the heel. First he thought he had been pricked accidentally by something; but the next moment he heard exclamations from several of the men near him. Bending down, he examined his foot, and found that one of the small steel arrows had pierced his flesh to the depth of three-quarters of an inch. Another soldier had been hit in the leg; another in the neck; a third in both legs; a fourth on the cheek; while a fifth, struck in the temple, was killed on the spot.”

Altogether, in regard to this one raid, which may be taken as typical of the arrow form of attack, there were thirteen casualties among the soldiers, while two horses also were killed. Apart from the damage inflicted, which was trifling compared with the effect of an onslaught by land, there was the moral influence to be considered. The strangeness of this menace, launched upon them so suddenly, when they are in the fancied security of their camp, and the feeling of impotence which overcomes them, may produce a general effect upon troops so disconcerting that it is indeed the moral influence, rather than the material loss sustained, that needs to be taken into account.

As a fortunate relief, even in so grim a business as aerial war, there are incidents occasionally which prove humorous. During moments of leisure on the Aisne, when the roar of artillery had ceased temporarily, and

there was a lull in the attacks upon the trenches, it became an amusement—which had aspects also of practical advantage—to play tricks upon the air-scouts. In one case, that of a French battery which found it had time upon its hands, a tree-trunk was hollowed out a little and fixed upon a cart, in the centre of a clearing near a hill-top, to make it look like a gun. Then, as a German monoplane droned across overhead, some of the Frenchmen grouped themselves around the dummy gun as though they were firing it, and by the igniting of straw in the hollow they had cut in the end of the tree-trunk produced a realistic flash and puff. The German airman, who was completely deceived, dropped a smoke-bomb to mark the position; and then, after the Frenchmen had run to the shelter of a neighbouring thicket, they had the pleasure of seeing a German battery come industriously into action, wasting its ammunition copiously against the dummy gun.

Another trick practised, when there has been time to carry it out, has been the digging of dummy trenches some distance away from those which infantry may actually mean to use. Then, after a hostile aeroplane has flown over and indicated the range of the false position, and the shrapnel shells begin to fall, the soldiers retire quickly to the real line they intend to hold, and the enemy continues to scatter bullets over empty trenches. But of course such tricks, although ingenious, can be played only under exceptional conditions, and when there is time for their elaboration—which usually there is not. Thus they cannot affect, in

any appreciable way, the general value of air reconnaissance.

Even more amusing, perhaps, than the two instances quoted above, was a report said to be taken back to his head-quarters by a German pilot. He had been flying over the British lines, noting the effect of a heavy bombardment, when in a village market-place, far below him, he saw some figures,

has been its work as a dispatch-carrier. The absence of suitable roads makes no difference to the airman, nor do such obstacles as forests or rivers. Once he is clear of the earth he flies straight from point to point, and does so at a speed that would be impossible on land. In half an hour, with the aid of a high-speed machine, a dispatch can be borne a distance of 50 miles,



British Air-craft at the Front in France

Here are some of the craft of the Royal Naval Air Service, photographed at one of their bases in Belgium. From left to right, the four aeroplanes seen are a Farman, a B. E., a Sopwith, and a Short; while at anchor in the background is the Astra-Torres air-ship—a vessel that has done valuable patrol work over the North Sea.

which he recognized as those of British soldiers, running wildly here and there. What they were doing actually was playing football; but such a game, and at such a time, was beyond the comprehension of the German airman. He flew back quickly to his own lines, thinking he had seen something of importance, and reported that in the village of — the British troops had been so demoralized that they were running to and fro in a panic!

The length of the battle-front in France, extending for more than 250 miles, has emphasized very clearly one of the utilities of the aeroplane: this

beating even the field-telegraph in the matter of speed, should the message be a long one.

Among other activities of the air service has been the patrolling and surveying of roads ahead of the army corps, and such duties as the safeguarding from surprise of the invaluable transport columns. In the latter respect, already, one of the British pilots has rendered striking service. He was acting in conjunction with a transport column that had been ordered to push on to a position some 20 miles ahead, now understood to be free of the enemy. But the airman, patrolling in front as

was his duty, detected a large force of Germans on the very spot to which the transport column was moving. Flying back at once, he alighted in front of the column, and was able to warn the colonel in charge of his danger in ample time for the route to be diverted. Had it not been for the speed of the aeroplane in bringing this timely warning, the column might have reached a position from which, when attacked suddenly, it could not have extricated itself.

During all this vital work, as has been clearly shown, the airman is not only fired at by the enemy, but is liable to be a target also for the gunners on his own side. It needs an expert to identify the various makes of machine, even with their identifying marks, when they are at a high altitude. The German aeroplanes have a black cross on a grey ground painted on each wing and also on the rudder. French machines have a tricolour disk under each wing, and the British a shield-shaped Union Jack. But ordinary combatants have not been able, so far, to discriminate between craft which appear from all points of the compass, and are not to be regarded as friends merely because they come into sight from the rear of one's own lines. Some machines, of course, may be recognized at once—notably the "Taubes", the German monoplanes which have a bird-like wing-curve; and there are also German biplanes that have distinctive swept-back planes. But apart from such quickly classified types there are several groups of machine which, when seen from below and by a non-technical eye, might be

either friend or foe; and on the policy of when in doubt open fire, a friendly airman may find himself under a hot fusillade from his allies, and unable to make them realize they are in error. To land, say, and remonstrate with the officer in charge of a firing-party, as one incensed British pilot is reported to have done, when attacked with rifle-fire from the French lines, would seem merely to be exposing oneself to a rapidly increasing peril, having regard to the fact that the troops on the ground, seeing a machine reduce its altitude, might imagine a bomb raid was in contemplation, and redouble their fire.

As time goes on, and troops become more accustomed to the work of the air services, and more familiar with the constructional aspects of the machines that pass overhead, this risk at the hand of friends should grow steadily less; but as things are, and as the appended statement from a British pilot shows, an airman must regard his own troops as potential enemies, as well as those of the actual foe. The experience of this airman may be summarized thus:—

"As we were coming back over the French lines (from a reconnaissance) I saw a movement and bustle among the troops, and then there was a noise of about 1000 rifles cracking at us, . . . and it positively fascinated me to see the holes appearing in the planes as each bullet ripped its way through—although there were only a few of them. I was looking at my instrument-board to see what height I was, when suddenly a bullet hit the board and a splinter jumped up in front of me. At the same time a bullet pierced the petrol tank, and all the petrol ran out. Another one hit



one of the instruments and smashed it. When the petrol ran out there was nothing for it but to come down, so I trusted to luck and came down in the first good field I saw. A dozen or so Belgian and French soldiers rushed out, apparently not sure



Sniping at a German Aeroplane

Belgian military cyclists "sniping" at a German aeroplane that is flying over Ostend. A high-speed air-craft travels more than 100 feet in one second; so the difficulty of hitting it with a rifle-bullet can be imagined.

whether I was English or German, till I shouted "Anglais, Anglais!" Then they hustled to and fro and did all they could for me. I happened to have two tanks, so I filled up the other one and got ready to start off again."

The piercing of vital parts of a machine by bullets, either from rifle-fire or shrapnel, and the wounding or even killing of a pilot or passenger,

have lent special interest to the question of armoured air-craft. It is possible, of course, to sheathe the body of a machine with metal plates that will resist the penetration of a bullet; but this protective shield represents a serious factor in the matter of weight, no matter how fine-drawn and specially treated each plate may be. The machine will lift its additional load so long as this is reasonable; it is not a question merely of rising from the ground. What the extra weight of the armouring does actually entail is a very sensible reduction in the speed of a craft, and it may have the effect also of rendering a machine sluggish and heavy in its response to its controls. Military aeroplanes with armoured hulls are being used in the war. The French have devoted much attention to this question; but, in spite of the powerful engines with which they are fitted, their speed and climbing power are affected to a marked degree, and in war, of course, both these qualities are of the utmost importance. The armour-plate makers have done their best in regard to the problem of weight reduction, but naturally, beyond a certain limit of thinness, a protective shield would cease to resist penetration. It has been found possible to prepare a hardened steel plate which, while it is only  $\frac{1}{10}$ th of an inch thick, will stop a rifle bullet at a range of 500 yards. But even with a protective shield as thin as this, if it is applied to the whole or a large portion of a craft's body, a materially adverse weight-factor is introduced. So a compromise is being arrived at by

which certain limited sections only are protected. A pilot's driving-seat, for instance, should be well shielded, and also that of his passenger—and for obvious reasons. In quite a number of cases already, when under fire from the ground, an airman has been wounded in the body or leg by a bullet which has struck upwards through the thin lower floor-boards of the hull. In the future, of course, when motors of thousands of horse-power, instead of hundreds, are available, and weight is no longer the determining factor, the sheathing of machines will cease to offer the problems it does to-day.

As to the actual uses of the aeroplane, judged as an individual unit, the war has borne out the teachings of peace manœuvres, showing that it was as scouts that the present-type air-craft rendered their most vital service. It was proved, also, how effectively the aeroplane could co-operate with artillery; while in aerial fighting and bomb-dropping—both thought to be developments of the future—it was demonstrated that a man of courage and resource, flying a high-speed machine, could already do excellent work.

C. G.-W.  
H. H.



Before the War: one of Germany's Naval Zeppelins—with a Parseval (non-rigid) Air-ship in the distance—accompanying the German Fleet in the North Sea

## CHAPTER X

## SUBMARINES AND COMMERCE-DESTROYERS

(September, 1914)

Submarines and Mines in the North Sea—Loss of the *Speedy* and the s.s. *Runo*—The *Pathfinder* sunk by a German Submarine—The Sweep of the Heligoland Bight—The British Submarine E9 sinks the German Cruiser *Hela*—Loss of the *Aboukir*, *Hogue*, and *Cressy*—Measures of Precaution taken by the Admiralty—The German Commerce-destroyers—Their Scenes of Operation—Destruction of the *Pegasus* by the *Königsberg*—The *Emden* Cruiser and her Prizes—She bombards Madras—The *Kronprinz Wilhelm*—Indirect Injury done by Commerce-destroyers—The *Carmania* sinks the *Cap Trafalgar*—Obscurity of Operations in the Baltic and Mediterranean—The Russian Fleet in the Baltic—Naval Weakness of Austria—British Naval Supremacy.

THE month of September, 1914, the second of the World War, will be memorable for one feature which was a surprise and a disappointment to some of us. It must be the period from which will date great changes in the estimate to be formed of the relative value of the different types of war-ship, and therefore in the building policy of all nations, and the conduct of war at sea. During this month the capacity of the submarine to approach undetected, to strike with fatal effect, and to escape uninjured was put beyond dispute. It would be going too far to say that this new and revolutionary craft proved its power to supersede vessels which can fight only on the surface of the water; but it certainly showed that those critics who had maintained all along that the submarine would greatly reduce the superiority of the big ship were in the right. Now this entails a vast change in the conduct of naval warfare. We can illustrate the case by a most simple and intelligible comparison. A line-of-battle ship or frigate of the old sailing navy had nothing to fear


except attack by a superior force of vessels of her own class, unless on the very rare occasions when she was becalmed and was attacked by rowing war-galleys. Even then she was hardly ever in danger of fatal injury. Small men-of-war of all kinds could only keep out of the way of the big. But now the representatives of the line-of-battle ship and frigate—the modern battleship and cruiser—go in fear of the submarine. They need attendant vessels to protect them by detecting and warding off the enemy. Therefore their relative strength is less than that of the wooden line-of-battle ships and frigates. To say that they are vastly stronger than the warships of old is to state what is not so much a platitude as a sophism. It is of no importance for an instrument of war to be superior to some other which no longer exists. Valuable superiority must be exercised over what works in the same time and space. Vast structures of metal, displacing 20,000 tons of water and more, carrying enormous guns, and able to attain a high speed, which will have to keep at a distance, to lie behind barriers,



to seek the aid of protectors, because they dread a small craft which menaces them below the water-line with a torpedo, are not stronger than the war-ships of old. They are weaker. And the demonstration of this truth is an event of great importance, and one which must make the operations of September, 1914, memorable.

The first events of the month in home waters seemed to point rather to the mine as the main danger. On September 3 the *Speedy*, a small and antiquated gunboat of 790 tons, struck a mine and was instantly destroyed. The loss of life in this case was slight. The *Speedy* was engaged in directing the work of trawlers which were endeavouring to clear the sea of these dangers. There must, it would seem, have been not a few of them about, for on the same day the *Linsdell*, a trawler, struck one and was sunk. The *Speedy's* crew were rescued by other ships. Two days later, on September 5, a double disaster occurred. The *Pathfinder*, a cruiser of 2940 tons, and the

s.s. *Runo*, a passenger-vessel belonging to the Wilson line, were both shattered, apparently in the same way as the *Amphion* and the *Speedy*. No doubt was ever felt that the *Runo* perished by a mine. She was at the time within a danger zone of which she had been



Drawn by Norman Wilkinson, R.I.

Under the Shadow of the Sea-plane: a Submarine beneath the water as it is revealed to the airman flying above

It is well known that objects beneath the water are visible from a height when invisible from the water level. Hence the danger of air-craft to the submarine. Conditions, however, must be favourable. The submarine must be over a bottom the nature of which permits it to reflect light, and the water must be comparatively smooth and clear.

warned. The warning was neglected, with fatal results. But the blow was of the nature of one given by a mine. The *Runo* did not sink at once. She remained afloat long enough to allow of the rescue of nearly all her crew and 300 passengers. Ten lives were lost.

Though it was assumed that the *Pathfinder* had perished in the same way as the passenger-steamer, doubts soon began to arise on that point. The blow struck her amidships—which was not where she would hit a mine—and was of such extreme violence as to suggest the action of a torpedo. She sank at once, carrying 259 of her crew with her. Her captain, Francis Martin Leake—a member of a family which has given distinguished officers to both navy and army—was wounded, but was saved, together with ninety of his men. All doubt was soon given up, and the loss of the *Pathfinder* must be attributed to a torpedo. The question was only how and by whom the weapon was launched. The mate of a trawler which was a few miles off affirmed that no other vessel was in sight, and his testimony would seem to prove that the destroyer in this case was a submarine. A natural disposition to attribute the enemy's success to fraud, rather than to legitimate warfare, led to a good deal of guessing at the particular device adopted. It



Photo. Symonds, Portsmouth

The British Cruiser *Pathfinder*, sunk in the North Sea on September 5, 1914

was supposed that the Germans had made an unfair use of disguised fishing-vessels. The wish is commonly father to the thought in both such suppositions as these. Before the month was over, enough had happened to make it seem most credible that the assailant of the *Pathfinder* was, in fact, a submarine.

For the moment, and as a precaution against the abuse of neutral flags by the enemy, the Admiralty ordered the removal of all aids to navigation, buoys, and so forth, on the east coast. A neutral could apply for directions how to keep safe; a disguised German would not think of putting himself in communication with a British man-of-war.

When much which it is at present advisable to leave in obscurity can be freely told and discussed, we shall be better able to understand the operations reported by the Admiralty on September 11. We were then told that a large British naval force of

several classes had carried out "a sweep" of the North Sea and the Bight of Heligoland. They had, in fact, gone inside the islands and had found no enemy. The successful performance of this manoeuvre proved that the German navy was not prepared to attempt to keep the sea. This was, of course, a full confession of our superiority. But a mere "sweep" can produce no permanent effect. The essence of blockade is the continuous watch. It was an understood rule of former days that when war-ships which had been besetting a port went away of their own free will, in order to perform some other service, they must be held to have raised the blockade, even if their absence was brief. If they were driven off by a gale, then the blockade was



Photo. Cribb, Southsea

The German Cruiser *Hela*, sunk near Heligoland by the British submarine E9 on September 13, 1914

not raised. The application of this rule concerned the neutral trade chiefly. But it is obvious that a port is not blockaded in the sense that the entries and exits of an enemy's ships are made difficult merely because a superior force comes in sight and then disappears.

Four days after the sweep had been carried out it was shown that the German ships could still come out. On that day Lieutenant-Commander Max Kennedy Horton, of the Submarine E9, sank the German cruiser

*Hela*, of 2040 tons, at a point about 6 miles south of Heligoland. The E9 sighted her enemy and was not detected. She launched two torpedoes and hit the mark with both. The *Hela* was destroyed at once. The submarine got away unhurt. Her feat was a fair return for the destruction of the *Pathfinder*, and was the first visible example of the way in which the submarine, when successful, works.




Photo. Cribb, Southsea

The Submarine E9 (war number, 89), which sank the German Cruiser *Hela*—and afterwards the enemy's Destroyer S126



It is to be observed that the *Hela*, though not a large vessel, could have made a swift end of E9 if she had caught sight of her enemy. Still more could she have avoided attack. A submarine cannot go as fast as a cruiser when on the surface, and is much slower when submerged. The *Hela* did not see the British boat, and was struck without warning or chance to defend herself. It is said that her crew were saved by German "merchant-ships" then in sight. If this is true, the "sweep" of four days before can have had small effect in hampering the enemy's movements. The merchant-ships, we cannot but think, must have been small coasters. The most

effective blockade may fail to stop small craft which can hug the shore and go by night, or by making short runs from one fortified place to another. And, as we know, it was not possible for the British fleet to lie close up to the dangerous German coast. Our submarines have shown great dash and skill in exploring the Bight of Heligoland; but submarines must not go into water which is too shallow to allow them depth enough in which to sink—that is to say, 7 fathoms, or 42 feet. When on the surface they are very helpless against gun-fire. But there is far less than 42 feet of water on the shallows of the German shore. Therefore coasters of a draught of 10 feet or so can move to and fro, hugging the shore in safety. There were other points on which it would have been desirable to have some light in this feat of E9, but they were sufficiently illustrated in the next incident of the month, which was also by far the most dramatic and important single event of the war so far.

About the time of the sinking of the *Hela* the British destroyers and submarines had their first experience of cruising continuously in the storms and thick weather of the North Sea. They bore the strain well, though it was severe for the vessels themselves and trying indeed for the men. Sailors are in some respects better off in war than soldiers. They fight in their own home, have some cover, and do not run the risk of a suspension of the food supply to which troops who are marching and bivouacking are, even with the best of management, always liable. On the other hand,



Lieutenant-Commander Max K. Horton, of the Submarine E9, awarded the D.S.O. for sinking the enemy's Cruiser *Hela* and Destroyer S 126

(From a photograph by West & Son, Southsea)

the pitching and rolling of a lively small vessel in a rough sea keeps the muscles in a perpetual tension. The deck is invaded by the waves. When the vessel is "battened down"—that is to say, the openings to the deck are kept shut tight—the atmosphere below must needs grow bad, and nothing is ever really dry. There comes a time when the hardest crew feel the strain and suffer from it. The spell of bad weather in mid-September, 1914, had a share in producing the impressive event of the 22nd—the loss of the *Aboukir*, the *Hogue*, and the *Cressy*.

These three cruisers were not new; they were about fourteen years old, and were surpassed by later ships. In the opinion of some naval officers, their armour—a 6-inch belt and a 3-inch-protected deck—their armament of two 9-inch and twelve 6-inch guns, with small pieces, and their speed of 18 knots and coal-carrying capacity were alike disproportionate to their size—12,000 tons. Yet they were fine ships, well able to meet any German cruiser of less weight than the huge *Moltke* or *Seydlitz*, and it was a revelation of the weakness of the big ship of to-day when all three perished in, as it were, the twinkling of an eye before the attack of a German submarine, and she not one of the best of her kind. There is no sure evidence that more than one German vessel was engaged, and we have to remember that if, in place of these three comparatively old ships, the finest and newest cruisers in the British navy had been subjected to the same attack in identical circumstances, they would have shared the same fate.

The *Aboukir*, Captain John E. Drummond, *Hogue*, Captain Wilmot S. Nicholson, and *Cressy*, Captain Robert W. Johnson, were cruising in the North Sea about 20 miles west of the Hook of Holland. They were not at the time accompanied by destroyers to act as guards and scouts. It is a matter of common knowledge that the absence of these scouts was much commented on, and that explanations were current which were not to be accepted without better evidence than was produced. The supposition that the destroyers had suffered from the heavy weather and had been sent in to Harwich for relief is credible and sufficient. It was also easy to believe that the *Aboukir* and her consorts had been cruising over the same waters from the beginning of the war. The Germans had had ample means of knowing where they were likely to be found, and when. There was a time when this knowledge would only have warned the enemy's small craft to keep out of their way; but those were not the days of the submarine. It is probable that when Lieutenant-Captain Otto Weddigen, of the German *Unterseeboot 9*, left his port of departure (which would seem to have been the Ems River) it was in the hope of delivering a stroke at these very vessels. The U9 was not one of the newest of her type, but her captain, whose report of his feat was communicated by the German Admiralty to the American papers, and published in that country on October 12, describes her as "behaving beautifully". She was assuredly most skilfully handled.



Drawn by Charles Dixon, R.I., from the description of one of the survivors.

The Disaster of September 22, 1914: Scene at the Foundering of H.M.S. *Aboukir*, at the moment of the Captain's last command—"Every man for himself!"

The *Aboukir* was one of the three cruisers to founder in the German submarine attack of September 22. The *Hogue* is shown sending boats to the rescue before her own turn came to be attacked. The *Cressy* also closed in to render assistance, but is not seen in the picture. Altogether nearly 1500 lives were lost in this triple disaster.



It would appear from the report of Commander Bertram W. L. Nicholson, of the *Cressy*, and from the explicit statement of the German captain, that the British ships were steaming with the *Hogue* on the bow, and the *Cressy* on the quarter of the *Aboukir*, at a distance of some 2 miles. The weather was fair, but the sea was rough after the late gale. As the attack came on the British ships from the unseen, the survivors of their crews can give no account of the preliminaries of the action. We must rely on Captain Weddingen, whose narrative is consistent with what is otherwise known, and has a ring of truth.

"I had been going ahead", he says, "partly submerged with about five feet of my periscope showing." The periscope, which is an adaptation of the camera obscura, is a long tube rising from the upper deck of the submarine. An apparatus of prisms throws a reflection of surrounding objects on a table below. It obviously affords a very uncertain view. When the submarine is sunk so far that the top of the periscope is just on the surface of the water, its range of vision is limited. When the surface of the sea is rough it must be constantly covered by broken water. From the context of Captain Weddingen's report it is clear that he did not first see the cruisers by means of the periscope but with his own eyes. When he sighted them "they were near enough for torpedo work". The latest torpedoes will travel 7000 yards—over 4 miles—at a rate of 45 knots. Some five minutes will therefore be needed for

the torpedo to travel 4 miles. But during that interval the vessel aimed at, if under way, will have altered her position. To take accurate aim must therefore be very difficult at such a distance. And, as the torpedo can be seen coming, the vessel attacked has time to get out of its way. The true policy for a torpedo-using craft is to come close and strike by surprise. A submarine must fire her torpedo through a fixed tube, and it is therefore necessary to place the vessel herself so as to bring the tube to bear on the target.

Captain Weddingen says that, having taken the bearings of the three British cruisers, he submerged his vessel completely, and steered to place himself in the midst of their "triangular formation". He speaks of having obtained "another flash" through his periscope before he began action. It had, in fact, been only intermittently useful, and his success in taking up an effective position was seemingly due to accurate calculation of time and distance, and, as he candidly confesses, to his "luck". When he had secured what he justly considered a good position, he loosed one of his torpedoes at the middle ship, the *Aboukir*, and hit her full and fatally on the starboard side. In an instant she was a shattered and sinking ship.

When the mortal blow struck the *Aboukir*, the first and natural thought of her crew, and also of the eyewitnesses in the *Hogue* and *Cressy*, was that she had run on the expected danger—a mine. The *Aboukirs* proved the solidity of their courage and the thoroughness of their discipline. There

was no disorder among them in the presence of this sudden disaster. Their successful enemy, a witness whose impartiality cannot be questioned, bears testimony to their admirable steadiness. They went to quarters prepared to fight, if opportunity was allowed, and, if not, then to minimize the loss by providing means of escape from the sinking vessel and of support for men struggling in the water. They

targets easy to hit, and as they came up to the place where he was waiting he had no need to move. When they had taken up their positions, boats were lowered and sent to aid the crew of the *Aboukir*. Some had reached the sinking ship, had taken men aboard, and were returning, or had returned, when the second blow was struck. We gather that the German submarine, after torpedoing the



Photo. Cribb, Southsea

A Submarine's Track, as revealed—in the right-hand bottom corner—while submerged in passing a Dreadnought

threw hammocks and mess furniture overboard. Her consorts closed to her assistance, the *Hogue* taking up a position ahead, and the *Cressy* on the port beam—that is to say alongside, at a distance of 400 yards. Their action was gallant, and in accordance with the law and tradition of the navy, which is that all help must be given to a "known friend in sight" and in need of aid. Yet in the circumstances their action was a venture of mistaken chivalry, in the sense that it put them in extreme peril. Captain Weddingen notes that by closing round the sinking *Aboukir*, and stopping to help her, they played his game. They presented

*Aboukir*, had forged ahead, rising to the surface for a view. The movement is known as "porpoising". She was between the sinking cruiser and the *Hogue*. From that position Captain Weddingen, after again sinking, discharged a second torpedo. It struck the *Hogue* under the magazine containing the ammunition for her great guns, thereby provoking an explosion of the most instantaneously destructive nature. This at least was the opinion of Commander Nicholson of the *Cressy*, an eyewitness from the outside. Commander Norton, of the *Hogue*, did not in his report mention an explosion, but was of opinion that his ship was struck by two torpedoes.

Sailors are, as Fielding has well said, "the most courageous fellows in the world", but in the midst of a crash of ruin the most intrepid of mankind cannot observe with minute accuracy.

The rising and sinking of the submarine had been observed from the deck of the *Cressy*. She dashed at her enemy, hoping to sink him, and fired right and left. Though they are the bravest of the brave, and perfect masters of their own business, sailors

strain of eager emotion created by such a scene of horror and excitement (however manfully it might be controlled), for any man to see the periscope or turret of a submarine where there was none.

The *Cressy* kept under way, circling round the wreck of her consorts. While she was going through the water a torpedo struck her under the fore bridge on the starboard side. She listed about ten degrees, and then



Photo. Cribb, Southsea

What a Submarine looks like while travelling with only its Periscope showing above the water

have the natural human inclination to believe what they wish to be true. It was hard for the men of the cruisers to believe that they had all fallen to the blows of one enemy, and that their own counter-strokes had failed to hit. They saw submarines—four, or even six—all about them. Mr. Dogherty, gunner of the *Cressy*, was convinced that he sank at least one. Commander B. W. L. Nicholson tells us that another officer, who was on deck and watching, was convinced that the *Cressy's* shot only hit a piece of floating wreckage. The waves were running high; mess tables and furniture, and hammocks were scattered over them. It was only too easy, in the

remained steady. A second torpedo was seen to pass astern. We do not, and perhaps never shall, know what were the exact movements of all the actors in this whirl of effort and destruction; but about a quarter of an hour after she had been first struck the *Cressy* was hit again in boiler-room No. 5, and the second blow was mortal. The first torpedo struck the *Aboukir* at about twenty minutes past 6 a.m. The last gave the finishing blow to the *Cressy* at about half-past seven. By eight o'clock the sea had closed over all three cruisers. The submarine went away unhurt.

What remains to tell is the story of the survivors and the roll of the lost.



Sixty officers and fourteen hundred and odd men perished. An equal number of officers and 777 men were saved. The difference in the proportions of officers to men is easily explained. The engine-room complements, who had to come up from below, suffered more than the parts of the crew stationed on deck and in the batteries. It was more difficult for them to escape, and they were the first to be injured by the explosions. While a ship is being battered above the water-line the peril is from shot, and is greatest for the men at the guns. But when the danger comes from below the position is reversed. The majority of the officers are stationed above and not below the water-line.

Of all who perished or who survived we can say with pride that "They were brave, and true to their country's sea traditions". These are the words of the German captain, but there are occasions when the praise of an enemy is praise indeed. The boats which had been lowered before the cruisers sank saved many. But numbers had to cling to more or less overloaded pieces of wreckage till they were picked up. Strong swimmers relied on their own power, and left the wreckage for the weaker and less skilful. It was the salvation of not a few that the disaster had been witnessed by fishing and trading craft, British or foreign. The Lowestoft trawler *L. T. Coriander* came to their aid, and so did two Dutch vessels, the *Flora* and the *Titan*. Captain Philips of the *L. T. Coriander* saved 156 officers and men. Others to nearly

the same number were saved by the Dutchmen. A somewhat obscure part was played by a trawler under the Dutch flag, which sailed away. Was she a disguised German scout? After a time British men-of-war from Harwich came up and took part in the work of rescue. About three hundred of the survivors were carried to the Hook of Holland or to Ymuiden. The others were brought back to Lowestoft and to Harwich. Captain Drummond, of the *Aboukir*, and Captain Nicholson, of the *Hogue*, were among the saved. Captain Johnson, of the *Cressy*, perished with his ship.

Every case of loss of His Majesty's ships is the subject of a court martial. In the course of time the due proceedings will be taken, and the evidence will then be set forth fully. Until then we can see the stories only in their main lines. Even so we can judge pretty accurately how far the loss of these vessels bears out the opinion expressed by Sir Percy Scott shortly before the war, that the development of a vessel which can fight below the water has rendered those which are limited to the surface superfluous. Though the *Birmingham's* feat shows that a submarine, if detected in time, can be destroyed by gun or ramming, the disaster of September 22 proves only too clearly that timely detection is difficult, and that for a large ship to remain passive in the neighbourhood of a submarine is a course very likely to lead to disaster. The Admiralty was so impressed by this consideration that it has instructed officers to leave a colleague torpedoed by a submarine to her own resources

and the help of the small craft, as if she were a battleship disabled in a general engagement. The analogy is far from perfect. A battleship must not lose her place in action merely to help the crew of her consort, but she may, and in honour she must, manoeuvre to cover her from the enemy's fire. But where the submarine is at work the attempt to cover will only serve to expose the rescuer to extreme peril without saving the injured ship. The course recommended, or rather ordered, to be taken is therefore in plain words to desert the injured vessel, which, to use other plain words, is equivalent to saying that the rational course for the big ship is to run away. But it is obvious that a vessel which has to run away from another is the weaker of the two, whatever their relative sizes may be. The loss of the three cruisers did not shake the superiority of Britain on the North Sea, for the sufficient reason that the peril to which they succumbed would be every whit as great for the German battleships and cruisers if they were to come to sea. It only goes to show that naval superiority no longer depends mainly on big ships which carry powerful broadsides.

German mines and torpedoes were so far effective that they imposed a change of policy on the Admiralty. The British Government had been reluctant to imitate the enemy's practice of sowing the North Sea with mines; but after these events in September we also planted a belt of mines stretching from west to east across the sea to the southern point of the German coast. How far this device would

serve to confine the enemy was a question which had to be answered by subsequent experience.

While the naval war remained in this somewhat inconclusive state in the waters of Europe, the outer seas and the great ocean routes were the scenes of some brisk encounters. We have already shown that the German navy was represented both in the Atlantic and in the eastern seas by such a number of swift ships built for war, or liners equipped for commerce-destroying, as was quite capable of doing an immense amount of damage to British trade if it was not quickly checked. The Admiralty's policy of concentrating the main naval forces of the country in home waters had as its inevitable consequence the proportionate reduction of the number of cruisers employed on foreign stations. It is obvious that the more distant the seas the greater was the difficulty of reinforcing the squadrons stationed in them. This was peculiarly true of the vast expanses of ocean which our fathers described as being "within the charter of the East India Company"—that is to say, all that lies between the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn. Here is an enormous field for the operations of the "skimmer of the sea". The Indian Ocean, the North and the South Pacific, are crossed by trade routes much frequented by merchant-ships, and they are full of islands belonging to different European States, or to America, but none the less in fact largely a No Man's Land. A countless multitude of them lie apart from the busy trade routes, have little or no

communication with the active world, and are barely inhabited. Yet they supply anchorages, water, hiding-places. Here, then, is a region made to favour the commerce-destroyer. The chance of the Germans was the better because in the early days of the war the most pressing duty for our naval forces on the Indian station was to cover the transport of troops, native and British, to the scene of the land war in Europe.

supply the Germans would not only provide themselves with fuel, but disturb, if they did not for a time prohibit, the flow of our commerce.

In the earliest days of the war almost the only feat which stands to their credit was the cutting of the cable between Bamfield, in British Columbia, and Fanning Island. This was the achievement of the *Nürnberg*, a cruiser of 3450 tons and high speed,

armed with ten 4.1-inch guns. Earlier in August, on the 6th of the month, the *Königsberg*, a cruiser of the same class and size, had captured the s.s. *City of Winchester* near Socotra, in the Indian Ocean, a rocky island once the seat of an Arab "kingdom", and of some note in the early days of the East India



Photo. Symonds, Portsmouth

The British Cruiser *Pegasus*, caught by the German Cruiser *Königsberg* while under repairs at Zanzibar, and sunk, September 20, 1914

Though the predominance of our allies, the French, over the Austrian navy, made it safe to detach ships from the Mediterranean, it was still impossible to provide at once a force equal to the task of patrolling many thousand miles of ocean route.

The Germans cannot claim to have made the most of their opportunity. They may have been—indeed we must conclude that they actually were—hampered by lack of coal. Yet a large and essential part of our commerce in these seas consists in the transport of coal to the ports where it is stored for the use of British trading-ships. By intercepting this

Company's trade. Her cruising-ground was the eastern coast of Africa, and she would have been more profitably employed for her own side if she had not been so far away as Socotra from Germany's East African possessions.

Though the best of our naval forces on the Indian station were otherwise employed, as we have seen, it was in the power of the authorities on the east of Africa to strike at the German ports. H.M.S. *Pegasus*, operating from Zanzibar, did effective service. The *Pegasus* was a small cruiser dating from 1899, of 2135 tons, carrying eight 4-inch guns and two torpedo-tubes.



Her speed had been 20 knots. She was not a match for the *Königsberg*, of 3400 tons, ten 4-inch guns, and a speed of 24 knots. In the absence of this opponent she was free to render good service by suppressing the German post at Dar-es-Salaam, destroying a wireless station and floating dock, and with them the gunboat the

*Möwe* (the Sea-gull), of 650 tons, employed as a surveying-ship. The stroke was an effective one, for though the *Möwe* was no great loss, the operations of German cruisers would be seriously restricted by the destruction of the port, the dock, and the stores.

The *Königsberg*, which failed to prevent, was to some extent able to retaliate for, this blow. On September 20, 1914, the *Pegasus* was back at Zanzibar. She was engaged in cleaning her boilers and repairing machinery when the *Königsberg* descended upon her. As we have already pointed out, the *Pegasus* would have been outmatched in any case by an opponent who carried more guns, and who, by making a moderately intelligent use of her greater speed, could fix the distance at which she chose to engage. Distance, too, was all in favour of the German, whose guns, besides being slightly more numerous, were of a later model and more powerful than the ordnance of the *Pegasus*. And then the British ship was motionless. Nothing save extreme



The German Cruiser *Emden*

ineptitude on the part of the *Königsberg's* captain, and the utmost clumsiness on the part of his gunners, could have saved the little British cruiser. But the captain of the German ship made good use of his advantages, and the fire of his gunners was accurate. He opened fire at 7000 yards, gradually reducing the range to 4000. The *Pegasus* was cut to pieces and sank, with a loss of 29 killed and over 80 wounded—not much less than half her crew of 234. In an artillery action, when one side has an initial advantage, the resistance of the weaker must needs diminish as the men fall at the guns and the guns themselves are disabled. We do not know what loss was inflicted on the *Königsberg*, and indeed in the circumstances it can have been but slight. Commander John Inglis and his crew lost no honour by being overpowered when in a helpless position; they rather gained some by sticking to their guns against crushing odds.

We have heard a good deal more of the *Königsberg's* all but sister ship,

the *Emden*, of 3650 tons, and twelve 4-inch guns. For about six weeks after war began the *Emden* was hidden, with other German cruisers, "in the blue". She was somewhere on the Indian Ocean, or China Seas, or among the myriad tropical islands of that region. Judging by later events we may conclude that Captain Karl von Müller was making necessary arrangements, for when he did burst into the Bay of Bengal, on September 10, he displayed a by no means contemptible aptitude for the game of commerce-destroying. Between the 10th and 14th he snapped up six British ships: the *Indus*, *Lovat*, *Bellin*, *Diplomat*, *Trabcock*, and *Kabanga* (or *Kabinga*). He may possibly—or so the Admiralty thought—have caught some others. They were not

prizes of the greatest value, but Captain von Müller might very fairly calculate that British trade in the Bay would be seriously upset by the mere knowledge that he was at large and was lying in wait for the trade. The effect he produced, whether on the movement of shipping or the rate of insurance, was less than might have been expected. It was, on the contrary, very slight. Captain von Müller sank all his prizes except the *Kabinga*, which he sent into Calcutta with the crews of the other vessels. He spared her for diplomatic reasons, for she was laden with an American-owned cargo, and it is the interest of Germany to conciliate public opinion in the United States. But he had to get rid of his prisoners in some way, and if he had been able to dispose of a ship in ballast he might not have spared the *Kabinga*. In the Atlantic, as we shall see, German officers have not always spared ships laden for American shippers.

Having made this clearance, the *Emden* went to Rangoon, and was again soon lost to sight. On September 22 (a busy day at "sea") she was, if not seen, at least felt at Madras. She turned up at half-past nine at night, explored the sea-front with her search-lights, and opened fire. The object was to destroy the unprotected tanks of the Burma Oil Company, which stand in the front and, being brightly painted, present a tempting target. The harm done was not considerable. Two tanks were set on fire, and oil to the value of £20,000 was destroyed. The *Emden's* shot ranged inland as far as Vepery,



Captain Karl von Müller, of the German Cruiser *Emden*



The British Auxiliary-Cruiser (Cunard Liner) *Carmania*, which sank the German Converted Liner *Cap Trafalgar* on September 14, 1914

a suburb 2 miles off, and the Shur Tank. The British India Steam Company's ship *Chupra* was injured a little. Two unlucky Indians were killed. When the fort opened on him Captain Karl von Müller made off. The whole affair, which began at about 9.30, was over in a quarter of an hour, and, being as brief as it was sudden, caused no panic. The *Emden* went off to the south, towards the French town of Pondicherry, but made no attack on the place. She could not afford to waste ammunition which must have been very valuable to her—for it could hardly be renewed—simply in order to do wanton damage. There was a reasonable prospect of inflicting serious hurt in Madras, and we may fairly assume that the Germans thought they had achieved their purpose. We shall have occasion to say more of Captain Karl von Müller and his commerce-destroying operations further on. During the rest of September he was out of sight in the Indian Ocean, and, though his activity did not cease, it was not heard of for some days. The news which did come to hand by the end of the month was what was to be expected. The *Emden* had

taken five ships more, one of them being laden with coal. She was, of course, counted two on a division, being not only loss to us, but gain to the Germans. Captain Karl von Müller's raid on Madras, though it did little material damage, had a dis-

turbing effect on native feeling, which supplied another reason why he should be promptly stopped.

The indirect and disturbing effect of commerce-destroying is apt to be the worst of it. The actual injury inflicted by the enemy could not have amounted in the first two months of the war to 1 per cent of British shipping. In the wars of the French Revolution and the Empire, when cruising frigates and privateers made captures from us to the very end, the average yearly loss was  $2\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. But by forcing us to send trade in large convoys they hampered and delayed our commerce. Had the Germans been allowed to maintain their average they would have destroyed 6 per cent, and we should again have been compelled to take to convoys, which would have put us at a disadvantage as against neutral rivals. But the first months of a naval war are the most fruitful for the commerce-destroyer, and the swarm of ships sent to hunt down the raiders made it most unlikely that the average would be maintained.

In the Atlantic, as in the Eastern Oceans, the signs of German com-



merce-destroying activity did not come either so quickly or in such numbers as had been expected. It had been thought that such a vessel as the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* at large on a trade route would cause vast destruction in the early days of a war till protection by patrolling cruisers, or by convoy, could be provided. The *Kronprinz Wilhelm* belonged to the North-German Lloyd,

or landfall. Every navigator knows what it is. When war is in full swing, and time has been given for making other arrangements, new routes can be taken. They will be longer, and will therefore increase expenses, both for wages, which is a small matter, and for coal, which is much more serious; but since they are arbitrary, taken not for convenience, but for concealment, the commerce-destroyer cannot tell beforehand where the prizes will probably be found. And here we will take the liberty to advise our readers who wish to judge of the commerce-destroying part of the naval war to eschew the use of maps, which, when they represent great expanses of the earth's surface, are always more or less untrust-



The German Converted Liner *Cap Trafalgar*, sunk by the *Carmania* off the coast of South America on September 14, 1914

and had a speed of 23 knots. She had left New York on August 3 heavily laden with coal. Her armament was stowed below ready to be mounted when required. It would seem that a ship of this speed, which by making use of her cargo as fuel would possess an immense range of action, could commit enormous depredations on the trade route of the North Atlantic among merchant-ships taken by surprise. A trade route is a segment of a great circle (that is to say, a circle dividing the globe into equal parts) passing through the point of departure and the destination

worthy. They are all attempts to represent a sphere on a plane surface, and are therefore of necessity conventional and require to be interpreted. The only safe course is to use a globe, which need not be a large one. Till the necessary changes of route had been made, the *Kronprinz Wilhelm* would seem to have had a splendid opportunity. It would have been not at all wonderful if she had made an end of a hundred British merchant-ships before she could be stopped.

The commerce-destroyer had a different use for her cargo of coal—no doubt to pass it on, at times and

places which we have no means of learning, to other German cruisers. When she was next heard of she was in the South Atlantic, and had captured the *Indian Prince*, of the Prince Line, a vessel of 2846 tons, with a cargo of Brazilian coffee. The *Indian Prince* was on the way to New York, and consigned to American buyers. The neutral who ships goods under the flag of a belligerent must take his fortune with her. But it is obvious that he will seek some other carrier, or make use of his own ships, in preference to employing the belligerent, if he finds that his cargo is very liable to be lost. And this is not by any means either the only or the least important of the reasons why every effort should be made to cut short the career of German commerce-destroyers. British shipping has been preferred because it has been, among various qualities, the safest. If it loses that character, then shippers will prefer to employ a neutral, or to develop their own merchant navy. If American shippers find that cargoes on their way to ports in the United States continue to be liable to share the fate of the coffee in the *Indian Prince*, their desire to do their own carrying and to regain the position which their flag held in the days of the famous "Yankee clippers" will be notably stimulated. And there is another aspect of the question which must not be ignored. A part, not exactly known but certainly not negligible, of the shipping under the British flag is the property of capitalists of American or other nationality. They have invested their capital in this country because of the

security and other advantages afforded by the British flag. If they lose the security they will in future look elsewhere for investments. It is not only the direct harm done by the commerce-destroyer which makes him injurious to British shipping and trade, but the indirect influence he may have in discrediting the British flag, and inducing neutrals to go elsewhere with their cargoes and their capital.

When we remember the wider aspects of the matter it is clear that much was at stake in the brilliant affair in the South Atlantic on September 14, 1914. If the disaster of the 22nd was the most instructive event of the month, the single-ship action, fought in the gallant and above-board style of the old wars, between the *Carmania* and the *Cap Trafalgar* was the most handsome. It was a fair set-to between equals in kind. Absolute equality is rarely found. It implies that leadership and skill shall be on an exact equality. When that is the case the combatants will in all probability simply beat one another to a standstill, unless some piece of mere luck befalls one of them. When the inequality is due to superiority of skill on one side, then it is entirely honourable; and in this case it was with the British flag.

The *Carmania* is a "Cunarder", the *Cap Trafalgar* was a Hamburg-Süd-Amerika liner. She had left home some days before the war broke out, but when it was foreseen—for the sufficient reason that it was intended to come by Germany. On August 6 she was in the vast and beautiful Bay of Rio Janeiro, where she transferred

armaments to other German ships. Her own guns were probably mounted already. They may have been meant to be used on the French packets of the *Messageries Nationales* and the *Chargeurs Réunis*, which trade to South America. But in the circumstances created by Germany's own actions they were available against us. The use made of Rio Bay was probably not in accordance with the rules of International Law. If we had not concentrated the bulk of our navy in home waters, but had retained an east coast of South America station, the *Cap Trafalgar* and others might have been intercepted at once. A North Atlantic liner of 600 ft. long and 60 ft. high presents a target which

a war-ship could hardly miss, and her thin plates would afford no protection. No man-of-war being at hand, she got away. Her proceedings till she met the *Carmania* are, of course, obscure to us. The British commerce-protector had left Liverpool on August 15, and had been engaged on search and patrol till September 14. She was commanded by Captain Noel Grant, R.N. Her second in command was Commander James Barr, R.N.R., who had been her captain when she was commissioned for service in war. Many of her officers and men are understood to have been members of the mercantile marine. The scene of the conflict is said, on the authority of a postal official in the



The Arrival of the British Marines at Ostend



*Carmania*, to have been off the Island of Trinidad, in the South Atlantic. The *Cap Trafalgar* would naturally select those waters as her cruising-ground if she meant to harass British trade with the River Plate. Her mere existence had some effect; for when it was known that she had left Rio for an unknown destination, on August 22, the rates of insurance went up. We can have but a vague idea of the preliminaries, but the encounter has been told by the victorious British officer—in the official narrative issued by the Admiralty—in words which remind us agreeably of many captains' letters written in the days of wooden frigates. They began with traditional directness and simplicity:—

"Shortly after 11 a.m. we made out a vessel, and on nearer approach we saw there were three steamers—one a large liner, and others colliers; the latter had derricks topped and were probably working when we hove in sight."

The big steamer was the *Cap Trafalgar*, which had painted her funnels to resemble a Castle liner. Attack, we are assured, is the tradition of the German forces by land and sea. The *Cap Trafalgar* made no attempt to escape, but turned to starboard and headed towards the *Carmania*:—

"He was then steering about south, and we were steering about south-west. . . . At 8500 yards we fired a shot across his bows, and he immediately opened fire from his starboard after gun. We opened with all port guns, and the firing became general. We were now well within range, and most of his shot going over; consequently our rigging, masts, funnels, derricks, and ventilators all suffered; he was then well open on our port side, all our port guns, and his

starboard guns engaged, and firing rapidly. Owing to decreasing range his machine-guns were becoming particularly dangerous, so ship was turned away from him, and range opened; ship continued to turn till starboard battery was engaged. Two of our hits were seen to take his deck steam-pipes. He was well on fire forward, and had a slight list to starboard. One of his shells had passed through the cabin under our fore bridge, and although it did not burst it started a fire which became rapidly worse, no water being available owing to the fore main having been shot through, and the chemical fire extinguishers proving of very little use. The fire got such a firm hold that the fore bridge had to be abandoned, and the ship coned [i.e. directed] from aft, using the tower steering position. At this time the enemy was on our starboard with a heavy list to starboard, and at 1.50 p.m., or one hour and forty minutes from firing of the first shot, she capsized to starboard, and went down bows first, with colours flying."



Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher of Kilverstone  
(From a photograph by Haines)



Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur K. Wilson  
(From a photograph by Maull & Fox)

The *Cap Trafalgar* had been out-maneuvred, as well as bested by gunfire. Captain Grant had handled his ship so as to present her at an angle as much as might be, and so show the smaller target. The superiority of the *Carmania's* gunnery is shown conclusively by the fact that the German was mortally wounded on the water-line while her shot damaged the upper works of the British vessel only. She herself was doomed. Metal splinters and leaves a hole where in the wooden walls of old, made of a fibrous material, there would have been a tear, which would tend to close itself. If the fire of the *Cap Trafalgar* had been as well directed as the *Carmania's*, both ships would have sunk. As it was, though the loss of life was comparatively small—nine killed and twenty-

six wounded—Captain Grant's ship was sufficiently injured to demand his entire attention.

"It was some time" says the report, "before we got the fire under, which necessitated keeping the ship before the wind, and consequently we could not go to the assistance of the survivors, some of whom got away in boats and were picked up by one of the colliers. The enemy, before sinking, was in wireless communication with some German vessel, and as smoke was seen in the northern horizon and the signalman thought he could make out a cruiser's funnels we went on full speed to the southward.

"When we were in touch with *Cornwall* [i.e. H.M.S. *Cornwall*, which was in these seas for the protection of trade] we asked him to meet us, as ship was unseaworthy and practically all communications and navigational instruments were destroyed, rendering the conning and navigation of the ship difficult and uncertain. On the 15th, at 4.30 p.m., the *Bristol* picked us up [H.M.S. *Bristol*] and escorted us until relieved by the *Cornwall*, who took us on to an anchorage to effect temporary repairs. Seventy-nine projectiles hit the ship, making 304 holes."

The message of the *Cap Trafalgar* may have been a ruse of the same order as the old practice of making signals to an imaginary consort on the offing. But we see that wireless may tell both ways. A message may be intercepted and convey information to an enemy. The attendant colliers picked up 279 officers and men of the *Cap Trafalgar's* crew and landed them at Buenos Ayres. It appears from a letter sent home by one of her crew that the *Carmania* returned to Gibraltar to refit. The gallantry and skill shown by her officers and men speak

for themselves; but the result of the action for both ships shows how very vulnerable these armed passenger - vessels are. They contain a quantity of woodwork which is very easily ignited by modern ordnance.

The services of the navy have never been wholly confined to the sea. Apart from the fact that the marines are soldiers, and have often done military work on shore, it has been the common practice to form naval brigades of bluejackets, under naval officers, for work on land. There was one in the trenches at Sebastopol,



Admiral von Essen, the Russian naval commander in the Baltic



Germany's Naval Disaster in the Baltic: the Cruiser *Magdeburg*, lost by shipwreck

and another operated far inland in the Mutiny, and they had many predecessors. In this war marines were landed for the defence of Ostend during the early days of the war. But the rule had been that these corps were formed from the crews of ships in commission for particular services. A different course has been followed in this war. On September 7 the Admiralty announced that it proposed to organize permanent naval brigades.

"After providing for all present and foreseeable future needs of the fleets at sea, there remained available a large number of men belonging to the Royal Marines, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, Royal Fleet Reserve, and Royal Naval Reserve. A portion of these have been organized into one marine and two naval brigades, the whole comprising the infantry of one division, to be called the Royal Naval Division."

The Marine Brigade had been on foot before war began. The Naval Brigades, of a strength, to begin with, of 3750 each, were collected in camp by August 19, 1914. They were formed out of the elements named



above, and were constituted in eight battalions by the 24th. The battalions of the Marine Brigade were simply numbered. The Naval Battalions were named and numbered.

First Royal Naval Brigade—*Drake* (1st), *Benbow* (2nd), *Hawke* (3rd), *Collingwood* (4th).

Second Royal Naval Brigade—*Nelson* (5th), *Howe* (6th), *Hood* (7th), *Anson* (8th).

In accordance with an ancient custom of the army and the marines, though not of the navy, these two brigades were provided with Honorary Colonels—the Admirals of the Fleet, Lord Fisher of Kilverstone and Sir Arthur K. Wilson. In view of the prompt response made to Lord Kitchener's appeal for recruits, it was decided to raise the total force of the division to

15,000 men, who, if the circumstances called for the measure, would be handed over to the War Office to constitute a purely land force. Lord Fisher's address to his own brigade was a stirring exhortation to be ready for service on either element. The formation of the Naval Brigades was part of the history of the war. Their actual services would be, from the nature of the case, military when once they were landed. "The Handy Man" can do both kinds of work, but when he is doing the one he is obviously not doing the other. The mere fact that when the navy was on a war footing it could still spare men to form landing-parties—not for temporary purposes and out of the crews of ships in commission, but as a permanency and out of its superfluity—is un-



The Shelter of the German Fleet: Kiel (Kaiser Wilhelm) Canal, linking the North Sea with the Baltic

answerable testimony to the thoroughness with which the naval defences of the country had been prepared for the day of need.

The naval part of this World War has, as we all know, not been purely British. But there is a difficulty in the way of an account of what has been done by our allies. In the Baltic the Russians, up to the end of September, 1914, claimed to have lost no ship. Their claim is, we have no doubt, well founded. They did not say that they had destroyed any German ship, and this is conclusive evidence that they did not. From the Germans we have only negative statements. Stories set going by neutrals at Stockholm, which has been the starting-place of not a few, deserve no credit. We cannot know whether the witnesses were competent when we were told that the sound of cannon

had been heard, that a battle was going on, or that German ships had fired by a blunder into one another; it was wiser to suspect that what we heard were the misapprehensions and rash deductions of gossip. A booming noise which has a superficial resemblance to the rumbling of distant artillery may be heard in certain conditions of weather on any coast of rocks and cliffs. It is known in Devonshire as "the cannon of Sir Francis Drake". An excited hearer may easily jump to the conclusion that he is listening to the echo of a battle. And then it is sufficiently notorious that Stockholm has become the centre of an indirect exchange of trade between Germany and Russia, or between both and the outer world. Rumours may be, and indeed most assuredly are, set going by persons whose object is to make profitable use



Russia's Naval Prisoners: survivors of the wrecked German Cruiser *Magdeburg* arriving at Petrograd

of the credulity of others. Every naval war is a strife not only of war-ships, but of commerce to find outlets when the routes used in peace are closed.

Whatever incidents may have occurred—and, except the loss of the German cruiser *Magdeburg* by shipwreck, hardly any have been fully reported—this much is certain, that the predominance of the German fleet in the Baltic blockaded the Russian ports, while the unfriendly action of the Turks, who closed the Dardanelles, had the same effect on their Black Sea trade. Much produce has been thrown back on the hands of the producer, and is, of course, withdrawn from the purchaser. The British housewife, who had to pay a higher price for eggs, soon knew as much by experience. The stream, dammed up in one place, tries to flow through another. In this case the outlet was naturally sought in Sweden.

Until some new element is brought in, there is small likelihood that the Russian fleet can produce much effect. It is true that Admiral von Essen, the Russian admiral, had at his disposal four pre-Dreadnoughts, six armoured cruisers, and some other vessels materially superior to the corresponding ships of the German navy. Four Russian "Dreadnoughts" are still in course of construction; but against them Germany can put thirteen "Dreadnoughts" actually ready. They were known to be at Kiel when the war began, or they could be collected there by means of the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal. With these odds against him Admiral von Essen could not hope to keep the sea. There was every reason

to believe that the German fleet had been mainly employed in helping to defend the Eastern frontier of the Empire, or in giving practice to its crews, or perhaps in testing the new guns, which we were told had been turned out by Krupp. By the end of December or beginning of January, until March or April, according to the severity of the season, the Baltic is closed by ice in the north, and is at any rate much pestered by it in the south. This natural condition had important consequences on the conduct of the war.

The Black Sea and Dardanelles share in the war depended on the action of Turkey, which is first of all a political question, not requiring to be dealt with here. We need say no more at present than this—that the transfer to the Turkish flag of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, and with them of the services of numerous German, and seemingly also of Austrian, officers, gunners, and artificers, was from the first a potential element in the course of the war.

In the Adriatic and the far-distant China seas there was no opening during the period under review for more than a demonstration of the power of vastly superior naval forces. The Austrian fleet could not come to sea in the face of the French. Whatever difficulties the Japanese may have found in mastering Tsingtau were military. In both cases the fleets which commanded the sea had some trouble with mines. But, as usual, these shifty weapons were as fatal to neutral trade, or even to the war-ships of the power which used them, as to





Germany's "Place in the Sun": her South-West Africa Camel Corps on the March

the enemy. It is hard to believe that Austria gained any advantage from scattering mines on the Adriatic, to correspond to the diplomatic difficulties they have created for her with Italy. The Austrian fleet did nothing to any purpose in September.

When looked at as a whole, the

course of the naval war in that eventful month proved that the serious combatants were Great Britain and Germany, and that the superiority of the first, though not maintained without loss, was overwhelming.

D. H.

## CHAPTER XI

### THE ATTACK ON GERMAN COLONIES

(August–October, 1914)

Prussia's First Colonies—The Great Elector's Dream—Neglected Opportunities—The Great Awakening—Bismarck and Greater Germany—How the German Colonies in Africa were acquired—Togoland captured by the Allies—Campaign in the Cameroons—War in East Africa—The Expedition to German South-West Africa—Germany loses her Possessions in the Pacific—Her Failure as a Colonizing Power.

IT is true, as a popular historian has declared, that Britain's oldest oversea settlements were made "when Prussia was a little State with barely a window even to the Baltic", but it is a mistake to suppose that

Prussia had no opportunity of founding a colonial empire until the fairest regions had all been parcelled out. She missed a golden opportunity in the days of the Great Elector towards the close of the seventeenth century,

when Benjamin Raule, an enterprising Dutch merchant-adventurer, was Director-General of the Brandenburg Navy. Raule had impressed the Elector, after entering his service, with schemes of colonization which were to give Brandenburg-Prussia her "place in the sun". He was not the first to essay the difficult task of stirring the seventeenth-century German to enthusiasm in such a cause. "Up then, brave German," wrote Johann Becher in his *Political Discourse* of 1667, "act so that on the map, besides New Spain, New France, New England, there shall in the future be found also New Germany. You are as little lacking as other nations in the intelligence and resolution to do such things; yea, you have all that is necessary; you are soldiers and peasants, alert, industrious, diligent, and indefatigable."<sup>1</sup> Becher's impassioned words were not altogether unheeded, and possibly had something to do with the Great Elector's warm encouragement of Raule and his colonizing schemes a few years later. These led, in 1682, to the formation of the Brandenburg African Trading Company, in the charter of which the Elector guaranteed to protect the company against all attempts to interfere with its trade in free places on the coasts of Guinea and Angola. Raule's merchantmen having already secured certain so-called rights from the natives, a fort was constructed on the Guinea coast and named Grossfriedrichsburg—to be seen to this day in crumbling ruins above the beach of Cape Three

Points, on what is now the British Gold Coast. This first attempt at Teutonic colonization in Africa seems for a time to have resulted in a considerable trade—largely in the lucrative slave traffic then conducted between West Africa and North America—and the Germans presently strengthened their hold on the coast with subsidiary fortifications. But their jealous rivals of the neighbouring Dutch Company forced them out of two of these strongholds, harassing them by every means in their power. Ravaged also by fever, the original force was reduced before the end of two years from ninety to sixteen men, and in the last days of the colony reliefs arrived to find only seven fit men left out of seventeen hundred sent since the Prussian occupation.

It was not an encouraging beginning, and other circumstances combined to shatter the Great Elector's dream of Empire-building. The enterprising Raule, like Clive after his Indian conquests for Britain, was accused by an ungrateful country of suspicious practices. Though the charges proved unfounded he was imprisoned for four years, and never received adequate support upon his reinstatement. This was especially the case after the death of the Elector in 1688, when his successor, Frederick I, father of Frederick the Great, was too intent on attaining to the dignity of a king at home to sink more capital in colonial enterprise. He had the desire of his heart when crowned King of Prussia on January 18, 1701, and thought more of his seven-foot Grenadiers than of his abandoned troops on the Guinea

<sup>1</sup> *German Sea Power*, by Archibald Hurd and Henry Castle.



Dr. Gustav Nachtigal

coast of Africa. Sixteen years later this first German colony was accordingly sold to the Dutch West India Company for the paltry sum of 6000 ducats and half a dozen negro boys decked with golden chains. The Dutch Company also took over the island of Arguin, which the Great Elector had seized in 1685, when, not content with Grossfriedrichsburg, he claimed jurisdiction as well over the whole of the African coast from the Senegal River up to the Canaries. It is idle to speculate as to what might have been, had the Elector's successors extended these dominions instead of handing over the task to rivals who had done their best to keep them out of the field.

To that extent, therefore, Germany has herself largely to blame for waking up towards the close of the nineteenth century to find, in the sudden realization of her need of a future overseas, that all the most promising regions of

the world had already been won, and that Great Britain everywhere barred her path. The awakening came to the generation of Germans whose childhood, in the words of Treitschke, the apostle of the new Prussian imperialism, "was illuminated by the sun of Sedan", and who were never tired of singing their "Germany, Germany, above all!" "The object of their ambition", added Treitschke, "is that the young giant who has just shaken the sleep from his eyelids should now use his strong arms to advance the civilization of mankind, and to make the German name both formidable and precious to the world. Therefore our German youth were thrilled as by an electric shock when, in August, 1884, the news came that our flag waved upon the coast of Angra Pequena (South-West Africa) and the Came-



Prince von Bismarck







rooms, and that Germany had taken the first modest but decided step in the path of independent colonization."<sup>1</sup>

The German Colonial Association, founded in 1882, had not worked in vain; nor was Bismarck the man to neglect such gifts as the gods now sent him in Britain's international difficulties, especially her strained relations with France over Egypt, and with Russia over Afghanistan. Bismarck was not always in favour of an over-sea policy. "I will have no colonies," he said to Busch on one occasion; "their only use would be to provide posts for certain people." But the opportunities in the early 'eighties of last century were too tempting to be resisted, and Bismarck made the most of them. His original idea, however, was not so much to provide new lands for the Fatherland's surplus population, or to carry the vaunted blessings of Teutonic culture to the heathen, as to develop fresh fields for German trade.

It was fitting that a new start should be made on the coast of the Continent which had been the scene of the first German attempt at colonization in the days of the Great Elector. The die was cast on April 24, 1884, when Germany hoisted her flag on the coast of Angra Pequena, in South-West Africa, though Bismarck had previously assured the Gladstone Ministry that Germany had no intention of establishing a foothold anywhere in South Africa. This foothold was obtained by the proclamation of a protectorate over the territories gradually acquired by treaty with the natives by a Bremen

merchant named Lüderitz, after whom, as already stated, a coast town is now marked on the map as Lüderitz-bucht, near which are the rich diamond-fields discovered in 1909. The occupation of the Cameroons was the immediate sequel to the protectorate in South-West Africa, and marked a more definite step in Bismarck's policy. It was accomplished only in the nick of time. Local chiefs of the Cameroons had petitioned Britain two years previously to step in and afford them protection; but Britain's hands were full elsewhere, and she made no response. It was not until July, 1884, that a British Consul was sent to arrange the desired protectorate. Meantime, however, Dr. Gustav Nachtigal, the German explorer, had arrived on the scene, ostensibly, according to Bismarck's assurance to the British Government, to "complete the information now in the possession of the German Foreign Office", but in reality with secret instructions to annex the territory, as had previously been done on the same authority at Angra Pequena. The chiefs under King Bell, tired of waiting for British protection, formally accepted that of Germany only five days before the arrival of the British Consul. Nachtigal successfully completed his imperial commission in the same month by negotiating a German Protectorate over Togoland, the narrow strip between the British Gold Coast Colony and French Dahomey, but died on his homeward journey, and was buried at Cape Palmas. Two years later his remains were removed for burial in the soil which he had won for Germany

<sup>1</sup> Treitschke, *Life and Works*, 1914.  
Vol. I.



in the Cameroons. To this territory was added as recently as 1911 the large slice of the French Congo accepted by Germany as "compensation" after the Agadir incident which ended in French supremacy in Morocco. There was much heartburning in the Fatherland over what was acknowledged as the humiliation of Germany on that occasion. The acquisition in the Congo region, after the proud hopes raised at Agadir, where the Kaiser's game of bluff nearly hastened the Great War by three years, was a poor set-off against the impressive gains of France in Morocco; but it was that or war, and in 1911 Germany considered it expedient—"from

important reasons which cannot be discussed", wrote Bernhardt at the time—to avoid, under the conditions then existing, a war with Britain and France at all costs. Britain had made it perfectly clear that she would stand by France on that occasion, and Germany never forgave her for thus forcing her to pocket such a thinly disguised affront.

On the other side of the continent was added, in 1885, the beginnings of German East Africa, the colony which fringes Uganda and British East Africa in the north, and Rhodesia and Nyasaland in the south, with other borders on Portuguese East Africa and the Belgian Congo. In East Africa, as in the South-West, Germany had waited



Germany's Colonial Army: Cavalry Contingent in South-West Africa



Captain (temporary Lieut.-Colonel) F. C. Bryant, R.A.  
(From a photograph by Lafayette)

for pioneer work to be done privately. In this case it was accomplished by such enterprising leaders of the German Colonization Society as Karl Peters and Count Pfeil, and when their audacious efforts were crowned with a certain measure of success, Bismarck stepped in with official recognition. Peters nearly succeeded in capturing Uganda as well; but his notorious exploits in that direction, while avowedly conducting his expedition for the relief of Emin Pasha, were rendered valueless by the Anglo-German Agreement of July 1, 1890. It was under the terms of this patched-up settlement that Lord Salisbury ceded Heligoland in return for Germany's recognition of a British protectorate over Zanzibar, excluding the strip ceded to Germany herself.

A glance at the map will show that, with Germany's scattered colonies in Africa upon the outbreak of the war in August, 1914, hostilities were inevitable in many places at once. Togoland—the smallest of her African possessions, but the only German colony which succeeded in paying its way—was the first to fall, thanks largely to the pluck and enterprise of Captain F. C. Bryant of the Royal Artillery—holding the temporary rank of lieutenant-colonel—senior officer of the Gold Coast Station. Without waiting for orders, Colonel Bryant crossed the frontier into Togoland on August 7 with a small detachment of the Gold Coast Regiment of the West African Frontier Force, in motor-cars, and seized Lome, the coast town and capital, without opposition. The Germans fell back towards Kamina, 100 miles inland, where their wireless station was situated—powerful enough to work direct to Berlin—but hotly contested the British advance from the coast. Colonel Bryant had placed himself in communication with the French officer commanding in Dahomey, on the other side of Togoland, and a small but extremely useful French force was soon co-operating with the British on their right flank. The Germans destroyed the bridges, cut all communications, and fortified themselves with trenches and electrified wire entanglements. But the Allies were not to be denied. They gradually forced the enemy back on Kamina, though the fighting was so fierce that in one engagement alone the British lost 17 per cent of their total. At length, on August 26, the

German governor, regarding the position at Kamina as hopeless, destroyed the wireless station and sent a flag of truce, offering, if given all the honours of war, to capitulate, stipulating for certain terms. Colonel Bryant replied that as the Germans were not in a position to ask for terms they must surrender unconditionally. He added, however, that Britons always respected private property, and that there would be as little interference as possible with the trade of the country, as well as with the private interests of firms. Thereupon the German authorities surrendered unconditionally, and on August 27, 1914, the Allied Forces entered Kamina, after a little campaign which deserves an honourable place in the history of this world-wide war. The roll of honour—eight British and French officers and non-commissioned officers killed and wounded, and sixty-six killed and wounded among the native troops—was shared about equally by the Allies.

Britain and France also co-operated in dealing with the German Cameroons, the capital of which was the next to fall. This success, however, was only an incident in a campaign of an infinitely more arduous nature than that in Togoland. One of the British columns invading the German colony under the command of Major—temporary Lieutenant-Colonel—P. Maclear, Royal Dublin Fusiliers and Nigeria Regiment, crossed the frontier on August 25, 1914, and after meeting with some resistance and capturing one of the German forts at Garua, was so heavily counter-attacked that it was compelled to retreat into British

territory with the loss of Colonel Maclear and four other officers killed, and four officers wounded, besides considerable casualties among the native troops. Meanwhile another British column reconnoitring from Ikom, in the southern province of Nigeria, after meeting with slight resistance, had, on August 25, occupied Nsanakang, 5 miles over the German frontier. A third British force from Calabar crossed the Akwa Jafe River, which here forms the Anglo-German boundary, on August 29, and seized Archibong, on the road to Rio del Rey, without experiencing any loss. On September 6, however, the garrison which had been left in Nsanakang was suddenly attacked at 2 a.m. by the enemy, who had received strong reinforcements. This attack was repulsed, but a second one, made at 5 a.m., proved successful after a stubborn resistance.

The official report of this engagement stated that our troops fought magnificently, and even the Germans admitted that this was the case. The losses were heavy, including eight British officers and non-commissioned officers killed, wounded, and captured, besides about 160 casualties among native rank and file; and Nsanakang was neutralized in order that the wounded might be attended to. The enemy admitted a loss of six Europeans and fifty rank and file killed, five Europeans and fifty rank and file wounded, and two Europeans missing. The number of wounded was, however, believed to have been considerably greater.

While these events were taking place on land, the British cruiser



*Cumberland* (Commander Cyril Fuller) and the gunboat *Dwarf* (Commander F. K. Strong), with a French cruiser, had reconnoitred the mouth of the Cameroon River and its approaches to Duala. Towards the middle of September a desperate attempt was made by the Germans to blow up the *Dwarf* with an infernal machine. Two nights later, as reported by Captain

where doubtless they had taken shelter upon the outbreak of war. The German gunboat *Sodon* was also captured, and commissioned at once, steps being taken as well for the raising of the German floating dock and Colonial Government steamer, *Herzogin Elisabeth*, which had been sunk. On September 24, French troops from Libreville attacked Ukoko, in Corisco Bay,



Photo. W. Green

South Africa's Call to Arms: Transvaal Scottish leaving Johannesburg for the Campaign against German South-West Africa

Strong, she was again attacked, this time by the German merchant-ship *Nachtigal*, the only result of which was that the *Nachtigal* herself was wrecked in making a fruitless attempt to ram the gunboat. Other assaults on the *Dwarf* were made in German launches, but were defeated in every instance by the gallant British crew. The *Cumberland* also distinguished herself by her capture of no fewer than nine German liners—eight belonging to the Woermann Line of Hamburg—off the Cameroon River,

attended by the French war-ship *Surprise*. The German forces were driven back, and the German armed auxiliaries *Rhios* and *Itolo* sunk by the *Surprise*. Three days later, following upon a bombardment by His Majesty's ships, the towns of Duala and Bonaberi surrendered unconditionally to an Anglo-French force under the command of Brigadier-General C. M. Dobell, D.S.O., escorted by two cruisers.

The Germans had considered Duala impregnable, and were taken com-



Photo. W. Green

The Campaign against German South-West Africa: Farewell Scenes at Johannesburg

pletely by surprise by the rapidity with which the Allies forced their way up the river, over every obstacle in the shape of mines and sunken ships which had been placed in their path. "We had set fire to the Governor's yacht and bombarded half the town", wrote a British officer on General Dobell's staff, "before they realized we were there! All was done so quietly and quickly." The enemy destroyed their wireless station and instruments before surrendering the place. Several hundred German prisoners were captured, while the casualties upon our side amounted to one naval signalman and four natives wounded. The Allied Forces, pressing their advantage, succeeded in driving back the Germans in the three directions in which they retreated from Duala. In a brilliant action on

October 6 the French forced the passage of the Japoma bridge to the east of Duala with a loss of two natives killed, and four Europeans and eight natives wounded.

On October 8 an attack was made up the Wuri River on Jabassi with a naval and military force commanded by Brevet-Colonel E. H. Gorges, D.S.O., Commandant of the West African Regiment. Although this was repulsed, a second attack, on October 14, was successful, Jabassi being occupied and ten Europeans being captured. Another force, commanded by Captain (temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) A. H. W. Heywood, of the Royal Artillery and Nigerian Regiment, attacked the enemy near Susa, on the railway which runs north from Bonaberi, and defeated him, with the loss of one officer killed and twenty-

seven native soldiers killed, wounded, and missing. Faced in the north by a column of the Nigerian Regiment, which had occupied the district round Mora, the German forces withdrew to the south, where we must leave their later operations to be recorded in a subsequent chapter.

On the other side of the continent the Germans appear to have taken the initiative, well aware that for the time being at least they held the advantage in the matter of military strength. The white population of between 5000 and 6000 in German East Africa consisted chiefly of Germans of fighting age, while, in addition, their native infantry and police forces numbered together about 2000. Army reservists from other parts of the world had reinforced the troops before the outbreak of war, and it was believed that some naval force, as Lord Crewe stated in the House of Lords on November 25, 1914, had

also been sent there from the Far East. Thus the Germans in East Africa, well provided as they were with ordinary guns, as well as with a number of machine-guns, constituted at once a formidable force. Ordinarily Britain did not keep more troops in these African possessions than were necessary for the maintenance of order, our military policy being based on concentration; but with the outbreak of hostilities the normal garrison of both the British East Africa and Uganda Protectorates was strengthened as soon as possible by strong reinforcements from India, as well as by mounted and unmounted volunteers raised locally. The normal force consisted of native police and the East African Rifles, which, although not so numerous as the German garrison, was, in Lord Crewe's words, "extremely efficient and well officered". Our unofficial population of East Africa responded to the call



With the Canadian Contingent in Britain: Getting the Dinner Ready



to arms with a readiness which called forth a public tribute of thanks from the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Well for our prestige that it was so, for the reinforcements were forestalled by various attempts on the part of the enemy to raid British territory. One party of invaders made a dash to blow up the Uganda Railway near Maungu, but this was frustrated before any damage was done, and all the German dynamite and outfit dispatched for the purpose were captured. Other efforts were made during September, 1914, to raid British territory across the boundary of the East Africa Protectorate, but all were repulsed, save the occupation of one unimportant frontier station on the border by a small party of the enemy, whose entry it was not at the time convenient to oppose.

On September 6 there was a hot engagement to the west of Tsava—famous for its man-eating lions—between a British force, composed partly of Indian troops and partly of King's

African Rifles, and a strong force of the enemy. The Germans brought Maxim guns into action, which the Punjabis made a gallant effort to rush with the bayonet. In the end, after being severely handled, the enemy were beaten back, though not without some losses on our side. Two days later the scene of action changed to the Nyasaland border, where the main British force advanced to repel a German column some 400 strong, including fifty Europeans, which had crossed the frontier. Successfully evading the British, the invaders, at sunrise on September 9, 1914, attacked Karonga, the town at the north end of Lake Nyasa which is the starting-point for Tanganyika. The town was defended by only one officer, fifty African Rifles and police, and eight civilians, but they kept the enemy at bay for three hours, when one of the columns from the main British force arrived on the scene and saved the situation. The Governor of



New Zealand's First Contingent: the Arrival at Chelsea Barracks, November 7, 1914

Nyasaland reported that "the enemy fought with great determination, and had to be dislodged by repeated bayonet charges; but they were ultimately driven towards Songwe. The British force", he added, "was too exhausted to pursue"; but it succeeded in capturing two field- and two machine-guns, besides inflicting heavy losses among the German officers—seven killed and two wounded and captured—and rank and file. The British loss among the whites was four killed and seven wounded. This action was typical of various other engagements along the Anglo-German frontiers of East Africa during the month of September, 1914, the raiders in nearly every case being soundly beaten and forced to retire. One of many plucky deeds was the repulse of a German force nearly 200 strong, with a couple of Maxim guns, between the Magadi railway and the frontier, by a squadron of the East Africa Mounted Rifles, only thirty in number, commanded by Captain Chapman. After an hour's severe fighting in thick bush country the Germans were thoroughly beaten, retiring hastily towards Longido. Their casualties are said to have been thirty-three (eleven dead), and in the hurry of their retreat they left behind them many loads. Twelve of the gallant thirty British were killed and wounded.

In addition to the British, a Belgian force from the Congo was also reported to be operating with success against the Germans in the region between Lakes Tanganyika and Victoria Nyanza.

According to Dr. W. E. Wareham,

VOL. I.

one of the missionaries of the London Missionary Society on the German frontier of Northern Rhodesia, Germany, with characteristic ruthlessness, determined from the first to create a reign of terror throughout East Africa. Enrolling the old fighting and raiding people, the German commandant sent the following message to the English commander: "Remove all Europeans, as my native soldiers will massacre them all". Early in September Dr. Wareham added that, though the British authorities had done all they could to keep the natives of the country out of it, they had been compelled to call our people out:—

"The 'fiery cross' has gone through the land—the Amambwa and Awemba have been told to come to the aid of the English, and they are flocking in, delighted to get the chance to burn and kill."

While these things were happening during the early months of the war in the Cameroons and East Africa, the sternest campaign of all in this continent was beginning on the south-west coast, where Nachtigal had first hoisted the flag of Germany on colonial soil. Here, as already explained, the British campaign was undertaken by the Union Government of South Africa, with General Botha in command. The number of the enemy was estimated at 10,000 mounted infantry and artillery, all admirably trained and equipped, besides a camel corps of 500. Blockhouses were dotted about the country, well-armed, and connected with each other by telephone, and with the capital, Windhoek, by wireless and underground telegraph. Roads and railways had been planned for "The



More of the "Lion's Whelps": Lord Kitchener Reviewing Australian Cadets. (From *The British Australasian*)

Day" when British South Africa was to be invaded, while emissaries were ever at work across the frontier to play upon the prejudices and ambitions of the remaining irreconcilables among the Boers. The partial success of these plots necessarily interfered with the development of the British campaign in German territory, which, during the period at present under review, had not made much progress beyond the point at which it was left on p. 104, with the occupation of Lüderitzbucht by troops of the South African Defence Force on September 18. This town was made the new base of the British expedition.

The rest of Germany's Colonial Empire at the declaration of war was distributed in the Pacific and the Far East (Kiao-Chau). How the Kaiser came by Kiao-Chau in 1898 is related on pp. 109-10. Its siege and capture by the Japanese are described on pp. 206-8. Just as the intrusion

of the mailed fist in China was resented by Japan as a menace to Japanese interests, and in South-West Africa by the British and loyal Dutch as an unwarranted seizure of territory long regarded as their own natural sphere of future expansion, so the planting of the German flag in the Pacific was loudly objected to by Australia and New Zealand. The first move in the Pacific was made towards the end of 1884, when, flushed with the triple success in Africa, Bismarck, now formally committed to a colonial policy, proceeded to add part of New Guinea to Germany's increasing place in the sun. This was the counterblast to Britain's announcement to Germany, earlier in the same year, that she intended to establish a protectorate over the southern coast of New Guinea and its adjacent islands. Public opinion in Australia at the time ran high against the Home Government for tolerating any rivalry of the kind. Australians



had long urged the imperial authorities to annex the whole of New Guinea, realizing the possible danger of a foreign neighbour; but colonial confidence had been restored when Lord Derby, on July 2, 1883, solemnly declared in the House of Lords that it would be regarded as "an unfriendly act if any other country attempted to make a settlement on the coast of New Guinea". In the following year, however, Britain found herself in the throes of the Sudan campaign and, as already mentioned, threatened by Russia over Afghanistan; so that Germany was able to seize the northern coast of New Guinea with impunity. The news caused intense irritation in Australia, where it was felt that the Mother Country, in ignoring the repeated advice of the colonists to annex the whole island, had not paid sufficient regard to their wishes or to the future welfare of their Commonwealth. The German peril in the Pacific slowly

but surely increased. Robert Louis Stevenson did not live to see the island on which he spent the last years of his life fall under the German flag, but his *Footnote to History* immortalized the petty squabbles which led to the Kaiser's supremacy in Samoa, and made "R. L. S." obnoxious to the German official world. The settlement by which Great Britain withdrew her claims in Samoa, the United States secured the small island of Tutuila, and Germany took the lion's share with the two larger islands of Upolu and Savii, occurred in November, 1899—some five years after Stevenson's death. It was in 1899, too, that the Caroline group, lying to the north of New Guinea, was bought by Germany from Spain for £837,500. The Marshall Islands, in the same region, had been in Germany's possession since 1885.

Whatever mistakes Britain may have made in the past she did not



A Royal Inspection of the Canadians: Their Majesties' Visit to one of the Colonial Camps in Britain

disappoint her sons when the hour of reckoning came. For one anxious moment in Australia, when Sir Edward Grey's speech arrived in so mangled a form that it suggested a British betrayal of her friends, and a base desertion of Belgium, there was a hint of consternation and disgust. One Australian Labour Statesman declared that if the Mother Country ran away from all her obligations of honour he would never call himself an Englishman again. It was only a momentary fear. Britain had been faithful to her highest traditions, and when the truth became known—that she had declared war against Germany after all—there was positive relief throughout the Commonwealth, followed by such an outburst of loyalty and enthusiasm as will never be forgotten. Before many weeks were over Australia and New Zealand—with the help of Japan in the Marshall Islands—had swept the German flag from Samoa, New Guinea, and every other island in the Pacific over which it had been raised. Elsewhere is told the story of these gallant achievements—deeds which inaugurated a new and inspiring chapter in the history of the British Empire, and entitled both New Zealand and Australia to a voice in the final settlement of peace.

The following is a list showing at a glance the extent of Germany's Colonial Empire at the outbreak of war:—

AFRICA			
Colony.			Square Miles.
German South-West Africa	...	...	322,348
Cameroons	...	...	295,000
Togoland	...	...	33,659
German East Africa	...	...	384,079

## PACIFIC

German New Guinea, including Bismarck Archipelago	...	90,000
Caroline, Solomon, Pelew, Marianne, and Marshall Islands	...	5,160
Samoa Islands	...	1,050

## ASIA

Kiao-Chau Protectorate	...	200
------------------------	-----	-----

This gives a total of 1,131,496 square miles, the population of which is estimated at 12,100,000. Of these millions less than 25,000 are whites, including garrisons and officials. The British Empire, on the other hand, extends, according to the latest statistics, over 11,211,000 square miles, including India, with a population of some 383,000,000. India alone accounts for 1,802,000 square miles, and a population of over 315,000,000. A comparison of the number of whites in the British and German Empires would be equally striking. The truth is that Germans for the most part will settle anywhere else on the globe but in their own colonies. They are "far too ready", as the Kaiser has told them, to colonize and thrive under the flags of other nations, and to lose in course of time their own nationality. Most of them lack the initiative of the British pioneer, the readiness to plunge into the unknown without counting the cost, the inborn gift of handling subject races according to their diverse temperaments, and the knack of adapting themselves to every changing circumstance. Above all, they lack tact. Happily for Great Britain, as Professor Egerton has said in his Oxford pamphlet on *The War and the British Dominions*, the mem-

bers of the German governing classes excel in offending those whom it is their interest to conciliate:

"Thus, after the treaty of Vereeniging, Transvaal farmers trekked into German South-West Africa to escape the humiliation of British rule. Most of them, however, soon found their way back, recognizing that the whips of British dominion were far lighter than the scorpions of German authority. Similarly, if, as seems probable, German ambitions looked forward to a time when a weak, nominally independent India should be under the aegis of Germany, it was obviously her policy to establish friendly relations with individual Indians. But what happened? On the punitive expedition of the concerted European Powers against the Chinese the treatment by the Germans of distinguished members of the fighting races of India was so intolerable as almost to lead to a breach of the peace. It is reported that an eminent Indian chieftain resented so deeply the slights put upon him that it was difficult for him at a later date to treat with proper civility the German Crown Prince."

It is no secret that the eminent chieftain in question was the veteran Sir Pertab Singh, Regent of Jodhpur, who, in spite of his seventy years,

would not be denied his right to serve with the Indian Expeditionary Force on the battlefields of Europe. Thus he was furnished with an opportunity not only of affording further proof of his splendid loyalty to the King-Emperor, but also of paying off an old score. India, like Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the rest of the colonies, realized that the underlying issue of the conflict was nothing less than the triumph either of the British or the German ideal of Empire, and no finer tribute to British rule could have been paid than the eager, spontaneous rush to the Motherland's support which followed immediately on the declaration of war in 1914. It is only necessary to compare this moving spectacle with the uninspiring record of the German colonies—an increasing drain upon the Fatherland's resources, estimated in the budget for the year 1913-14 at more than a million and a half sterling—as well as the object-lesson of Alsace-Lorraine under German rule, to decide which ideal of world-power is the true one.

F. A. M.



Canadians' First Sunday in Britain



## CHAPTER XII

## THE FAR EAST AND NEAR EAST

(August–November, 1914)

The "Mailed Fist" Incident—Japan's Revenge—Bombardment of Tsingtau begun—British Expeditionary Force arrives—Fall of Tsingtau—Its Loss to Germany—Turkey enters the War—Russian "Barbarism"—Germany's Designs in the East—Her Supremacy at Constantinople—Enver Pasha's Dictatorship—Young Turks—First Acts of Hostility—Britain declares War—Turco-German Plots against Egypt—Attempt to Start a Holy War—Khedive's Position—Safeguarding the Holy Places—Loyal Moslems of the British Empire—Annexation of Cyprus—Successful British Operations in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea—The Caucasian Frontier.

NOT many weeks elapsed after the German flag had been swept from Samoa, New Guinea, and the adjacent islands in the Pacific, before the last of the Kaiser's colonial strongholds outside Africa was captured by the combined Japanese and British forces at Kiao-Chau. It was a hopeless position for the German garrison from the first, but Germany was desperately anxious to postpone the humiliation of surrendering the place until she had beaten some of her European enemies to their knees. After all the proud hopes raised some seventeen years previously, when the Emperor's brother, Prince Henry of Prussia, sailed from Kiel as the "mailed fist" to seize this colony, for reasons explained on pp. 109-10, and, incidentally, "to declare the gospel of Your Majesty's hallowed person", the Kaiser's indignation on the receipt of the Japanese ultimatum on August 15, 1914, giving a month's notice to quit, was not unnatural. It was reported that he sent instructions to the German officer in command to hold out at all costs, adding: "Bear in mind that it would shame me more to surrender Kiao-Chau to the Japanese

than Berlin to the Russians". Tsingtau, the fortress-capital, was expected to hold out at least six months, and its capture in less than half that time was a fine feat of arms on the part of our Japanese allies, as well as of the British force—including Indian contingents—co-operating with them.

The garrison made a good defence, but was powerless against the courage, enterprise, and superior force which the Japanese were able to bring against it. The German mines with which the Yellow Sea was thickly strewn did a certain amount of damage, but failed completely to prevent the successful landing of the expeditionary force and the close blockade of the German port. Here were bottled up some eight German war-ships and the Austrian cruiser *Kaiserin Elizabeth*. As soon as Germany and Japan entered into a state of war, Austria-Hungary, who had only the most limited interests in the Far East, and with whom Japan was ready to maintain peaceful relations as long as possible, asked for permission to send the *Kaiserin Elizabeth*, her only man-of-war in those waters, to Shanghai, in order that she might disarm there. Germany,



apparently, interfered, for at the very moment when Baron Kato, the Japanese Prime Minister, was about to inform the Austrian Ambassador at Tokio, that neither Great Britain nor Japan entertained any desire to refuse this request, the Austrian Ambassador was instructed to leave his post, and diplomatic relations were broken off. The *Kaiserin Elizabeth*, accordingly, was left to share the fate of the miscellaneous German squadron in Tsingtau harbour, where the crews were doubtless—and for sufficient reasons—regarded as too valuable for the defence operations ashore to be offered as a vain sacrifice to the Anglo-Japanese fleet.

The bombardment and blockade of

Tsingtau were begun by the Japanese immediately after their declaration of war at noon on August 23, 1914, the prescribed days of grace having elapsed since the delivery of the ultimatum without a response from Germany. Aeroplanes were employed on both sides, the Japanese being most effective in dropping bombs on the German vessels and locating the enemy's chief positions. The first encounters between the land forces took place on September 14, when the Japanese advanced from Tsimu, which they had seized two days previously, 10 miles outside the Kiao-Chau zone. The German outposts were soon driven back, and the operations resolved themselves into a regular siege, from

which there was no possibility of escape for the garrison—between 3000 and 4000 strong, chiefly marines, together with a force of German-trained Chinese soldiers—either by land or sea.

The British Expeditionary Force arrived in Laoshan Bay to co-operate with the Japanese on September 24, and, with the British navy, played a gallant part in the operations leading up to the surrender of the fortress on November 6. The brunt of the fighting in the final assault was borne by the Japanese, who lost on that occasion 14 officers wounded and 420 men killed and wounded. This was during the midnight attack on the central fort and main defence line at Tsingtau, before the surrender, a brilliant charge by the Anglo-Japanese infantry being led in person by General Yoshimi Yamada, when 200 prisoners were taken. The assault had been preceded by a terrific bombardment of the German forts by the allied war-ships, and though the defenders made desperate efforts to repair the work of destruction, they were unable to make the slightest headway against the remorseless hail of Anglo-Japanese shells. After the forts on the first line of defence had been carried at the point of the bayonet in the early hours of November 6, and other forces had been seen by the garrison advancing to carry the remaining batteries, white flags were hoisted at 6 a.m. from the Observatory—a prominent building standing on a dominating hill—and from the forts facing the sea an hour and a half later. At nine o'clock German officers arrived within the

Japanese lines to ask for terms of surrender, and at the conference subsequently held at the Moltke Barracks the conditions proposed by the two Japanese plenipotentiaries were accepted, as the official report from Tokio expressed it, "without haggling". A few days later the Japanese took formal possession of the place, and the wrongs and insults of the past had been avenged. Japan had not forgotten that Germany had been the principal among the Powers who robbed her of the legitimate fruits of her victory over China in 1895. By the capture of Tsingtau, too, Japan, as Mr. Balfour said at the Guildhall on November 9, 1914, "made the most dramatic answer perhaps that history records to one of the most insolent messages ever sent from one sovereign to another some seventeen years ago"—the message of the mailed fist.

"Everybody", added Mr. Balfour, "must sympathize with the feelings of the Japanese, who have shown . . . all that courage, enterprise, and organization which have always distinguished them. Everybody must sympathize with them when they have learned that the great fortress erected by those who so flouted them in 1897, has fallen to their arms, never again to return to those who built it. Our allies in the Far East are the first among us who have reached conclusively and finally the objective for which they strove."

The Japanese were magnanimous in their hour of victory, the Emperor permitting the Governor and all his officers to retain their swords. Apart, however, from the heavy blow thus delivered to German prestige throughout the Far East, the fall of Tsingtau



was a serious loss to German arms and capital. Some three thousand officers and men were taken prisoners, with the Governor, Captain Meyer-Waldeck, and removed to concentration camps in Japan; while the little fleet of war-ships originally stationed at the port was wiped off the German navy list. Of this fleet, five gunboats—the *Iltis*, *Jaguar*, *Luchs*, *Tiger*, and

velopment of the protectorate, which stretched about 160 miles along the coast of Shantung, and extended over an area, including the neutral zone, of about 2750 square miles. In 1913 alone the expenditure amounted to little short of £900,000, partly paid for by an imperial subsidy furnished out of the German taxpayer's pocket. Most of the £20,000,000 which Ger-



Photo, Underwood & Underwood

Turkey's Fighting Forces in the Sinai Peninsula: Syrian Troops, equipped by Germany for the Attack on Egypt

*Cormoran*—were found by the victors sunk through explosion, together with the destroyer *Taku*, and the mine-layer *Ruchin*. Another torpedo-boat was known to have foundered outside the port. Five transports, including a Russian volunteer steamer, which had been one of the *Emden's* prizes, were reported to have been captured. The Austrian cruiser, which had been damaged by gun-fire, was found sunk with the rest, but the Japanese thought she could be raised. Vast sums of money had been expended on the de-

many is estimated to have spent on Kiao-Chau from first to last was devoted to fortifying and developing the capital. The forts of Tsingtau were said to contain as many as 600 Krupp guns of various calibre; the harbour was extended and developed until it ranked among the most splendid ports in the Far East, while costly water-works, Government offices, hospitals, and other institutions were added to the town which the Kaiser had fondly hoped to make the citadel of the Far Eastern dominions of his

world-wide empire. The trade which had grown up with this enterprise exceeded that of any of Germany's other colonies, the exports amounting to £2,746,000, and the imports to £4,015,000 in 1912. Germany's own share of all this trade, however, was infinitesimal compared with that which fell to other countries, her failure in this direction being even more marked in the Far East than in any of her nearer colonies, though her average share in the trade of her colonies in 1912 was no more than 36 per cent. Germany refused to admit her failures as a colonizing power. She was prepared to lose these millions for the sake of possible gain in the future, and Kiao-Chau was essential to her dreams of world-wide supremacy. Her wrath at the shattering of this dream in the Far East was expressed by a writer in the Berlin newspaper *Lokal-anzeiger* on the arrival of the news that Tsingtau had fallen:

"Woe to you, Nippon! We shall never forget the brutal attack of the yellow bandits, nor the Britons who instigated them. . . . Our mills will grind slowly, but even though years should pass before our turn comes at last, then throughout Germany will resound a shout of joy. Woe to you, Nippon!"

Undisturbed by Germany's rage, Japan received the news of the fall of Tsingtau with general rejoicings, and proceeded to take over the administration of the port. It was afterwards stated by the Vice-Minister of the Japanese navy, Baron Suzuki, that Tsingtau would remain under Japanese rule during the continuance of the war, and that upon its con-

clusion Japan would open negotiations on the subject with China. Meantime General Kamio, the Japanese commander-in-chief, was appointed Governor-General, and steps were at once taken to restore the port to its normal state.

Turkey's entry into the war was later than that of Japan, but the malign influence of Germany at Constantinople made her intervention probable from the first. The British White Paper on the course of events leading up to the rupture shows that the Porte exhibited a hostile tone as soon as the British Government, upon the outbreak of war with Germany, requisitioned the two Turkish Dreadnoughts then building in this country. The die was cast when the two German war-ships, the super-Dreadnought



General Liman von Sanders, the German Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish Army



Mohammed V, Sultan of Turkey  
(From a photograph by Abdullah)

*Goeben* and the cruiser *Breslau*, escaped through the Dardanelles from their pursuers in the Mediterranean. Their fictitious sale to Turkey was announced on August 12, 1914, three days before the Japanese ultimatum to Germany. With Japan, as she well knew, preparing to range herself beside Great Britain, Germany was more than ever determined to secure the alliance of Turkey, and so organize not only an invasion of Egypt through her Asiatic possessions, but also, if possible, a Holy War among the countless Mohammedans of the British Empire. It did not matter that such an alliance furnished a damaging commentary upon all the German talk about the war as a conflict between German "culture" and Russian "barbarism".

Russian "barbarism", be it added, is a bugbear of the past in this country, and even then was largely a penny-dreadful idea, fostered by melodrama and sensational fiction. The reconciliation of the Russians and the Poles is but one of many signs that the war has brought out the best qualities of a great nation, and revealed the fundamental changes which have taken place in modern Russia's political life. The Germans, as Professor Vinogradoff has said, "expected to encounter raw and sluggish troops under intriguing time-servers and military Hamlets . . . Instead of that, they were confronted with soldiers of the same type as those whom Frederick the Great and Napoleon admired, led at last by chiefs worthy of the men." And behind these soldiers they discovered a nation regenerated.



Enver Pasha, Turkish Minister of War




Turkey, knowing that Russia had always regarded the emancipation of the Balkan peoples from the Turkish yoke as its historic mission, was not unwilling to flirt with German friendship, unmindful of the fact that the Ottoman Empire had been ear-marked by the Pan-Germanic party. Bismarck was content to make the Fatherland the most formidable nation on the continent of Europe. William II, on the other hand, dreamt of extending this supremacy over the entire world. "Berlin to Bagdad", with the whole of Asia Minor under his flag, was one of his golden visions which he fondly hoped the war was appreciably to bring nearer to realization.

Professor Usher alluded to this Imperial dream in his prophetic study of *Pan-Germanism*, published before the war.

"The Germans", he wrote, "consider perfectly feasible the construction of a great confederation of States, including Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Balkan States, and Turkey, which would control a great band of territory stretching south-east from the North Sea to the Persian Gulf. A railway from Constantinople to Bagdad would effectually tie the great trunk lines, leading from the Rhine and Danube valleys, to Constantinople and the Persian Gulf, and so establish a shorter route to India than that via Suez. Egypt, Syria, Arabia, Persia, India herself, the mother of nations, would fall into German hands, and be held safe from conquest by this magnificent overland route to the East."

For this dazzling scheme the Kaiser had been ready to make a friend of Abdul Hamid when every other ruler of a civilized State shunned the Red Sultan on account of the appalling



Carrying the War to the Persian Gulf: Turkish Troops being ferried across the Euphrates in a "cufa"

massacres in Armenia. He sent military experts to remodel and train the Turkish army, and, with railway, banking, and commercial concessions, so extended the power of Germany in Constantinople that when war broke out, Turkey, for all practical purposes, seemed transformed into little more than a German province.

Years of systematic effort had thoroughly undermined British prestige. The average Briton remained, perhaps, more popular, but his easy-going ways, in contrast to the ceaseless activities of his rival, caused a former Grand Vizier, Ferid Pasha, to say frankly that he thought Germany would do greater things for Turkey than would the British Government.

How completely the Kaiser's emissaries had hypnotized the Turkish

Government in 1914 was shown in a single sentence in the British Foreign Office statement published on November 2:

"Since the war, German officers in large numbers have invaded Constantinople, have usurped the authority of the Government, and have been able to coerce the Sultan's Ministers into taking a policy of aggression."

The commander-in-chief of the Turkish army was General Liman von Sanders, while other German officers were practically in command of the various army corps, as well as of the Turkish navy. Whole train-loads of German officers and men for both services, as well as guns and artillery material, had been sent to Constantinople before Turkey openly played the game so cunningly contrived by Germany. Undoubtedly

the escape of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* into Turkish waters influenced the Porte in thus recklessly deciding to stake its all upon the Kaiser's success. It was a gambler's throw, like Germany's own reckless bid for world-power. The Allies were not deceived when the escaped German war-ships were announced as sold to the Turkish Government, the *Goeben* taking on its new name of the *Sultan Selim* and its auxiliary that of the *Medellu*. The British and Russian ambassadors informed the Porte that their Governments declined to accept the sale as valid, and therefore regarded both vessels as German ships which had entered the Black Sea in defiance of treaties and in violation of the pledges of Turkey herself. The Porte, however, was now completely



Turkey's Entry into the War: Scene of the Campaign against Russia, the Fighting in the Persian Gulf, the British Annexation of Cyprus, and Turkey's threatened Invasion of Egypt

in the power of the war-party, and the promise that the two war-ships should be handed over bodily to Admiral Limpus—the British naval commander who had been lent to the Turkish service in April, 1912—was mere subterfuge. On the very day after this promise was made, Admiral Limpus and the whole of the British Naval Mission were suddenly replaced in their executive commands by Turkish officers, but ordered to continue work at the Ministry of Marine. By September 8, however, their position had become untenable, and arrangements were made for their withdrawal. This left the Germans with practically a free hand and receiving every encouragement from Turkey's unscrupulous War Minister, Enver Pasha, who had won his way to a virtual dictatorship over his compatriots by the assassination of Nazim Pasha. The Sultan, one of whose daughters he married not long before the war, was said to have become a mere tool in his hands.

The White Paper shows that the Germans had found in Enver a man after their own heart. From the first he welcomed the prospect of war and the designs for the conquest of Egypt. Sir Louis Mallet, British Ambassador, in one of his telegrams, said that he believed Enver to be the only fire-brand. He permitted the *Breslau* and three other ships to enter the Black Sea in spite of an order from the Turkish Minister of Marine prohibiting the sending of a fleet into those waters, and he overruled the pacific counsels of the amiable but invertebrate Grand Vizier, Prince Said



Rear-Admiral Limpus  
(From a photograph by Russell, Southsea)

Halim, as well as of most of the other Ministers, who clearly wished for peace until Enver and his Teutonic allies, with the army and the navy in their hands, persuaded them to take the fatal plunge with Germany and Austria. With Enver was associated the miscellaneous party of agitators and extremists who had also fallen under the spell of Potsdam's "shining armour". These extremists were neither the old Turks, who were content to remain Oriental, nor the honest revolutionaries who had brought about the downfall of Abdul Hamid in 1908, but represented the worst elements among the Young Turks—men who had lived too long in Western cities, and, losing their Faith, had returned to their native land with



little respect left for many of their national institutions, and none at all for religion. Educated Moors aptly described these Young Turks as in no sense representative of modern Mohammedan thought, but as a band of unorthodox freethinkers, with no consideration for upholding the prestige of Islam.

For the time being, however, these men, with Enver at their head, controlled the high commands in the army and navy, and they lent a ready ear to the secret Pan-Islamic propaganda so insidiously cultivated by Germany. The Young Turks had proved a disheartening failure to liberty-loving nations like Great Britain, which had congratulated them on their bloodless revolution of 1908, hoping that this would mark the establishment of freedom and constitutional government in the Ottoman Empire. "Never",

said Mr. Asquith, in his speech at the historic Lord Mayor's Banquet in London, on November 9, 1914, "were hopes so sanguinely entertained and so confidently expressed doomed to bitterer and more complete disappointment. But after six years' experience we have reluctantly to admit that the Young Turk has reproduced the vices without either the vigour or the versatility of the old régime." Ignoring the definite assurances made at the beginning of the war by the British Government—concurring in by Russia and France—that if Turkey remained neutral her independence would be respected both during the struggle and in the terms of peace—the Germanized Porte steadily organized a policy of provocation. Repeated promises to send away the German officers and men of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* were never fulfilled, and increasing breaches of neutrality strained the patience and forbearance of the British Government to the uttermost. It was not Britain's wish to declare war against a nation which she had so often befriended in the past. Though it was well known that Enver Pasha was decidedly pro-German, and that Germany was doing her utmost to force Turkey's hand, it was long hoped that the saner counsels of his colleagues would have prevailed. All these hopes were wrecked by the bribes which the Germans were known to be distributing with a lavish hand, as well as by the ceaseless activities of their military elements in Constantinople. Matters were at length brought to a head on October 29 by the bombardment, without warning



Prince Said Halim, the Grand Vizier, who was overruled by Enver and his German Associates

and without the slightest provocation, of Odessa and various open and defenceless ports of Russia on the Black Sea coast, Turkey thus committing—to quote from the British Foreign Office statement—“an unprovoked violation of the most ordinary rules of international law, comity, and usage”. This was done deliberately to precipitate the crisis, like the closing of the Dardanelles contrary to treaty, and other acts of calculated hostility. Turkey’s professed desire to remain at peace with the Triple Entente after the outrage in the Black Sea was mere insolence, since it was unaccompanied by any promise to dismiss the German officers who had doubtless taken the initiative in those acts of war. On the morning of October 31, 1914, therefore, the Ambassadors of Great Britain, Russia, and France demanded their passports from the Grand Vizier and left Turkey.

Britain’s formal declaration of war followed on November 5, 1914, after the official announcement of the threatened attack upon Egypt and the Suez Canal, planned by Enver Pasha with his German advisers. Two Turkish army corps had been mobilized for this invasion, starting from Akaba and Gaza, the object being to organize a Holy War, drive the British out of Egypt, and restore that country to its old condition as a Turkish province. A large body of Bedouins had been called out to assist in this venture. Some of these were known already to have crossed the Sinai frontier. Transport had also been collected, roads prepared up to the very frontier

of Egypt, and mines dispatched for distribution in the Gulf of Akaba. A notorious Sheikh named Aziz Shawish had disseminated throughout Syria, and probably India, an inflammatory document urging Mohammedans to fight against Great Britain. Dr. Prueffer, one of the Kaiser’s countless army of secret-service agents, had long been busily intriguing in Cairo against the British occupation, proving his official connection after the outbreak of war by openly attaching himself to the German Embassy in Constantinople. Most startling of all was the revelation in the White Paper of the Turkish conspiracy to send bombs into Egypt, and plots of similar origin for blocking the Suez Canal, with other destructive deeds. This dramatic discovery was due to the arrest in October of Lieutenant Mors, a German officer of the Alexandria City Police, who confessed that he had just returned from Enver Pasha, to whom he had been conducted by a German official formerly in the German diplomatic agency in Cairo. Mors refused to divulge the name of this secret-service agent who had been thus masquerading as a diplomatist, but he disclosed the nature of some of the intrigues fostered by the Germans and Turks for the undoing of Britain both in Egypt and in India. The subtlety of German activities in this direction may be judged from Sir Louis Mallet’s dispatch of October, 15, 1914, in which he refers to the prospect of certain individuals being introduced into Egypt, and causing mischief by impersonating Indian soldiers. “In



Photo. Bourne &amp; Shepherd

India's Army for the European War: Unloading Regimental Baggage before embarking at Alexandra Dock, Bombay

substantiation of this", writes the British Ambassador, "I have to state that His Majesty's Consul at Aleppo has learned that a tailor in that town has been commissioned to make a variety of Indian costumes and head-dresses on designs and measurements supplied by German officers there." A report was even circulated that the Kaiser had embraced Islam.

The Khedive, Abbas Hilmi, who was in Turkey on the eve of the war, visiting the Sultan as his nominal tributary in Egypt, naturally became the centre of a network of intrigue. It was not long before the Kaiser's war news flashed across the world the announcement that Abbas was about to lead the expedition against the British in Egypt. The Kaiser himself telegraphed to the German Crown

Prince to the effect that the Sheikh-ul-Islam had published a *Fetwa* against Britain, France, and Russia, and that this meant the Holy War for the whole Islamic world. As with so many other calculations of the kind, however, Germany did not find it so easy as she imagined to sap the loyalty of the great body of Mohammedans, either in India, where alone they numbered seventy millions, or in Egypt. It was contrary to the wishes of the Sultan himself thus to risk his precarious hold over the followers of his faith—precarious not only because the Turkish claims to the Khalifate rest on highly disputable foundations, but also because among the Turks themselves there are still countless numbers who regard the present Sultan as a usurper and the captive





Abbas Hilmi, Khedive of Egypt  
(From a photograph by Dittrich, Cairo)

Abdul Hamid as their rightful sovereign. The Turkish claims to the leadership in Islam through the head of their State are disputable, because this distinction was robbed by the Turks from its lawful holders, the Arab tribe of the Koreish, from which the Prophet sprang. Consequently the Sultan is not of the true blood, and the validity of the *Fetwa* of the Sheikh-ul-Islam, referred to by the Kaiser, was questioned by millions of the Faithful, especially when obviously employed for the purpose of making Islam a mere pawn in Germany's game of world-wide dominion. The significant fact was not overlooked, that while Mohammedans in their thousands were fighting in the armies alike of Great Britain, France, and Russia, not a single Moslem could be

found in the ranks of the Kaiser's army.

"They must look with detestation", again to quote from the British Foreign Office's forcible statement, "on misguided action under foreign rule in Constantinople, which will inevitably lead to the disintegration of the Turkish Empire, and shows such forgetfulness of the many occasions on which Great Britain has shown friendship to Turkey. They must feel bitterly the degeneration of their co-religionists who can thus be dominated against their will by German influences, and many of them realize that when Turkey is pushed into war by Germany they must dissociate themselves from a course of action that is so prejudicial to the position of Turkey itself."

Turkey's war strength at the beginning of hostilities was an unknown quantity, for with no other army in the world are the published paper figures so untrustworthy. It was estimated, however, that she could put into the field, all told, some 500,000 men, trained as far as possible by a small army of German instructors, with some 50,000 cavalry and 1500 guns of all calibre. In addition, she had probably mustered another 250,000 untrained men at the depots. The bulk of these forces were destined for the European campaign, where Enver Pasha hoped to win back part, at least, of the territory lost in the last Balkan Wars. Some 100,000 men, it was also estimated, would be available for the campaign on the Russian frontier in Asia Minor, where the Tsar, on his side, had a formidable army already prepared for eventualities; while a third concentration was, of course, necessary for the operations against Britain in Egypt and the Persian Gulf.

Germany having succeeded in pushing the Porte over the precipice, and Britain having declared war against Turkey—the day after Russia had invaded Armenia as a result of the Black Sea bombardment—false reports were circulated among Mohammedans to the effect that Great Britain was shelling Jeddah, the port of disembarkation on the Red Sea for pilgrims bound for Mecca. Thereupon the Indian Government found it necessary to reassure its loyal Moslem subjects to the effect that all the holy places of Arabia, including the sacred shrines of Mesopotamia and the port of Jeddah, would be immune from an attack by the British naval and military authorities “so long as there is no interference with pilgrims from

India”. The Governments of Russia and France had given similar assurances to His Majesty's Government. It was afterwards announced that Great Britain had no intention of undertaking military or naval operations in any part of Arabia, “except for the protection of Arab interests against Turkish or other aggression, or in support of Arabs attempting to free themselves from Turkish rule”.

Happily the Moslems of the British Empire were quick to realize that no question of religion was involved in the entry of Turkey into the great world-struggle. Germany's attempt to start a Holy War in that direction only served to emphasize the unswerving loyalty of India. Renewed assurances to that effect were at once



Nearing the Journey's End: Indians on the March in France

received from the native rulers, and manifestoes were published to their subjects by such princes as the Nizam of Hyderabad, who warned his people not to be beguiled by the wiles of anyone into a course of open or secret sedition against the British Government, since "there is no Moslem or non-Moslem power in the world under which they enjoy such personal and religious liberty as they do in India". The Aga Khan was equally emphatic and unhesitating in his advice to the sixty million Mussulmans of India, with the result that telegrams poured in from his followers assuring the Viceroy of their entire accordance with their leader's views, and of their absolute devotion to the British Empire. The matter was admirably summed up in the remarks of an Indian Mussulman, repeated in the Commons by the Under-Secretary for India: "Why should anyone question the loyalty of India? Is it not our Empire too?"

Turkey's extension of the war not only involved the Holy Places, but also, by the formal annexation of Cyprus, proclaimed on November 6, 1914, linked British history of the twentieth century with the exploits of Richard the Lion-Hearted upwards of seven hundred years ago. It was at Cyprus that King Richard, after conquering the island from the inhospitable Emperor Isaac, married the Lady Berengaria of Navarre, whom the Emperor had treated discourteously. Apart from this romantic interest the annexation of the island was of considerable strategic value to Great Britain, besides at once saving the tribute of £92,800 annually paid to the Sultan

since the British occupation in 1878. Cyprus was in that year placed under our administration in return for Britain's undertaking to assist the Sultan in defending his Asiatic possessions against Russia. Now the whirligig of time and the machinations of Germany had placed Russia on the side of Great Britain, and the fate of Turkey was sealed.

This was entirely against British hopes and efforts. Nor was it the fault of the Turkish people, as Mr. Asquith pointed out in his Guildhall speech on November 9, 1914:

"It is the Ottoman Government that has drawn the sword, and which, I venture to predict, will perish by the sword. It is they, and not we, who have rung the death-knell of Ottoman dominion, not only in Europe, but in Asia. With their disappearance will disappear, as I, at least, hope and believe, the blight which for generations past has withered some of the fairest regions of the earth."

It was not long before other blows to Turkish, as well as to German prestige, were dealt by Britain in the Sultan's dominions. Some of the smartest operations in the whole World War were effected by the troops from India under the commands of Lieutenant-General Sir A. Barrett and Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, who, after a journey of some 1500 miles to the Persian Gulf, signally defeated the Turkish forces in two stubbornly contested engagements, and captured both Fao and Basra—all within seventeen days of the declaration of war. Basra was the ancient seaport marked out by the Germans as the terminus of the rail-



way to Bagdad, on which such high hopes had been raised. Standing on the west bank of the Euphrates, at the confluence of that river with the Tigris, some 56 miles from its mouth in the Persian Gulf, Basra was founded by the Caliph Omar in 636, and became one of the famous cities of the East. Though much of its glory gradually departed under the Turkish regime, its importance had revived of

defeated Turkish forces in their headlong flight up the Tigris, together with the Vali of Bagdad. This triumph was completed on the morning of November 23, when a ceremonial march was made by the British troops through the streets of Basra to a central point at which the notables of the town were assembled, while the Union flag was hoisted on all the prominent buildings. Naval salutes



Islam's Reply to the Kaiser's Call for a Holy War: Algerian Cavalry bringing in German prisoners in France

late years under the activities of British and German shipping, its exports and imports, according to the latest available figures, amounting in annual value to upwards of £2,000,000 sterling. In the operations in the Persian Gulf, crowned "with greater and more rapid success than was anticipated" — to quote from the statement on the subject issued by the Secretary of State for India—the enemy left eight guns and many wounded in our hands. Basra was occupied on November 21, 1914, by both our naval and land forces, the Vali accompanying the

were fired; the troops presented arms and gave three cheers for the King and Emperor; and a suitable proclamation, issued by the commander-in-chief, was received by the inhabitants with acclamation. The Arab soldiery, who had but recently been mobilized by the Turks, were left behind in the flight from Basra, and many of these, discarding their arms and uniforms, were only too glad to return to their home and resume civil dress. It was known that they were thoroughly dissatisfied with their treatment at the hands of the Turks.

## The Great World War

Meantime other Turkish positions had been captured at each end of the Red Sea, the first at Akaba, which had been planned as the starting-point of one of the Turkish army corps destined for the invasion of Egypt, and the other at Sheikh Seyd, which has been called the Gibraltar of the Red Sea. The Sheikh Seyd peninsula, situated at the southern entrance to the Suez Canal, consists of a group of rocky heights, joined to the mainland by a low, sandy plain, the greater part of which is covered at high water by a shallow lagoon. The guns of the Turkish fort (Turba) commanded the isthmus connecting the peninsula to the mainland. Three battalions of Indian troops were landed here in face of opposition, but under cover of the guns from H.M.S. *Edinburgh*,

and succeeded in capturing all the enemy's positions, with comparatively small loss. Many prisoners were taken, together with six field-guns and large amounts of munitions of war.

The splendid work of the Indian troops in so many parts of the Great World War earned a well-deserved tribute from the Under-Secretary for India in the House of Commons on November 26, 1914:

"They have taken part in the reduction of Tsingtau, in the rapid and successful occupation of Fao and Basra. They are in force in Egypt, they took part in the landing at Sheikh Seyd, and, sharing the vicissitudes of the war, they were present at the attack against great odds in East Africa. Of course, the main force is in France, taking part in a battle which is lasting as long as the famous battle of the



The Threatened Invasion of Egypt: Our Sudanese Troops on the Nile

great Indian epic. . . . Of the actual exploits of the troops the official reports, private letters, and the accounts of eye-witnesses all tell the same story. There is no need to speak of the quality of the British units in the Indian army, or of the very gallant leadership of the officers with the Indian troops; but the Indian troops themselves have by all accounts acquitted themselves in accordance with the expectations of those who best knew them. They very soon adapted themselves to conditions of fighting which are as novel to them as to our own men. They have stood the shell-fire steadily, and when the time comes to give the details of their action in the recent fighting it will be, I am sure, a record of which India and Britain will be proud."

While, therefore, the first important consequences of the war with Turkey on Great Britain's side were the annexation of Cyprus, and the occupation of vital points in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, on the side of Russia the initial steps were the rapid march of a Russian army of liberation across the Caucasian frontier towards Erzerum and Turkish Armenia—an army strong in its conviction that it was at last carrying deliverance to kinsmen who had suffered far too long under Turkey's iniquitous yoke. The operations which followed will be dealt with in a later chapter.

F. A. M.

## CONSPECTUS OF ARMY ORGANIZATION

### I. THE BRITISH ARMY

**ARMY CORPS** = Headquarters (Commander, General Staff Officers, Adjutant-General, Quartermaster-General, Director of Medical Services, Director of Veterinary Services, Director of Ordnance Services, Postal Service, Provost-Marshall, &c.) + 2 Divisions + Army Troops (Cavalry, Mounted Infantry, Horse Artillery, Signal Units, Ambulance, &c.).  
= about 40,000 officers and men, under General or Lieutenant-General.

**DIVISION** (chief unit in field organization) = Headquarters + 3 Infantry Brigades + 1 Cavalry Squadron + 4 Field Artillery Brigades (1 of Howitzers), 1 Heavy Battery and Ammunition Column, and 1 Divisional Ammunition Column + 2 Field Companies of Engineers + 1 Signal Company + 1 Divisional Train + 3 Field Ambulances.  
= 585 officers and 17,488 men, under Lieutenant-General or Major-General.

A Division has 5592 horses, 54 18-pounder guns, 18 howitzers, 4 60-pounder guns, and 24 machine-guns.

**INFANTRY BRIGADE** = Headquarters + 4 Battalions.

= 124 officers and 3931 men, under Brigadier-General.

**CAVALRY DIVISION** = Headquarters + 4 Cavalry Brigades + 2 Horse Artillery Brigades + 1 Field

Squadron of Engineers + 1 Signal Squadron + 4 Cavalry Field Ambulances.

= 439 officers and 8830 men, under Major-General.

**CAVALRY BRIGADE** (when included in Cavalry Division) = Headquarters + 3 Cavalry Regiments + 1 Signal Troop.

= 85 officers and 1633 men, under Brigadier-General.

**CAVALRY BRIGADE** (not allotted to a Cavalry Division) = Headquarters + 3 Cavalry Regiments + 1 Horse Artillery Battery and Ammunition Column + 1 Field Troop of Engineers + 1 Signal Troop + 1 Cavalry Field Ambulance.

= 104 officers and 2180 men, under Brigadier-General.

#### INFANTRY UNITS—

Section = 12 to 14 men, under Section Commander (N.C.O.).

Platoon = 4 Sections, under Lieutenant.

Company = 4 Platoons.

= 6 officers and 221 men, under Major or Mounted Captain, with Captain as Second.

Battalion = Headquarters + 4 Companies + Machine-gun Section.

= 30 officers and 977 men, under Lieutenant-Colonel.



Machine-gun Section = 17 men and 2 guns, under Lieutenant.

#### CAVALRY UNITS—

Section = 8 men, under Section Leader (N.C.O.).

Troop = 3 or 4 Sections, under Troop Leader (Lieutenant).

Squadron = Headquarters + 4 Troops.

= 6 officers and 152 men, under Major and Captain.

Regiment = Headquarters + 3 Squadrons + Machine-gun Section.

= 26 officers and 523 men, under Lieutenant-Colonel.

#### ARTILLERY UNITS—

Section = 2 guns, with men, under Lieutenant.

Battery = 3 Sections (in Horse and Field Artillery), or 2 Sections (in Heavy Artillery).

= 5 officers and about 200 men and 6 guns (Horse and Field Artillery), or 5 officers and 163 men and 4 guns (Heavy Artillery), under Major and Captain.

Ammunition Column = 3 officers and 155 men (18-pounder Field Artillery), 2 officers and 119 men (Field Howitzer), 1 officer and 29 men (Heavy Artillery), or 4 officers and 223 men (Horse Artillery), under Captain (Lieutenant in Heavy Artillery).

Divisional Ammunition Column = 4 Sections, each under Major or Captain = 15 officers and 553 men, under Lieutenant-Colonel.

Brigade = 3 Batteries + Ammunition Column (in Field Artillery), or 2 Batteries + Ammunition Column (in Horse Artillery).

= 28 officers and 772 men and 18 guns (18-pounder Field), or 22 officers and 733 men and 18 guns (Field Howitzer), or 19 officers and 662 men and 12 guns (Horse Artillery), under Lieutenant-Colonel.

#### ENGINEER UNITS—

Field Troop = 3 officers and 74 men, under Captain.

Field Company = 6 officers and 211 men, under Major and Captain.

Field Squadron = Headquarters + 4 Troops = 7 officers and 184 men, under Major.

Bridging Train = 7 officers and 278 men, under Major and Captain.

#### AMBULANCE UNITS—

Field Ambulance = 3 Sections = 10 officers and 224 men, under Lieutenant-Colonel.

Cavalry Field Ambulance = 2 Sections = 6 officers and 118 men, under Lieutenant-Colonel or Major.

#### TRANSPORT AND SUPPLY UNITS—

Divisional Train = 4 Companies (each under Major or Captain) = 26 officers and 402 men, under Field Officer.

Army Troops Train = 7 officers and 93 men, under Major.

#### SIGNAL UNITS—

Section = 24 or 48 men, under Lieutenant.

Company = Headquarters + 4 Sections = 5 officers and 157 men, under Major or Captain.

Troop = 1 officer and 23 or 42 men, under Lieutenant.

Squadron = Headquarters + 4 Troops = 8 officers and 198 men, under Major and Captain.

#### ROYAL FLYING CORPS UNIT—

Aeroplane Squadron = 19 officers and 138 men, and 12 Aeroplanes, under Commander.

## II. FOREIGN ARMIES

#### GERMANY—

Infantry Brigade = 2 Regiments = 6 Battalions = 6000.

Cavalry Brigade = 2 Regiments = 8 Squadrons = 1200.

Artillery Brigade = 2 Regiments = 12 Batteries = 72 guns.

Division = 2 Infantry Brigades (12 battalions) + 4 Cavalry Squadrons + 12 or 24 machine-guns + 72 field-guns.

Army Corps = 2 Divisions + Army Troops.

#### FRANCE—

Infantry Brigade = 2 Regiments = 6 Battalions = 6000.

Cavalry Brigade = 2 or 3 Regiments = 8 or 12 Squadrons = 1280 or 1920.

Artillery Regiment = 9 or 12 Batteries = 36 or 48 guns.

Division = 2 Infantry Brigades + 1 Cavalry Squadron + 24 machine-guns + 36 field-guns.

Army Corps = 2 or 3 Divisions + Army Troops.

#### RUSSIA—

Infantry Division = 2 Brigades = 4 Regiments = 16 Battalions = 14,140, with 32 machine-guns and 48 field-guns.

Cavalry Division = 2 Brigades = 4 Regiments = 24 Squadrons = 3466.

Field Artillery Brigade = 2 Divisions = 6 Batteries = 48 guns.

Army Corps = 2 Divisions + Army Troops.

#### AUSTRIA-HUNGARY—

Infantry Division = 2 Brigades = 4 Regiments = 12 or 16 Battalions = 12,000 or 16,000, with 24 or 32 machine-guns and 48 field-guns.

Cavalry Division = 2 Brigades = 4 Regiments = 24 Squadrons = 3600.

Artillery Regiment = 2 Divisions = 4 or 6 Batteries = 24 or 36 guns.

Army Corps = 3 Divisions + Army Troops.

## CHAPTER XIII

## THE WAR IN EASTERN EUROPE

(August–September, 1914)

Austria and Serbia—The Serbian Victory of Shabatz—Mobilization of the Russian Army—Some Russian Generals—Invasion of East Prussia—The Grand Duke Nicholas's Proclamation to the Poles—First Engagements in East Prussia—Repeated German Defeats—Austria's Advance into Russian Poland—The Conqueror of Galicia—Some Austrian Commanders—The Great Battle for Lemberg—Samsonoff's Defeat at Osterode—Exaltation of General von Hindenburg—Further Austrian Defeats in Galicia—The Russians withdraw from East Prussia—Their Renewed Successes in Galicia—The Plight of Austria—Serbian Successes in September—The Germans advance into Russian Poland, but are driven out.

THERE were various fluctuations in the first hostilities which followed the outbreak of war in Eastern Europe. It was not unnaturally anticipated that if Austria and Serbia were left to fight out their quarrel the former would end by prevailing by sheer force of numbers. But, apart from the consequences accruing from the intervention of Russia, the Serbians put up an amazingly good fight against their formidable antagonists. They had been recently inured to warfare by their campaigns against the Turks and the Bulgarians, and not only did they offer a vigorous resistance to the forces of the Emperor Franz Josef, but they were soon able to take the offensive.

As was stated in a former chapter, Austria, after declaring war on July 28, 1914, proceeded two days later to bombard Belgrade, whereupon the Serbian Government removed to Nish, the ancient Serbian capital. The Serbian forces were rapidly mobilized, and every preparation was made to prevent both the passage of the Danube and any irruption from the Austrian province of Bosnia. In attempting to cross the Danube Austria encountered

repeated failures, and amid the confusion which momentarily arose in her councils on the intervention of Russia, she made no effort to cross from Bosnia into Serbia by the River Drina. Her troops even withdrew from Visegrad on the frontier of the Sanjak of Novi Bazar, whereupon the Serbians assumed the offensive and captured the town of Foca or Fotcha, commanding the communications between Montenegro and Sarajevo, the Bosnian capital. Montenegro, it should be mentioned, had mobilized her little army, and declared for Serbia already on August 2. Penetrating beyond Foca, the Serbians seemed to be on the point of possessing themselves of Herzegovina, but the Austrian forces recovered from their first stupor and succeeded by weight of numbers in forcing the passage of the Drina, near Lodznitz, where some severe fighting ensued to Serbian advantage. Another Austrian army, which crossed the Save near Shabatz, encountered an even more spirited resistance, and on August 18, after a four days' contest, the invaders were driven in confusion across the Drina, three of their regiments being cut up and many of

their officers and men taken prisoners. Profiting by the advantage they had gained, the Serbians pursued one column of their adversaries to Yana and Bjelana in Bosnia, again inflicting severe losses on them, and between August 21 and 25 fighting was resumed with the Austrians still in Serbia. The final result of these operations was that the invaders lost from 12,000 to 15,000 men killed and wounded, while the Serbians captured some 10,000 prisoners, seventy guns, and large quantities of ammunition and other war material. The victors attributed their success partly to their strategy, which had resulted in the piercing of the enemy's centre and the separation of his forces into two parts, which were then engaged sepa-

ately and in a large measure outflanked. The Serbians also claimed that their marksmanship had proved superior to that of the Austrians, that they had employed the bayonet with remarkably good results, and that their guns, derived from France, had outmatched the enemy's artillery.

Meantime the Montenegrin army had achieved some successes in Herzegovina. While Austria was suffering these reverses at the hands of the two Balkan States she was confronted by a yet more powerful adversary, for the Russians had taken the field with the object of invading both of the Central Empires. The mobilization of the forces of so vast a State as Russia appeared to be a serious problem, fraught with many difficulties; but for obvious reasons it had always been the Russian practice to keep the army corps in the Asiatic part of the Empire at war strength. Of recent years, moreover, the peace strength of the forces in the western military divisions of Warsaw, Vilna, and Kiev had been a high one in order that these corps might be fully mobilized in a week or thereabouts. Apart from this, the great development of the Russian railway system under the auspices of Prince Kilikoff, ever since the Russo-Japanese war, placed much greater facilities than formerly at the disposal of the military authorities, and thus the Russian army was mobilized in fifteen days—about half the time which would have been required under the old conditions.

Moreover, Russia did not wait for the complete mobilization of her troops. On August 2—the very day when a



A Young Serbian Hero: a twelve-year-old boy who fought in the trenches at Belgrade





The new Call to Arms in Serbia: Veterans of the last Balkan wars on the march to Nish

*Te Deum* for victory was chanted outside the Winter Palace at St. Petersburg (whose name was soon to be changed to Petrograd), and when, in the presence of statesmen, courtiers, soldiers, and seamen, the Emperor Nicholas took a solemn pledge that he would not conclude peace so long as a single enemy remained on Russian soil—a first army crossed the East Prussian frontier under the orders of General Rennenkampf, an officer of German extraction, who had previously commanded at Vilna. The post of generalissimo of the Russian forces had been conferred, it may here be mentioned, on the Grand Duke Nicholas Nikolaïevitch, one of the Czar's uncles, and the control of the principal army intended for the operations against Austria was allotted to General Ruzsky, until then commander at Kiev.

Some German detachments had already penetrated to various Polish frontier villages and towns, but they refrained from going farther in that direction when Rennenkampf's troops made their appearance in East Prussia, where several minor engagements took place during the ensuing week. More important operations were imminent when on August 14 the Grand Duke Nicholas issued a momentous proclamation to the whole Polish people. Poland, it will be recollected, was dismembered twice during the eighteenth century, one part (Posen and Danzig) going to Prussia, another (Galicia) to Austria, and the remainder (the Warsaw territory) to Russia. For several years prior to the Great World War, Prussia, as is well known, had grossly ill-treated her Polish subjects, whom she vainly strove to


"Germanize". In Galicia Austria had exercised a milder sway, while Russia, anxious to obliterate the unhappy memories of the past, had recently promised a number of reforms in the administration of her Polish territory. At the moment of the declaration of war, the Austrian Poles or Galicians gave numerous signs of loyalty. In response to the appeals of the Emperor Francis-Joseph they flocked to the Austrian colours, and tendered large war-offerings of money, Cracow alone contributing over £40,000. Prussia, on her side, suddenly strove to conciliate the more or less disaffected inhabitants of Posen by dint of blandishment and cajolery; and, carrying her intrigues as well as some of her forces across the frontier, she endeavoured to stir up revolt among the Russian Poles. Russia retorted in a very remarkable manner, for the Grand Duke Nicholas's manifesto to the Poles promised the reunion of all the severed regions of Poland under the Russian sceptre, with freedom in faith, language, and self-government. In a striking passage of his proclamation the Grand Duke said: "A century and a half ago the living flesh of Poland was torn asunder, but her soul did not die"—words which recalled the legendary retort of the heroic Polish patriot, Kosciuszko, who, on being finally overcome in 1794, was said to have exclaimed: "*Finis Poloniæ!*" "I said no such thing," he afterwards declared indignantly; "it would have been blasphemy. Poland will live!"

While the German intrigues were being checked by the unexpected

action of the Grand Duke Nicholas, Rennenkampf's troops gave battle to three German army corps at various points. A first success near Eydtkuhn, near the East Prussian frontier, was followed by an advance along the whole front of the German positions between Stallupönen and Kattenau. The former locality was protected by field-works, but the Russians rushed them with the bayonet and seized the town. Hard fighting ensued, but the enemy was driven from successive positions, and by six o'clock in the evening was completely routed—fleeing in the direction of Gumbinnen, with the Russian cavalry in close pursuit. Further successes were gained during the next two days, and on the 20th Rennenkampf's troops made yet another vigorous forward movement. The Germans had prepared for it by bringing an additional army corps from Mlava, on the Polish frontier; but by weakening their forces in that direction they cleared the way for another Russian army, which, under the command of General Samsonoff, was advancing from the vicinity of Warsaw. The battle of the 20th lasted fourteen hours, 3000 German killed were left upon the field, and the Russians took 400 prisoners and thirty guns. During the next three days the enemy was driven back beyond Insterburg, which the Russians occupied. More to the south, at Soldau, Mühlen, and Allenstein, the Germans were defeated with severe loss by the Warsaw army on August 23. But the region is one of lakes and marsh-land, between which there are only comparatively narrow, sinuous defiles,

# EAST-EUROPEAN THEATRE OF WAR

English Miles  
0 50 100 150 200  
Fortified Towns







and these were defended by various works armed with heavy guns, in such wise that the Russian advance could not be prosecuted rapidly. Nevertheless, after a few more days' fighting, the Germans were constrained to fall back on Osterode. The Kaiser was greatly affected by the invasion of his "loyal East Prussia", and telegraphed an expression of his deep sympathy, and an assurance that the Russians would soon be driven out of the country. This, however, did not allay the general anxiety, and thousands of panic-stricken people fled

westward from Königsberg, Danzig, and other towns.

The Russian and Austrian operations were now becoming more important. Galicia being seriously threatened by the army of General Ruzsky and another under General Brussiloff, the Austrians endeavoured to check their advance by a bold counter-stroke, which consisted in invading Poland with strong composite forces of Austro-Germans, Poles, and Hungarians. These troops advanced from Cracow into the Kielce, Radom, and Lublin districts of Russian Poland,



Petrograd and the Great War: Citizens offering up prayers for the victory of Russia's arms  
(The portrait raised aloft is that of the Tsar)

where they made considerable progress, thereby creating a hope that they might be able to turn the right of the Russian troops who were operating against Galicia from the east. Russia, however, disposed of ample forces to defeat this design, and her plans with respect to Galicia remained unchanged. These were carried out in the careful methodical manner which was to be expected of such a commander as General Ruzsky—an officer of the scientific type, sixty years of age, spectacled, and slightly bent, even as Moltke became bent, patient also like Moltke with respect to the accomplishment of his designs, but quick in his decisions. His fellow commander, General Brussiloff, was an officer of a more dashing stamp, but also one of high attainments. In opposition to these leaders Austria put forth Field-Marshal von Ost-Auffenberg, Field-Marshal von Hoetzendorf, General Dankl, the Archduke Frederick—a brother of the Queen-mother of Spain, and reputed to be the best military man of the Austrian imperial family—and also the young Archduke Joseph, heir to the empire since the assassination of his uncle, Francis Ferdinand, at Sarajevo.

On August 25 there began a great battle for the possession of Lemberg, the seat of the Austrian Government in Galicia, though Cracow, at the other extremity of the province, was the capital of all Poland in the days of the country's independence. The contest for Lemberg raged during seven days, and extended over a distance of 200 miles from the Lublin district in Russian Poland to Halicz,



General Rennenkampf

south-south-west of the threatened city. By September 2 the Austrians, who included five army corps, totalling about a quarter of a million men, were completely defeated. There were thousands of killed and wounded, and the Russians claimed to have taken no fewer than 70,000 prisoners, in addition to 200 guns and several standards. Many of the Austrian losses were incurred on the Halicz front, where they desperately attempted a flanking movement but were decisively routed by General Brussiloff. At this point alone the Russians buried 4800 of the enemy's dead. Lemberg, several of whose fortified positions had previously been taken, now surrendered to General Ruzsky.

It happened, however, that on the



day preceding this signal triumph the Warsaw army, under General Samsonoff (an officer of much higher repute as an organizer than as a commander in the field), suffered a severe defeat in the Osterode region, where the Germans, by means of their well-developed railway system, were able to concentrate powerful forces under an undoubtedly energetic commander, General von Hindenburg. Hindenburg claimed to have captured or destroyed in this engagement—called the battle of Tannenberg by the Germans—three Russian army corps, but it was asserted at Petrograd that General Samsonoff had only two corps with him at the time. In any case, Samsonoff himself was killed, and the Germans certainly made many prisoners. It would be puerile to deny that the reverse was a set-back for the Russian arms in East Prussia. Before long, indeed, it led to a German

advance into Poland, and the withdrawal for a time of General Rennenkampfs hitherto successful forces from their positions near Königsberg. In Berlin, Hindenburg's victory was hailed with enthusiastic delight. According to independent American accounts it was held to be the most remarkable military achievement since the days of antiquity, and the General, in spite of his stern, indeed his almost forbidding, countenance, at once became the darling of the Berlin drawing-rooms and the god of all the beer-gardens. As it happened, however, that triumph was shortlived.

Meanwhile General Ruzsky and his colleagues were dealing further severe blows at the Austrian forces. On September 5 the latter were attacked in the vicinity of Tomaszow, near the frontier, and retreated in disorder towards Rawaruska, north-west of Lemberg, where, after four days'



All Roads lead to Germany: Russian Soldiers marching along the railway line to the Front

fighting, they were again severely defeated. The result of these engagements was that the Russians were able to cross the lower part of the River San—driving the Austrians before them into a marshy triangle between that stream and the Vistula—and to lay siege to the great fortress of Przemyśl, which offered, however, so determined a resistance that the invaders ultimately contented themselves with isolating it, relying on time to contribute to its reduction.

It was on September 9 that the Germans at last took the offensive against General Rennenkampf in the vicinity of Königsberg. The Russians were so placed that, although the enemy greatly outnumbered them, they were compelled to give battle. For three days they continued fighting, and by a partial retirement of their protruding left wing considerably improved their position. Nevertheless, before many days were over, the Grand Duke Nicholas deemed it expedient for Rennenkampf to withdraw from East Prussia. After receiving huge reinforcements, the Germans, finding the door left open for them, began to cross the frontier, not realizing that the Grand Duke's object was to lure them on to destruction.

Meantime Generals Ruzsky, Brusiloff, and Dimitrieff were inflicting further defeats on the Austrians under Auffenberg and his colleagues, Dankl and Boverig. On September 17 these commanders were routed in Galicia with terrible losses, the estimates supplied by the Russians being so huge as to appear almost incredible. On the 21st the important fortified town

of Jaroslav, commanding the railway-line between Lemberg and Cracow, was stormed by the Russians, and although Przemyśl still stanchly resisted bombardment, the end of the month found the Austrian armies in a most woeful plight, and the Russians steadily prosecuting their advance towards Cracow.

In these circumstances several Austrian commanders were superseded, and the victor of Osterode, the much-belauded German General von Hindenburg, became, in connection with the campaign against Russia, generalissimo of the forces of the Dual Monarchy. It was asserted at the time that his appointment had been imposed on Austria by the German Kaiser, but there is



The Grand Duke Nicholas, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army  
(From a photograph by Boissonnas & Eggler)



*Imperial Cousins.  
The Tsar, Nicholas II and H.M. King George V.*







A "Frightful Example" for Germany: Neidenburg in East Prussia, after its destruction by the Russians

evidence that the aged Emperor Francis-Joseph was profoundly dissatisfied with the conduct of his own generals. They had failed on all sides. In vain, too, had every available man of the eleven nationalities of the empire been called to the colours. Nothing seemed to stem the tide of disaster. Cossacks had driven back the Austrian forces in the Carpathians and descended into the Hungarian plain, where their presence seemed to threaten a speedy advance on Budapest. Vienna, crowded with an ever-increasing number of refugees, was reported to be almost in a state of panic. No good results had attended even the hostilities against the despised little state of Serbia. On September 8 the Serbians gained a victory at Racha; on the 10th, having crossed the Save, they even seized the Hungarian frontier town of Semlin; on the 19th they again defeated the Austrians in the Sanjak of Novi Bazar; and

though in the meantime they had been obliged to withdraw from Semlin, they invested it once more on Michaelmas Eve. Before then the Germans had certainly advanced into Russian Poland from various directions, one of their objectives being Grodno on the Niemen, and the other Kalisz, a town on the Polish frontier, south-east of Posen. Kalisz, it would seem, was regarded as a convenient base for a march on Warsaw, where the Kaiser, who had momentarily joined his eastern forces, may have hoped to spend the winter. The enemy's principal effort was made, however, in the Grodno region. But he was repeatedly checked there, and although for a while he possessed himself of several towns, notably Augustovo, the Russians, after biding their time, took the offensive vigorously, signally defeated him, and in the first days of October pursued him into his own province of East Prussia.

E. A. V.

## CHAPTER XIV

## THE COMMAND OF THE NORTH SEA

(October–November, 1914)

The Home Waters—Extent and Importance of them—How Command of the Sea is exercised—British Mine-field in the North Sea—The Naval Brigades at Antwerp—Character of the Coast and Banks of Flanders—The Naval Operations on them—Commander Horton's Destruction of a German Submarine—Captain Fox's Victory over the German Destroyers—The Loss of the *Hawke* and the *Hermes*—The *Badger* and the Submarine—The German Raid of November 3.

IF a line is drawn on a map from the most southerly point of Iceland to the coast of Norway, and if another is carried to the south till it is on a level with Cape Finisterre, in Spain, and if then a third is marked to the Spanish headland, they will enclose what we call the British Seas, or the Four Seas of Britain, or Home Waters. In every war, whether it has a prominent naval side or not, this is the most important part of the surface of the globe for the British Empire. Our trade starts from and returns to it. Within it lie our home ports and the basis of all our oversea operations, even when they are most purely military. Unless we command it we cannot bring in food, nor send troops abroad, nor provide reinforcements, arms, and stores to armies or garrisons which are acting oversea anywhere on the earth. Therefore, Home Waters must always be first in the thought of a Government which has to direct a war, or of the writer who endeavours to describe the course of one. Nelson, in a moment of irritation, complained that services performed near home were always most praised and best rewarded. If that was the case, the

reason is plain. Common sense tells us all that the most brilliant success made in far-off seas would be far outweighed by a failure anywhere within the region we have just marked out. Therefore, though much more spirited and lively episodes are to be recorded in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, than can be recorded of our Home Waters during the period of the war we are now to deal with—that is to say, from the beginning of October till the middle of November—we will deal with them first.

Command of the sea is exercised in two ways: by the movement of active forces and by the obstruction which obstacles or barriers of one kind or another put in the way of an enemy's attack. The first is in the long run by far the most important, but it is also the most difficult to see. A fleet which is at hand whenever it is needed can by a moderate exercise of care be made to vanish as completely as if it were cruising between Cape Horn and Australia. We have lost sight of the Grand Fleet under command of Sir John Jellicoe. His ships have been seen by some of us, but to the nation at large they are out of sight. We cannot if we would, say—and if we



could we ought not to tell—what have been their movements. But we know that the main force of the British navy has been employed cruising, watching, waiting, somewhere in the Channel and the North Sea. We can, by simply considering the conditions, arrive at a fairly accurate estimate of what they must have been doing. A blockading fleet cannot cruise to-day in sight of the enemy's shores, tacking up and down its beat, and showing its topsails, if not its broadsides, to the foe's look-out. For one thing, wireless telegraphy has rendered a close watch less necessary. And then the submarine and the torpedo have made a stationary watch too dangerous. The watchers must keep

on the move, and that at a not inconsiderable rate of speed. So we must figure to ourselves the swift courses of submarines, destroyers, cruisers, in some open order, each sweeping the line appointed for its watch, and all so arranged that if an enemy slips between the units of one line he will be met as he tries to pass the next. They go in the ever-present consciousness of the submarine, which strikes from below, without lights in the dark, or signal in the fog, communicating by wireless, calling one another up, and passing the warning. Their function is to examine and test what ships they may meet; but, above all, to watch till the German fleet comes out. And that is the



Photo. Cribb, Southsea

"Somewhere in the North Sea": 13.5 guns firing from one of the British Battle Cruisers, with decks cleared for action



Photo. Cribb, Southsea

How our Battleships are Protected against Submarine Attacks: Torpedo nets in position

active exercise of command of the sea.

The passive command, or command by obstruction, is more visible. We cannot help seeing, for instance, that Germany has been aided to control the Baltic by the obstacles, some political or military, but others geographical, which bar the entry of the British fleet. The cruel ingenuity of modern inventors has created a new and terrible means of obstruction—the mine. In theory there are limits to the use of these weapons. They are forbidden to be placed in the open sea, and when they are laid on an enemy's

coast they must either be fixed or be so constructed that when they float loose they rapidly become innocuous and cease to be a peril to neutral traders. But such rules as these are made at conferences on international law or on some such occasions; they cannot enforce themselves, and a belligerent can always disregard them unless he is deterred by the fear of injuring some neutral whom he cannot venture to offend. When all the Great Powers are engaged in the war there is no third party whose intervention is to be feared. In the present war all the Great Powers of Europe are

engaged in the struggle. The only neutral of formidable strength is the United States, which will, as a matter of course, not act till its interests are injured.

We have had more than one occasion to refer to the use of mines already, but in October the question rose to the acute stage. The German Government has consistently denied that it has laid mines indiscriminately in the open sea. It maintains that they have been placed only on the British coast. This assertion cannot be reconciled with the undoubted fact that British and neutral trading-vessels and trawlers have been destroyed by mines where they cannot be said to have been on the British coast. The German Government retorts that the mines have been scattered broadcast by the British Government. As between ourselves and our enemies, each side will take the word of its own rulers. But to a neutral it must appear obvious that Great Britain, which has other and very effectual means of suspending German trade, has no interest in obstructing the transport of the food and raw material which it imports from northern Europe. When it took the serious measure which it put in practice at the beginning of October the antecedent probability was that it was retaliating in self-defence. On the third of the month an official announcement was made that a mine-field had been laid in the oblong outlined by the lines of latitude and longitude  $51^{\circ} 15''$  and  $51^{\circ} 40''$  N. and the  $1^{\circ} 35''$  and  $3^{\circ}$  E. The south-east corner of the block touched the coast of the Continent at Ostend. The

whole constituted a danger-space lying between two lines drawn on the north from off the coast of Essex to a point near the Dutch island of Schouwen, while the south one stretched from off the North Foreland to Ostend. It will be seen that a passage was left free for trade on the east side. The *Königin Luise*, we may remember, was engaged in laying mines in this very region when she was destroyed by the *Amphion* and her flotilla. This fact alone supplies sufficient justification for the action of the British Government. But there is another and an even better. The submarine, which acts below the surface of the water, must be guarded against where it is most dangerous. The mine area was designed, we must presume, to guard against the invasion of the Straits of Dover and the Channel by the German submersible craft, by making the way too dangerous for them. They would naturally aim at doing the utmost possible harm on the line of communications with the army in France and Belgium. We shall see what measure of success was attained by the means taken to baffle them.

The laying of these mines was part of a policy which developed during the following weeks under the stress of the German attack. Mines were placed along the coast up to Aldeburgh. From October 3 foreign trawlers were forbidden to enter the east-coast ports of Great Britain. The measure was one which affected our own interests, for many trawlers under foreign flags are British owned; but it was rendered necessary by the facilities which the frequentation of



our waters by these vessels offered to the enemy for obtaining information. When a number of them were together they might serve as cover to German submarines, or even as decoys. A cruiser which stopped to overhaul one would present a stationary target to the enemy's torpedo. The reports that they have so served were of a merely hypothetical character, but the possibility was undeniable.

The mines thus placed were designed to serve as barriers, for open spaces were left for the movements of war-ships or traders. The traders would, of course, have to follow the route given them by the British authorities. It became obvious before long that the mine-laying on our part could not be confined to the southern half of the sea. So long as the whole area was open to the movement of merchant shipping the same difficulties would remain. The only effectual measure would be to close it to the movement of trade, as being occupied by warlike operations. What other measures in the form of mine-laying were taken can only be known in a general way, but the policy finally adopted was made public on November 3. The Admiralty began by a preamble which stated the facts of the case:

"During the last week the Germans have scattered mines indiscriminately in the open sea on the main trade route from America to Liverpool via the north of Ireland".

This fact had already been revealed by the loss of the s.s. *Manchester Commerce*, outward bound, which



On one of the Naval Armoured Trains in Belgium:  
the look-out men

struck a mine somewhere to the north of Tory Island, off the coast of Donegal. It was known from this and other incidents that a mine-field had been laid there:

"The White Star liner *Olympic* escaped disaster by pure good luck. But for the warnings given by British cruisers, other

British and neutral merchant and passenger vessels would have been destroyed."

of whether they are friend or foe, civilian or military in character."

Such a way of conducting war is, when done secretly, a pure method of barbarism, and has no similarity to a blockade, which is a measure taken openly and publicly announced.

"These mines", the Admiralty went on, "cannot have been laid by any German ship of war. They have been laid by some merchant-vessel flying a neutral flag which has come along the trade route as if for the purposes of peaceful commerce, and, while profiting to the full by the immunity enjoyed by neutral merchant-ships, has wantonly and recklessly endangered the lives of all who travel on the sea, regardless

In the face of this policy, carried out by an abuse of the neutral flag by hospital ships and trawlers, the British Government, represented by the Admiralty, found it necessary to take "exceptional measures".

"They therefore give notice that the whole of the North Sea must be considered a military area. Within this area merchant shipping of all kinds, traders of all countries, fishing-craft, and all other vessels, will be exposed to the gravest dangers from mines which it has been necessary to lay, and from war-ships searching vigilantly by night and day for suspicious craft. All



The Handy Man Ashore: one of the British Navy's armoured trains at the Front

merchant- and fishing-vessels of every description are hereby warned of the dangers they encounter by entering this area except in strict accordance with Admiralty directions. Every effort will be made to convey this warning to neutral countries and to vessels on the sea, but from November 5 onwards the Admiralty announce that all ships passing a line drawn from the northern point of the Hebrides through the Faroe Islands to Iceland do so at their own peril.

"Ships of all countries wishing to trade to and from Norway, the Baltic, Denmark, and Holland are advised to come, if inward bound, by the English Channel and the Straits of Dover. They will be given sailing directions which will pass them safely so far as Great Britain is concerned up the east coast of England to Farne Island [on the coast of Northumberland just south of the border] whence a safe route will, if possible, be given to Lindesnaes Lighthouse [the south point of Norway]. From this point they should turn north or south according to their destination in safety, so far as Great Britain is concerned, but any straying of a few miles from the course thus indicated may be followed by fatal consequences."

The full effect of these regulations could not be felt within the period with which we are now dealing, but they must be understood and borne in mind by all who wish to realize the conditions in which the war was necessarily conducted. Their tendency was to shut the North Sea to all movements of ships. It must never be forgotten that mines, particularly in spells of bad weather, are liable to drift, and that, therefore, no exercise of care could prevent risk to vessels, whether for war or trade, which were making use of the so-called safe passages. While these conditions were

maturing, a number of operations, which seem to be isolated because we do not see their connection, occurred in these waters.

This is not the place for an account of the events on land which led to the active intervention of the navy on the coast of Belgium and north-eastern France. It is enough to record that by the end of September and in the beginning of October the western or right part of the German army was pressing so far towards the sea that it came within the range of the navy's action. The coasts of Belgium and of France as far as Calais constituted a line which the fleet was called upon to help to hold.

A glance at the accompanying sketch-map will show that this line is affected in a curious and even non-natural manner by political divisions. Antwerp, at the north-eastern corner, is a great seaport in the exceptional position of being shut off from access to the open sea except through the territorial waters of another State. It stands on the River Scheldt 12 miles above the delta, or conglomerate of deltas, full of islands formed by that river, by the Maas or Meuse, and by the Rhine. But these islands and part of the coast on the south-westerly branch of the delta, the Honte or West Scheldt, belong to the neutral kingdom of the Netherlands, generally known as Holland. The passages are therefore Dutch territorial waters. As a port of war Antwerp is by itself of no value. Napoleon described it as a pistol held at the heart of England; but when he spoke he was master of Holland. To-day it could not be



used as a basis of naval operations except by a Power either in alliance with Holland or prepared to violate Dutch neutrality. The Belgian coast really begins at Sluis, a little to the west of Cadzand, or Kadzand, the Dutch frontier town. Though divided in political allegiance, the coast is geographically one, and its character is succinctly described in *The North Sea Pilot*:

line of soundings, which, in the southern part of the North Sea, is the eastern limit of the fairway to Dover Strait."

These are the famous Banks of Flanders, on which the Armada was nearly wrecked when it had been driven by fireships from Calais Roads. They have always been a danger to large vessels operating in these seas. There is no good natural harbour on



The Fight for the Channel Coast: Map showing the scene of the combined naval and military operations on the coast of Belgium and North-Eastern France, October–November, 1914

The line of the allied armies followed roughly the course of the canal from Nieuport to Ypres.

"The approach to the low and dangerous coast between Calais and the River Scheldt is obstructed by numerous banks of grey and black sand, which extend 15 miles from the shore on the meridian of Calais, and 42 miles in a north-easterly direction from Dunkerque. They are all long and narrow, and converge in direction towards Dover Strait. Their shortest parts may be touched upon by vessels of almost any draught, and the eddies they occasion cause a hollow sea which breaks when it blows hard. Those farthest from the land lie on the eastern side of the 20-fathom

the coast, which is low and fringed by sand-hills, the Dunes. All the harbours, such as they are, have been made by art—by running out moles and piers. The two which most concern us are Zeebrugge and Ostend. The first lies between the second and the Dutch town of Sluis. Its name means "Bruges on the Sea, and it is really the trade port of that ancient city familiar to multitudes of British travellers. They are connected by

the Bruges canal, a cutting entered through a sea lock,  $6\frac{1}{2}$  miles long, 229 feet wide at the sea-level, and with a depth of 29 feet over a breadth of 72 feet. These details are of extreme importance for our subject. The existence of this canal, which is connected at Ghent with a great inland system of artificial waterways or canalized rivers, renders the possession of Zeebrugge very important to Germany. The communications with the interior are not complete. There are breaks or portages which obstruct the transfer of German submarines to Zeebrugge. By bringing them in parts, or, in the case of the smaller types, even by carrying them on special trucks, this artificial port could be turned into a German naval base so soon as the interior had been mastered. Ostend is of much the same character as Zeebrugge, but has no such communications with the interior. The defect of both is that, being flush on the coast, they have no natural protection against bombardment by modern guns, which, in the case of the most powerful, have a range of up to 15 miles. On the other hand, the nature of the coast, the shallow waters, and the sands, which are liable to change place in heavy storms from the north, hamper the movements of the largest war-ships. It would also be easy to keep submarines in the inland or Bruges basin of the canal which reaches the coast at Zeebrugge. With these facts to guide us we can easily realize how important it was to the Allies to keep the Belgian cities and ports named above out of the hands of the enemy if possible, or at any rate to delay his

occupation to the last moment. And therein lies the justification of a venture which was much and bitterly criticized—the dispatch of naval brigades to assist in the defence of Antwerp.

Mention has already been made of the formation of permanent naval brigades to assist in the longshore operations of the fleet. We have noted that this naval division was only in part drawn from the superfluity of the navy, and was made up by volunteers drawn from many sources. It hung somewhat loose on the Admiralty, being held at the disposal of the War Office and subject to be transferred to the army. It had a staff of its own, which was mainly military in character—only one of the eight gentlemen composing it being an honorary captain of the Royal Naval Reserve. The decision to send this division to the aid of Antwerp was much blamed, as a mere example of fussy activity, and as the city fell before the German attack, those who talked of it as a mere waste of effort and lives appeared to have a *prima facie* case. But there is a pedantry of naval and military as of other criticism. We must, as Lord Rodney said, know how to take the great line—that is to say, to judge each operation in connection with the general course of the war. Mr. Churchill justified this one on the ground that it was designed to help an ally and detain the enemy. In so far as it attained those ends it was legitimate and successful, even though the apparent object—the defence of Antwerp—was not achieved. The actual operations on shore, fighting in the trenches and batteries, are outside



The Monitors' Part in the Fight for the Channel Ports: the warships built for Brazil, but taken over by the British Government, bombarding the German flank on the Belgian coast



the field of the naval historian. The navy proper is hardly affected even by the loss of life incurred, or by the fact that when Antwerp was evacuated, on October 8, some two thousand men of the division were cut off from their line of retreat eastward and driven into the Dutch territory on the west bank of the Honte or West Scheldt. The list of casualties published on October 17, 1914, showed a great predominance of military over naval names.

The time for the direct action of the navy came when on October 18 the allied commanders on shore applied for the help of the Admiralty. It was instantly given by the dispatch from Dover of vessels best adapted for the work. The exact constitution of the force employed was not officially announced, but it is known from casualty lists and other indications to have included the three so-called monitors, the *Humber* (Commander A. L. Snagge), the *Severn* (Commander E. J. A. Fullerton), and the *Mersey* (Lieutenant-Commander R. A. Wilson). These vessels were built for the Brazilian Government, to be used as river gunboats, and were to have been named, from Brazilian rivers, the Javary, Madeira, and Solimoes. They were taken over and renamed. From the nature of the service they were expected to perform they were constructed to have but a small draught—8½ feet—are 265 feet long, and have a moderate speed of 11½ knots. Their armament, as originally designed, was two 6-inch guns, two 4.7-inch howitzers, and four 3-pounders. On the open sea they would be no match for a very moderate cruiser, but among the banks

and in the shallows of the coast of Flanders they were at home. To them are to be added the battleship *Venerable* (Captain J. H. G. Bernard), the light cruisers *Hermes* (Captain C. R. Lambe) and *Brilliant* (Captain H. Christian), the destroyers *Myrmidon* (Lieutenant-Commander J. V. Creagh) and *Falcon* (Lieutenant H. O. Wanton), and the sloops *Rinaldo* (Chief-Gunner A. G. Weeks) and *Wildfire* (Chief-Gunner A. Jennings). The command of the whole was held by Rear-Admiral Hood.

After October 18 this squadron was engaged in the class of operations which have been defined as amphibious. It co-operated with the army both by firing from the sea and by landing men. The object of its fire was the German force, which kept hammering at the left wing of the Allies in the hope of turning it and so driving them away to the south and from the coast. The character of the operation is well described in its main lines by the Admiralty statement of October 22, 1914:

"A heavy bombardment of the German flank has been maintained without intermission since the morning of the 19th, and is being continued to-day. Observation is arranged from the shore by means of naval balloons, and all reports indicate that substantial losses have been inflicted upon the enemy, and that the fire is well directed and effective against his batteries and heavy guns."

And on the 24th the story was continued:

"All yesterday the monitors and other vessels of the British bombarding flotilla fired on the German right, which they

searched thoroughly and effectively, in concert with the operations of the Belgian army. All German attacks on Nieuport [between Ostend and Dunkerque] were repulsed. Much damage was done to the enemy by naval fire, which enfilades the German line, and the enemy's prisoners taken yesterday and the day before testify



Rear-Admiral Hood, in command of the Naval operations off the coast of Flanders  
(From a photograph by Russell, Southsea)

to the heavy losses they have suffered from this cause. Fire was also opened in the afternoon on the German batteries near Ostend."

Until the beginning of November these operations continued with full success for the ships. The naval gunnery proved its superiority over the artillery which the Germans were able to bring into action against it, and that was more markedly the case when the *Venerable's* four 12-inch guns, sup-

ported by her own 6-inch guns and those of the monitors.

We must figure to ourselves the *Venerable* and the members of Admiral Hood's squadron navigating in the waters between the Banks of Flanders and the shore of Belgium—that is to say, among banks and shallows where the most exact handling is required even for vessels which, like the monitors, draw only  $8\frac{1}{2}$  feet, and to a much greater extent for the *Venerable*, of 15,000 tons, which draws 25 feet. In front of them is a shore of monotonous low sand-hills, each own brother to the other. The landmarks are not natural formations of the land, but church towers, by which pilots and seamen can take their bearings—Lef-frinckouke with its spire, Zuidcoote with a steeple, Ghyvelde with a square tower, Furnes with two spires of different height, Wulpen with one spire, Lombartzyde with a high, flat tower, Westende with its spire, and Middelkerke with a high white tower surmounted by a spire. The enemy whom they had to repel and the ally who was to be helped were fighting over hedge and dyke and for the possession of farm-houses round the churches. The fire had to be directed so as to spare friend and hit foe. Those church spires and towers became pawns and positions in the struggle as much as the dykes and hedges and farm-houses, and suffered with them. A naval officer whose letter was published in the *Times* of October 26, 1914, tells how, when the enemy was seen to be making use of one spire, the 6-inch gun of his vessel was turned on it five times. "The first

[shot] took the top clean off, the second hit again; one went through the roof; only one of the five missed, and that grazed the side." The humble Flemish church shared the fate of Rheims and Ypres cathedrals.

The work of the squadron was not confined to firing from the sea. Besides those who landed to use the balloons and mark the positions of the enemy, there were some who were to take part in actual fighting. Lieutenant Wise of the *Severn* was sent with a detachment of twenty men and a machine-gun to assist in the defence of the Groote Bamburgh, a farm-house near Nieuport. It had been seized by the Germans, but the British officer was not told in time. He was seen by the Belgians in the trenches behind the building as he came across a field, map in hand, leading his men, cool and resolute, to perform his duty. The warning shouts of the Belgians, who knew that he was going to destruction, were not heard in the clamour of battle, or were not understood. Lieutenant Wise marched to within 50 yards of the farm before he was shot. In the squadron itself the losses were small. Lieutenant Wanton, of the *Falcon*, was killed, together with eight of his crew, by an explosion of shrapnel; but the total loss was slight in comparison with that known to have been inflicted on the enemy by the naval guns.



Photo. Symonds, Portsmouth

H.M.S. *Hermes*—employed as a carrier of Sea-planes—sunk by Submarine attack on October 31, 1914

Throughout these engagements the ships were subjected to attack by a German submarine, or by submarines, without success. The assaults were beaten off, the torpedoes, detected as they came through the water, being avoided by a quick turn of the helm. As experience of the value of submarines accumulated it began to be seen that, however formidable they may be when circumstances favour them, they have their limitations. One of these is that as they must sink to exercise their whole power they are greatly hampered on a shallow coast full of sand-banks. The only success gained by one of them in this part of the field of operations was scored, not on the Belgian coast, but in the Straits of Dover. On the last day of October, 1914, the *Hermes* (Captain Lambe), an oldish vessel of 5600 tons, which had been employed as a carrier of sea-planes, was struck early in the morning and sank, happily with small loss of life. Fleet-Surgeon Mowatt, a retired navy doctor who had returned to service when war came, afterwards related how the blow was given while the officers were at break-



fast, and sent table and all on it flying up in ruin. The promptitude of the officers, the good discipline of the crew, and the instant aid of other vessels in sight prevented nearly all loss of life. The value of the *Hermes* as a fighting ship was not great, but it was a disappointment, after all the precautions taken to shut them out, to find the German submarines still able to strike in the Straits of Dover.

While the fleet was helping to confine the German advance to the line formed by the canal from Ypres to Nieuport, the normal course of patrol carried on by the British fleet, and of sporadic attack by German submarines or other small craft, produced clashes of conflict from time to time. Until the records of both sides can be compared in detail it is impossible to judge what proportion the encounters of the vessels bore to the number of cruisers. The reports sparingly published by the British Government make it clear that the German submarines were enterprising, and that their activity had some effect in conditioning the disposition and movements of British ships. The enemy possessed a certain advantage in that he knew, not neces-

sarily from observation, and still less from reports of spies, but by easy deduction from probability and the nature of the case, that many British vessels must at all times be on the move in certain large but well-defined areas of sea. On the other hand, British naval officers could not strike at the German ships, which were carefully kept behind barriers. The great majority of them were in all likelihood stationed on the east side of the Kiel Canal. While the enemy, therefore, could aim his harassing attacks at an object of which the many items were indeed continually on the move and difficult to find, the British vessels could strike only at the small points provided by the occasional adventurer—submarine, destroyer, or cruiser—who slipped out undetected from behind Heligoland. This being so, the balance of chances were much in favour of the German enterprises. It is a proof of the activity and vigilance of the British watch that they were not more successful, and that they were so often cut short at the beginning.

A very typical example of this work of cutting short and suppressing was given on October 8 by Lieutenant-Commander Max K. Horton of the submarine E9. Successes with submarines on both sides in the war so far had had a way of falling to the same officer, a fact which perhaps goes to show that some individual



Photo. Symonds, Portsmouth

The British cruiser Hawke, sunk by Submarine attack on October 15, 1914

form of calculating power is required by the men who handle these vessels. Lieutenant-Commander Horton was the officer who sank the *Hela* on September 13. On October 8 he was one of the officers engaged on the advanced or close watch (the old term was the inshore watch) maintained by



Captain Cecil H. Fox, of the *Undaunted*, in command of the Flotilla which annihilated the four German destroyers off the coast of Holland on October 17, 1914  
(From a photograph by Russell, Southsea)

the fleet. He sighted two German destroyers and sank one of them by a torpedo attack. The action took place off the Dutch island Schiermonnikoog, close to the western Ems, which is the border of Germany and Holland. The whole of this, the Frisian coast, which is politically partly Dutch and partly German, is fringed by sandy islands. At low tide the sands between them and the mainland

are largely left dry. As cover for destroyers or submarines they are of but little value except at high tide. It is perhaps to this fact that we have to attribute the loss of the British submarine E3, which the Germans destroyed "in a bay" on their coast on October 22. The details were unknown, and whether the E3 was stranded by the ebb tide while searching between the islands and the mainland or not was a mere matter of guesswork.

However vigilant the watch might be, a vessel which can navigate under the surface cannot often be detected. On October 15 the *Hawke* was sunk by a submarine commanded, according to German authority (which in this case can be readily accepted), by the same Captain Weddingen who destroyed the *Aboukir* and her consorts. The German Government has not allowed the report of its officer to be published, as in the earlier case. Therefore little beyond the bare fact can be known. The *Hawke* was a cruiser launched in 1891. She was of 7350 tons, with an armoured belt of 5 inches, and 6-inch protection for her guns, two 9.2 inch, ten 6-inch, twelve 6-pounders, and five 3-pounders, and a complement of 544 officers and men. She was cruising between the north-east coast of Scotland and Norway, when she was struck without warning, "rose as if she had hit a rock", listed to one side, and sank so rapidly that there was no time to launch the boats. Only a small part of her crew was saved on a raft or by a trawler and a Swedish steamer, the *Modesta*, which picked some of them up. The

*Hawke* had more than her official complement on board at the time of her loss. When the details were known it appeared that 524 perished out of a total of 594. On the same day the *Theseus*, a cruiser of the same size and armament as the *Hawke*, was attacked by torpedoes but was not hit.

The successful attacks on the *Hawke*, the *Hermes*, and other cruisers were made in pursuit of that policy of "attrition" on which the German Admiralty was known to rely as being the best way of reducing the British fleet until the time should come when it might be so weakened that it could be openly attacked. If we compare the achievements with the end aimed

at we see that a very small measure of success had been won. We must not make too much of the age of the ships destroyed; they were serving a useful purpose and they carried hundreds of valuable lives which were lost with them. It must also be conceded that when the British Admiralty felt constrained to lay mine-fields in the North Sea it did to no small extent hamper the movements of its own ships. But the vital strength of the navy was not affected, and the work of confining the German fleet was done. Something more than submarine successes, which depend very largely on luck, is required before "attrition" can be carried to the point where it becomes effective.

VOL. I.

An action which took place off the coast of Holland on October 17, two days after the loss of the *Hawke*, afforded no reason for believing that the something else would be forthcoming. On that day Captain Cecil H. Fox, of the *Undaunted*, with his flotilla of destroyers, the *Lance* (Commander W. de M. Egerton), *Lennox* (Lieutenant-Commander C. R. Dane), *Legion* (Lieutenant-Commander C. F.



Photo Symonds, Portsmouth

H.M.S. *Badger*, which rammed a German submarine off the Dutch coast on October 25, 1914

Allsup), and *Loyal* (Lieutenant-Commander F. Burges Watson), fell in with four German destroyers, S115, S117, S118, and S119. These boats were of about half the size of the British destroyers, and had no cruiser with them. As between such forces there could be no parity. Victory was not possible for the Germans. The promptitude and skill of Captain Fox cut off all hope of escape, by intercepting the enemy's line of retreat. The *Undaunted*, a new cruiser of 3750 tons, and 29 knots speed, carrying two 6-inch and eight 4-inch guns, with her four attendant destroyers, had an easy task. The guns of the *Undaunted* outranged the trifling 4-pounders of the enemy. Within an



hour all the four German destroyers were sunk, and it was to their credit that they were able to do as much as wound one officer and four men in the British flotilla. Indeed, it was allowed by the victors that their enemy showed conspicuous gallantry. They resisted to the last and went down with colours flying. With an equality of force such opponents would have rendered victory doubtful. As it was, they could only save the honour of the flag. The thirty-one prisoners taken were picked up floating in the water.

On October 25 the British destroyer *Badger* (Commander C. A. Freemantle) sighted a German submarine off the Dutch coast, and rammed her with such force as to suffer damage to her own bows. She also fired on her enemy and claimed to have hit. The torpedo fired by the German missed. No doubt occurred to the mind of anyone in this country that the submarine had been sunk. These vessels are of necessity built very light, and were believed to be unable to resist a severe blow whether by collision or shot. When, therefore, the German Government declared that the submarine, though injured, had reached port, the statement met with general incredulity. A later event in the war, which does not fall to be mentioned here, seemed, however, to give a measure of plausibility to the German assertion.

It is not easy to know what to make

of the last incident of note which occurred in the North Sea at this phase of the operations. On November 3 an uncertain number of German cruisers appeared off Yarmouth, drew up at such a distance as to render their fire on the town quite ineffective, fired shells which, for the most part, fell short, in no case hit their mark, failed even to damage the *Halcyon* coast-guard gunboat, and went off again. As they retreated they threw out mines to cover their flight, and a British submarine, D 5, which was following them on the surface, ran upon one of the mines and was sunk. It was known immediately afterwards, and confessed by the German Government, that the *Yorck*, a cruiser of 1905, and of 9500 tons, had run on a mine near Wilhelms-haven, and had gone down, with the loss of 200 men.

This hasty cruise must be allowed to show that it was possible for German vessels to come from their own ports, cross the North Sea at a high speed, appear before Lowestoft and Yarmouth, make a very futile bombardment, and get back home unchecked by us. When it is borne in mind that the necessity for reducing the danger from submarines to the



Photo. Symonds, Portsmouth

The British Submarine D5—War No. 75—sunk by one of the German Mines while chasing the German Warships after the Yarmouth Raid, November 3, 1914



The Cost to Germany of the Yarmouth Raid: The German cruiser *Yorck*, which foundered on a mine near Wilhelmshaven on the journey home

lowest possible point forces the British patrol vessels to move at high speed, the mere escape of the Germans is not wonderful. It is obvious that vessels which follow one another swiftly, or which cover a course, turn, and come back, cannot maintain the same close watch as if they remained stationary outside of a port. It is also clear that the power to drop mines in the wake may cover the escape of a weaker squadron. Yet the German squadron ran a very serious risk of being cut off, like the destroyers which fell in with the *Undaunted*, while it is very hard to see what object was to be obtained. If they wished to give a terrifying example of "frightfulness" the Germans ought to have pushed their attack on Yarmouth home. But their whole conduct shows that they were very nervous lest a British force should cut their retreat. The result of their rush out and back was not worth the necessary expenditure of good coal. The mere escape of the German ships did not shake the

British command of the sea in the least. Reinforcements could be sent to the army in France as before, and the German navy was as much shut up as it had been.

While noting the limits of the power of submarines, we must take care not to overlook the proofs they began to give of an undeniable capacity for acting as cruising

vessels. On October 20 the *Glitra*, a steamer of 866 tons, belonging to Messrs. Salvesen, of Leith, was stopped by a German submarine, the U17, about 12 miles from the coast of Norway, taken, and sunk. There were unexpected features in this incident. It had been commonly supposed that a submarine, having no room to stow prisoners, would be compelled simply to send any prize she might take to the bottom with her crew in her. But the U17 acted very much as a privateer or sloop would have done in former times. She sent a boat to take possession of the *Glitra*. It appears from the report of the captain of the merchant-ship that the captors showed much temper and little manners. They tore the British flag up, and trampled on the fragments—a puerile exhibition of rudeness. But the Germans allowed the *Glitra's* crew to take to their life-boats, in which they made their way to the coast, where they were picked up by a Norwegian torpedo-boat and landed at Skudesnäs. More humanity

has survived in modern naval warfare of the most scientific order than had been expected. It is, perhaps, a consideration not to be quite overlooked that a torpedo is a costly weapon which is used up when it is fired, and that

a submarine carries only a few—six or perhaps eight. A submarine would speedily disarm herself if she wasted torpedoes on merchant-ships. The *Glitra* was sunk by the opening of her valves. D. H.

## CHAPTER XV

### THE FALL OF ANTWERP

(September–October, 1914)

Antwerp's Value to Germany—Entry of Belgian Army—Antwerp's Defences—German Plan of Operations—The First Forts to fall—Belgian Appeal for British Help—Mr. Churchill's Visit—The British Expedition justified—Evacuation of the City—Disasters to Naval Division—A Costly "Mistake"—Fate of the "Missing"—The Larger Scheme of Operations involved—Sir Henry Rawlinson's Army—The Final Flight from Antwerp.

THE fall of Antwerp demands a chapter to itself. Other incidents in the agony of Belgium filled the world with greater horror, but no previous event in the whole of that theatre of war was fraught with such deep dramatic interest for Britain, or caused so much exultation in Germany. Antwerp, the Liverpool of the Continent as it has been called, with its four hundred thousand inhabitants, its vast potentialities in the shape of a war indemnity, and its miles of docks, was a prize rich enough in itself, but above all else its capture was regarded as a vital blow at the enemy of enemies, a preliminary to The Day when the might of Germany would strike at the heart of Britain itself. That, at least, was the triumphant point of view of Pan-Germanism, which naturally made the most of it after the disastrous failure of the dash for Paris.

When King Albert and his heroic army—still, as we have already seen, defending their land step by step against overwhelming odds—retired to Antwerp, within what were regarded as its impregnable defences, the Germans made one last characteristic attempt to secure the Belgian king's neutrality. Belgium, it was pointed out, had already suffered more than enough; if King Albert would but accept the inevitable, and remain with his army inactive in Antwerp, that city would be spared. The answer of the King and his ministers was as honourable and determined as when the Kaiser sent his infamous ultimatum on the eve of his invasion. There was extraordinarily little excitement in the city itself when the investment began. Antwerp had known too many sieges in the past, and had too much faith in her defences, to realize the hopelessness of her posi-



tion against guns of such overwhelming power as the enemy now had in the field. A glance at the accompanying map of Antwerp's serried rows of fortified positions suggests, on the face of it, that the faith of the citizens was justified. It was a faith shared by

advance; their ancient strategy of flooding portions of the surrounding land heavily handicapped some of the enemy's operations; mile upon mile of barbed and electrified wire threatened disaster to any infantry attack; and all the beautiful suburbs were

levelled to the ground—at a loss, it has been estimated, of no less than £16,000,000—in order that no possibility of cover could be found there by the enemy. All, however, was in vain. As soon as the Germans began their bombardment, on September 28, the critical nature of the situation was obvious. While the enemy could reach the outer line of forts at an effective range of nearly 8 miles, the Belgians had no gun which could fire at a greater distance than 6 miles.

In these circumstances there were few German attempts to rush the trenches and barbed-wire



Antwerp and its Defences

most military experts until the revelation of Germany's giant howitzers cast all such calculations to the winds. By their gallant sorties and counter-attacks, in the course of which such neighbouring towns as Termonde, Malines, Alost, and Aerschot constantly changed hands—suffering irreparably in the process—the Belgians gave constant proof of their power to check and hamper the German

entanglements. The Germans had lost heavily enough in the previous attempts to cross the Scheldt between Termonde and the outer ring of forts in order to attack Antwerp from the west as well as from the south, where the German guns were preparing their devastating bombardment of the Wavre St. Catherine and Waelhem sector of the city's defences. It was now left to the guns alone to hack a

way through the outer and newer ring of forts—the defence-works designed by Brialmont, and armed with the only Belgian guns at Antwerp capable of resisting the assault of ordinary modern armaments. The inner line of forts was more than forty years old, and armed with out-of-date guns. The Germans therefore concentrated on the Wavre St. Catherine and Waelhem sector, and the forts, entirely at their mercy, were soon reduced to a heap of ruins. According to Mr. E. Alexander Powell, the American correspondent, who went right through the bombardment and fall of Antwerp,<sup>1</sup> the Belgian general staff thought at the time that the Germans were using the same giant howitzers which demolished the forts at Liège, “but in this they were mistaken, for, as it transpired later, the Antwerp fortifications owed their destruction to Austrian guns served by Austrian artillerymen”. The impotence of the Belgians, thus outdistanced, can be better imagined than described.

“Add to this”, writes Mr. Powell, “the fact that the German fire was remarkably accurate, being controlled and constantly corrected by observers stationed in balloons, and that the German shells were loaded with an explosive having greater destructive properties than either cordite or shimose powder, and it will be seen how hopeless was the Belgian position. . . . When one of these big shells—the soldiers dubbed them ‘Antwerp expresses’—struck in a field it sent up a geyser of earth 200 feet in height. When they dropped in a river or canal, as sometimes happened, there was a waterspout. And when they dropped in a village, that village disappeared from the map.”

<sup>1</sup> *Fighting in Flanders* (Heinemann), 1914.

Wavre St. Catherine, pounded to a shapeless mass of steel and concrete, was the first fort to fall. That was on September 29. On the following day Waelhem was silenced equally effectually, the Antwerp waterworks, lying at the back of Waelhem, being destroyed at the same time. Through the breach thus made the Germans poured their masses of infantry, but, thanks to the desperate resistance of the Belgians, failed for the time being to cross the River Nèthe towards the inner line of forts. Then apparently it was that the Belgian Government turned to Great Britain for help.

“In response to an appeal by the Belgian Government,” to quote from Mr. Churchill’s official announcement, “a Marine Brigade



Admiral von Schroeder, German Governor of Antwerp



Inspecting their Handiwork: German troops at one of the churches which suffered in their advance on Antwerp

and two Naval Brigades, together with some heavy naval guns, manned by a detachment of the Royal Navy, the whole under the command of General Paris, R.M.A., were sent by His Majesty's Government to participate in the defence of Antwerp during the last week of the attack."

It is now a matter of history that Mr. Churchill himself preceded the expedition and inspected the Belgian position at Antwerp for himself, remaining on the spot almost to the last. "He repeatedly exposed himself upon the firing-line," writes Mr.

Powell, "and on one occasion, near Waelhem, had a rather narrow escape from a burst of shrapnel." Much more than the possible hope of saving Antwerp was at stake when this much-discussed British Expedition arrived at Antwerp. It was not possible to save the city, but every day that was gained in keeping a German army—probably numbering 150,000 men—too heavily engaged to assist in the desperate fight for the coast against the French and British was of vital consequence to the Allies' plan of cam-





Men of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve: Training Recruits for the Division which afterwards took part in the Expedition to Antwerp

paign as a whole. The marines from Ostend—some 2000 all told—were the first of the British reinforcements to arrive. They reached Antwerp on the evening of October 3, and at once restored confidence to the anxious populace as they marched through to the support of the exhausted Belgians facing the enemy on the banks of the Nèthe. The remainder of the expedition—about 6000 officers and men of the Volunteer Naval Reserve—arrived on the 5th and 6th, and was at once rushed to the front. Mr. Powell, the American correspondent, bears testimony that “they were as clean-limbed, pleasant-faced, wholesome-looking a lot of young Englishmen as you would find anywhere”; but no one pretended that they were fully trained and thoroughly seasoned

troops. In the nature of the circumstances this had been impossible. The men were chosen, as Mr. Churchill afterwards explained in reply to criticism in the House of Commons—

“Because the need for them was urgent and bitter; because mobile troops could not be spared for fortress duty; because they were nearest and could be embarked the quickest, and because their training, although incomplete, was as far advanced as that of a large portion not only of the force defending Antwerp, but of the enemy forces attacking”.

Their courage under fire has not been disputed, and to the best of their ability they fulfilled the dangerous duty assigned to them. That duty formed at the time part of a large operation for the relief of the city planned by the Franco-British armies

on the Belgian frontier, but "other and more powerful considerations", as it was officially explained, prevented this from being carried through.

Meantime the Belgian army and the British Marines had successfully defended the line of the Nèthe River up to the critical night of October 5. Early on the following morning, however, a furious German attack, supported by powerful artillery, forced the Belgians on the right of the Marines to retire, with the result that the whole of the defence was withdrawn within the line of the inner and weaker chain of forts. Thenceforward it was merely a question of time for the Germans to bring up their guns and hold the city itself at their mercy. It was not even necessary to employ their heavy howitzers

for that purpose. All through October 7 and 8, however, the inner line of defences was maintained while the bombardment of the city began. Our Royal Marines and Naval Brigades distinguished themselves both in the trenches and the field, and, with their gallant comrades, the Belgians, could have held out for a longer period, but not long enough—to quote from the official account—to allow of adequate forces being sent for their relief without prejudice to the main strategic situation. On the 8th the enemy began to press strongly on the lines of communication near Lokeren, and though the Belgian forces defending this point fought, as elsewhere, with the greatest determination, they were gradually pressed back by the sheer weight of superior numbers. Thereupon the Belgian and British military authorities decided to evacuate the city, the British offering to cover the retreat. General De Guise, however, who was of course in supreme command, desired the British expedition to leave before the last division of the Belgian army.

How it was that the German Commander-in-Chief, General von Beseler, had not previously made desperate efforts to cut off all retreat westward is a mystery which remains unsolved. It is true that while the bombardment of the city was in progress the Germans had returned to the attack on the Scheldt with the obvious idea of threatening the retreat of the allied troops; but, though the passage of the river was at length effected at various points, the Belgian cavalry, armoured cars, and other mobile forces told off



British Naval Volunteer Reservists at the Front: serving out bully-beef rations in the trenches at Antwerp



With the British Naval Division at Antwerp: a maxim-gun squad in action during the last days of the German bombardment

for the purpose, prevented the Germans from achieving their purpose in that direction. Had the initial successes been followed up with greater vigour by the Germans there is little doubt that the whole of the British and Belgian forces would either have fallen into the enemy's hands or been forced into internment in Dutch territory. As it was, the retreat was not effected without lamentable losses. According to the Admiralty statement, issued on October 16, the three Naval Brigades, after a long night march on October 8 to St. Gilles, entrained, and—

“Two out of the three have arrived safely at Ostend, but owing to circumstances which are not yet fully known the greater

part of the 1st Naval Brigade was cut off by the German attack north of Lokeren, and 2000 officers and men entered Dutch territory in the neighbourhood of Hulst and laid down their arms in accordance with the laws of neutrality”.

Later official facts and figures reduced the number of British troops interned to 1560, and explained the losses thus incurred as having been due to “a mistake”. Exactly what happened is not clear, but from all accounts spies were infesting the whole country, and a plausible suggestion was made that the 1st Naval Brigade had been wilfully led astray.

Possibly it was just, as the official statement says, “a mistake”. Some 20,000 Belgians also crossed into



Holland and shared the same fate as their British allies. One of the naval men who got through safely—though having acted as a rear-guard he could not tell what was happening in advance—explained that in the course of the retreat they came within a few hundred yards of the Dutch frontier; that the night was very thick and foggy; and that to cross the border was a mistake that might easily have been made, especially as the men were worn out after a week in which they had crowded the experiences of a lifetime, with scarcely twelve hours' sleep since they embarked at Dover.

The heavy loss by internment in Dutch territory, however, was not the only disaster that befell the Naval Brigades at Antwerp. The official casualty lists showed that in addition

to these 1560 unfortunates, as well as 32 killed and 189 wounded, 967 officers and men of the Naval Division were "missing". Of these last, 200 were known to have been captured while endeavouring to escape with a trainload of fugitive civilians. The truth seems to be that instead of the three naval brigades retreating together and entraining at St. Gilles, as suggested in the Admiralty statement of October 11, 1914, several battalions never received the order to retire, and were left stranded. When these battalions realized their desperate plight they had little chance of making good their escape. By that time the pontoon bridge across the Scheldt had been blown up by the Belgians—the sole remaining avenue of retreat from the city—while the



Last Scenes at Antwerp before the Fall: the flight of the inhabitants

Germans had seized the railway at Lokeren. Some of the missing naval men may have succeeded in slipping through to Holland, but the majority were captured, some 900 being officially notified on December 21 as prisoners of war at the Gefangenen-lager (prisoners' camp), Doeberitz, Germany. The 200 who were in the train already referred to, surrendered in order to save the civilian refugee passengers from the fire from the enemy's guns.

In spite of these losses the great adventure, if it had failed to save the city, had proved of inestimable service to the Allies. As Lord Kitchener afterwards declared in the House of Lords, not only was the gallant Belgian garrison, with King Albert in its midst, safely removed by British



The Flight from Antwerp: taking a Baby aboard the last Tug



The Bombardment of Antwerp: some effects of the German Shells

efforts, but the delay which had been caused in the release of the besieging forces in front of Antwerp just gave time for Sir John French, by a bold forward movement, to meet the onrush of the Germans towards the northern coast of France, and prevent them from obtaining their objective.

Sir John French's own dispatch of November 20, 1914, served partly to pierce the mists which still obscured the nature of the larger scheme of operations, of which the naval expedition to Antwerp had formed part. In that memorable dispatch the Field-Marshal referred for the first time to the army, consisting of the 3rd Cavalry Division (Major-General the Hon. J. Byng) and the 7th Division (Major-

General Capper), under Sir Henry Rawlinson, as placed under his orders by telegraphic instructions from Lord Kitchener. Although too late to effect its primary purpose of aiding the naval division to save Antwerp, the army under Sir Henry Rawlinson served after the fall of that city to cover and protect the withdrawal of the Belgian army, which reached the Ostend district on October 11, and joining forces with its allies, entrenched itself on the Ypres Canal and the Yser River. Here, as Sir John bore witness, the Belgian troops, "although in the last stages of exhaustion, gallantly maintained their positions, buoyed up with the hope of sub-

stantial British and French support". The revival of this indomitable army—reported by the Germans, in the first flush of victory at Antwerp, as virtually wiped out of existence—was a disillusionment which, with the empty husk of a deserted city, the blocked harbour and docks, and the wrecked lighting and other works, robbed the victors of much of their hoped-for reward.

The naval brigade also had succeeded in saving its armoured trains and heavy guns, which did not have time to play the decisive part expected of them in the last phase of the defence operations.

"The train", to quote from Mr. Powell's account, "consisted of four large coal-trucks,



After the Exodus: German sailors overhauling the things left behind by the inhabitants in their final flight from the quays at Antwerp



with sides of armour-plate sufficiently high to afford protection to the crews of the 4.7 naval guns—six of which were brought from England for the purpose, though there was only time to mount four of them—and between each gun-truck was a heavily armoured goods-van for ammunition, the whole being drawn by a small locomotive, also steel-protected.”

More remarkable even than the retreat of the naval and military forces was the exodus of the people themselves in those last days of the defence. Though thousands of the population of Antwerp—especially the well-to-do—had already slipped away, it was not until the last moment that the bulk of the citizens would believe that their famous defences could be pierced before the Allies had time to come to their rescue. When they woke on the morning of October 7, to learn by proclamation that the bombardment of the city was imminent, and that everyone who could leave had better do so immediately, the effect beggars description. Not only were there some 400,000 of Antwerp's own population; at least another 100,000 had flocked into the city from the surrounding towns in their endeavour to escape from the invaders. It is estimated that in the appalling flight which followed, more lives were lost than in the casualties from German shot and shell.

“No one who witnessed the exodus from Antwerp”, adds Mr. Powell, “will ever forget it. No words can adequately describe it. It was not a flight; it was a stampede. The sober, slow-moving, slow-thinking Flemish townspeople were suddenly transformed into a herd of terror-stricken cattle.”

Was it to be wondered at after all the horrors of the German policy of “frightfulness” in other parts of stricken Belgium? Every road leading towards Ostend and the Dutch frontier became black with a hurrying crowd of fugitives carrying all that could be seized at a moment's notice; while every boat, from a merchant-steamer to a racing-skiff, was pressed into service for the escape by river—anywhere, anyhow, to escape beyond the reach of the ruthless invader. Hence, when the German hosts, after a bombardment in which comparatively little irreparable damage was done to the city itself, made their triumphal entry during the afternoon of October 10, passing in review before the newly appointed military governor, Admiral von Schroeder, and General von Beseler, it was more like a pageant in a city of the dead than in what but a short while previously had been one of the most thriving and hospitable towns in Europe.

F. A. M.

---

## CHAPTER XVI

## FROM THE AISNE TO THE LYS

(October, 1914)

Positions and Increase of the French Armies—French Successes in Eastern France—New Plan of Campaign in North-west France and Belgium—General Foch's New Duties—Transfer of the British Troops from the Aisne—New British Positions in the North-west—Lille seized by the Germans—Sir H. Smith-Dorrien advances on La Bassée—General Hubert Hamilton killed—His Troops avenge his Death—Continued Advance towards La Bassée—Checks and Counterchecks—Gallantry of the Royal West Kent, Wiltshire, and Middlesex Regiments—General Pulteney and the 3rd Corps—Capture of Meteren, Bailleul, and Mont des Cats—The Lys carried near Armentières—Allenby's Cavalry checked—General Result of the Advance upon Lille and La Bassée.

AT the date which has now been reached, October 12, 1914, Sir John French had decided to withdraw his forces from the Aisne. During the last week or so of our presence there, the general position was as follows: On our right, going westward, came, first, the French forces, commanded by General Manoury; secondly, on the line Lassigny-Roye-Péronne, the army of General de Castelnau, supported (September 21–26) by some territorial divisions under General Brugère. Next, on September 30, another newly formed army (No. 10), under General de Maud'huy—whose father was one of the most distinguished combatants of the siege of Paris in 1870—took up position in the region of Arras and Lens, joining hands with certain divisions which at this moment emerged from Dunkirk. On our other side, going eastward, were the armies commanded by Generals d'Espérey, Foch, de Langle de Cary, Sarraill, and Dubail. It should here be mentioned that various changes in the French commands had been made during the earlier part of the war. Thus General

d'Espérey had succeeded General Lanzerac, and General Sarraill had taken the place of General Ruffey. Some of the French armies referred to had to contend against vigorous German attacks during the latter days of September. On the 26th, to the east of Rheims, there was a violent engagement, which ended in a serious German repulse, witnessed, so the French staff ascertained, by the Kaiser in person. Somewhat later the Emperor was to see his forces thrown back with even greater vigour in the vicinity of Ypres.

Since the retreat from the Marne the Germans had only achieved successes near the north-eastern frontier of France. At the end of September they were holding St. Mihiel and the Hauts-de-Meuse, and drawing closer to Verdun. But after the advent of October fortune again favoured the French in these directions. Verdun recovered more breathing-space, the *débouché* of St. Mihiel was closed to the invader, and the French forces steadily gained ground to the east of Nancy, the north of Lunéville, and the north-east and east of St. Dié.

Those successes were achieved by the armies of Sarrail and Dubail, whose appointed task it was to protect the French right flank against any attack coming by way of Metz and Thionville, and, by continually assuming the offensive, to keep as many German corps as possible in front of them, while contributing to the recovery of territory in the Woëvre region and around Verdun.

At the outset of October Sir John French realized that it was necessary to bring the strongest possible pressure to bear in support of the northern flank of the allied forces, with the object of driving the enemy from his positions in that direction, for his presence there was beginning to threaten both the Belgian and the French coasts. Sir John represented his views to General Joffre, who fully agreed with them, and it was arranged that the British army should be transferred, in the first instance, to north-eastern France, a subsequent advance into Belgium being intended, for the capitulation of Antwerp was already fully foreseen in higher military spheres. It should be added that, according to a French official report, the Belgian army, after two months' continuous fighting, was extremely short of ammunition. It was proposed that, with the support of French and British troops, the Belgian force should come down to the line of the Yser to form part of a strong barrier to any further German progress in west Flanders and north-west France. The first positions assigned to the British troops were between the River Lys and its tributary the Clarence, its right being



Map showing the route taken by the British Army during the move from the Aisne to the Lys

directed on Lille, and the road between that town and Béthune separating it from one of the French corps. The transport of such a large body of men was not to be effected, however, in a few days, and it was estimated that the whole British force could not be in position until October 20. The calculation was a close one, for the last troops transferred from the Aisne—those of Sir Douglas Haig's army corps—detrained at St. Omer on the 19th.

Before then, General Joffre had appointed General Foch to supervise all the operations of the French forces north of Noyon, making him, indeed, as the Parisian press remarked, a kind of Vice-Generalissimo. Joffre, it may



be mentioned, had formed a very high opinion of the commander of the 9th Army on account of the skilful manner in which he had handled his troops during the last episodes of that great battle on the Marne, which, as the General-in-Chief declared in one of his proclamations, had virtually saved France, adding that for four-and-forty years he had been waiting for such an hour of victory. On repairing to the north-eastern departments, General Foch skilfully reinforced and perfected all the French corps which he found there, creating, moreover, the so-called French Army of Belgium (No. 8), which under the orders of General d'Urbal, and his colleagues Bidon and de Mitry, was to co-operate with the Belgian and the British troops.



General William Pulteney  
(From a photograph by Russell & Sons)




General Foch, who supervised the "French army of Belgium", which co-operated with the Belgian and British troops

(From a photograph by Henri Manuel)

VOL. I

A week before Sir Douglas Haig's command reached St. Omer our 2nd and 3rd Corps, under Smith-Dorrien and Pulteney, became active. The departure of our men from the Aisne trenches was carried out at night with great secrecy and success. In the course of a letter written home, and subsequently published in the *Times*, a British officer described the operation as follows:—

"It was a wonderful move. French troops appeared out of the darkness and took our places. They had marched many miles but were quite cheerful and calm, their only desire being to get into our 'dug-outs' and go to sleep. They cared nothing for the expected pressure of the enemy. Then we marched down the hill into a comparative peace, and, joy of joys, were allowed to smoke and talk. It was a bitterly cold night, and we were dread-



fully sleepy, so that we nodded as we trudged along, and saw visions of the men in front of us, as it were of trees walking! . . . And so we entrained, and slept, closely packed indeed, but on beautiful soft cushions instead of the mud of a trench. The men were comfortable, being wedged by forties in covered trucks with clean straw for a bed. But we awoke in Paris! There it

Somme, and made final arrangements with him. Smith-Dorrien's command was to be on the line from Aire to Béthune on the 11th, connecting with the 10th French Army on the right, and pivoting on its left, so as to deliver a flank attack on the hostile forces which confronted the 10th Army.



With the German Army at the Front: Infantry attack on a village on the Belgian frontier

was, with the church of the Sacré Cœur on Montmartre, all the same as ever. All was peace. But it was not for us; and we passed slowly through and slept again, our journey continuing as fast as a train holding 1000 men and their transport wagons can travel."

The cavalry, however, went by road, the first to depart, the 2nd Division under General Gough, setting out on October 3, with Compiègne as its first *étape*. On the 8th Sir John French visited General Foch at the little town of Doullens, in the

Aire is on the Lys, and Béthune a few miles south of that river, both localities being south-west of Lille. Smith-Dorrien's men having reached their assigned positions, the object of the somewhat complicated movements which they had to execute during the ensuing week—in co-operation with the 3rd Army Corps, which detrained at Saint Omer on the 11th, and afterwards moved to Hazebrouck—was, in the first instance, to dislodge the enemy from the positions he held near Lille, at such towns as La Bassée,





A Farmyard Ruse: Belgian soldiers with their black helmets hidden in straw

Many points of vantage have been held by the Belgians among the haystacks and farm-yards of their native land. When taking cover they have often disguised their helmets with straw, as shown in the photograph.

Armentières, and Bailleul, and various villages along the Lys. Raided at an earlier stage in the hostilities, Lille, which is a city of more than 200,000 people, had afterwards been held by some French territorials. On October 10, however, a detachment of Uhlans rode in, and would have carried off the Mayor and others as hostages had they not been prevented by the timely arrival of a squadron of Chasseurs. To avenge that check the Germans began to bombard the city, and on the 12th, when the church of St. Maurice and many dwelling-places had been badly damaged, there was an infantry attack which the French territorials could not withstand, the result being that on the morrow the Germans made a triumphal entry with bands playing and banners flying.

We had taken the offensive two days previously, when General Gough's cavalry cleared some woods, near the Aire-Béthune canal, of the enemy's troopers, and then joined hands both with the cavalry of the 6th Division, near Hazebrouck, and with the left of Smith-Dorrien's corps. On the 12th, one of the latter's divisions, the 5th, attacked the Germans, who were already contending with the French to the north of the village of Annequin, and presently the whole of the army corps became engaged. The country is covered, however, with factories and mining-works, which render operations difficult, and it is also almost uniformly flat, so that effective artillery support can scarcely be given. Nevertheless, some little advance was made, and on the ensuing days the

efforts of the 2nd Corps were directed upon the road from La Bassée to Lille, in the vicinity of Fournes. South of La Bassée, a little industrial town on a canal to which it gives its name, is some high ground, a rare feature in the district, and this was held by the Germans, who successfully resisted both the French and British attempts to dislodge them from what was practically an impregnable position.

Smith-Dorrien's instructions were to turn the right flank and the rear of the force at La Bassée, and strenuous efforts were made to effect that object. On October 13 the Dorset Regiment was so heavily engaged, that in clinging to a position which it had seized it incurred 400 casualties, 130 of which were fatal. Major

Roper, its commanding officer, was among the killed. On the 14th, while the advance was being continued, Major-General Hubert Hamilton, who commanded the 3rd Division, which had particularly distinguished itself at Mons, was suddenly struck down. According to one account, this happened whilst he was riding along the front; according to another, he was standing in a covered place when he was hit by a shrapnel bullet, all those round him escaping unhurt. As Sir John French afterwards stated, the death of the commander of the 3rd Division was a great loss to the army. A brother of General Sir Bruce Hamilton, he had always shown himself a first-rate soldier, seeing service in Burma, Egypt, the Sudan, and South Africa, and acting at one time



With the Indian Army at the Front: Ammunition columns bringing up supplies



Prisoners of War: French officers at the front interrogating German soldiers brought in from the trenches



as Lord Kitchener's military secretary. On the morrow of his death and the two ensuing days his men fought splendidly, urged on, perhaps, by a desire to avenge him. By means of planks they sped across the many dykes intersecting the country. On the 15th they were at Pont-de-Ham and Croix Barbée, between Béthune and Armentières; on the 16th they went westward towards Aubers, which strongly held village was taken on the morrow, a south-easterly movement on the same evening resulting in the capture of the village of Herlies, which the Lincolns and Royal Fusiliers, under Brigadier-General Shaw, carried at the point of the bayonet.

On the 18th the enemy, who was in great strength, delivered a vigorous counter-attack, but was repulsed. Our 2nd Corps could make, however, but little progress. During the ensuing days we managed to hold most of our positions, but here and there we had to retire owing to the large reinforcements which the Germans received. The Royal Irish, who had pushed as far as Le Pilly, thereby threatening the communications between La Bassée and Lille, were cut off and surrounded; and our 5th Division was driven out of the village of Violaines, in the immediate vicinity of La Bassée. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien then deemed it expedient to withdraw to a line running from Fauquissart on the north to Givenchy, which is exactly west of La Bassée. This occurred on the night of October 22, and thus the attempt to turn the strong position of La Bassée had so far failed.

Two days later the Lahore Division of the Indian Army Corps, under Major-General Watkins, reached the front. India's share in the Great War is dealt with elsewhere, and here one need only speak of the men's services in the field in Europe. The Lahore troops were in the first instance placed at Lacon, somewhat in the rear of Smith-Dorrien's corps, which it was their mission to support. On the 24th there was a heavy attack on the 2nd Army Corps, but thanks to our artillery the enemy was unable to come to close quarters until the evening. He was then repulsed on one side by the Wiltshires and the Royal West Kents, while on the other, though he rushed the trenches of the Gordon Highlanders, he was driven out of them by the "Die Hards", gallantly led by Lieutenant-Colonel Hull. In all this fighting the Germans lost very heavily, and left many dead and numerous prisoners behind them. At the same time the strain on Smith-Dorrien's command had become very great, as it was constantly confronted by superior forces.

It will be remembered that our 3rd Corps, under General Pulteney, had advanced on Hazebrouck after detaching at St. Omer. This movement threatened the Germans from the west, just as Smith-Dorrien's movement threatened them from the south-west. A connecting-link between our 2nd and 3rd Corps was supplied by a strong French cavalry force under General Conneau, an officer who deserves more than passing mention, for his father was the private physician of Napoleon III, and he

himself was the intimate playmate and friend of the ill-fated Prince Imperial, who fell under the assegais of the Zulus in South Africa.

On October 13 our 3rd Corps held a line stretching from Sylvestre-Cappel to Strazeele, north-north-east of Hazebrouck. Our objective was Armentières, a manufacturing town of 30,000 people on the Lys, somewhat to the north-west of Lille. The Germans, however, held Meteren, Bailleul, and other small places in our vicinity. On the 13th, amid rain and fog, we attacked them, and after dark we carried the position at Meteren, where there was some very fierce street-fighting. The Germans then evacuated Bailleul, which we occupied on the following day. More to the north, our 2nd Cavalry Division had already pushed the enemy back from Flêtre and taken Mont des Cats.

From Bailleul we pushed on in an easterly direction, and the enemy's right having been forced to fall back, his left had to conform to the same movement lest his line should be broken. The result was that on the night of October 15-16 we held all the country on the left bank of the Lys from a point some 5 miles below Armentières, while all the bridges above that town were also in our possession. The Germans had apparently lacked sufficient time to organize a proper defence of the river, which hereabouts is only some 6 feet deep, though its width varies from 45 to 75 feet. Two bridges had certainly been destroyed, and the one at Frelinghein was strongly defended, but the Erquinghem bridge was neither

defended nor destroyed, and both the road and the railway bridges connecting Nieppe with Armentières were merely barricaded. On the 16th, after a few shells had been fired at these barricades, the enemy retired and evacuated Armentières, leaving a number of wounded and some military supplies behind him.

Our success was one of some importance, and Sir John French did his utmost to profit by the advantage which had been gained. In the result, although the enemy was strongly reinforced both from Lille and from La Bassée, our 3rd Corps, on the night of the 18th, held a line which extended between Armentières and Lille, from Radinghem on the south to Premesques, Frelinghein, and Le Gheir on the north.

So far, the general position was as follows: Sir H. Smith-Dorrien and the 2nd Corps had been checked in the attempts to take or turn the position of La Bassée, while General Pulteney and the 3rd Corps had been uniformly successful in their advance towards Lille. Both corps, however, were now faced by a powerful concentration of the enemy's forces, and it appeared difficult to take either Lille or La Bassée. Accordingly Sir John French imposed on the 2nd and 3rd Corps and on General Allenby's cavalry a defensive attitude pending the result of certain operations on another field with which the 1st Corps under Sir Douglas Haig was chiefly entrusted. To explain the commander-in-chief's purpose we must now pass from France to Belgium.

E. A. V.

## CHAPTER XVII

## FIGHTING FOR THE CHANNEL COAST

(October, 1914)

The Franco-Belgian Forces at Nieuport and Dixmude—German Advance to Bruges and Zeebrugge—First Fighting on the Nieuport-Dixmude Line—Sir Henry Rawlinson and the 7th Division—British Advance to Ypres—Our Projected Occupation of Menin—Relative Strength of the Germans and the Allies—Sir Douglas Haig's Advance—Pressure on the Franco-Belgian Forces—A British Flotilla off the Coast—The Imperturbable General Grossetti—General Joffre's New Plan—Attacks and Counter-attacks near Ypres—Rawlinson's Troops transferred to Haig's Command—The Battle of Ypres on October 31—Tributes to the 7th Division and General Byng's Cavalry.

NO longer fearing a flank attack, after they had taken Antwerp and the Belgian army had retreated to the Ostend-Thourout line, the Germans pressed on to the famous old city of Ghent, whence John of "Gaunt" derived his name, and occupied it on October 13. That same day, moreover, they drew near to Bruges, overcoming the resistance which the Belgians opposed to them. On the morrow the Belgians fell back to a line running from Nieuport, on the coast, to Dixmude, a distance of some 10 miles in a south-easterly direction. The positions were fairly strong, for they followed the course of the canalized Yser (the "iron" river), and, moreover, the Belgians were supported on their left by a French brigade under General Grossetti, and on their right, at Dixmude, by 7000 French marines commanded by the Breton Admiral Ronarc'h. On the 15th, however, the Germans occupied Bruges, where they condescended to spare the ancient churches and other fine monuments, but took a Belgian senator and two deputies as hostages, requisitioned cattle and horses, ill-treated the old

Burgomaster, and ordered the judge of the local tribunal to deliver all future judgments in the name of the Kaiser as sovereign of Belgium by right of conquest. This, however, the judge sturdily refused to do, and the German commander refrained from insisting, being more anxious to secure possession of the city's port, that is Zeebrugge, otherwise Bruges-on-the-Sea. Zeebrugge was founded under the auspices of Leopold II at a great expense of money and labour between 1894 and 1907, with the object of reviving the ancient commercial prosperity of Bruges, with which it was connected by a maritime canal about 227 feet in breadth and 26 feet in depth. Protected by a curved mole or jetty 8125 feet long, the roadstead of Zeebrugge formed an expanse of 330 acres, varying in depth from 26 to about 37 feet. As the Germans could not use Antwerp as a naval base without violating the neutrality of Holland, which they had reasons for avoiding, they were particularly desirous of occupying Zeebrugge, being well acquainted with the capacity of its port, whence, by divers means, they intended to assail the British





Before the German Bombardment: the famous Town and Market-hall at Ypres—the cradle of Flemish civilization

coast. That design resulted, however, in the virtual destruction of Zeebrugge, as will be related elsewhere.

Zeebrugge alone did not satisfy the German craving for salt water. On that same October 15, after sending several Taubes on a tour of inspection, the Kaiser's troops occupied Ostend, the shipping there seeking a refuge at Dunkirk, though that port appeared to be one of the enemy's principal objectives in his desire to get nearer and nearer the shores of Great Britain. He came down the coast from Ostend towards Nieuport, but here, on the 17th, he was vigorously repulsed by the Franco-Belgian forces. On the 18th, however, the latter lost the

position of Keyem, and eventually, on the 27th, they had to retreat from the Yser canal to the railway between Nieuport and Dixmude. This line of resistance was defended desperately. At one moment the Belgians certainly lost the position of Ramsappelle, but on October 24 a division and, not long afterwards, an army corps of French troops took possession of the railway line, recaptured Ramsappelle and consolidated the position.

We must now revert to the 16th. At that date the troops under Sir Henry Rawlinson, referred to in Chapters XV and XVI, were at some distance from the Belgian forces. Sir Henry's command was our incomplete 4th Army Corps, one of the divisions

of which, the 8th, had not yet completed its mobilization at home. The General, therefore, had with him only the 7th Division and the 3rd Division of cavalry, under General Byng, this including various Yeomanry, who were the first of our Territorial forces to go into action, as was afterwards shown when the distinction was erroneously claimed for the London Scottish.

After helping to protect the Belgian withdrawal, General Rawlinson's force was chosen by Sir John French to form the left column of the British line in its advance eastward. On or about October 16 the cavalry under General Byng was near Langemarck and Poelcappelle, north-north-east of the famous old city of Ypres, the

cradle of Flemish civilization and a most flourishing mart long before Ghent arose, before Bruges displaced Ghent, and Antwerp Bruges. Of recent years one of the chief lace-making centres of Belgium, Ypres was renowned for its priceless buildings, its grand Gothic cathedral of St. Martin, its unique market-palace, its Renaissance town hall. In olden time French, English, Spanish, Austrian armies passed that way fighting, but those monuments of art were spared. The Prussian came, however, and from a safe distance—for the French and British troops would not allow him near—he defaced or shattered all that his shells could reach.

Nearer to Ypres than Byng's cav-



After the German Bombardment: the burning of the old Town and Market-hall at Ypres



The Sufferings of Ypres: Inside the Cathedral after the German bombardment

alry, but still on its eastern side, was Rawlinson's 7th Division, occupying a line which extended from Zonnebeke, through Gheluvelt, to Zandvoorde. The Rawlinson command thus threatened the German positions at Roulers, Menin, and Courtrai. In its rear were two French territorial divisions, one occupying Ypres itself, and the other Vlamertinghe and Poperinghe on the west. The front was a very wide one, it being necessary to retain all the ground which we already held towards the north, and until the 1st Army Corps, under Sir Douglas Haig, reached St. Omer on October

19 no reinforcements were available. The French, however, had four cavalry divisions at hand, and these deployed on the left of Byng's troopers, and drove some advanced bodies of the enemy beyond the forest of Houthulst.

When on October 17 Sir John French ordered Smith-Dorrien, Pulteney, and Allenby to do their utmost to establish positions east of the River Lys, he also instructed Rawlinson to advance on Menin, and to endeavour to seize the passage of the Lys at that spot, in order to facilitate the advance of the rest of our forces. Menin is some 5 miles north-east of the point whence starts the Ypres canal connecting the Lys with the Yser on the north-west, and it was very desirable that the position should be secured. But the attempt was not made, though the left of the 7th Division was to have been supported by the cavalry under General Byng and further north by the large force of French cavalry which from the forest of Houthulst had advanced to the neighbourhood of Roulers:

"Sir Henry Rawlinson", wrote Sir John French in a subsequent report, "represented to me that large hostile forces were advancing upon him from the east and north-east, and that his left flank was severely threatened. I was aware of the threats from that direction, but hoped that at this particular time there was no greater force coming from the north-east than could be held off by the combined efforts of the French and British cavalry and the Territorial troops supporting them until the passage at Menin could be seized and the First Corps brought up in support. Sir Henry Rawlinson probably exercised a wise judgment in not committing his troops to this attack in their somewhat weakened condition; but





The Ruined Tower of Ypres Market-hall

the result was that the enemy's continued possession of the passage at Menin certainly facilitated his rapid reinforcement of his troops and thus rendered any further advance impracticable."

It may be confidently stated that during the fighting which ensued in October and November the French, British, and Belgian forces were opposed by no fewer than fifteen army corps and four cavalry corps, under the Crown Prince of Bavaria, Duke Albrecht of Württemberg, and Generals von Fabeck and von Deimling. To contend against that multitude there were three and a half British corps with three divisions of cavalry, five

French corps with sundry territorial divisions, and about four divisions of cavalry, and the remnants of King Albert's gallant but almost exhausted army. The German design was plainly to carry Dunkirk and reach Calais and Boulogne, thereby turning the Allies' flank and cutting the direct communications of the British with the sea. This, moreover, might facilitate an invasion of Great Britain. Further, there are serious indications that after successfully overrunning the whole of Belgium the Kaiser intended to declare that country annexed, as a new Reichsland, to the German Empire. But all those designs were foiled.

At the time when Sir Douglas Haig's troops arrived upon the scene Sir John French's information led him to believe that there were no very



General Sir Henry Rawlinson  
(From a photograph by H. Walter Barnett)



The Eyes of the German Army: a battery commander at an artillery observation post on top of a haystack

The photograph reproduced above was taken during the fighting in the Yser district. The telephone is inside the haystack. It will be noticed that the officer is using a form of periscopic observation glass.

strong German forces north of Ypres, most of the enemy being to the east of the little city. Accordingly, on the evening of October 19, Sir Douglas was instructed to advance with the 1st Corps through Ypres to Thourout, and then, if possible, to take Bruges and drive the enemy towards Ghent. He was given latitude, however, to attack either the enemy's forces on the north or those which were advancing from the east, according to circumstances. He was to be flanked on his left by two divisions of French cavalry, and on his right by Byng's command, whilst Rawlinson was to conform generally to his movements.

Apart from its chief object, the capture of Bruges, Sir Douglas's advance

northward was calculated to relieve the pressure which the Germans were now bringing to bear on the Franco-Belgian forces holding the line from Nieuport to Dixmude. The position there was serious, and already, on October 18, the British Admiralty had received a request for naval assistance, which was at once given, in such wise that a flotilla, mounting a large number of powerful long-range guns, came into action off the Belgian coast at daybreak on the 19th. The Germans were bombarding Nieuport and the Franco-Belgian line extending towards Dixmude, from Mariakerke, Middelkerke, and other points; but the flotilla,



The Eyes of the German Army: Telephoning to the battery the information received from the observer on top of the haystack



In the German Trenches: Photograph showing their typical formation in long irregular lines

which was assisted by several naval balloons, retaliated by vigorously bombarding their flank, much to their cost and confusion. The operations of our monitors and other vessels are recounted in the naval chapters of this work. Here, however, it may be said that, thanks to this assistance, the Belgians and the French held out right gallantly. During the bombardment General Grossetti, the commander of Nieuport, was installed in the neighbouring village of Pervyse, which suffered greatly from the German shells, and it has been related of him that while the church roof was being destroyed, and its tower was rocked by the force of the shell-fire, becoming so

tilted as to remind one of the famous tower of Pisa, he remained seated in the open air just across the little *place*, issuing his orders with the utmost calmness, even when a great bell fell clanging to the ground.

Such, then, was the position when the 1st Army Corps, under Sir Douglas Haig, started northward. On the 20th the troops reached the Elverdinghe-Zonnebeke line, intending to advance on Poelcappelle and Passchendaele; but on the 21st, owing to the heavy attacks which were made on Rawlinson's forces on the right, and the necessity of giving them support, it was not possible for the 1st Army Corps to proceed beyond the line Zonnebeke-





Belgium's Shattered Townships: How Dixmude suffered in Germany's dash for Calais

St. Julien - Langemarck - Bixschoote, particularly as the French cavalry which had been flanking Rawlinson suddenly received orders to retire to the west of the Ypres canal. The order appears to have emanated from General Joffre, who met Sir John French that same day, and told him that he was bringing an army corps to Ypres, that more French troops would follow, and that in conjunction with the Belgian forces he proposed from a more northerly point to drive the Germans eastward. Unfortunately the movement could not begin until three days later (the 24th), and Sir John French therefore instructed Generals Haig and Rawlinson to strengthen their actual positions as far as possible, and to hold their ground until General

Joffre's offensive developed. On the 22nd Sir Douglas Haig was again somewhat hampered by the necessity of sending support to Rawlinson; nevertheless he repulsed a series of attacks all along his line, though in the evening a part of it, north of Pilkem, held by the Cameron Highlanders, was penetrated by the enemy.

At six o'clock the next morning a counter-attack to recover the lost trenches was made by the King's Royal Rifles, the Queen's Regiment, and the Northhamptons, under General Bulfin; and in the face of strong opposition it became necessary to use the bayonet. But the counter-attack was completely successful, and 600 prisoners were taken. On the other hand, a determined but unskilful German

attack on our 2nd Infantry Brigade, stationed near Langemarck, was victoriously repulsed, the enemy leaving no fewer than 1500 dead upon the field. In the evening a French division arrived upon the scene and took over the positions of our 2nd Division, which thereupon relieved Rawlinson's sorely tried troops by occupying their line from Poelzelhoek to the road between Becelaere and Passchendaele—these positions being apparently the most easterly of all those secured at this moment by the allied forces, and therefore the most exposed to the attacks of the powerful columns which the enemy was constantly bringing from the east.

The repeated efforts made by the Germans on October 24 and 25 were brilliantly repulsed. On the 26th the situation became somewhat critical at Kruseik, south of the road to Menin, and the Royal Horse Guards were sent forward to relieve the pressure of a determined attack. The intervention of the Household troops was crowned with complete success. Captain Lord Alastair Innes-Ker, who commanded the advance squadron, was afterwards rewarded with the Distinguished Service Order for his conspicuous courage, both in leading his men and in bringing wounded out of action under very heavy fire. French Territorials had now relieved our 1st Division, which was thereupon concentrated near Zillebeke, while our 2nd Division, with Rawlinson's men and the French 9th Army Corps, progressed towards the north-east, capturing numerous guns and prisoners in their advance. It was evident, how-

ever, that Rawlinson's heroic troops, which had been fighting and marching incessantly ever since their hasty dispatch to support the Belgian withdrawal, had suffered terrible losses. In the infantry alone only 44 officers remained of the 400 who had embarked from Britain, and not more than 2336 out of 12,000 men. After personally investigating their condition, Sir John French decided to break up the imperfect 4th Corps, and to place the 7th Division and Byng's cavalry under Sir Douglas Haig's command, while Sir Henry Rawlinson repaired to Aldershot to supervise the mobilization of the 8th Division, which was also to have been under his orders.



St. Jean's Church, Dixmude, after Bombardment

Sir Douglas Haig stationed the 7th Division on a line running from Zandvoorde to the Menin road. His 1st Division was thrown more forward, that is, from the Menin road to the west of the village of Reytel, while the 2nd Division occupied ground near the road running from Zonnebeke to Moorslede. At an early hour on October 29 the centre of Sir Douglas Haig's line was vigorously assailed at about a mile to the east of Gheluvelt. At two o'clock in the afternoon, however, after very severe fighting, the enemy began to give way, and by dark the hill at Kruseck, which had been lost, was retaken, and most of our line north of the Menin road re-established. One cannot be absolutely sure that the Germans were aware of the weakened condition of the 7th Division (previously under Rawlinson), but at all events, soon after daybreak on

October 30, they directed a fierce attack on the vicinity of Zandvoorde. Their heavy artillery fire compelled General Byng's cavalry to withdraw to the Klein Zillebeke ridge, and the right of the 7th Division then became involved. The position was serious, for the enemy had secured possession of the Zandvoorde ridge, and was in great strength, having been reinforced at this point by the whole of his 15th Army Corps. His forces also included the 13th Army Corps and the 2nd Bavarian Corps, and, according to an order issued by General von Deimling, these troops were appointed to break through the British line to Ypres at any cost, the Kaiser himself considering the success of this attack "to be of vital importance to the successful issue of the war".


Sir Douglas Haig gave orders that the line from Gheluvelt to the corner of the canal south-east of Ypres was to be held to the last man. Numerous precautions were taken with that object, and the 9th French Army Corps sent three battalions and a cavalry brigade to assist our troops. Early on the morning of October 31 this detachment of our allies, which was commanded by General Moussy, and had taken up positions on Sir Douglas Haig's right, advanced against the enemy, but was unable to make any progress. The Germans displayed this day a greater determination to overcome us than had hitherto been



Armoured Cars in the Great War: one of the Belgian cars at the Front

The armoured motor car, manned by crack shots and armed with a mitrail-leuse, has played a prominent part in the war, the Belgians finding it particularly useful in rounding up Uhlans.





The British Positions before Ypres on October 29, 30, and 31, 1914

October 29.—A, 2nd Division; B, 1st Division; C, French detachment; D, 7th Division. October 30.—E, Line to be defended at all costs. October 31.—F, Line to be defended at all costs after temporary withdrawal. That night, however, the original positions A and B were virtually regained.

exhibited since the very beginning of the operations near Ypres. Attacks and counter-attacks lasted throughout the morning on the road to Menin, south-east of Gheluvelt, which point was at last assailed so strongly that our 1st Division's line was broken. The retirement of the 1st Division exposed the unfortunate 7th Division, which, like General Bulfin's command, had already been heavily shelled. The Royal Scots Fusiliers, who had remained in their trenches, were cut off and surrounded, and at about 1.30 p.m. the enemy delivered a strong infantry attack on the right of the 7th Division. Two brigades—the 2nd and the 22nd—successively became exposed, but reserves were employed to restore the line, and the right of the 7th Division held on to its trenches until nightfall.

Soon after the 7th was thus violently attacked, the head-quarters of the 1st and 2nd Divisions were shelled. Six staff officers were killed by the enemy's fire, Major-General S. H. Lomax of the 1st Division was wounded, and Sir Archibald Murray, commanding the 2nd Division, received so severe a shaking that for a short time he remained unconscious. General Lomax's condition necessitated that General Landon (previously at the head of our transport service) should take over his command.

When at about 2.30 p.m. Sir Douglas Haig received word that the 1st Division had moved back, and that the enemy was approaching in strength, he ordered that the line from Frezenberg (north-east of Ypres) to the bend of the Canal at Klein Zillebeke (south-

east) should be held at all costs, and, when the 1st Division had rallied, the German advance was checked by enfilade fire from the north. Further, the left of the 1st Division and the right of the 2nd now delivered completely successful attacks against the right flank of the German line, with the result that Gheluvelt, which had been lost when the line of the 1st Division was broken, was retaken at the point of the bayonet, the 2nd Worcestershires being to the fore, admirably supported by the 42nd Brigade of the Royal Field Artillery.

Between 2 and 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the most critical and anxious

moment in the day, Sir John French was with Sir Douglas Haig at the latter's head-quarters at Hooze, between two and three miles east of Ypres. The 1st Division was then retiring, and the fight was going against us; but the rally of the 1st Division and the recapture of Gheluvelt altered everything. The 7th Division profited by the favourable turn in affairs to advance almost to its original lines and reconnect with the 1st Division, while the reoccupation of Gheluvelt released the 6th Cavalry Brigade, which had been supporting the 1st Division. This enabled Sir Douglas Haig to send two of the



Winter Campaigning at Ypres: Belgian soldiers in the trenches



Brigadier-General C. FitzClarence, V.C., who was killed while commanding the 1st Guards Brigade  
(From a photograph by Gibbs, Pirbright)

released cavalry regiments to clear the woods on the south-east, and close the gap which existed between the 7th Division and the 2nd Brigade. Partly mounted, and partly on foot, our troopers scoured the woods, surprising the enemy there, killing large numbers of his men, and materially helping to restore the line. About 5 o'clock, moreover, some French cavalry came up to the cross-road east of Hooge, and supported our cavalry brigade with a dismounted detachment.

During the day the extreme left of the 1st Army Corps had been but slightly engaged, but the extreme right was heavily shelled and subjected to repeated infantry attacks. In the evening the 7th Division and the 2nd Brigade drove the enemy from the woods on our front, and by ten o'clock our line was practically re-established.

In the foregoing account of our operations there has frequently been occasion to mention the troops of Sir Henry Rawlinson's command—the 7th Division under Major-General Capper and the 3rd Cavalry Division under Major-General the Hon. Julian Byng. Sir John French bore testimony in one of his reports to the fact that both infantry and cavalry “fought with the utmost gallantry and rendered very signal service”. Special orders which Generals Rawlinson and Byng issued to their officers and men were subsequently made public. After being landed at Zeebrugge and Ostend, between October 6 and 8, to add to our naval division at Antwerp—only to find that they were too late for that primary purpose—these troops



The Earl of Cavan, mentioned in dispatches for “skill, coolness, and courage”  
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)





Heroes of the Belgian Army: the 75th Regiment marching past King Albert with their colours decorated with the Royal Albert Order

had to fight a series of desperate rear-guard engagements all the way from Ghent to Ypres, crossing meantime a very difficult country without either lines of communication or base, but none the less resisting the enemy at each successive position—such as Thielt and Roulers—until they at last made a final stand near Ypres,

was taken prisoner declared that he and his comrades had imagined that they were opposed by fully four British army corps.

The cavalry under General Byng displayed equal bravery and resolution. On only one occasion, October 30, was the 7th Brigade compelled to withdraw against a terrific attack



The Dogs of War: Belgians bringing up machine guns

while there awaiting the arrival of the other British forces. All told, they did not exceed 30,000 men, and they had to bear the whole pressure of an enemy whose numerical superiority was as eight to one. It seems probable that no other force of ours ever suffered such severe losses in contending against overwhelming odds. Well might Sir Henry Rawlinson praise their "stubborn valour and endurance in defence". So doggedly did these men fight that a German officer who

delivered by an entire army corps of the enemy. On other occasions both this brigade and the 6th, which also belonged to General Byng's command, repeatedly distinguished themselves. Reference has already been made to the important part which the Royal Horse Guards played on October 31. The two brigades again fought extremely well on November 1 and 2. On the afternoon of the 6th, Brigadier-General Kavanagh, commanding the 7th Brigade, learned that the French

troops placed between Klein Zillebeke and the canal—that is, on the right of our 4th Infantry Brigade, under Lord Cavan—were falling back. Forthwith General Kavanagh hurried up the 1st and 2nd Life Guards, with the Horse Guards in reserve, thereby encouraging our allies to resume the offensive. Scarcely, however, had the latter reoccupied their trenches when they again fell back, reporting that the enemy were advancing in great strength. Two squadrons of our men thereupon doubled across the road from Zillebeke to Klein Zillebeke, and suffered heavily in endeavouring to stem the retreat. According to General Byng's diary of events, a *mêlée* of Germans, French, and British

ensued, and Kavanagh's brigade had to retire to our reserve trenches before it could extricate itself. There, however, it held on, the 1st Life Guards remaining in position until two o'clock in the morning, by which time Lord Cavan, with other help, had been able to re-establish his position. General Kavanagh was thanked by both Sir John French and Sir Douglas Haig for the splendid conduct of his brigade. Among the numerous officers and men whom we lost during this desperate fighting were the commanding officers of the 2nd Life Guards and the Royal Horse Guards—Colonels Dawnay and Wilson—both of whom were killed while leading their troopers against the enemy.

E. A. V.

## CHAPTER XVIII

### THE NAVAL AIR RAID ON FRIEDRICHSHAFEN

(November 21, 1914)

"A Fine Feat of Arms"—Friedrichshafen—Count Zeppelin—The Value and Limitations of Zeppelins—New Zeppelins in Preparation—Commander Briggs, Flight-Lieutenant Sippe, and Flight-Lieutenant Babington—The Avro Scout Biplane—The Start of the British Raid—Effect of River Mist—Swiss Neutrality respected—The Attack on the Zeppelin Sheds and Factory—The German Reply—Commander Briggs compelled to descend—The Damage done—The Return of Sippe and Babington to Belfort—The Legion of Honour for the Airmen.

**A**DMIRABLY conceived, boldly and successfully carried out—indeed, to use the words of the official report, "a fine feat of arms"; such was the British air raid on Friedrichshafen, made on Saturday, November 21, 1914. It was the third, and the most daring, of our aerial invasions of Germany, and again the men who flew—as was the case with

the two attacks on the air station at Düsseldorf—were naval airmen who had been selected specially for their task.

Friedrichshafen, lying snugly on the shore of Lake Constance, is a point of strategic importance to the Germans, and a point, also, against which it is well worth our while to strike a blow. Essen we know as the





The Scene of the British Raid: one of the German airship sheds—with its Zeppelin in flight—attacked by the Royal Flying Corps on November 21, 1914

birthplace of the Krupp gun, and Friedrichshafen, almost equally significant to the German mind, represents the birthplace of the Zeppelin airships. It is, in fact, the home, building-place, and launching-port of that fleet of huge, rigid-type air-craft, of which Count Zeppelin, by the end of the first three months of the war, was assembling the fortieth unit. It was here, far back now in the history of flight, that the first of these monster craft was towed out upon the lake for its trials; and it was here, in 1908-9, after a series of disasters which robbed Count Zeppelin of his private fortune, that he was able to construct, thanks to the generosity of the German public, the large and completely-equipped factory which has, of late, been so busily at work. An ardent and picturesque figure—one of the most popular and at the same time most unassuming of men—this veteran inventor, whose

story is that of courage in the face of misfortune, so endeared himself to the German public that, within a few months, they subscribed £300,000 for the continuance of his work; and this, the most costly of all in regard to aviation, was to perfect a type of airship which should be swifter in flight, and more able to combat winds, than had any of those he had previously built.

Then came the war, and the Zeppelins were put to the test. Their size makes them unwieldy, although in the air they are comparatively safe. But at launching and upon alighting, especially when in a wind, they are very susceptible to injury. Still, they can remain in the air longer, and carry greater weights, than any other air-craft in the world; and they are more formidable than any other, also, as weapons of destruction. But to their use in actual war, and against an enemy

who is active and well armed, there are limitations so serious that they are condemned almost entirely to flights by night. Their immense hulls, more than 500 feet in length, and so frail that they may be riddled with shot, offer a huge mark by day when they are exposed to gun-fire. And their ascensional power is limited—10,000 feet, indeed, representing the record in 1914; while an anti-aircraft gun of the most powerful type will throw a shell far higher than any existing Zeppelin can fly. Slow-moving, too, and necessarily deliberate in all its evolutions, the Zeppelin is at a disadvantage should she be attacked by hostile aeroplanes. Her best speed is about 60 miles an hour: theirs may be as high as 130 miles an hour. She can carry machine-guns in her car, and use them with effect; but a high-speed aeroplane, steering an erratic course, is an abnormally difficult mark; and it is the scheme of the attacking planes, directly they sight their bulky foe, to outfly her in order to gain the advantage of height, and then rain down bombs upon her as they rush past overhead. In the first four months of the war, recognizing quite clearly their limitations, the Zeppelin pilots reserved themselves for the making of raids by night; but even here—largely through inexperience in such a form of fighting, and lack of practice in the dropping of bombs—the results they obtained proved unsatisfactory.

War teaches many lessons, however, and it is here that we come to the reason for our attack upon Friedrichshafen. Under favourable con-


ditions, and with craft built so as to profit by the lessons already learned, it was possible that Zeppelins might do serious damage in a raid. They must have weather in their favour certainly, and their blow must come in the nature of a surprise—they must not be detected, that is to say, as they approach their mark. These conditions, in time of war, and when a long flight over hostile country is required, are not easy to obtain. There is a heavy risk also, even at night, from an attack by enemy aeroplanes and from the fire from land guns which may be aided by search-lights. Still, with specially-prepared craft, and if the need be considered urgent, such a raid might have been thought worth risking. "Give me Calais", Count Zeppelin is reported to have said, "and I will give you London." This sentence from some speech is probably distorted; certainly it is exaggerated; but what is a concrete fact is that at Friedrichshafen, both before and during the early months of the war, the whole of the skilled staff was busy with the construction—working night and day—of a new and more powerful type of Zeppelin; and one of the aims of this craft, if not the principal aim, was the making of air raids upon England. More knowledge on this point was, of course, in the hands of the authorities than could be allowed to come to light; but that these new Zeppelins would embody the teachings of the war was evident, also that they were likely to remain longer in the air, and fly higher and probably faster, than any of the machines with which

Germany entered the struggle. It was safe to assume, too, that their motors would be very efficiently silenced.

It was known definitely that these machines were being built; also that, even with the facilities existing at Friedrichshafen, where more than one Zeppelin could be assembled at the same time, it would be a matter of months before one of them would be ready to take the air. In the meantime, could a blow be struck at these busy works, it might paralyse them temporarily. Hence the planning of our air raid, for which we had highly-skilled pilots and excellent machines available. Apart from the craft and the men, though, there lay the need for extremely careful organization. Secrecy, of course, was vital to success.



German Quick-firing, Anti-aircraft Gun at work



Count Zeppelin

(From a photograph by Brandseph, Stuttgart)

As Napoleon said: "You must surprise the enemy by strategy; by the unexpectedness and rapidity of your operations." But when Napoleon wrote those lines the aeroplane was a dream; he could not foresee these raiders of the future—these supermen who can rush upon their objective at 100 miles an hour, 5000 feet above the earth, and screened from human eyes by mist or cloud.

To reach Friedrichshafen by way of the air was no easy matter. To gain it from the north of France, or from any of the points where the naval airmen had been operating, necessitated a non-stop flight of at least 250 miles; and this, when the return journey was taken into consideration, meant an undertaking



which, while not being impossible, offered too much chance of failure. But there lay, as a matter of fact, a nearer point of attack. The aeroplanes might be taken with secrecy down to Belfort, just at the point on the Franco-German frontier where it approaches that of Switzerland; and from here, if they followed the course of the Rhine, the airmen were within 120 miles of Lake Constance and the Zeppelin works. This meant a non-

afloat, it seems clear that they would have augmented their defences by the use of armed aeroplanes; and these, had they been ready to harass the invaders when they neared the sheds, would have made accurate bomb-dropping extremely difficult. But there were no such defending craft, and it seems clear indeed that, until a message came from Constance that hostile airmen were passing out above the lake, the German commander at



Map illustrating, approximately, the Course taken by the Airmen in the Royal Naval Raid on Friedrichshafen, November 21, 1914

stop return flight of say 250 miles, or a period in the air of approximately three hours. Such a flight, over difficult and mountainous country, and with a hostile land below, represented a serious undertaking, and one full of risk for the airmen; but it was decided upon none the less.

A rigid secrecy was preserved, the greatest ingenuity being displayed so as to prevent any news of the raid leaking across the frontier. This was no easy matter, seeing that it is merely a step, so to speak, from Belfort into Alsace, and that the district abounds in spies. But that the raid *was* kept secret is evident. Had the Germans at Friedrichshafen imagined what was

Friedrichshafen had no inkling of the bombardment that awaited him.

The morning was fine, but there seems to have been a ground mist; at places along the Rhine, indeed, it appears to have been thick. Although this made route-finding difficult, it had the advantage of obscuring the airmen as they flew. There were three pilots who set out upon the raid. First, in their order of starting, came Squadron-Commander E. F. Briggs, who was an Engineer Lieutenant-Commander in the navy before he entered the air service. When the Naval Flying School was opened at Eastchurch, in the Isle of Sheppey, Commander Briggs was appointed to



Squadron-Commander E. F. Briggs, who led the Flying Raid on Friedrichshafen, and was wounded and captured

it, being occupied mainly with engineering work. He is an aviator who has inclined to the scientific, making many test flights with special instruments on his machine. But he handles an aeroplane finely, apart from any question of science, as was proved when, one extremely cold morning, he rose in a Blériot to 15,000 feet, creating an altitude record for Britain. When he alighted, after this flight, his face was found to be so frostbitten that he had to spend some days in hospital.

The second of the three air-raiders was Flight-Lieutenant Sippe—a civilian pilot before the war, and a man who has handled many types of machine and gained experience of flying in most of the countries of Europe. Flight-Lieutenant Sippe, it will be re-

membered, took part in the second air raid on Düsseldorf; but his engine failed him on that occasion, and he had to abandon the flight. The third airman who left Belfort was Flight-Commander J. T. Babington, a pilot of exceptional skill, who has specialized in the handling of high-powered craft.

The machines the men flew were of a type that has passed with the greatest credit through the ordeals of war—the Avro single-seated “scout” biplane, fitted with an 80 horse-power Gnome motor. All three airmen had machines of this make, chosen not only for their speed, which was high, but also for their handiness in flight. As a pilot reaches the moment when he must drop his bombs, and manoeuvres so as to pass above his mark, his



Flight-Commander J. T. Babington, one of the Heroes of the Friedrichshafen Raid  
(From a photograph by F. N. Birkett)

machine needs to be one which will respond instantly to its controls.

It was shortly before 10 a.m., according to the official report, that the men rose and were away, each with a full load of fuel, in addition to the weight of his bombs. They ascended to a fair altitude—about 5000 feet—and were soon lost to view, steering across the frontier towards Basle. Here, after a flight of 30 miles, they were seen distinctly by people who stood upon the Rhine bridges; and it seems they were flying rather low—probably with the idea of making sure of their position. On again they flew, following the Rhine upon its German bank, and with Switzerland lying to their right. Here and there they were seen, from points upon the Swiss frontier; but, speaking generally, they appear to have been hidden by the mist that lay upon the river. When they reached Schaffhausen, which was within 40 miles of their goal, this river mist proved confusing, and Squadron-Commander Briggs, who still led the flight, bore away too much to the left, instead of swinging to the right upon the course of the Rhine. But Lieutenant Sippe, who was not far behind him although he could not see his companion's machine, steered a true course; and Flight-Commander Babington, who was the third of the flyers, and had lost sight of both his colleagues, made the turn correctly also, passing on down the Rhine. There-



"Flight" copyright

The Type of Machine used in the Royal Naval Raid on Friedrichshafen

The name does not appear on active-service machines, numbers being substituted.

after these two pilots flew without incident, until Lieutenant Sippe saw the gleam of Lake Constance ahead of him, and passed across it on his way to Friedrichshafen. It was here—from the town of Constance, that is to say—that the airmen were seen, and a message was flashed across the lake to the Zeppelin works. But the distance is less than 15 miles, and with craft that fly at nearly 100 miles an hour there lay a small margin of time between the warning and the actual delivery of the attack.

In reply to representations afterwards made by the Federal Council of Switzerland, the British Government stated that the airmen who participated in the attack had received formal instructions not to fly over Swiss territory, but that if, in spite of this, they had done so, it must be attributed to accident and the difficulty of recognizing at a great height the position of an aeroplane. While expressing its regret for any accident of the kind, the British Government took the opportunity of explaining that this must not be interpreted as




a recognition by Great Britain of the existence of a sovereignty of the air. The Swiss Federal Council, however, claimed this sovereignty to its full extent, and pointed out that the Swiss Army had received instructions accordingly.

It was misty on the lake—to return to our story of the raid—and Lieutenant Sippe descended low. Thus, when he sighted Friedrichshafen, he was so near the earth that he passed close above the roofs of the houses on his way to the Zeppelin works. Of course he was seen, and guns began to roar. But he flew straight on, and came in sight of his goal. Here he met with a surprise. Squadron-Commander Briggs, who had

detected his error quickly at Schaffhausen, and had altered his course, had arrived first on the scene and was busy with his bombs; while from the ground below—from rifles, machine-guns, and pieces of special artillery which threw an explosive shell—there was a furious fire directed skyward.

We have it, in the words of Squadron-Commander Briggs, that the German artillery practice was “devilish good”. It seems clear indeed that, in order to protect Friedrichshafen, gunners had been sent from the front who had obtained weeks of practice in firing at air-craft. It is a fact, well established by evidence, that the German anti-aircraft guns, owing to the ceaseless firing done, have grown daily




War against the "Fourth Arm": an anti-aircraft gun

more of a menace to the airmen at whom they are aimed. Early in the war, when they had everything to learn, the German gunners were nearly always wide of their mark; but at the time of the battle of the Aisne, and in the stages that followed, their shells burst nearer and nearer the air-scouts, who had to rely upon speed and manœuvring power to escape being hit. It is quite evident, in regard to this land fire from Friedrichshafen, that it was far more deadly than that which had greeted the air raiders at Düsseldorf. It must be remembered, also, that these anti-aircraft guns, a number of which were in position near the factory, and mounted also upon boats on the lake, are formidable weapons. They will, according to their calibre, throw a 14-pound or a 20-pound shell to a height as great as 20,000 feet, and they can be

sighted with extreme rapidity, while their breech action is automatic, so as to quicken their fire.

Squadron-Commander Briggs, coming down low in order to place his bombs on the works, was met by a devastating fire. Shells burst above, below, and on either side of him; his planes were struck again and again, and presently one shot reached a vital part of his machine, penetrating the fuel tank and allowing his petrol to escape. There was nothing to do now, of course, but descend; and so the airman came planing down. But as he did so, and even knowing that he would be alighting among an angry foe, he continued his mission of destruction. As he swept down, passing low over the air-ship factory with his motor stopped, he launched several more of his bombs at point-blank range.



Zeppelins at Home: view inside a shed made for two



Coming out for a Trip: one of Germany's dirigibles emerging from a shed constructed for both Zeppelins and Parsevals

Even according to German sources—and here naturally the effects of the raid have been minimized deliberately—it is admitted that Commander Briggs was not more than 100 feet above the factory when he dropped the last of his bombs, and from this height, of course, they were almost certain to have been effective. Exactly what damage was done did not at the time transpire, although—to quote our Admiralty report—it was believed to be “serious”. German statements, obviously distorted, declared that the bombs fell wide of the factory and the shed, dropping among the workmen’s houses near by; but, according to telegrams received from Switzerland and elsewhere, it seems clear that at least six of the bombs duly reached their mark. One is reported to have gone through the roof of the factory, and to have made a hole three or four yards wide, blowing out all the windows with the shock of its explosion, and damaging seriously the construction-gear that had been erected on the floor within.

After he had planed over the factory, discharging his bombs as he flew,

Commander Briggs came to rest on an open space, not more than 100 yards from the row of buildings. His machine, apart from trifling punctures and the hole in his petrol-tank, was quite uninjured. Naturally he was not received with favour. His final exploit, in dropping bombs while he was right above the factory, had vastly incensed the Germans who were watching from below. It seems he was threatened by an angry crowd that rushed up—not soldiers, by the way, but civilians; probably workers at the factory who were enraged at the damage which had been done. It appears, also, that he defended himself with his revolver, and was wounded in the head, although luckily the injury was not serious. Then a party of soldiers arrived, and the airman surrendered to their officer and was borne off to the hospital. That the German garrison was quite conscious of the gallantry of his deed is shown by the fact that the officer who had captured him sent off a wire to London, explaining that the Commander’s wound was not serious, and adding words that were appreciative of his exploit.





Drawn by John de G. Bryan

A Flying Corps Incident at the Front: saving the mechanic an airman had to leave behind him

"Captain Gérard, scouting for the French on a Caudron biplane, came to ground rather near the German advance posts, and German cavalry made an effort to surround him. His mechanic restarted the engine, but got foul of the blade, which disabled him for a while. Captain Gérard had to leave him on the ground. Happily, a military car was following closely, and the occupants made a dash for the mechanic. The biplane hovered over, the pilot shooting with his pistol, while the mechanic was taken on board the car under the cover of the fire of its occupants. Both aeroplane and car got safely out of danger."

The Director of the Air Department at the Admiralty subsequently issued a further memorandum stating:

"It is believed that the damage caused by this attack includes the destruction of one airship and serious damage to the larger shed, and also demolition of the hydrogen-producing plant, which had only lately been completed. Later reports stated that flames of considerable magnitude were seen issuing from the factory immediately after the raid."

Flight-Commander Babington and Lieutenant Sippe, still aloft and intact, braved the guns that had brought down their companion; and, mainly through flying at a greater altitude, managed to escape the full brunt of the fire, although both their machines were struck. They circled and dived and released their bombs, and it is interesting in this regard to quote the Admiralty report. Both these airmen, it is affirmed, state that "all bombs reached their objective". Then, their

ammunition gone, and being still in flying trim despite the holes in their planes, they turned back the way they had come and duly reached their base at Belfort. Here they made out their report, and explained what they had seen of the fate of Commander Briggs. They had been in the air, reckoning the out and return flight, more than four hours. Considering the length of this journey, the difficult country negotiated, and the deadliness of the fire to which the airmen were subjected, the raid was a magnificent success. It provided, indeed, a striking instance of what can be done in the organization of a long-distance air raid into an enemy's country; and it was not surprising that, immediately on hearing the result of the flight, General Joffre ordered that each of the three airmen should receive the Cross of the Legion of Honour.

C. G.-W.

H. H.

## CHAPTER XIX

### THE CRUISER WAR IN DISTANT SEAS

(November, 1914)

Why it is difficult to capture Commerce-destroyers—Scenes of their Operations—Admiral von Spee's Squadron in the Pacific—Action off Coast of Chile—Loss of the *Good Hope* and *Monmouth*—The Destruction of the *Emden* by the *Sydney*.

WHILE the naval war was progressing without decisive incident in home waters, events, fortunate and unfortunate, were happening in the distant seas. The half-score or so of German cruisers which were at large when the war

began were heard of in many parts. Some irrational impatience was felt and expressed by persons who declared themselves unable to understand why this little handful of hostile vessels was not suppressed at once. The explanation was very simple.

They were not caught at once just because they were very few and the spaces in which they were to be sought are very large. The west coast of South America has been the scene of very striking events in the commerce-destroying war. Now, if we take Valparaiso as a centre, we shall see that the distance from that port to Vancouver is 5910 miles, to Honolulu 5850 miles, to Tahiti 4210 miles, and to Melbourne 6740 miles. Here are 22,710 miles of sea route to be watched, and a vessel which is only 20 miles off is as completely out of sight as if she were at a distance of 1000 miles. Nothing compelled the Germans to keep to these routes, which are but a very few of the lines by which the continent can be approached or left. To set out to find a single vessel or half a score of vessels on the vast expanses of ocean may be compared to the attempt to find a threepenny bit which had been dropped on Salisbury Plain—and the threepenny bit will lie where it was dropped, whereas the commerce-destroyer goes at 15 knots and upwards. If it were not that these pests must come to known meeting-places of trade in order to be sure of making prizes, and that they themselves must renew stores and fuel, they might never be caught. The pursuer can only guess what meeting-place of trade they will haunt, and as a large part of British commerce in all seas necessarily consists in the carrying of coal, the hostile cruisers can renew their supply of fuel out of prizes. When these conditions are allowed for, it is surprising that the British navy has achieved so much.

Three oceans have been the scene of the chief events of the cruiser part of the war, the South Atlantic, the South Pacific, and the Indian. We may dismiss the first rapidly. The South Atlantic carries so large a part of the food-supply of Great Britain, from New Zealand and the Argentine, that prompt and effectual measures were taken to give protection to trade. The chief events in this region during October were the capture of German stations on the West African coast, which are dealt with elsewhere. In the early days of November we learned that the German cruiser *Karlsruhe*, an armoured vessel of 4900 tons, with a trial speed of 27 knots and twelve 4-inch guns, had captured British prizes somewhere near the Equator and had sent the crews into Pará in Brazil. One of the three vessels known to have been taken, the *Vandyck*, was valuable. She was of 10,300 tons, belonged to the firm of Lamport & Holt, whose colours are well known all along the American coast, north and south, and was, with her cargo of Argentine meat and Brazilian coffee (bound to the United States), worth well over £300,000. The other two, the *Hurstdale*, of 2752 tons, and the *Glanton*, of 3021 tons, the first homeward bound with grain from the Argentine and the second outward bound with coal, were of less value, probably £80,000 to £90,000 when taken together, ship and cargo.

This was not much to have obtained on so promising a field as the South Atlantic, where prizes of vital importance were to be made, and the lie of the land and course of the currents fix



the course of trade to within known limits. In fact, before the end of October, part of our forces in that ocean could be dispatched to the Pacific, where their aid was urgently needed.

Mention has already been made of the fact that the German navy was represented, when the war began, by a squadron of active cruisers in the

with these two in the operations we have to deal with here, the *Dresden*, *Nürnberg*, and *Leipzig*, were of 3544, 3396, and 3200 tons respectively, and of about the same speed as the larger vessels. They carried ten 4-inch guns and smaller pieces.

In the earlier days of the war this squadron, commanded by Admiral von Spee, appeared to have vanished

"into the blue". We heard of the taking of German stations by Japanese or Australian forces, but nothing of the doings of German ships. Their subsequent proceedings prove that their quiescence was not due to the lack of capacity and will to act. What they were doing for the first weeks is matter for speculation. In October, however, reports from a French source told that they had suddenly appeared

at Tahiti, in the Society Islands, a French possession, on September 22, had sunk a small disarmed French gunboat—the *Zélée*, of 600 tons—had bombarded Papeete, and had then steamed away. Then we heard that the *Leipzig* had turned up on the west coast of South America, a rich trade route, and had sunk the *Elsinor*, an empty oil-boat, and the *Bansfield*, a steamer with a cargo of sugar. The s.s. *Ortega*, carrying many French reservists, escaped from her, or another like her, by running through



The Pacific Steam Navigation Company's Steamship *Ortega* (Captain D. R. Kinnear), which foiled a German cruiser by escaping through the uncharted Nelson Passage, near the Straits of Magellan

Indian Ocean and the Pacific. Two of these vessels, the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, were strong. They were of 11,420 tons, carried eight 8.2-inch and six 5.9-inch and twenty 3.4-inch guns, with fourteen small pieces and four torpedo-tubes. Their indicated speed was 22.5 and 23.8 knots, and both were new. Indicated speed is what a ship can go at her trial and in the most favourable circumstances, not what she can attain when her hull and her boilers are fouled by use. The three smaller cruisers which went

the unsurveyed Nelson passage in the Tierra del Fuego, Chilian territorial waters. Probability, and such direct evidence as there was, all pointed to the west coast of South America as the most likely scene of German activity. British, Australian, Japanese, and perhaps French vessels, to the number it was estimated of seventy and over, were drawn together from

great effect. Though we obviously cannot know all the movements made by both sides, the results show in the main lines what happened.

Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock had come round from the Atlantic in his flagship, the *Good Hope*, and on November 1 was off the coast of Chile. He had with him his own ship, an armoured cruiser of 14,100 tons, carrying two 9.2-inch guns, sixteen 6-inch, twelve 12-pounders, three 3-pounders, two machine-guns, and two torpedo-tubes. The part of his squadron immediately under his hand consisted of the *Monmouth*, an armoured cruiser of 9300 tons, fourteen 6-inch guns, eight 12-pounders, three 3-pounders, and eight machine-guns; the *Otranto*, an armed



Photo. F. G. O. Stuart

H.M.S. *Good Hope*, Admiral Cradock's Flagship, lost in the battle off Chile on November 1, 1914

all points of the compass to round up the raiders.

If they had been a hundred and seventy they would have been too few to patrol tens of thousands of miles of ocean route so as to keep every part under close watch. And then, when a larger force is closing in on a smaller, it is rarely that all the parts of it can arrive at the same time, and the leader against whom this circling movement is directed may not choose to sit still till he is caught in a ring. He may rush at one part of it and break through. This way of upsetting such an attack has been practised on sea and land from ancient times with

merchant-ship, recently hired, which was incapable of facing any real man-of-war; and the *Glasgow*, armoured cruiser of 4900 tons, two 6-inch and ten 4-inch guns, one 2-pounder, four 3-pounders, and two torpedo-tubes. He was in communication by wireless with the *Canopus* battleship, which had been sent to join him. Sir Christopher knew that Admiral von Spee was in Chilian waters and stretched his ships out to intercept or overtake the enemy.

Soon after one o'clock the *Glasgow* sighted the two big German ships and one small one heading to the north, and on the east side of the British ships. She reported, and the British



Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, in command of the British Fleet at the battle off Chile  
(From a photograph by Russell, Southsea)

squadron was concentrated. Shortly before six in the afternoon the enemy was sighted at some still uncertain point off Coronel. The German ships turned, and both squadrons stood to the south at a distance from one another of 15,000 yards, and a speed of 17 knots. The indicated speeds of the British ships were at least equal to the German, and though "indicated" is by no means always the same as "actual", there is no reason to doubt that Admiral Cradock could have kept his distance if he had chosen. But was there any reason why he should? By merely counting guns and opposing calibre to calibre it is possible to demonstrate that the Germans had a superiority of weight of metal. Sir Christopher Cradock

had a reputation for gallantry which was so fiery as to overpower discretion; but, again, was there any reason for leaning to the side of discretion? Something depends on what the British admiral knew of the position of the *Canopus*. Though her exact position is uncertain, she was coming from the south, and therefore nearing the two squadrons which were heading southward. If he had reason to think that the battleship could come up in good time, he was well justified in doing what other British officers had done before him, namely, attack even a markedly superior enemy in the hope not so much of defeating him as of delaying and damaging him so that he could not escape from other British forces at hand. Some doubt still exists as to what the odds exactly were.



Admiral von Spee, in command of the German Fleet in the battle off Chile



The letter of Captain Luce of the *Glasgow*, published on November 18, left the impression that the German squadron was composed of the two big cruisers and one small one. But

were perfectly capable of damaging the hulls of the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*. There are escapes which are more injurious to honour and confidence than a defeat. Have we ever regretted the heroic fury of Sir Richard Grenville in "Flores in the Azores"?

The two small squadrons closed on converging lines just before sunset in a high sea, with head wind and rain. While the sun remained above the horizon it served the British ships by shining across them and in the faces of the enemy; but the opponents were still at a distance. When it set, with the sudden plunge and in the splendid gold-red glow which mark the brief twilight of tropical, or close on tropical, seas, the dark hulls of the British ships stood out against the flaming background. It was just after seven when the Germans began the terrible salvos of gun-fire which poured swift destruction on the *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth*. The *Otranto* had been ordered away, and indeed she was useless. Where modern guns can develop their full power they work furiously rapid destruction. The *Good Hope* and *Monmouth* were soon blazing forward. The heavy guns of the *Good Hope* were silenced, and soon she blew up with an immense explosion. In the dark which comes

so close on the brief tropical twilight, the *Monmouth* turned before the wind, the cold south trade-wind which brings the possibility of living to the inhabitants of the steep slope of the Cordillera. Her captain hoped, no doubt, that the smoke and flames would blow ahead and might be got under; but



Scene of the battle off Chile, November 1, 1914

from the deck of the *Glasgow*, which suffered little and alone escaped, the flashes of the German gun-fire were seen as Admiral von Spee's cruisers closed round and completed the destruction. The *Glasgow* steered to meet and warn the *Canopus*.

The action was fought by ships steaming against a head sea and wind, which drove a heavy spray before it. But that condition affected the Germans no less than the British. It cannot account for the rapidity of the defeat, nor can the serious superiority of weight of guns the enemy possessed. Another element must have had a decisive influence. Admiral von Spee had had his ships under his command for two years; he was known to have paid much attention to gunnery, and to have made the *Scharnhorst* a crack ship, and no doubt he kept the others up to the mark. The skill of the German gunners must have made the utmost of all the advantages of armament or position they possessed. With modern ordnance an initial superiority multiplies itself at a frightful ratio. The German ships which came back to Valparaiso after the action claimed to have suffered little loss, and it is probable that they told the truth. The supposition that the Germans possess a peculiarly powerful explosive, though supported by some evidence, remained only a supposition.

They did not leave the coast at once, for they were heard of in Chilian ports, and were said, with every appearance of truth, to have abused the neutrality of South American waters, more particularly by making use of the solitary and little-visited islands of the Galapagos archipelago and of Juan Fernandez.

The arrival of somewhat tardy reports of the disastrous action off the coast of Chile coincided with a most



Photo. Cribb, Southsea

H.M.S. *Glasgow*, which fought in the battle off Chile, but escaped

welcome piece of news. When we last heard of the *Emden* she had just completed her swift cruise in the Bay of Bengal, and had vanished into the Indian Ocean. She had not been long out of sight before news came that she had met and taken other batches of British merchant-ships and a Japanese prize. Then she performed a feat of the old quasi-buccaneer order, which, however, was legitimate enough. It has always been counted fair war at sea to disguise a vessel, and to show false colours until the very moment before opening fire, for the purpose of deceiving the enemy. The only restriction is that you must not fire while

the false flag is flying, nor till your own is hoisted in its place. Captain Karl von Müller played this old game with effect. A Russian cruiser, the *Schemtschug*, or *Zemshug*, as it is variously transliterated from the national Russian alphabet, had come to render

assistance in the protection of commerce in the Straits of Malacca and on the coast of the Malay Peninsula, and she was lying at Penang. The captain of the *Emden* had rigged a false funnel to alter the outline of his ship. He succeeded in deceiving whatever outlook the Russians were keeping, and the *Zemshug* was destroyed. It was a smart feat in its way, and one of which Dundonald would not have been ashamed. The Russian was a cruiser of 3180 tons, carrying eight 4.8-inch guns, and therefore a fair match for the German.

This, however, was the crown of Captain von Müller's career. His run had been active and, all things considered, long. But there were too many pursuers after him to allow him to escape. Moreover, although the Indian Ocean abounds in island hiding-places, well-informed naval officers could form a fairly accurate estimate of his position, with large bounds and in a general way. The immediate cause of his capture was an attempt to ruin a wireless-telegraphy station on Direction Island, one of the Keeling or Cocos Islands.

This little group of coral islands is




Photo. Cribb, Southsea

H.M.S. *Monmouth*, lost in the battle off Chile, November 1, 1914

admirably described in Darwin's *Voyage of the "Beagle"*. It lies about 600 miles south of Sumatra, and is occupied by a British cocoa-nut-planting industry. The islands lie in a roughly-drawn circle. It is in fact a coral reef built up on a submerged mountain. The islands are, as it were, tops of the reef on which soil has been formed. They enclose a lagoon which is mostly shallow, and obstructed by growing coral patches. In the north part of the circle is the chief island, Direction, on which are the principal port and the wireless station. The best anchorage, Port Refuge, is on the west side of Direction, which itself is shaped like a somewhat fat half-moon, and is concave on the lagoon or inner side. To the north-west is Horseburgh, and to the north of that lies Keeling Island, a small coral reef with a little and shallow lagoon of its own. It has its name from William Keeling, "general" or commander-in-chief of one of the early voyages of the East India Company, 1607-10, by whom it was first sighted. The wireless station is on the concave side of Direction.




When Captain von Müller decided to destroy the wireless station he ran a distinct risk. There was always the possibility that alarm might be given from the station to some British man-of-war within call, and that he would be interrupted not only before his work was done, but while his landing party was still ashore. And this was what happened. A message was flashed to call for help, and it reached a part of the Australian squadron.

The story has been excellently told in the brief and businesslike dispatch of Captain John C. T. Glossop of H.M.A.S. *Sydney*, to whom fell the honour of putting a stop to the depredations of the *Emden*. Writing at Colombo on November 15, 1914, he tells how:—

"Whilst on escort duty with the convoy under the charge of Captain Silver, H.M.A.S. *Melbourne*, at 6.30 a.m. on Monday, 9th November, a wireless message from Cocos was heard reporting that a foreign warship was off the entrance. I was ordered to raise steam for full speed at 7.0 a.m. and proceeded thither. I worked up to 20 knots, and at 9.15 a.m. sighted land ahead and almost immediately the smoke of a ship, which proved to be H.I.G.M.S. *Emden* coming out towards me at a great rate. At 9.40 a.m. fire was opened, she firing the first shot. I kept my distance as much as possible to obtain advantage of my guns. Her fire was very rapid and accurate to begin with, but seemed to slacken very quickly, all casualties occurring in this ship almost immediately. First the foremost funnel of her went, secondly the foremast, and she was badly on fire aft; then the second funnel went, and lastly the third funnel, and I saw she was making for the beach on North Keeling Island, where she grounded at 11.20 a.m. I gave her two more broadsides and left her to pursue a merchant ship which had come up during the action."

The merchant ship was the British collier *Buresk*, into which the *Emden* had put a prize crew of three officers, one warrant officer, and twelve men. She was, of course, retaken at once, but she was by the action of the German prize crew in a sinking state. They, and the remains of the original crew—eighteen Chinamen, one Eng-



Sketch-map of the northernmost part of the Keeling or Cocos Islands: the scene of the *Emden's* last fight

These islands lie about 600 miles south of the west end of Sumatra



Captain John C. T. Glossop, in command of the *Sydney*, which caught and destroyed the *Emden*  
(From a photograph by Lafayette, Ltd.)

lish steward, and one Norwegian cook—were taken out, and she was sent to the bottom by four shells. After providing for the men of the crew of the *Buresk* by putting them into her boats, Captain Glossop returned to the *Emden*, which was now beached in the surf on the weather side of North Keeling Island. In the north-easterly monsoon which blows from October to May, this is the north and east side of the island. In the position in which the *Emden* then lay, her crew had no resource but to surrender. Captain von Müller displayed some mere contumacy, for he would not hoist the white flag till the *Sydney* had, “reluctantly”, as Captain

Glossop tells us, fired two broadsides into his ship. The white flag was hoisted at 4.35. It was now too late to do anything more for her. Captain Glossop sent her own prize crew from the *Buresk* in one of that vessel's boats to tell her captain that he would return in the morning.

While these events were happening, the landing party sent to destroy the wireless station by the *Emden*—three officers and forty men—had seized a small schooner of 70 tons, the *Ayesha*, had laid hands on provisions, and had gone off in her, taking two Maxim guns of their own with them. What they could hope to do was not very clear, unless it was to reach a Dutch port in Sumatra or Java. They must have found it by no means easy for them to do even this with the monsoon against them, for the schooner was leaking and her pumps were out of



Prince Franz Joseph of Hohenzollern, one of the officers of the cruiser *Emden* captured by the *Sydney*

order. But it was a spirited attempt.

Two days were spent in rescuing the remains of the *Emden's* crew from the wreck in the surf, and the few who succeeded in reaching the shore were taken off from the landing-place on the west side of Keeling Island. It was difficult work.

If we look at the respective sizes of the vessels only, the *Emden* was plainly much out-classed. She was of 3600 tons as against the 5400 of the *Sydney*, and her ten 4-inch guns were not a match for the eight 6-inch guns of the Australian cruiser. The absence of three officers and forty men of the *Emden's* crew who formed the landing party may be set off against the presence of "a large proportion of young hands and people under training" in the *Sydney*. All behaved gallantly, and are praised by their captain. We must allow too that there was no lack of spirit nor of skill shown by the Germans. Had tonnage and armament been equal the result would have been doubtful, for the *Emden* having been long in commission and practice, the general level of training in her crew would probably have been rather the better. But Captain Glossop and his ship's company made the ut-



Photo. Cribb, Southsea

The Ship which ended the *Emden's* Career: the Australian cruiser *Sydney*

most of their superiority, which they could not have done without the display of energy and skill. The disproportion in the loss suffered was what might have been expected. The *Sydney* lost 4 killed or mortally wounded and 12 wounded. The loss of the German was 7 officers and 108 men killed in the action, 1 officer and 3 men who died of their wounds in the *Sydney*. There were also 2 officers and 50 men wounded. Here, as is so often the case in modern naval warfare when the defeat means destruction, the dead were far more numerous than the wounded. Captain von Müller, who had acted handsomely to his captives in the days of his successes, was received kindly when a prisoner. Among the survivors of his ship's company was a prince of the Sigmaringen branch of the Hohenzollern family, Franz Joseph.

D. H.



## CHAPTER XX

## THE REVOLT IN SOUTH AFRICA

(August–December, 1914)

Political Situation—A Claim to Neutrality—Triumph of the Government followed by Resignation of Beyers—Tragic End of De la Rey—Treachery of Maritz in Cape Province starts Revolt—Maritz defeated—Beyers's and De Wet's Headquarters in Transvaal and Orange Free State—Hertzog's Failure to induce Rebels to return home—Botha defeats Beyers—De Wet's Old Grudge against Magistrate—Botha attacks while De Wet sleeps—A Tame Surrender—Hot Pursuit of Beyers—Final Drama: Beyers drowned—"Senseless Rebellion" declared practically over.

WHEN the news that Britain had declared war resounded through the Empire, it was not surprising that South Africa, notwithstanding the magnificent spirit of the vast majority of both Boers and British, found herself face to face with danger from within as well as from without. In certain parts the old canker of racial hatred was still smouldering, and German agents had been indefatigable in their efforts to keep this alive, in accordance with the secret-service system of Pan-Germanism. These agents were specially busy in the country districts, where news from the outside world filtered through for the most part by word of mouth, coloured by the prejudices or hidden designs of the speaker. In the towns and more-populated districts the people had means of reading and judging for themselves, and for the most part, in Britain's hour of need, demonstrated their whole-hearted loyalty to the Empire at once. The sudden outbreak of world-wide war, however, was so unexpected that it found South Africa as a whole unprepared, vaguely and anxiously wondering what would happen now that national problems which might have been solved by time without serious disturbance—or, on the other hand, have become more dangerous with insidious growth—had of necessity to be brought up for immediate solution. Above and beyond all other problems was that of the relation of South Africa to the Empire. That section of the Government which had mustered under the leadership of General Hertzog—and whose members came in consequence to be known as the Hertzogites—was in a very decided minority, but it held strongly to the view that South Africa had no concern in the destinies of the British Empire as a whole, maintaining that, in the event of a European War involving Great Britain, South Africa should have the right to claim absolute neutrality. On that account, and on personal grounds of animosity towards General Botha and other leaders of the Government—personal feeling playing no small part in the grave crisis which ensued—General Hertzog left the Cabinet and gathered round him what came to be known as the neutrality party, the ultimate aim of which, there could be little

doubt, was complete South African independence. What would have been the fate of this party had the Empire's call to arms not brought matters so suddenly and unexpectedly to a head it would be idle to speculate, but the outbreak of hostilities in Europe also meant the declaration of war between the rivals in South Africa. General Botha threw down the gauntlet to the

ment to maintain the security and integrity of the Empire, they carried the day in Parliament with an overwhelming majority of ninety-two against twelve. Nine of the minority were members for the Orange Free State, including General Hertzog himself, who proposed an abortive amendment, which, while promising to support all measures of defence necessary to resist



The Call to Arms in South Africa: Johannesburg volunteers leaving for the Front

Photo. E. Green

neutrality party at once, and the real friends and the real foes of the Empire were forced to declare themselves. To that extent, therefore, the Great War was a blessing in disguise. An open wound is better than a cancerous growth.

The splendid stand made by General Botha and his colleagues earlier in this crisis has been dealt with in a former chapter. In their address of unswerving loyalty to His Majesty, promising to defend the Union and co-operate with the Imperial Govern-

any invasion of Union territory, declared that an attack on German territory in South Africa "would be in conflict with the interests of the Union and of the Empire".

Defeated in Parliament, the opponents of the Union Government proceeded to more drastic steps. General Christian Beyers, Commandant-General of the Defence Force, handed in his resignation on September 15, and published a manifesto which plainly showed his implacable hatred of Great Britain and the dangerous tendency



General Smuts, South African Minister of Defence  
(From a photograph by Elliott & Fry)

of the revolt. Beyers's action was much more serious than the subsequent treachery of De Wet, who, though a power to be reckoned with in the Free State, had not the same high reputation as a leader among the rest of his compatriots as his slippery achievements in the last war had won for him in Great Britain.

Both Beyers and De Wet had signed the treaty of Vereeniging, which ended the Boer War of 1899-1902, though among the last to give in. Beyers, after a time, had apparently become so loyal in his allegiance that in 1907 he was appointed Speaker of the Transvaal Legislative Assembly, and subsequently accepted the post of Commandant of the Union Defence Force. His loyalty was unsuspected up to the last. As General Smuts,

the Minister of Defence, pointed out, in reply to the ex-Commandant-General's manifesto, Beyers had given no hint to the Union Government of his contemplated resignation when discussing the very expedition to German South-West Africa which he afterwards opposed. He had himself been largely responsible for the plan of operations to be adopted, and, indeed, had been regarded as the future Commander-in-Chief of the British Campaign. Beyers's treacherous change of front was the more astonishing, too, when it was remembered that at the end of August, in addressing the troops at Johannesburg, he had expressed the hope that Boer and Britain would stand together and fight to the last man, concluding by calling for three



General Christian Beyers, who resigned as Commandant-General of the Defence Force to become one of the Leaders of the Revolt, and was drowned on December 8, 1914




ringing cheers for His Majesty the King.

On the very day on which Beyers handed in his resignation in Pretoria he met General De la Rey, whose old allegiance to Botha and patriarchal influence with his people made his attitude at this time of supreme importance. The possible fruits of that meeting remain unknown, for it was while the two generals were on their way by motor-car, that very evening, to address a demonstration at Lichtenburg in opposition to the Government, that De la Rey, as the car was passing through Johannesburg, was accidentally shot dead. It happened that the police were hunting at the time some desperate bandits, who were known to be escaping through the district in a motor car. Beyers and De la Rey dashed through Johannesburg without responding to the challenge of the police patrol, with the result that the car was fired on, and De la Rey, to the grief of the whole country, was killed on the spot.

As soon as Beyers's betrayal was revealed it was natural that the public should recall his cordial meeting with the German Emperor in 1912. But until the actual event they did not suppose that this accomplished lawyer Boer, who had been born and educated in the old Cape Colony, was capable of extreme treachery. A self-styled prophet named Vanrensburg, who acquired a certain influence in the Transvaal, had, however, preached that the Dutch Republics would be re-established with De Wet and Beyers as presidents, and the words had fallen on fruitful soil.

VOL. I.

It was on October 13, 1914, that the Union Government publicly announced that rebellion was in the land. Europe had been at war for nine weeks. During about half that period, or ever since the resignation of General Beyers as Commandant-General of the Union Defence Force, the Government and General Botha had well-



General De la Rey, accidentally shot dead in Johannesburg, September 15, 1914

founded suspicions that something was wrong with their forces in the north-west of the Cape Province, which were under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Maritz. To Solomon Gerhardus Maritz the British yoke had never been congenial. He was a Cape rebel in the Boer War of 1899-1902, a man of strong character, noted for the speed and endurance with which he conducted guerrilla fighting. But he had now undertaken a forlorn hope, and was doomed to be stigmatized by his countrymen as one

who brought disgrace on the Dutch race. The Union Government acted promptly. Colonel Conraad Brits was sent to take over the command from Maritz, but, on being summoned to come in and report, Maritz replied with insolence. Colonel Brits thereupon sent Major Ben Bouwer to take over the command. On arrival at Maritz's camp this officer was taken prisoner with his companions, but subsequently was released and sent back with an ultimatum to the Union Government. In it Maritz threatened to attack Colonel Brits's force, and further to invade the Union, unless the Government guaranteed by October 11 to allow Generals Hertzog, De Wet, Beyers, Kemp, and Müller to meet him in order that he might receive instructions from them.

Maritz had a force of Germans under him, besides his own rebel commando, and had dispatched to German South-West Africa all those of his officers and men who were unwilling to join the Germans. From the enemy also he boasted that he had ample guns, rifles, ammunition, and money. Maritz temporarily occupied Keimoes and Kakamas. Affecting to be still a commandant of the Defence Force, he disarmed the inhabitants of the latter place on the plea that he required the rifles to arm a force against the German border. Here, too, he hoisted the Vierkleur, the flag of the old Transvaal Republic, though presently it was displaced by the German flag. A few days later he sent in an order to Colonel Brits to evacuate Upington, and, receiving no answer, declared his intention to

attack it. The plan, however, was frustrated. On the same day a squadron of the Imperial Light Horse rounded up seventy-one of the rebels; and next day the Imperial Light Horse and Enslin's Horse (the latter composed of Dutch burghers of the Transvaal) brought in fifty more, who had surrendered. At five o'clock on the morning of October 22, Maritz attacked Keimoes, a town between Kakamas and Upington on the northern bank of the Orange River. At first he was supposed to have over 1000 men, including several hundred Germans, with eight guns and four machine-guns, but later evidence showed the force to be almost entirely German. Keimoes was held by 150 Union men until reinforcements arrived, when the enemy was driven back, leaving two dead and removing their wounded. One of four officers captured was the German Count von Schwerin. Maritz himself was shot through the knee-cap. The Union casualties were eight wounded. The rebels retiring on Kakamas, Colonel Brits, after a forced night-march, arrived at the outskirts of that town at dawn on October 24, and surprised them with a vigorous attack. A portion of the rebel force defended for about an hour and then retreated. Colonel Brits entered the town without opposition, but, his horses being done up after the heavy march, he was unable to pursue Maritz. The rebels retreated westward towards Schuit Drift, leaving tents standing, and abandoning a large quantity of stores and ammunition. On the following two days Colonel Van de



# SOUTH AFRICA

Scale: 0 to 100 miles / 0 to 160 kilometers. Longitude: East of Greenwich.





Venter engaged and defeated at Calvinia a portion of Maritz's force which had left Kakamas about a week before.

Since the outbreak of the revolt there had been a stream of willing captives. Twenty-four rebels surrendered to Colonel Van de Venter's



Lieut.-Colonel Maritz, who first raised the flag of revolt in South Africa, and afterwards fled to German South-West Africa

scouts at Brandolei and 100 to Captain Vermaas at Onderste Doorns without any fighting. It was clear that Maritz's men, the younger of whom he held together by threats of the sjambok, had repented their allegiance. Many, on surrendering, volunteered for active service. Others sent messages expressing intention to escape and join the Union forces. Maritz himself, who was said to be at

loggerheads with the Germans, offered to surrender on terms, but the offer was contemptuously ignored. On October 27 Colonel Brits met and defeated a portion of his force at Schuit Drift. Colonel Alberts, who arrived at Truerfontein on October 29, sent a reconnoitring force out under Commandant de Villiers. They met a strong rebel commando with white flags on their rifles. On the Union commandant's approach the rebels attacked and captured 110 of his men. But these were not to wait long for release. The rebels advanced from two points against Colonel Alberts, who easily defeated them, and chased them for 20 miles. The rebels scattered over a front of 5 miles, leaving carts, bicycles, &c. Their losses were 13 killed, 36 wounded, 240 captured. From Kenhardt at the same time Colonel Commandant Celliers announced the capture of rebel leaders, including Maritz's adjutant, Major Ben Coetzee. Colonel Brits was now able to report that the invasion of the Cape Province was finally broken. He had defeated the combined rebel and German force at Schuit Drift and was returning to the Transvaal, having temporarily transferred his command to Colonel Royston.

After his complete defeat at Kakamas, Maritz fled into German territory. Meanwhile a more sinister complexion was given to the rebellion by developments in the northern districts of the Orange Free State and western districts of the Transvaal. On October 27 the Government announced the discovery that General De Wet and

General Beyers respectively were heading movements there. Armed rebellious commandoes were already in existence. The town of Heilbron had been seized and the officials of the Government made prisoners. At Reitz a train had been stopped and armed citizens of the Defence Force taken from it and disarmed.

Christian De Wet was known to be no ardent lover of the British, but his utterances since the war, when he had been General Commander-in-Chief of the Orange Free State Forces, had been marked by a loyal tone apparently sincere. One of the most striking of these utterances was made in 1909, when, as Minister of Agriculture for the Orange River Colony, he addressed a gathering of farmers near Bloemfontein. At the end of the

meeting the audience sang the "Volkslied", De Wet joining in. "That is quite right," he said; "it is our old hymn. But now, as we are British subjects and loyal men, we must also sing 'God save the King'"—which they did with equal heartiness, De Wet leading the singing. This was quite in the spirit of the counsel to the nation with which he had closed his book on the war between Boer and Briton: "Be loyal to the new Government! Loyalty pays best in the end. Loyalty alone is worthy of a nation which has shed its blood for freedom." It is not known whether General Hertzog, who set out from Bloemfontein towards the end of October, accompanied by a son of ex-President Steyn, on a visit to the rebel commandoes, reminded his old



Crushing the Rebellion in South Africa: a loyal burgher commando detaining near a veldt camp



friend of those sentiments; but whatever efforts General Hertzog made to induce the rebels to go home and be loyal were unavailing. He failed to induce De Wet, who had erected Heilbron into the capital of the new Republic, to throw up the sponge; and from beginning to end of a rebellion which cost the northern districts of the Orange Free State £200,000 in direct losses through looting, he cut a somewhat inept figure.

General Botha's attitude on the outbreak of the revolt was one of calm and dignified strength. He himself assumed command of the operations. Accepting a standard presented by the ladies of the Transvaal on October 22, he said that he could not break his oath whatever happened; that he would do everything in his power to prevent further bloodshed; and that it would be the happiest day for him when South Africa was restored to peace. Early on October 27 General Botha started from Rustenburg, west of Pretoria, to round up Beyers's rebels. In a few hours he came in touch with them, and drove them in headlong rout, capturing eighty fully armed. Fighting took place towards the end of the day's pursuit. One of Botha's men and several of Beyers's were wounded. But it was in the Free State that the chief danger-spot lay. The affected districts were Heilbron, Vrede, Lindley, Reitz, and Bethlehem. Near Lindley, De Wet destroyed the railway in several parts. He detached a body of rebels to loot Harrismith, but was tackled at Doornberg (November 7) by the Government forces, though not in sufficient



General Christian de Wet  
(From a photograph by Russell)

strength, under Commandant F. R. Cronje. In this fight De Wet's son Daniel was killed. De Wet and his men behaved like brigands in the towns they occupied. At Winburg they stole everything they could lay hands on in the shops—even dolls, hats, and rolls of velvet—and at the shop of Mr. Wright (the Mayor) De Wet struck in the eye an assistant who answered his demand for petrol by saying there was none. De Wet acted as if demented. He had suffered two slight paralytic strokes a year or so before. His most childish exhibition was at Vrede (October 29). By his order on that occasion the magistrate was dragged in view of the inhabitants to the monument in front of the Dutch Church, where the rebel General made a speech. After

referring to the "miserable pestilential English" he said: "King Edward VII promised to protect us, but he failed to do so, and allowed a magistrate to be placed over us". De Wet then bitterly accused the magistrate of having fined him 5s. for beating a native with a small shepherd's whip. "You pleaded guilty," interjected the magistrate. From this incident General Smuts, Minister of Defence, wittily characterized the rebellion as "the five-shilling rebellion". De Wet at Vrede also spoke of the invasion of German South-West Africa as a dastardly act of robbery, and added that "the ungodly policy" of General Botha had gone on long enough.

These were but the fulminations of a desperate man. Dutch and British in the Union had at the outset held meetings and rallied to the side of General Botha, and the failure of the rebellion was sure, though the difficulties of the country and its vast area prolonged the resistance. De Wet had induced many to join him in the belief that there would be no fighting. The whole Free State, he represented, was rising; the Government would do nothing. On November 12, in the Mushroom Valley, these illusions were shattered. De Wet was caught napping, being actually in bed when General Botha opened a fierce attack. Colonel Myburgh and Colonel T. Smuts were associated with the Commandant-General, while Colonel Brand co-operated from Hoenderkop. The result was complete defeat and rout of the rebel force, over twenty of whom were killed and a large number wounded. Of the prisoners taken

255 were European and 27 native. Prisoners De Wet had taken, including Senator Stuart and the magistrate at Winburg, were recaptured and released by Colonel Brand. The Union losses were three killed, twenty-four wounded. An incident of the fight at Mushroom Valley was a daring attempt to get the Union forces to fire on each other. A tall man in uniform rode up to Colonel Brand's commando, wildly making signs, and pointed to General Botha's commando, which was then approaching. They were rebels, he said, and urged General Brand to open fire. Just then one of Brand's men recognized a friend among the new-comers. "Hullo, what are you doing here?" he shouted. "I am with Botha," was the answer. "Whom are you with?" Upon this the ruse of the tall stranger was made plain. A revolver-shot rang out, and Van Niekerk, rebel leader, fell pierced through the chest.

Two of De Wet's sons surrendered to a special Justice of the Peace on November 21. The same night De Wet crossed the Vaal River into the Transvaal. He was pursued by Commandant du Toit in a motor-car, but escaped with four followers only. Joining a small commando which had been secretly forming in the Schweizer Reneke district he started westward, and on November 25 crossed the railway near Devondale siding, 18 miles north of Vryburg. From Vryburg Colonel Brits advanced in hot pursuit, aided by a motor-car contingent from Witwatersrand. On the 27th fifty of De Wet's force were captured at Kommandant Spruit. The

leader had left this party the day before and trekked west. But he was at the end of his tether. His actual capture was effected by Colonel Jordaan and Captain Helgaard De Jager, with about eighty men of the Middleburg (Transvaal) commando, who followed De Wet up to a farm where he was camping for the night

without a shot being fired. Colonel Brits afterwards stated that the capture was only possible owing to the motor-cars acting in co-operation with the horsemen. De Wet himself owned that the motor-cars finished his horses. His own last journey was by motor to Johannesburg, where he arrived under escort on December 4, smoking his



The Revolt in South Africa: a group of loyalists

at Waterburg, 110 miles west of Mafeking. They surrounded him, gradually drawing in closer from a circumference of 3 miles. Early next morning (December 1) Colonel Jordaan captured most of his horses, and sent a message calling on him to surrender. Before complying, De Wet tried to ride away with a few men; but the mere threat to shoot was enough to decide his course, and he and his men were made prisoners

pipe but looking haggard. He was lodged in one of the forts.

The career of several of the minor rebel leaders was almost equally inglorious, and need not be followed in detail. One of Kemp's exploits was to demand the surrender of Kuruman, in British Bechuanaland. On November 18, at a bivouac near the Orange River, a portion of the Natal Light Horse were attacked by 1600 rebels under Kemp, Vanzyl, and Ferreira.



The rebels approached with a white flag and wearing white armlets, and were supposed to be reinforcements until on reaching the observation-posts they dismounted and fired volleys into the Union troops. The latter's casualties were seven killed, fourteen wounded. The rebels had forty killed. After suffering defeat at Rooidam, north of Upington, many of Kemp's men surrendered. Kemp himself then escaped into German South-West Africa. On November 12, after nearly all his force had been captured at Bronkhorstspuit, east of Pretoria, by Colonel Mentz, the rebel General Chris Müller was taken in a farmhouse wounded in both legs. The virulent rebel Conroy (member of the Provincial Council), whose exploits included blowing up a bridge at Virginia, narrowly escaped capture on November 19. He remained at large another month. In a brilliant combined movement directed by General Lukin, the S.A.M.R. completely disorganized the rebels under Rautenbach and Bruwer south of Bethlehem. Commandant Cherry Emmett of the Vryheid commando severely repulsed the rebel General Wessels. General Botha's proclamation that rebels (except leaders) who voluntarily surrendered before November 21 would not be criminally prosecuted produced good results, though the leaders kept their men in ignorance of it as far as possible; and by the first week in December the chief outstanding item was to settle with Beyers in the Transvaal.

After his escape from the clutches of General Botha on October 27,

Beyers crossed the railway line from north to south near Bloemhof, in the western Transvaal. Colonel Lemmer caught him up, and totally dispersed his commando, on the Vet River on November 7, capturing 364 prisoners, 300 horses, and much material. The Union casualties were three killed and nine wounded, while the rebels lost nine killed and eleven wounded. General Botha inflicted further punishment at Zoutpansdrift. Colonel Dirk Van de Venter's fight with the rebels at Zandfontein, 64 miles north of Pretoria, on Sunday, November 8, was one of the most sanguinary encounters of the rebellion. No fewer than 120 of the enemy were killed or wounded. The Union casualties were twelve killed, eleven wounded. Dum-dum bullets were used by the rebels, and some of our men suffered frightful wounds. The fragments of Beyers's commando, numbering at least 1000 men, under Beyers, Wolmarans, Conroy, &c., were attacked by Colonel Celliers on November 15 at Verhels-leegte, in the Hoopstad district of the Free State. The fight was carried on over a distance of 6 miles, and then resolved itself into a rapid chase for 18 miles, when the Union horses became exhausted. In three days Colonel Celliers took 299 prisoners. On the other hand, a Union force of 300, under Commandant Koen, had a narrow escape from capture by 1500 rebels, whom they attacked at Zoornberg, in the Senekal district (November 18). The rebels hoisted the white flag, and when the loyalists got up they fired again, wounding a burgher. Fighting was renewed, and the rebels

a second time hoisted the white flag. The Union troops retired. Three loyalists were treacherously shot dead by rebels in the vicinity. On November 20, when Colonel Fouché drove a rebel force of 600, under General Rautenbach, from a strong position at Zandfontein, the rebels again abused the white flag shamelessly. Haman's Kraal, to the north of Pretoria, was the scene of furious fighting on November 23. At midnight fifty men of Enslin's Horse and 100 South African Mounted Rifles, under Captain Rutherford, moved out to surround the rebels at Klipdrift. Fifty men of the infantry were also posted to intercept the rebels. On approaching the laager it was found that the enemy had moved away. At

eleven o'clock they were discovered on Rondefontein in a very strong position, their flank protected by a line of rugged hills, and a high kopje dominating their rear. The shooting of the rebels was deadly, and they had a superior force (300 men). The Union troops retired in good order. Captain Allan King, Sub-Native Commissioner of Pretoria, was killed while getting back to cover after bandaging a wounded trooper.

Brilliant work was done by armoured trains about this time. The "Trafalgar", under Captain Robert C. Wallace, of the South African Engineer Corps, made a run up the Reitz-Frankfort line on the morning of the 24th, and had a brisk engagement. A force of



Canada's Call to Arms: the first contingent leaving Toronto for the motherland



Canadians in Camp in the Motherland: a corner of the Canadian Highlanders' quarters

mounted rebels tried to cut off the armoured train at a deep cutting overlooked by a mountain, from which the crew of the train would have been exposed to deadly fire. The "Trafalgar" kept up a running fight, and inflicted at least fifteen casualties on the rebel band. A rebel veldt-cornet named Koster was killed, and Nicolaas Serfontein, ex-member of the Legislative Assembly and one of De Wet's three rebel generals, was wounded during this action. On the following day the "Erin" (Captain Shannon) accompanied the "Trafalgar" on a reconnaissance, and, while repairing the line that had been damaged on the preceding day, entered into an engagement and quickly repulsed the

rebels. The "Schrikmaker" (Captain Adams) also shared in operations.

One point in connection with the capture of prisoners was the direct evidence established of the German origin of the revolt. Thus, among a batch of 106 rebels who voluntarily surrendered at Carnarvon, in the Cape Province, in November, were seven German soldiers. In the early days of the rising a German proclamation was freely distributed by the Germans with Maritz. It was dated Windhoek, September 16, signed "Seitz, Imperial Governor of German South-West Africa", and contained "emphatic" assurance "that the Germans are not making war against the Dutch inhabitants of South Africa; that, on



the contrary, they are using all measures to ward off the attacks of the British troops at all points, and that they will carry on the war against the English, and against the English only, to the utmost". Among other notable prisoners was a member of the Transvaal Provincial Council, Dantje Kerstein, one of Beyers's commandants, who was among the captures made by Colonel Pretorius, of the Lichtenburg Ruiters, on November 13; but a member of the Orange Free State Provincial Council among the rebels, Commandant Fierstenburg, who surrendered voluntarily a few days later, had left his commando on November 10, "when it was clear that the rebels meant to use armed resistance to Government forces". H. Van Rensburg, captured on November 18, was member of the Provincial Council for Hoopstad. An attack by Commandant Geyser of Nylstroom resulted in the capture of the local rebel Commandants, Viljoen, Van Staden, Potgieter, and Wessels, with fifty others. After only a few shots 200 rebels under Fourie were captured by Colonel Manie Botha. [Captain Fourie was later tried by court-martial, and was shot, December 20.] These were part of the harvest of the sweeping operations round Reitz conducted under General Botha in early December, which accounted altogether for 700 rebels. During this great drive all the Union commandoes moved according to schedule. "Thirty-six hours of continued heavy rain", reported General Botha, who himself accompanied the forces in the centre, "made it very hard for the men, but in spite of the

exacting conditions the conduct of all officers and men has been exemplary. They deserve nothing but praise for their fine spirit." This tribute may well bear application to the whole arduous campaign. The fine conduct of the loyalist fighters was all the more remarkable inasmuch as they included fathers and brothers of rebels.

The final drama in the misguided movement which had led to their being engaged in civil war was also the most tragic. By the time Beyers was engaged by Commandant Sarel Du Toit at Reitgat on the Zandspruit on December 7 he had only seventy men left. But he inflicted loss and escaped again. The rebels split up, Beyers's party, about thirty strong, being pursued by Commandant Botha to Klerkstroom. Captain Ruys and Veldtkornet Denecker crossed from Maquissi, and at sunrise on the 8th met a small band of rebels on the Zandspruit, and drove them towards the Vaal River. On the banks of the Vaal a sharp engagement took place, lasting fifteen minutes. During the fight Beyers and others galloped to the river and tried to cross. They were fired on. Beyers fell from his horse, but managed to grasp by the tail another horse, and was swimming back to the Free State side. He drifted down the swollen stream, calling for help. A branch was thrown towards him, but it was of no avail. Fighting was still in progress. Soon he disappeared under water. His field-glasses and his revolver were found; also his horse, which had been killed. The body was recovered at Vliegekraal, not far from the spot where he was seen to sink. The

same day that Beyers died saw the unconditional surrender of the rebels General Wessels, N. W. Serfontein, Vancoller Bert Wesses, and Bruwer, with over 1200 men; within the next fortnight Wolmarans and John Pretorius were captured. In a manifesto on December 9 General Botha announced that "this senseless rebellion" was practically at an end, and counselled a spirit of tolerance and for-

bearance and merciful oblivion. "Our next duty", he concluded, "is to make it impossible for German South-West Africa to be again used in the future as a secure base from which to threaten the peace and liberties of the Union. I hope and trust the people will deal with this danger as energetically as they have dealt with the internal rebellion."

F. A. M.

## CHAPTER XXI

### THE TURKISH CAMPAIGN

(November–December, 1914)

Turkey's Problem—The Armenian Campaign—Turkish Atrocities—Kaiser's Gift to the Sultan—Germans among the Faithful—Von der Goltz's New Appointment—The Threatened Invasion of Egypt—Treachery of the Khedive—Revelations of the French Yellow Book—Frank Avowal of German Designs—How they were foiled by Britain—Following up our Naval and Military Successes—British Territorials, Colonials, and Indian Reinforcements in Egypt—The Khedive deposed—Egypt formally constituted a British Protectorate—Abbas Hilmi succeeded by Prince Hussein Kamel Pasha with the New Title of Sultan.

WHEN Turkey found herself dragged into the war by Germany she was faced with the difficulty of organizing a double attack by land—one across the desert against Great Britain in Egypt, the other across the towering heights of the Caucasus into Russian Caucasia. In Europe attack was possible only by way of the Black Sea, where no serious attempt at invasion on either side would be practicable until either the Russian or the Turkish fleet had been annihilated. The only other feasible way to reach Russia by land—or to deliver a flank attack on Serbia—was to march an army

through Bulgaria and so set the whole Balkans ablaze again. For the first two months of the war, however, although a Turkish army of increasing strength was massed in Thrace, the main efforts of the Turks seemed to be concentrated for the campaign against Russia in the Caucasus. Here the Russians themselves had already taken the offensive, welcoming the war as the renewal of the Crusades, from time immemorial the supreme task of Holy Russia. Naturally the Russian troops were received with open arms by the Christian population as they marched through Armenia towards Erzerum, driving back the

Turks after violent fighting at various points. In one battle, lasting three days, the Turks are reported as having left cannon, machine-guns, and many prisoners in the hands of the Russians. The main Turkish army was at Erzerum, in immense numbers but poorly equipped, and reported as seething with discontent under its German drill-sergeants and brutal officers. The chief danger upon the outbreak of war was to the Christian population at Erzerum, some 20,000 strong, whom the Turks threatened with massacre for their Russian sympathies and killed upon the slightest pretext. Here Armenians and Greeks, suspected of espionage, filled the

prisons to overflowing, and were reduced in number by being removed in batches to the streets, where they were hanged without even the pretence of a trial. Their bodies, according to refugees who escaped to Russia at the time, were allowed to remain swinging in the wind for days, while passing Turks spat upon them, forcing the Christians to do the same. These were the Kaiser's allies in the cause of German culture! The Kaiser himself commemorated the unholy alliance by presenting the Sultan with a magnificent lamp of gold and bronze to hang at Damascus in the mosque of the Sultan Selaheddin, who lives in the works of Western writers as



Photo. Underwood & Underwood

Russia's Campaign in Armenia: Kurdish cavalry mobilized to meet the Russians





The Spirit of the Crusaders: Russians at prayer before giving battle

The priest of every Russian regiment blesses the troops before they give battle to the enemy. In the scene depicted above a service is being held in a barn, the soldiers unable to find room listening outside to the service

the famous Saladin—the Bayard of Moslem chivalry, whose inviolable fidelity to treaties, if remembered by William II in sending his gift to the Sultan, should have put him to shame.

No stone was left unturned by the Germans in their eagerness to curry Turkish favour. It was true, as Sir Louis Mallet wrote to Sir Edward Grey on November 20, “that they could at any moment force Turkey to march with them, but to do so before every means of suasion had proved useless would obviously not have been politic”. All the Turkish newspapers in Constantinople—as in every other part of the world where German agents and German gold could suborn the press—became Teu-

tonic organs, glorifying every real or imaginary success of Germany or Austria; minimizing, or ignoring altogether, everything favourable to their enemies. Thus William II became the monarch whom “Pan-Islamic pro-Germans”, as the British Ambassador described the war-party in Turkey, acclaimed as the hope of Islam, and whom the devout in some places had been taught to regard as hardly distinguishable from a true believer. German agents and officers in the Sultan’s dominions went the length of proclaiming themselves as followers of the Prophet, entering the mosques with the Faithful, and performing a pretence of prayer, while German sentinels stood on guard outside.

Rumour presently had it, however, that all was not well with the Turco-Germanic alliance; that the Turkish officers resented the domineering methods of General Liman von Sandars; and that the army was becoming restive under the rigours of German rule. Colour was lent to these reports by the arrival in Constantinople in December of Field-Marshal von der Goltz, who, as Goltz Pasha, had superintended the training of the Turkish army before the last Balkan War, and was more tactful in his methods than were some of his compatriots. The Field-Marshal was succeeded as Governor of Belgium by Cavalry-General von Bissing.

Meantime both Turkey and Germany were realizing that their threatened invasion of Egypt was not quite the simple enterprise they had imagined, the British Government having quietly foiled their intrigues and guarded against every possible form of attack. The White Papers containing the correspondence leading up to this rupture, and Sir Louis Mallet's supplementary dispatch, published by the British Government, revealed the treachery of the Khedive, besides confirming in detail all that has been written in an earlier chapter of the cunning and mendacity of the Turks and the arrogance of their unscrupulous masters from Germany. That the Khedive had lent a not unwilling ear to the German whispers of golden rewards if he threw off the British yoke was widely suspected, and his presence in Constantinople when the war broke out was not without significance. Before the final rupture with



Russian "Tommies" in camp: listening to a comrade's yarns

Turkey he wished to return to Cairo, but the British Government declined to permit him to do so. The early rumour that he was preparing to take part in the threatened invasion of Egypt was confirmed in Sir Louis Mallet's dispatch of November 20, 1914, summarizing the events which led to the declaration of war. Referring to the preparations in Syria for the invasion of Egypt, the British Ambassador wrote:

"Emissaries of Enver Pasha were present on the frontier, bribing and organizing the Bedouins. Warlike stores were dispatched south, and battalions of regular troops were posted at Rafah, while the Syrian and Mosul army corps were held in readiness to move south at short notice. The Syrian towns

were full of German officers, who were provided with large sums of money for suborning the local chiefs. . . . Under directions from the Central Government, the civil authorities of the Syrian coast towns removed all their archives and ready money to the interior, and Moslem families were warned to leave in order to avoid the consequences of bombardment by the British fleet. The Khedive himself was a party to this conspiracy, and arrangements were actually made with the German Embassy for his presence with a military expedition across the frontier".

The Khedive, however, seemed in no hurry to leave Constantinople. He was present at the state opening of the Turkish Parliament on December 15, when the Sultan, in his speech, uttered his shameless travesty of the

facts which had led to Turkey's participation in the war:

"While our Government was firmly resolved to observe the strictest neutrality", he declared, among other amazing falsehoods, "our fleet was attacked in the Black Sea by the Russian fleet".

It is proved by Sir Louis Mallet beyond a shadow of a doubt that the actual order for the unprovoked attack on Odessa and other Russian ports in the Black Sea was given by the German admiral, as the result of a conspiracy hatched between the Turco-Germanic dictators in Constantinople. Germany was tiring of Turkish procrastination, and under the stress of events in the main theatre of war a diversion in the Near East had become a vital necessity. The hour had struck when all the secret plotting and scheming elucidated in the secret report of the German Government, dated March 19, 1913, and published for the first time in the French Yellow Book, four months after the outbreak of war, were to be put to the test:

"We must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that we should open up relations, by means of well-chosen organizations, with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case of a European War. Of course in case of war we should openly recognize these secret allies; and on the conclusion of peace we should secure to them the advantages which they had gained. . . . Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to be carefully prepared and by material means. They must break out simultaneously with



The Terror of the Turks: a Russian Cossack



# BLACK SEA BOSPHORUS AND DARDANELLES

English Miles  
0 20 40 60 80 100

Fortified Towns





the destruction of the means of communication; they must have a controlling head to be found among the influential leaders, religious or political. The Egyptian School is particularly suited to this purpose; more and more it serves as a bond between the intellectuals of the Mohammedan World."

Obviously the leader to aim at in Egypt was the Khedive himself, Abbas

the throne by the death of his father, Tewfik Pasha, in 1892. In 1905 he was a guest of King Edward at Windsor Castle, where, also, seven years later, he was received by King George; and the world at large regarded him as reconciled to his position as titular ruler of a country which owed its recovery from ruin and deso-



The Campaign in the Caucasus: how Russian transports travel over the snow

Hilmi—great-great-grandson of Mehemet Ali, the first of the dynasty—who was known to be both impulsive and ambitious. Abbas had proved troublesome on more than one conspicuous occasion, but the dominating influence of such great pro-consuls as Lord Cromer and Lord Kitchener kept him in order, while the unmistakable blessings of British rule to Egypt robbed him of any cause to complain for his country's sake. It is worth remembering that he received his education in Austria, where he was completing a college course, at the age of eighteen, when summoned to

lation to the protection and thriving influences of Great Britain. In reality, however, he was in favour of the pro-Turkish "Nationalist" party which arose out of the Turkish Revolution of 1908, and was surreptitiously supported by Germany; and the relations between Abbas and the British agent had been frequently strained in recent years. In particular he had been furious, according to well-informed accounts, at Lord Kitchener's refusal to allow him to sell the Maruit railway, over which he held hereditary rights, to a German syndicate. What sum the Germans were offering for the line



was not stated, but Abbas was enraged at being unable to complete the bargain. It was pointed out to him that in view of the strategic value of the railway in question any purchase of the kind would on no account be sanctioned, the upshot of the affair being that the Egyptian Government bought it instead. Viewed in the light of subsequent events there is little doubt that the whole proceedings formed part of Germany's secret campaign to undermine British rule in Egypt, and to strengthen Turkey's striking power in that direction by means of railways and other concessions wherever possible.

In his Cambridge lectures on *The Origins of the War*—published by the Cambridge University Press—Dr. Holland Rose showed how Germany's

concessions from the Sultan regarding Alexandretta had made that port for all practical purposes a German stronghold, and how the permission to build a branch line to Damascus, and on past the east of the Dead Sea and the Sinai Peninsula to Mecca—thus bringing it almost within striking distance of the Suez Canal—was intended to menace Egypt while ostensibly planned to mitigate the hardships of the pilgrims' journey to Mecca. This menace was frankly avowed by Dr. Rohrbach in his book on the Bagdad railway<sup>1</sup> in a striking passage of which Dr. Holland Rose gives the following translation:—

"England can be attacked and mortally wounded by land from Europe only in one place—Egypt. The loss of Egypt would

<sup>1</sup> *Die Bagdadbahn*, 2nd edition, 1911.



Photo. Bourne & Shepherd

Indian Troops for Egypt—and elsewhere: embarking the horses at Bombay



Famous Fighting Men from India: Gurkhas in campaigning kit

mean for England not only the end of her dominion over the Suez Canal, and of her connections with India and the Far East, but would probably entail the loss of her possessions in Central and East Africa. The conquest of Egypt by a Mohammedan Power, like Turkey, would also imperil England's hold over her 60,000,000 Mohammedan subjects in India, besides prejudicing her relations with Afghanistan and Persia. Turkey, however, can never dream of recovering Egypt until she is mistress of a developed railway system in Asia Minor and Syria, and until, through the progress of the Anatolian Railway to Bagdad, she is in a position to withstand an attack by England upon Mesopotamia. . . . Egypt is a prize which for Turkey would be well worth the risk of taking sides with Germany in a war with England. The policy of protecting Turkey, which is now pursued by Germany, has no object but the desire to effect an insurance against the danger of a war with England."

That was written three years before the Great War, and was afterwards confirmed by Bernhardt in his insolent book on *Great Britain as Germany's*

*Vassal*, in which he declared that it was of vital importance to the Austro-German alliance "to preserve Turkey, and make her powerful and efficient". Unfortunately for the success of most of these schemes the British Government was fully prepared to deal with them in the right way and at the right moment. The sledge-hammer blows which sent the Germanized Turkish troops reeling from the Persian Gulf, Akaba, and elsewhere, as already described, brought about the complete discomfiture of the German agents who had loudly proclaimed the impotence of the British army. Following up their triumph at Basra, the Indian Expeditionary Force, the objects of which included the safeguarding of the new Admiralty oilfields in Persia, and the release of the Arabs of the Persian



The dreaded Kukri Knife of the Gurkhas

Gulf from Turkish domination, captured the town of Kurnah on December 9, when Subhi Bey, the late Governor of Basra, and commanding the Turkish forces at Kurnah, surrendered unconditionally with his troops. The navy again played its

country from the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates to the sea—a hundred miles away—comprising the richest part of that fertile delta. Our casualties during these operations amounted to one British officer killed and three wounded, and about forty Indian rank and file killed and 120 wounded.

The arrival in Egypt during the same month, not only of formidable armies of British Territorials and Indian troops, all burning to share some of the glories of the war, but also of the Australian and New Zealand contingents, admirably equipped and equally enthusiastic, upset many other calculations of the enemy, apart from the failure to shake the loyalty of the Egyptian army itself. The Australians and New Zealanders—28,000 in all—were on their way to the Motherland to complete their training before joining the fighting force under Sir John French on the Continent, but cheerfully disembarked in order to complete their training in Egypt instead, and meantime be ready, if need be, to give the Turks a taste of their mettle. Turkey's only attack on Egypt during the first month of her war, however, was a small affair of outposts against the Bikanir Camel Corps, in which the camelry fought well and killed a number of the enemy. The hostile camps at Gatia and Bir el Nusa were broken up, and British aeroplanes, constantly passing over the Sinai Peninsula in the early weeks of December, found no trace of the threatened invasion. While a great army was reported to be assembling for this purpose in Syria, with Da-



Changing Guard outside the Governor's Palace, Cairo

part in this smart little affair, taking armed steamers farther up the Shatt-al-Arab for the operations which led to the capture both of Kurnah and of Masera—immediately opposite, on the left bank of the Tigris. By this success, which was achieved under the command of Brigadier-General Fry, 1000 prisoners, exclusive of wounded, and nine guns, fell into our hands, and Britain secured the control of the



mascus as headquarters, and countless German officers to organize it, Sir John Maxwell, commanding the forces in Egypt, declared that everything was ready for the defence of the country; and any tendencies to yield to Turco-Germanic temptations among certain suspected Egyptians were suppressed on the prompt arrival of the reinforcements. The British Government's wise decision to guarantee Egyptian Treasury Bonds to the extent of £E5,000,000 also helped to convert those waverers who had listened to the lies of the Teutonic intriguers. Rushi Pasha, the President of the Council of Ministers, proved his steadfast loyalty from the beginning, and was rewarded in December with the K.C.M.G. "Egypt", he declared, "needed the protection of a Great Power to enable her to work out her destiny"; and by deeds, as well as words, he displayed his conviction that Great Britain, which had already done

so much for the country, was the one Power above all others that could afford them that protection. Doubt on the subject was set at rest by the historic announcement made on December 17, 1914:

"His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gives notice that, in view of the state of war arising out of the action of Turkey, Egypt is placed under the protection of His Majesty and will henceforth constitute a British Protectorate. The suzerainty of Turkey over Egypt is thus terminated and His Majesty's Government will adopt all measures necessary for the defence of Egypt and the protection of its inhabitants and interests."

At the same time Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Arthur H. McMahon, who had crowned a distinguished career in India by his appointment in 1911 as Foreign Secretary to the Indian Government, was announced as His Majesty's High Commissioner for the



In the new Sultan's Capital: Egyptian troops on guard outside the Governor's Palace, Cairo

new Protectorate. The nominal suzerainty thus terminated had lasted since 1882, when Great Britain suppressed the revolt of Arabi Pasha, and restored the authority of the Khedive. At the beginning of the Great War of 1914 Great Britain made it clear to the Turkish Government, in the words of Sir Edward Grey, that "if Turkey remains neutral and Egypt remains quiet, and should no unforeseen circumstances arise, His Majesty's Government do not propose to alter the status of Egypt". By her own acts Turkey lost her last foothold in Africa, and closed a chapter of her history which had lasted four hundred years. In opening the new chapter for Egypt the British Government formally deposed Abbas II—or Abbas Hilmi Pasha, as he was officially called—and appointed as his successor his uncle, Prince Hussein Kamel Pasha, with the new title of Sultan of Egypt:

"His Majesty's Government", wrote the Acting High Commissioner in Egypt, in informing His Highness of his elevation to the Sultanate, "are in possession of ample evidence that ever since the war with Germany His Highness, Abbas Hilmi Pasha, has definitely thrown in his lot with His Majesty's enemies. . . . His Majesty's Government have decided that Great Britain can best fulfil the responsibilities she has incurred towards Egypt by the formal declaration of a British Protectorate, and by the government of the country under such protectorate by a Prince of the Khedivial family. In these circumstances I am instructed by His Majesty's Government to inform Your Highness that, by reason of your age and experience, you have been chosen as the Prince of the family of Mehemet Ali, most worthy to

occupy the Khedivial position, with the title and style of the Sultan of Egypt."

Hussein I, as he is now styled, made his ceremonial entry into the Abdin Palace at Cairo on December 21 amid the general rejoicing of the populace, passing along a route lined by troops from near and distant parts of that empire with which Egypt had just been formally incorporated—Australians, New Zealanders, the Ceylon Planters' Corps, and the East Lancashire Territorials—as well as by long lines of Egyptians. In his Rescript to his Premier the Sultan declared that he had decided to accept the offer made to him by the British Government "as a duty to Egypt and to my glorious ancestor, the great Mehemet Ali, whose dynasty we



Sir Francis Wingate, Sirdar of Egypt  
(From a photograph by F. A. Swaine)



Prince Hussein Kamel Pasha, the new Sultan of Egypt  
(From a photograph by Dittrich, Cairo)

desire to perpetuate", the succession to the Sultanate, it was announced, being hereditarily vested in that dynasty "according to a line to be laid down later". The following historic telegrams were exchanged between King George and Hussein I on the occasion of the state entry of the Sultan upon his new office. The King to His Highness the Sultan of Egypt:—

"On the occasion when Your Highness enters upon your high office I desire to convey to Your Highness the expression of my most sincere friendship and the assurance of my unflinching support in safeguarding the integrity of Egypt and in securing her future well-being and prosperity. Your Highness has been called upon to undertake the responsibilities of your high office at a grave crisis in the national life of Egypt, and I feel convinced

that you will be able, with the co-operation of your Ministers and the Protectorate of Great Britain, successfully to overcome all the influences which are seeking to destroy the independence of Egypt and the wealth, liberty, and happiness of its people.

"GEORGE R. AND I."

The Sultan telegraphed the following reply:—

"To His Majesty the King, London.

"I present to Your Majesty the expression of my deepest gratitude for the feelings of friendship with which you see fit to honour me and for the assurance of your valuable support in safeguarding the integrity and independence of Egypt. Conscious of the responsibilities I have just assumed, and resolved to devote myself, in entire co-operation with the Protectorate, to the progress and welfare of my people, I am happy to be able to count in this task on Your Majesty's protection and on the assistance of Your Government.

"HUSSEIN KAMEL."

The new Sultan was born on November 21, 1853, the younger son of the Khedive Ismail, and brother of Ismail's successor, Tewfik. A varied experience in the administration of the country admirably fitted him for the high office to which he was now called, though for some time previously differences of opinion with his designing nephew had caused him to retire from politics and devote his attention to agriculture. He had long enjoyed the confidence of Great Britain as well as the respect and affection of all classes of Egyptians, among whom, with few exceptions, the new regime was welcomed with the keenest satisfaction. Not the least gratifying





Are we ill-treated? German prisoners in Britain on fatigue duty—a photograph at Frimley encampment

tribute to British rule was the undivided allegiance of the Egyptian Ministry. All through the crisis in the early stages of the war Hussein Rushdi Pasha and his colleagues, though still nominally holding office under the Khedive as the vassal of Turkey, kept in view the true interests of Egypt and the Egyptians, and never hesitated in their loyal co-operation with the British when convinced of Abbas Hilmi's betrayal. The best

proof of Egyptian progress, it was pointed out, was to compare the condition of the country before and after the British occupation; and it was felt that with the final relief from what Lord Cromer described as "the pernicious mortmain of Turkish sovereignty" there was nothing to prevent Egypt from taking her rightful place among the foremost of Oriental nations.

F. A. M.









